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Abstract 
 
 When civil wars are resolved via negotiated settlement, peace-agreement 
provisions like power-sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees often are 
advocated for their purported benefits of ensuring a long-lasting and durable peace. 
Although scholars have explored the effects of peace-agreement provisions on enhancing 
the security of states, their influence on shaping individual security outcomes is largely 
unknown. The strong potential exists that these same provisions that improve a 
government’s ability to deter future violence also increase that government’s violation of 
its citizens’ physical integrity rights as a means of coercion and governance. Also rare in 
the power-sharing literature is exploration of the effects of individual, disaggregated 
provisions. 
This dissertation, therefore, asks: Under what conditions do peace-agreement 
provisions significantly improve the state’s protection of its citizens’ physical integrity 
rights? Two models are proposed. Model 1 considers aggregated power-sharing 
provisions. Model 2 considers disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, and includes 
both power-sharing agreements and robust third-party security guarantees.  
Both models are evaluated in light of the situational and historical contexts 
relevant to each state’s civil war experience. The universe of cases includes thirty-six 
civil wars in twenty-seven states where conflict terminated between 1989-2007 via 
negotiated settlement. This project leverages a mixed-method research design, including 
 iii 
contingency tables and fuzzy-set Quantitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to resolve 
the “small number of cases, multiple variables” challenge and to account for causal 
complexity. 
Four central claims are advanced in this dissertation: First, the common technique 
of evaluating peace-agreement provisions by aggregating them according to common 
political, military, and territorial dimensions obscures and misleads scholars; the 
disaggregation of peace-agreement provisions reveals how measures often act in 
opposition. Second, a number of commonly present provisions—including integration of 
rebels into the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy—are 
consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war ends. Third, other provisions 
such as robust third-party security guarantees and the granting of territorial federalism 
consistently lead to a reduction in the level of political repression used by states after 
civil war has ended. Fourth, significant human-rights improvement results from favorable 
causal recipes (i.e., combinations of disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both 
the motivation and opportunity of a government to repress.  
These findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as 
they (1) identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving 
different civil wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both 
assure its population and to deter future violence.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Civil wars are brutal. Cruel cousins of death, disease, and displacement afflict 
citizens in states undergoing such turmoil. However, all civil wars eventually come to an 
end. Four prominent pathways exist for their termination. War may end in military 
victory by rebels, in military victory by the government, in a ceasefire/stalemate, or in a 
negotiated settlement (Toft 2010).1 The pathway to war termination reliably determines 
the duration of peace that follows a war. Civil wars ending in military victory—especially 
rebel victory—result in more durable, long-lasting peace than wars that end in negotiated 
settlements (Toft 2009).2  
Civil wars also witness gross violations of fundamental human rights. 
Governments are particularly culpable of violating these rights, committing various acts 
of political repression both during and after a war, as a means of establishing social 
control (Saideman and Zahar 2008; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986). A prominent form of 
political repression is the government’s violation of the physical-integrity rights of 
individuals through actions such as state-sanctioned torture, disappearances, 
imprisonment, or extrajudicial killings. Contemporary literature does not cover the effects 
of war termination pathways on political repression in its various forms. What is known 
                                                 
1 Cease-fires/stalemates are rare, compared to the other civil war termination types. 
 
2 Toft (2010) corroborated these findings in a later study that showed conflicts ending in military victory 
from 1940 to 2000 were almost twice as likely as negotiated settlements to remain settled for five years (i.e. 
no civil war recurrence during that time period). Also see Licklider (1995) who concluded that outright 
military victories are more effective than negotiated settlements in resolving civil wars in that they 
comparatively increase the length of time until civil war recurs. 
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with respect to war termination and human rights writ large, is that wars ending in 
government or rebel military victory are more likely than negotiated settlements to result 
in acts of genocide and mass killings after a conflict formally ends (Harff 2003; Licklider 
1995).3  
This dissertation is about political repression, principally in the form of violations 
against physical integrity rights and as carried out by a government or its agents 
following a civil war. Given the strong empirical finding that the presence of a civil war 
results in increased political repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), 
the inverse also should hold true: The absence of civil war should result in decreased 
political repression. That is, once a civil war has ended, then government respect for the 
physical-integrity rights of its citizens should improve.  
Yet this finding did not hold true across all the cases in this study. Often the level 
of political repression had remained unchanged or even had become worse after their 
civil wars ended, even if the type of conflict-termination had held constant. A brief 
review of the conflicts that ended in negotiated settlements since 1989 demonstrated a 
broad range of experience. Two years after their respective civil wars had ended, the 
violation of physical integrity rights by respective governments had: (1) increased in 
Chad and Rwanda; (2) remained unchanged in Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Nicaragua, and South Africa; and (3) decreased significantly in Guinea 
Bissau, Moldova, and Liberia (following its second and third civil wars). 
What explains this broad range of experiences despite the end of civil war? If the 
principal driver for political repression had ended, why did political repression remain at 
                                                 
3 This effect is evident primarily in identity-based conflicts.  
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the same level or become worse in some states while the level of repression decreased 
significantly in others? One method for addressing this question is to compare the effects 
that each of the four types of war termination had on political repression. A second 
method is to focus on civil wars that ended in negotiated settlements. This dissertation 
takes the latter approach, based on the following two factors: 
First, while military victory appeared to guarantee more enduring peace than 
negotiated settlements, the termination method of ending civil war via peace agreements 
became a more common termination pathway. The end of the Cold War demarcated this 
transition: In the fifty years preceding the transition (1940-1990), only 20 percent of civil 
wars were resolved with negotiated settlements (Walter 1997, 335). In the 1990s, almost 
three times as many conflicts (54% of all civil wars)4 ended in negotiated settlements 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 10).5 This trend continued unabated into the twenty-first 
century, with fifteen of nineteen civil wars (79%) ending with power-sharing agreements 
in negotiated settlements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015). 
Second, this selection confronted a difficult conundrum head on: The manifold 
expansion of, and preference for, negotiated settlements was rebuffed by the reality that 
this method of civil war termination also had led to the quickest recurrence of civil war. 
This finding was unsettling. Indeed, it drove Toft to question whether some natural 
characteristic of negotiated settlements had caused them to “reignite more often than 
                                                 
4 This trend holds true even with changes in the civil war dataset. Toft (2010, 6) for example, alternatively 
assessed that just seven of 68 civil wars (10 percent) ended in negotiated settlements between 1940-1989. 
In contrast, she found that 15 of the 37 civil wars (41 percent) ending in the 1990s concluded via negotiated 
settlements; of the remaining conflicts, 15 conflicted in military victory and seven concluded by cease-
fire/stalemate. This represented a four-fold increase in the presence of negotiated settlements. 
 
5 The remaining civil wars were resolved equally by either military victories or ceasefires/stalemates 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 10).  
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military victories” (Toft 2009, 151) and to investigate what potential factors might have 
changed the anticipated outcome. Toft concluded that the presence of security-sector 
reform had increased peace duration, while the presence of third-party security 
guarantees had meant civil war was more likely to recur.  
What are the effects, though, of third-party security guarantees and military pacts 
(the operationalized version of Toft’s security-sector reform) on political repression? Do 
guarantees both aggravate civil war recurrence and also lead to worse human-rights 
violations? Do military pacts both improve peace duration and enhance government 
recognition of human rights? What if these recommended measures—or other commonly 
advocated peace-agreement provisions—improve peace duration but intensify the 
government’s violations of physical integrity rights?  
Framing the Primary Research Question 
These questions matter significantly to a host of actors, including the government 
and opposition group(s) who were fighting, as well as those representatives and third 
parties involved in peace negotiations. Conventional thinking about negotiated 
settlements is unprepared to address these issues, due to an overemphasis on the 
dependent variable of peace duration. Under this approach, success in negotiated 
settelements is based on whether conflict recurs in a given time period.6  
                                                 
6 Most scholars proxy enduring peace, understood as the absence of civil war, by measuring the number of 
months or years until civil war recurs. The common standard then for measuring the success of different 
negotiated settlements is based on whether the state relapsed into civil war within a given time period. By 
definition, civil war recurrence is triggered when the number of deaths within a state surpasses Small & 
Singer’s (1982) threshold of 1,000 deaths within one year. 
 
   5 
This dissertation contends that the traditional method of defining success based on 
civil war recurrence is a suboptimal approach overall, for “Peace is not just the absence 
of war but the creation of all the conditions which enable man to live without anxiety or 
fear" (Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights 1994). Protection from large-scale 
violence is an important component of peace. But it is not the only component of peace. 
The traditional approach fails to account for whether citizens live in constant anxiety and 
fear of their government after the war. It emphasizes the government’s ability to deter 
civil war while ignoring the government’s ability to assure its own population that it will 
not personally threaten their well being after conflict has ended.7  
Practically speaking, this means that advocacy for the inclusion of certain peace-
agreement measures in a negotiated settlement is principally related to their known 
effects on civil war recurrence; how they influence human rights is unknown. Ignorance 
of this carries great policy risks. Consider, for example, contemporary Iraq, which 
embodies this aforementioned challenge found in civil wars ofrebuilding a government 
that is both strong enough to protect and deter large-scale violence, and that also assures 
the population it will not use this same power to threaten or harm them. As one scholar 
recently explained: “The fundamental problem in Iraq now is not that the government did 
not have enough coercive capability but that the governors were using that capability 
against the Sunnis . . . [who] have now opted for the Islamic State” (Saideman 2014).  
Given the relevance of this topic to current civil wars in Iraq and Syria and the 
general dearth of empirical literature on the matter, this project asks: Under what 
                                                 
7 For more on this discussion about the need for governments to balance deterrence and assurance, see 
Chapter 2, as well as Saideman & Zahar (2008). 
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conditions do peace-agreement provisions significantly improve the state’s protection of 
its citizens’ physical integrity rights? Throughout this dissertation, a state’s violation of 
its citizen’s physical integrity rights is referred to in shorthand as political repression.  
Likewise a reduction in such violations is at times called less political repression or 
human rights improvement.8 For economy of explanation herein, these terms are used 
interchangeably throughout the dissertation—with the caveat and direct acknowledgment 
up front that the violation of physical integrity rights is but one form of political 
repression (albeit a prominent, important form, as detailed in Chapter 2) and that other 
types of human rights exist (as do various violations of them).9 
Negotiated Settlements and Peace-Agreement Provisions 
Negotiated settlements occur when civil war belligerents (i.e., contending 
government and rebel groups) initiate contractual guarantees (Toft 2009), which detail 
how power will be distributed or shared after a conflict. These guarantees are commonly 
referred to as power-sharing agreements, or arrangements.10 An established method of 
comparing negotiated settlements is evaluating the various power-sharing agreements 
between the government and the rebel group(s); these agreements are the “basic level” 
(Goertz 2006, 6) or general concept of interest.  
                                                 
8 Another way then of stating this main question is: Under what conditions do peace agreements 
significantly improve human rights? 
 
9 Chapter two describes these other forms and types in more detail. 
 
10 Technically, when the term “power sharing” is used throughout this work, it refers to both power-sharing 
and power-dividing mechanisms. Hoddie and Hartzell (2015, 40-41) argued the rationale for this best, 
stating “the power-sharing and power-dividing mechanisms that we analyze share a common emphasis on 
the distribution of authority—through the sharing and the dividing of power—among former rivals in the 
context of the postwar state.” The approach of using this single term also follows the coding and theoretical 
arguments of previous power-sharing agreement research (DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 2009; Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2003b, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 1997, 2002).  
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Power-sharing agreements, a subset of peace-agreement provisions, are 
commonly categorized and evaluated in the empirical literature based on political, 
military, economic, and/or territorial dimensions (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2003a, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002). This categorization 
means that scholars typically evaluate the basic level, general concept of power-sharing 
agreements by using the “constitutive dimensions” of that concept (Goertz 2006, 6). But 
none of the power-sharing dimensions is a distinct measure persay. Rather, these 
constitutive dimensions are an aggregation of several specific peace-agreement 
provisions included in a negotiated settlement (see Figure 1 below). The provisions 
represent a third level of indicators, or data (Goertz 2006). They provide the substantive 
content that collectively makes up a given dimension. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
each of these provisions can have quite divergent effects on the outcome of interest.  
 
Figure 1: Basic, Secondary, and Indicator Levels of Power-Sharing Agreements 
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A core argument of this dissertation, then, is that disaggregated, individual 
provisions (as shown in this third-level) provide more consistent, useful findings with 
respect to the effects of power-sharing agreements on political repression than by using 
an approach based on aggregated dimensions. Thus, this dissertation is organized around 
comparing the following two models that I devised based on arguments and theories 
found in peace-agreement literature. Model 1 is based on the common approach within 
the field of using aggregated dimensions of power-sharing agreements. Model 2 is based 
on disaggregated provisions within negotiated settlements, and also includes the 
individual provision of third-party security guarantees.11  
The Aggregated Dimensions Approach 
A central argument of this dissertation is that the aggregated approach to 
evaluating power-sharing agreements by their respective dimensions is insufficient and 
potentially misleading. To demonstrate this, this study examined the key arguments about 
aggregated power-sharing dimensions to see if they also obtained when an outcome had 
shifted from enduring peace to significant human-rights improvement as measured in 
terms of political repression. Thus, this research sought to confirm or disconfirm the 
various power-sharing theories as they apply to the alternative outcome of government 
respect for physical-integrity rights.  
Advocates uphold power-sharing agreements as an ideal solution for civil wars, 
given their purposeful design and orientation toward resolving three paramount security-
                                                 
11 This measure is included given strong theoretical arguments (Walter 1997, 1999, 2002) that the presence 
of security guarantees helps resolve the critical problem of credible commitment, which in turn allows 
other provisions to have greater impact. Other scholars consider such guarantees non-essential as long as 
economic development is strong (DeRouen et al. 2010; Taydas and Peksen 2012) or as long as certain 
power-sharing dimensions are included (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). 
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related concerns within such conflicts: (1) the threat and use of coercive force by a 
government against rebels, which some scholars contend is resolved with military power-
sharing agreements; (2) the appropriate distribution of political power, which other 
scholars consider best resolved via political power-sharing agreements; and (3) the 
appropriate distribution of physical resources, which some scholars argue is best resolved 
with economic and territorial power-sharing arrangements (Hartzell 1999). Two main 
advocacy camps have arisen from differences over these dimensions: (1) Some scholars 
argue that all power-sharing dimensions matter for the prevention of civil war recurrence, 
while (2) others suggest that only some dimensions matter. 
In the first camp, several scholars (Hartzell 1999, 4; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 
2007) contended that extensively institutionalized settlements matter most. From this 
view, the more dimensions of power sharing that are present, the better; that is, the 
different political, military, territorial, and economic dimensions reinforce each other. For 
simplicity, this is called the more is better approach. In this project, the condition of 
extensively institutionalized settlements tested whether the presence of more power-
sharing dimensions reinforces improvement in the human-rights outcome.  
Scholars in the second advocacy camp maintain that certain thick, individual 
dimensions matter more to durable peace. The foundational assumption here is that “The 
reinforcing effect of particular provisions within one dimension should be even more 
pronounced than the reinforcing effect across dimensions” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 748). 
In practice, scholars in this second camp do not agree on which thick dimensions matter 
more though. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) contended, for example, that military and 
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territorial power-sharing agreements serve as costly signals, due to substantial economic 
and logistical implementation costs. As a result, they increase the duration of peace. In 
contrast, Mattes and Savun’s (2009, 748) empirical research supported the argument that 
each additional provision of political power-sharing reduces the risk of civil war 
recurrence. This second camp might be summarized as the more of some (dimensions) is 
better approach.  
For this study, I used three different conditions to evaluate this theoretical 
argument. The first condition of a territorial power-sharing agreement tested the 
argument that the presence of either form of territorial power-sharing agreement (whether 
autonomy or federalism) leads to improvement in human-rights outcomes. This measure 
cannot be assessed in terms of thickness, given that an agreement will only contain a 
provision for autonomy, or for federalism, but never both. In contrast, I assessed the 
second condition thick political settlements and third condition thick military settlements 
based on whether the thickness of the respective condition (i.e., dimension) mattered, as 
claimed by Mattes and Savun (2009).  
An alternate view to these two advocacy camps is that power-sharing agreements 
ultimately undermine human security and elevate the risk of fractured peace (Horowitz 
1985; Mehler 2009; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Sisk 2013; Sriram 2008; Sriram and 
Zahar 2009). This perspective is abbreviated as the less is better approach. No further 
conditions were added for assessing this perspective, however, since it is examined by the 
negation of the previous arguments.  
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In summary, to evaluate these different theoretical arguments, I proposed four 
aggregated dimension-based conditions in application to the outcome of human rights. 
These include extensively institutionalized settlements, the presence (or absence) of a 
territorial power-sharing agreement, thick political settlements, and thick military 
settlements.12 Figure 2 (below) summarizes the theories, associated scholars, and Set 1 
proximate conditions that test these theories. 
 
Figure 2: Set 1 Proximate Conditions That Test Power-Sharing Theories 
The Disaggregated Provisions Approach 
An alternate approach to studying negotiated settlements by looking at aggregated 
power-sharing dimensions is to evaluate the disaggregated peace-agreement provisions. 
This approach may be more accurate since power-sharing measures within the same 
political, military, or territorial dimension are anticipated to have very different efects on 
human-rights outcomes. Aggregating these measures by dimension muddles the variance, 
with the potential risk of misguiding policymakers into relying on such analyses. While 
this study focused on the outcome of political repression, one strong implication on 
                                                 
12 The specific definitions and operationalizations for these conditions are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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where a claim that disaggregated provision had divergent effects was accurate, then 
previous findings on power-sharing provisions vis-a-vis their effects on peace duration 
should be re-examined. 
This study considered seven specific disaggregated provisions found within the 
aggregated political, military, and territorial power-sharing dimensions (recall Figure 1 
above). I operationalized the aggregated dimensions, and the respective provisions within 
each, following prior scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a, 2015; Mattes and Savun 
2009), who defined them, in brief, as follows: 
Political power-sharing agreements involve the proportional distribution of 
political power in the central government, which means that prior belligerents “are 
guaranteed a degree of representation within governing institutions based on their group 
affiliation” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 41). Three principal provisions are used here, 
including guarantees of proportional representation in legislative branch elections, in a 
certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts in the executive branch, and in the 
government’s civil service.  
Military power-sharing agreements emphasize the proportional distribution of 
power within a state’s coercive apparatus (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 42). The most 
common provision employed in peace agreements is the integration of disputing parties 
into a state’s joint defense force. An alternate provision is the guarantee of key leadership 
positions in that joint defense force to prior rebels.  
Finally, territorial power-sharing agreements decentralize government authority 
and redistribute political influence based on territory (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 42). 
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Two provisions used here include the allocation of separate powers to sub-state units 
(federalism) or the granting of authority on local issues in a certain region to a prior rebel 
group (autonomy) (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a; Mattes and Savun 2009).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, I excluded the economic power-sharing dimension 
(both in the aggregated and disaggregated) for two reasons: (1) This measure is rarely 
used in peace agreements; its rarity makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness. (2) A 
number of studies have examined wealth-sharing in post-conflict situations, but none 
found any statistically significant effects on the measured outcome of peace duration 
(Binningsbø and Rustad 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009). 
Peace agreements also may include a provision for third-party security 
guarantees. These guarantees are distinct, yet potentially supplemental to power-sharing 
provisions; their inclusion likely affects whether or not such provisions reduce the level 
of political repression. As Walter (1997, 1999, 2002) demonstrated, third-party security 
guarantees help prior belligerents to overcome credible commitment challenges that are 
inherent in civil wars resolved by negotiated settlement. Third parties theoretically 
increase compliance with a peace agreement by mitigating the weaker side’s fears that the 
opposition might cheat them in moments of critical vulnerability, such as during times of 
demobilization or disarmament. Under this logic, third-party security guarantees help 
prevent defections from an agreement, allowing all parties to credibly commit to the 
settlement terms. In contrast to Toft’s (2009) negative findings, my expectation for this 
research was that third-party guarantees do prevent violations of an agreement, including 
a government’s use of political repression. In particular, robust third-party security 
   14 
guarantees (i.e., those with a mandate to use force and sufficient force on the ground to 
back up that mandate) will lead to less political repression. 
Organizing the Approaches into Two Models for Examination 
A central tenet of this dissertation is that when the arguments of power-sharing 
advocates and of groups opposed to power-sharing are considered in relation to the 
outcome of political repression following civil war, neither of these groups is wholly 
correct nor are their approaches pragmatically useful to policymakers. Definitive 
guidance for policymakers is difficult because the aggregated, dimension-based approach 
used by most researchers to evaluate power-sharing agreements obscures the divergent 
effects of individual provisions. Analysis using the aggregated approach will show that 
the inclusion of more power-sharing dimensions is not better; the dimensions do not 
appear to positively reinforce each other. Second, less power sharing is often better; the 
military dimension in particular consistently lead to worse human-rights outcomes.  
A corollary argument of this dissertation is that the disaggregation of peace-
agreement provisions is necessary for understanding the effects of such provisions on 
human-rights outcomes. Furthermore, these individual provisions interact within a variety 
of situational and historical contexts that shape and constrain how much they will affect 
the level of political repression. A complex approach to causality is needed, one that 
accounts for and considers which causal combinations consistently reduce the likelihood 
that a government will choose to repress. 
Causal recipes involve combinations of conditions from different categories. To 
aid in classifying conditions, I drew from Schneider and Wagemann (2006) who 
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concluded that, with complex social phenomena, conditions are often clearly divisible 
into two main categories which they call proximate factors and remote factors. According 
to the authors’ construct, proximate factors are evidenced by their variance over time and 
by their recent origins. Proximate factors are manipulable conditions that result from 
human actions (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760). Proximate factors do not operate in 
isolation. Rather, they unfold in combination with remote factors, which capture the more 
constant, stable factors that reside largely outside the influence of actors (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2006, 2012), including: underlying conditions, historical legacies, and 
contexts that alternately constrain or enable a desired outcome.  
Accounting for Situational and Historical Contexts  
In this study, proximate factors included mechanisms like power-sharing 
agreements that represent intentional efforts by actors to improve the peace after the war. 
As discussed above, I evaluated two sets of proximate factors: Set 1, which captures 
aggregated, dimension-based theories (detailed in Chapter 3), and; Set 2, which covers 
disaggregated peace-agreement provisions (detailed in Chapter 4). Peace-agreement 
provisions, whether assessed in the aggregated or disaggregated, do not operate in 
isolation. Rather, these provisions operate within a variety of historical legacies and 
situational contexts that also may influence human-rights outcomes. These pre-existing 
conditions, established at and before the time of a peace agreement, may improve or 
stymy significant improvement in human-rights outcomes.  
In this vein, I selected eight remote factors from the civil war literature, 
principally for their known effects on political repression. The eight remote factors 
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included: (1) whether civil war had recurred after a negotiated settlement, (2) whether the 
civil war was driven by ethnic causes, (3) the costs of that conflict, (4) the duration of the 
conflict, (5) the regime type that existed after the conflict, (6) the size of the population, 
(7) the level of economic development in the state, and (8) the overall state capacity. 
To align with later methodological decisions and terminology, hereafter I refer to 
proximate and remote factors as proximate and remote conditions.13 The previously 
discussed sets of proximate conditions and remote conditions are summarized here:  
Table 1: Proximate and Remote Conditions 
 
Research Methodology 
Let us return to the overarching research question: Under what conditions do 
provisions within negotiated settlements significantly decrease the degree of political 
                                                 
13 This slight shift in terms still follows Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) purpose of dividing 
social phenomena into two principal categories. 
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repression conducted by a state? At the outset of this study, two methodological 
challenges arose in addressing this empirical question.  
First, the research question narrowed the field of study to a small number of cases. 
I only considered cases where civil wars had ended in negotiated settlement, rather than 
those that had ended in all war-termination types. This smaller universe of cases was 
further restricted by the availability of human-rights data, which limited the number of 
cases to a maximum of thirty-six civil wars.  
Second, the two models I devised for this study (discussed earlier) involved a 
substantial number of initial variables: Model 1—using an aggregated, dimensions-based 
approach—included four proximate conditions and eight remote conditions for a total of 
twelve total conditions (see Table 1 above). Model 2—using a disaggregated, individual 
provisions-based approach—included eight proximate conditions and eight remote 
conditions for a total of sixteen total conditions. Each model accounted for situational and 
historical contexts using the same set of eight remote conditions. 
From these two challenges arose the classic “many variables, small number of 
cases” dilemma commonly found in comparative social science research (Lijphart 1971, 
685; Lijphart 1975). This problem has persisted because quantitative techniques have 
been incapable of delineating causal complexity necessary to small and medium-N 
comparative research (Ragin 2008). A methodological divide exists between quantitative, 
variable-oriented approaches that emphasize probabilistic relationships and broad 
patterns across many cases with qualitative, case-oriented narrative approaches that 
emphasize holistic, close examination and historically specific contexts (2008, 2014).  
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Bridging the Methodological Divide 
To evaluate which methodological approach was best for addressing the research 
question stated above, a robust means for bridging this divide and surmounting the “small 
N—many variables” dilemma proved to be Charles Ragin’s seminal work on the 
alternative methodology known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). At its core, 
QCA analyzes set relations rather than correlations. This distinction also necessitated 
using a different lexicon: “In QCA terminology, the dependent variable is called the 
outcome, while the potential explanatory factors are called the conditions” though “the 
latter are not ‘independent’ variables as they are expected to operate in combination” 
(Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 93). Set relations refer to the various causal recipes 
(i.e., to the different combinations of conditions, or input variables) that might generate a 
given outcome (i.e., the output variable). QCA assumes that the same outcome might 
result from different combinations of causal factors.  
QCA combines features from both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. It 
retains the case-oriented approach’s capability to analyze causal complexity and to 
account for different combinatorial configurations, constellations, and conjunctures of 
explanatory factors (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2014). Additionally, QCA imports the 
robust, analytical techniques of the variable-oriented approach. In addition, the use of 
Boolean algebra and logic in this study enabled cross-case comparison and examination 
of cases by clustering simplified, similar configurations of conditions. The blending of 
these features in QCA facilitated identifying causal patterns across cases.  
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In summary, QCA accommodates for, and helps to unravel, causal complexity by 
the application of set-theoretic methods to identify “decisive cross-case patterns, the 
usual domain of quantitative analysis” (Fiss 2012). These patterns are expressed in 
different combinations of conditions (causal recipes) that indicate the pathways by which 
the outcome consistently will be achieved. 
Theory: Effects of Proximate and Remote Conditions on Political Repression 
Earlier discussion noted that the desired outcome of significant human-rights 
improvement results from favorable causal recipes that, together, reduce the likelihood 
that a government will choose to repress. These causal recipes involve combinations of 
proximate and remote factors that, together, affect a government’s likelihood of pursuing 
political repression. In its simplest form, the two models I devised for this study differed 
with respect to whether power-sharing provisions had been evaluated individually 
(disaggregated) or by dimension (aggregated): 
Model 1: Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions 
Model 2: Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions 
Model 1 tested the aforementioned theories about (1) whether more power-
sharing is better (i.e., extensively institutionalized settlements), (2) whether more of 
certain power-sharing dimensions is better (i.e., thick political settlements, thick military 
settlements, or the presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement), or (3) 
whether less power-sharing is better for human-rights outcomes.  
Model 2 examined the effects of disaggregated provisions on human-rights 
outcomes, under the rationale that different provisions, even within the same dimension, 
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have quite divergent effects. Aggregation masks this variance and arguably misses 
significant factors that are diluted by inappropriate aggregation with other factors that 
have opposite effects. For these reasons, I anticipated less conclusive results from Model 
1 in comparison to Model 2.  
What Reduces Political Repression 
In order to hypothesize how these factors might affect political repression, it was 
first necessary to grapple with what causes states to politically repress their people. 
Political repression is defined as the violation of citizens’ physical-integrity rights by the 
state or by its agents (Wood and Gibney 2010, 369); also called personal-integrity rights, 
physical-integrity rights are a subset of universal human rights that everyone has as a 
human being. These rights include protection from political imprisonment, state-
sanctioned torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.  
What is the role of the state with respect to these rights? An inherent tension 
exists between states and human rights because states are simultaneously the principal 
violator of human rights as well as the essential protector of these rights (Donnelly 2003, 
35-37; Donnelly 2013). The restoration of a state after civil war must carefully account 
for this tension and help to establish the state as the essential protector rather than the 
principal violator of human rights.  
Political repression is a form of governance. That is, the use of political 
repression—whether torture, killings, disappearances, or political imprisonment—is a 
course of action initiated by a government to control its people. Contemporary research 
indicates that states increase political repression as a function of three factors:  
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First, when the hostility or threat to a government is high, the state’s motivation to 
repress increases. Threats and hostilities manifest in a variety of ways; including 
dissension and instability in the form of strikes, riots, demonstrations, general unrest, 
guerrilla warfare, and/or civil war. What matters most is the intensity of the threat. The 
more violent the domestic threat, the more likely it is that the state will increase political 
repression (Carey 2009; Davenport 1995; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Poe, Tate, and Keith 
1999; Regan and Henderson 2002).  
Second, when institutional checks and balances on a government are low, the 
state’s opportunity to repress increases. Certain democratic institutions like electoral 
participation and competition, as well as executive constraints, serve to constrain political 
repression (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007c; Gates et al. 2006). 
Third, beyond the prominent causal factors of state motivation and opportunity to 
repress, an often overlooked factor that affects the degree of political repression used by a 
state is whether the regime possesses alternative, substitutable forms of governance. In 
this regard, two prominent substitutes exist as alternatives to governance via coercion 
(i.e., political repression): cooptation and cooperation. States with strong economic 
capacity, for example, can coopt the opposition as a substitute strategy of social control. 
Alternatively, states with stronger democratic institutions, can cooperate with the 
opposition.  
How do the existence or absence of governance alternatives reduce the level of 
political repression? Davenport (2004, 540) theorized that the presence of alternatives, 
such as cooptation and cooperation, compels those who advocate for coercion “to justify, 
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persuade, and compete” with those who advocate for the alternatives, while the absence 
of these alternatives means that “coercion and its advocates have free reign.” Existing 
research presents several means for capturing the existence or absence of governance 
alternatives: the level of economic development and the state capacity proxy a 
government’s ability to coopt its citizens, and the degree of democracy (or regime type) 
proxies the government’s ability to cooperate with its populace (Davenport and 
Armstrong 2004). 
To recap, states adjust their use of political repression based on three factors: (1) 
motivation, which is a function of the threats to the regime; (2) opportunity, which is a 
function of the restrictions on governmental authority; and (3) alternative governance 
mechanisms, which is a function of the government’s economic capacity (its ability to 
coopt) and the government’s regime type (its ability to cooperate).  
How Proximate Conditions Affect Political Repression 
In application, political repression is likely to decrease when proximate and 
remote conditions: (1) reduce the threats to the government, (2) increase the restrictions 
on governmental authority, and (3) improve the regime’s alternative governance 
mechanisms. As noted earlier, aggregation of peace-agreement provisions by their 
respective dimensions obscures the possibility that these compiled measures may actually 
act in opposition to each other. Peace-agreement provisions must be disaggregated, 
because they influence the above three causal factors very differently. Certain provisions 
lead to significant human-rights improvement when they are present, while others lead to 
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such improvement when they are absent. Still others have mixed records because they 
influence these three causal factors in divergent ways.  
Each disaggregated measure must be considered in relation to why states violate 
physical-integrity rights by politically repressing their citizens. Highlights of these 
relationships are summarized here. The full relationships are detailed in Chapter 4, 
alongside supporting empirical literature. 
Sometimes, the presence of a provision consistently leads to improved human 
rights (i.e., less political repression), while its absence may lead equally to either better or 
worse rights. For example, the presence of territorial federalism is hypothesized to lead to 
better human rights by improving alternative governance mechanisms and by reducing 
the threat to the government; the former is accomplished when this provision is present, 
due to the allocation of separate powers to sub-state groups that serve as an additional 
constraint on executive power and guard the interests of opposition groups. Federalism 
also reduces political insecurities of the dissenting groups, by recognizing the “political 
and spatial realities on the ground” with respect to territorial divisions, while leaving 
external borders intact so the territorial integrity of the state is preserved (Lake and 
Rothchild 2005, 109-110); this reduces the threat of increased dissension and of 
autonomy to the regime. The absence of federalism, however, does not guarantee that 
human rights will either get better or worse.  
Robust third-party security guarantees are hypothesized to follow a similar 
pattern. The presence of such guarantees helps former belligerents to commit credibly to 
the terms of a peace agreement by raising the costs and difficulty of either party cheating 
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on the settlement’s terms. With defection from the peace agreement less likely and 
compliance by both parties verified, the threat to the government is reduced. Moreover, a 
robust guarantee protects vulnerable groups and detects any violations, meaning that the 
government’s opportunity to politically repress its citizens is reduced. Robust 
guarantees—backed by a strong mandate and sufficient soldiers on the ground—are 
anticipated to consistently lead to significant human-rights improvement by both 
reducing the threat to the government and its opportunity to repress. 
The presence of military power-sharing provisions that integrate rebels into the 
main ranks of a joint defense force or into leadership positions of that defense force are 
both hypothesized to improve human rights outcomes. Implementation of these military 
provisions carries high implementation, economic, and integration costs, as well as risks 
for the government (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Given these high costs, when the 
government and rebels offer up and agree to military integration provisions in a peace 
agreement, they send costly signals of their capabilities, intentions, and resolve to adhere 
to that agreement (Fearon 2005; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). 
From this perspective, when signals are costly like this, former belligerents (and 
especially the government) can overcome problems of credible commitment without the 
need for a third-party guarantor; trust built in this fashion reduces the potential that actors 
resort to political violence, which means the threat to the government is reduced and it 
should, concomitantly, reduce its use of political repression.  
In addition, guaranteeing integration of rebels into the main ranks and into 
leadership adds a substantial new constraint on the executive branch, further restricting 
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the government’s opportunity to use coercion against its people. This especially holds 
true in cases where the regime relied upon the defense force as its primary means of 
implementing different forms of political repression. Military integration installs a new 
check and balance against the government abusing its restored monopoly on the use of 
force towards coercive ends. 
An alternate pattern occurs when the presence of a provision leads to more 
political repression, while its absence leads to improved human rights. Territorial 
autonomy is hypothesized to follow this pattern. Scholars are divided over whether 
autonomy serves as an ideal solution for permanently resolving conflicts in deeply 
divided societies (Downes 2006, 52; Kaufmann 1996, 137) or instead increases the 
likelihood of recurred conflict, as in a number of cases (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 
2009, 2014).  
How does autonomy affect political repression? Empirical evidence indicates that 
when a government loses territory, this division reifies existing differences, which leads 
to increased suspicion by the regime and increased political violence by the population 
(Bell 2013, 246). An increase in political violence increases the likelihood that the 
government will turn again to political repression, and autonomy likely will lead to worse 
human rights. Conversely, the absence of this partitioning provision preserves the 
territorial integrity of a state and yields the strong possibility of an overall decreased 
threat level to the regime in the aftermath of conflict. 
Some provisions are predicted to result in mixed, less predictable outcomes. This 
variance in outcomes occurs because of how these conditions affect the different triggers 
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of political repression. Consider, for example, the various political provisions that 
guarantee proportional representation in the respective legislative and executive branches 
of government and in the civil service: On the one hand, such provisions are likely to 
improve a government’s ability to cooperate with former belligerents (i.e. an improved 
alternative governance mechanism). This expected benefit may be overcome by the 
potential increased threat that each guarantee of proportional representation introduces 
into the political system.  
Some governments, for example, view legislative elections that guarantee 
proportional representation of rebels as a threat to the status quo. They are likely to 
respond with increased political repression as compared to governments that consider 
elections a liberalizing, legitimating experience (Davenport 1997). Likewise, rapid 
inclusion of prior belligerents into the executive branch on occasion may lead to 
increased political instability and violence, which then leads to increased repression. This 
occurs as the result of “rapid mobilization of new groups into politics,” particularly when 
the political institutions in a state are slow to develop and respond to the increased 
demand (Huntington 2006, 4). The integration of rebels into the civil service is unlikely 
to raise the threat to a government by much. At the same time, this provision provides 
only a weak constraining influence on executive decision-making.  
In summary, the three political conditions outlined above are all anticipated to 
improve a government’s ability to cooperate with prior combatants, though in varying 
degrees. A government’s opportunity to repress is generally decreased given these new 
constraints on executive decision-making. Perhaps most important, governments often 
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view these provisions, especially elections and executive integration, with great 
suspicion. This increases the threat against the government and negates the prior benefits 
in a number of cases. As a result, given these opposite effects on drivers of political 
repression, overall outcomes based on political provisions are less predictable. 
How Remote Conditions Affect Political Repression 
Remote conditions also affect a regime’s motives, opportunities, and/or 
alternative governance mechanisms, which cause those regimes to adjust their use of 
political repression. Since remote conditions are, by definition, more constant and stable 
factors that lie largely outside of actor influence, they are referenced in this dissertation as 
a form of scoping conditions.  
According to Cohen’s (1989) original formulation, scoping conditions are the set 
of circumstances under which a theoretical claim is applicable. Schneider and 
Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) application of remote conditions, which I followed in this 
study, closely aligns with Cohen’s arrangement. Therefore, in this dissertation, remote 
conditions are treated as factors that either constrain or enable the ability of proximate 
conditions to influence an outcome; they define the set of circumstances under which 
theoretical claims about proximate conditions are applicable.  
Eight remote conditions were considered applicable to this study. Four of these 
conditions, defined below, were hypothesized as primarily affecting the level of residual 
threat facing a state:  
(1) Recurrence of civil war signifies the presence of strong domestic threats to a 
regime. Research demonstrates that this factor correlates significantly with an increase in 
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state repression (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Davenport 1995; Harff 2003; Poe, Tate, 
and Keith 1999).  
(2) Civil wars driven by ethnic divisions are generally considered highly 
intractable, non-divisible conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Licklider 
1995). When resolved via negotiated settlements, peace breaks down more quickly 
compared to wars where ethnicity was not the issue at stake (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 
328; Mattes and Savun 2009). One common pathway to such breakdown is that elites 
leverage power-sharing arrangements to mobilize their political base more quickly. When 
such mobilization is coupled with inherent fears and resentments over resulting 
proportional representation (or over excluded ethnic groups), political violence is likely 
to result and the threat to the government to increase quickly (Aydin and Gates 2008; 
Petersen and Staniland 2008).  
(3) Severe civil wars (i.e., those with a high number of battle-related deaths, what 
scholars commonly call high war costs) typically increase the likelihood of civil- war 
recurrence following a negotiated settlement (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; 
Mattes and Savun 2009). These same high intensity conflicts are expected to similarly 
exacerbate a higher level of threat against the state, resulting in worse political repression 
by the regime.  
(4) The length of the war affects the level of threat facing the state. Scholarship 
on the effects of war duration has concentrated principally on whether it helps or hinders 
the duration of peace. The answer is unclear. Some scholars have argued that long wars 
exhaust rivals and reveal more information about each combatant’s intentions and 
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capabilities (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009; Zartman 2000, 2001). 
This exhaustion and information helps to overcome animosity and lack of trust, which is 
empirically demonstrated by longer wars leading to longer peace (Fortna 2004b; Walter 
2004). Other scholars have not observed any significant effect of civil war duration on  
civil war recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Mattes and Savun 2009). A potential 
reason for this latter observation is that animosity between rivals intensifies over time 
with tit-for-tat counterstrikes. Long wars reflect intractable, unresolved issues between 
bitter belligerents.  
Although empirical evidence favors the former perspective for the outcome of 
durable peace, for human rights, I contend that long civil wars generally have led to 
increased political repression after war ended; that this happens because exhaustion does 
not mean prior combatants easily forget or forgive deep wounds. Short civil wars more 
readily lead to improved human rights, because all parties more readily recall life before 
the civil war and desire return to civility rather than retribution for long-standing feuds. 
Two remote conditions likely affect a government’s opportunity to repress: the 
size of the population and the type of regime. The size of the population matters because 
larger populations increase the sheer number of opportunities for political repression as 
well as the base within which a regime can diffuse increased violations (Murdie and 
Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Additionally, larger populations (and large flows 
of internally displaced persons) place greater strain on limited social, political, and 
economic resources, which overwhelms the respective institutional capacity to respond to 
demands (Henderson 1993; Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). This 
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then might lead to increased political violence and revolt, followed by more government 
repression. Some power-sharing agreements exacerbate these strains; for example, the 
guarantee of proportional representation in various political branches might create even 
greater demands on the supply and distribution of resources.  
With respect to regime type, as a government becomes more democratic, its 
leaders find “both less opportunity and less willingness to repress” (Poe, Tate, and Keith 
1999, 293). Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 551) empirically confirmed that, once a 
certain democratic threshold is passed, authorities begin to perceive constraints on their 
authority and consider alternative governance mechanisms to political repression. Regime 
type also affects a government’s consideration of alternative governance mechanisms, 
such as cooperation with opposition groups. Thus, two additional remote conditions  were 
considered because of their effect on a government’s alternative governance mechanisms:  
First, the level of economic development within a state consistently has correlated 
with an increased respect for physical-integrity rights by a regime (Cingranelli and 
Richards 1999b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 
1999). The generation and distribution of valued goods and services coopts individuals 
and groups, which may both prevent revolts due to scarcity (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe 
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and also reduce the need for third-party 
security guarantees (DeRouen et al. 2010; Taydas and Peksen 2012). These results are 
anticipated in economies that are at least moderately developed.  
Second, recent literature (Arbetman and Kugler 1997; DeRouen et al. 2010; 
Hendrix 2010) has suggested that a better measure of a government’s ability to coopt and 
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cooperate with its population is state capacity. A state that is “capable of accommodating 
grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of autonomy 
rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements within the party system” will 
decrease the motivation for political violence (Hendrix 2010, 273) and also reduce the 
threat to the regime’s status quo.  
In summary, the following four remote conditions likely would enable significant 
human-rights improvement by reducing threat to governments: the existence of enduring 
peace, non-ethnic civil wars, short wars, and low-cost wars. Conversely, if civil war 
recurs, if ethnic issues drive the civil war, if the war lasts longer, or if the war costs are 
high, then the overall threat to the regime after the conflict would be higher and more 
extensive political repression would be expected. In turn, the government’s opportunity 
and willingness to repress would be reduced when that regime became more democratic. 
Smaller populations provide less opportunity to repress and to hide such repression; 
demand on limited resources following civil war is also lower. The inverse also holds 
true, in that less democratic states and those with larger populations have greater 
opportunity and willingness to repress their people. Finally, governments with high levels 
of economic development and state capacity are unlikely to repress their populations, 
while those with low overall economic development and low state capacity are more 
likely to pursue political repression rather than alternative governance mechanisms.  
A Testable Combined Theory 
The relationship of power-sharing agreements with human-rights outcomes is 
clearest when disaggregated provisions are used rather than aggregated dimensions, 
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because provisions often affect a government’s likely pursuit of political repression in 
divergent ways. Four of the eight power-sharing provisions are anticipated to consistently 
contribute to significant human-rights improvement when they are present; namely, 
robust third-party security guarantees, territorial federalism, rebel integration into the 
main ranks of the military, and rebel integration into the leadership of the military.14 The 
provision of territorial autonomy is expected to lead to the desired human-rights outcome 
primarily when it is absent. None of the political provisions is likely to maintain a 
consistent effect either way due to conflicting effects on drivers of political repression. 
Model 1 (assuming the hypotheses hold true) would lead to less consistent results. 
Consider the four different proximate conditions included in Set 1: (1) Thick political 
settlements. As noted above, the presence of the political dimension is inconclusive, since 
each of the political provisions has conflicting effects on political repression. (2) Thick 
military settlements. Based on prior hypotheses, the presence of either military provision 
is likely to lead to improved human rights. (3) Territorial power-sharing agreement. This 
aggregation of territorial autonomy and territorial federalism is likely inconclusive, since 
these two provisions have divergent effects on the desired outcome of human-rights 
improvement. (4) Extensively institutionalized settlements. Recalling that this measure 
assesses whether the inclusion of more power-sharing dimensions is better, and seeing 
that the presence of either the political and territorial dimensions is likely inconclusive 
while the presence of the military dimension likely leads to worse human rights, 
extensively institutionalized settlements are anticipated to more strongly associate with 
the negation of the outcome. More power-sharing is not always better. 
                                                 
14 Security guarantees are not included in any aggregated component. 
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Returning to Model 2 (expected to provide clearer, actionable insights for 
policymakers), now that the anticipated relationships of remote conditions with human-
rights outcomes also have been explained, the remote conditions can be combined with 
the disaggregated, individual provisions in a single testable model. The expectations of 
that model can be visually represented (see Figure 3 below).15 In this model, proximate 
and remote conditions are aligned in accordance with their primary hypothesized effects 
on the three causal factors that lead to political repression, namely whether that condition 
is expected to: (1) reduce the threat to the regime, (2) reduce the regime’s opportunity to 
repress, or (3) improve the regime’s alternative governance mechanisms.16  
The model anticipates that the desired outcome of significant human rights 
improvement (SHRI)—understood as a reduction over time in the overall violations by a  
government of its citizens’ physical-integrity rights—consistently occurs when territorial 
autonomy is absent and when all other non-political power-sharing provisions are present 
(i.e. integration of rebels into the main ranks of the military and into leadership positions, 
territorial federalism, and robust third-party security guarantees). Meanwhile, political 
power-sharing agreements (i.e., the guarantees of proportional representation in the 
executive and legislative branches and in the civil service) are not anticipated to result in 
                                                 
15 The idea for this figure and its legend came from Goertz’s (2006) work on set-theoretic models and from 
Mello’s (2014, 2016) use of a similar model in his work on premature coalition withdrawal from alliance-
based military operations. 
 
16 In the model, lowercase letters indicate that the condition’s absence is anticipated to lead to significant 
human-rights improvement (SHRI), while uppercase letters indicate the condition’s presence will likely 
lead to improvement. Multiple arrows indicate proximate conditions that affect several drivers of political 
repression. The remote conditions are vertically aligned with the drivers of political repression, to indicate 
where they are hypothesized to affect political repression. For example, the remote conditions of enduring 
peace, non-ethnic civil war, and low war costs are hypothesized as factors that reduce the threat to the 
government and therefore result in less use of political repression. 
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consistent effects on the level of political repression; therefore, they are not included in 
the diagram. Finally, the presence of the following remote conditions—enduring peace, 
non-ethnic civil war, low war costs, short war, small population, strong democracy, 
moderately developed economies, and high state capacity—are anticipated to consistently 
encourage realization of the desired outcome of significant human rights improvement.  
   
Figure 3: Model 2 – Disaggregated Proximate Conditions & Remote Conditions 
Figure 3 also depicts that none of the proximate or remote conditions is 
considered a necessary or sufficient factor that would be able to produce the outcome of 
interest on its own. Rather, each of these conditions is considered an INUS condition, 
which is an acronym first coined by Mackie (1974, 79) to describe the conditions in 
which each respective factor is an “insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is 
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itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”17 This INUS term is another way of 
saying that multiple configurations of conditions, or causal recipes, lead to the outcome. 
This study revealed, with respect to the desired outcome, a strong blend of 
expected and quite unexpected findings. With respect to remote conditions, high state 
capacity and low war costs were removed before the fuzzy-set analysis began due to lack 
of demonstrated relationship over any evaluated time period; the first step of the Two-
Step Approach then removed small populations, strong democracies, and moderately 
developed economies as less consistent conditions, leaving just three remote conditions 
for pairing with proximate conditions. Of these remainders, both the presence of enduring 
peace and the presence of short wars exhibited wide coverage (multiple cases) and high 
consistency. Non-ethnic wars were largely indeterminate (one causal path with just one 
empirical case).  
Meanwhile, with respect to proximate conditions, six of the nine sufficient 
pathways leading to significant human rights improvement involved the presence of 
robust third-party security guarantees; only one causal path consistently involved the 
absence of these guarantees.18 A stunning finding was that seven of the nine causal 
recipes leading to significant human rights improvement involved the absence of both the 
integration of rebels into the military’s main ranks and rebel integration into the 
                                                 
17 The acronym arises from the beginning of the following italicized words: “insufficient but necessary part 
of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”⁠ 
 
18 Notably this causal path also involved the absence of all power-sharing provisions and was represented 
by multiple cases; the path is explored in depth in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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leadership of that defense force.19 The absence of autonomy was consistent in five of the 
nine causal pathways; of note, the only path where the presence of autonomy led to 
significant human rights improvement was when it was paired with robust third-party 
security guarantees AND the absence of both military power-sharing provisions. 
Territorial federalism consistently led in the mid- and long-term to improvement of 
human rights, but its rarity as a provision required its exclusion from the fuzzy set 
analysis (discussed more in Chapter 8).  
The findings of Model 2 with respect to the outcome of significant human rights 
improvement are captured in Figure 4. They form the basis for the central claims 
advanced in this dissertation: First, aggregate dimensions obscure and mislead; 
disaggregation reveals. Second, significant human rights improvement is consistently 
achieved when certain provisions are absent—such as military integration of rebels into 
the main military ranks and the granting of territorial autonomy—and when other 
provisions like robust third-party security guarantees are present. Lastly, significant 
human-rights improvement results from favorable causal recipes (i.e., combinations of 
disaggregated conditions) that together reduce both the motivation and opportunity of a 
government to repress. 
 
                                                 
19 This extended the finding from Model 1, where all nine causal recipes that led to significant human 
rights improvement involved the absence of thick military power-sharing agreements.  
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Figure 4: Model 2 Findings—Conditions Leading to SHRI 
Project Outline and Chapter Overview 
 The logical flow of the whole project is depicted in Figure 4 (below)20, which aids 
in explaining the content, purpose, and sequencing of the different chapters. Since QCA 
has a “fundamentally iterative nature” (Rihoux and Lobe 2009, 230)—meaning that a 
constant dialogue exists among theoretical knowledge, case knowledge, and the 
operations within each of the steps—the more prominent relationships are depicted with 
return arrows and feedback loops.  
                                                 
20 This figure is adapted from Rihoux and Lobe (2009, 238, Figure 12.2). Since their model only describes 
procedures for crisp-set QCA, adjustments were made to integrate remote and proximate conditions, the 
Two-Step Approach, and fuzzy-set QCA procedures, as well as the two pertinent models to this study. 
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Figure 5: Research Design Outline of fsQCA with Two-Step Approach 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 cover the first phase of QCA, where maximal complexity 
exists. Together, these chapters map out the pertinent theoretical knowledge and case 
knowledge necessary to proceed further with this dissertation’s analysis. This includes 
conceptually and operationally defining the outcome, the universe of cases, and the 
applicable proximate and remote conditions for each of the two models. Specifically: 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical basis for human rights writ large. The rationale 
for selecting physical-integrity rights as the specific outcome of interest is provided here. 
The state-society relationship is explored, with specific focus on the state’s prominent 
role in securing these rights and its common violation of the rights. The connection 
between the state’s violation of physical-integrity rights and the measure of political 
repression is explained. The chapter details the unique difficulties for states as they exit 
civil war, especially in balancing the need to deter further violence and to assure the 
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population that the regime will not pose a threat to them. The chapter then considers 
contemporary literature written on power-sharing agreements, showing its predominant 
orientation toward addressing the ability of the state to deter violence (measured as  civil 
war recurrence) and toward assessment using aggregated dimensions of power-sharing 
agreements.  
Chapter 3 outlines key components of the research design. First, it establishes the 
universe of cases, which initially included thirty-six civil wars in twenty-six states where 
conflict had terminated between 1989 and 2007 via negotiated settlement. Second, the 
chapter details why Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was selected as the 
principal methodology for this project. In short, selecting QCA was based on its capacity 
for medium-N comparative research using a holistic, analytic approach and beginning 
analysis from an assumption of causal complexity. A lexicon for grappling with this 
different methodological approach is also provided. Third, the chapter provides initial 
coding and dichotomization of human-rights improvement (i.e., decrease in a state’s use 
of political repression). To accomplish this, I determined applicable datasets for raw data 
on civil wars and human rights, then assessed those rights, looking at: the short-term (two 
years after a civil war ends), mid-term (five years later), and long-term (ten years later).  
Chapter 4 establishes theoretical arguments about my two different models, 
defined earlier. Both of these models blended proximate conditions and remote conditions 
(i.e., those situational and historical contexts that remain largely outside actor influence). 
The models differed in that Model 1 evaluated the remote conditions alongside 
aggregated power-sharing dimensions. Model 2 evaluated remote conditions alongside 
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disaggregated peace-agreement provisions, including individual power-sharing measures 
and third-party security guarantees. In accordance with best practices for QCA regarding 
the transparent identification and description of selected conditions, I extensively 
examined each proximate and remote condition. This includes presenting the anticipated 
effects each might have on the three causal factors that increase a state’s use of political 
repression:  motivation, opportunity, and alternative governance mechanisms. Hypotheses 
are proposed regarding how each condition is likely to affect a government’s violations of 
physical-integrity rights.  
Next, with the theoretical foundations laid, hypotheses established, models 
proposed and raw data gathered, the analytic phase of QCA could begin in earnest. Given 
the initial breadth of potential factors affecting the outcome of significant human-rights 
improvement (SHRI), I followed the advice of several QCA scholars (Berg-Schlosser and 
De Meur 2009, 27-8)21 by using “a number of stepwise multi-methodological 
procedures” to reduce the initial complexity. This dissertation specifically used 
contingency tables and the Two-Step Approach, as detailed in Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively.  
In Chapter 5, statistical techniques (i.e., cross-tabulations, what others call 
contingency tables) are used to help identify strong bivariate relationships between the 
proximate or remote conditions and the outcome. Analysis of the 2x2 tables also helped 
to identify any asymmetric relationships. I retained conditions that displayed strong 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Berg-Schlosser & Mitchell’s (2000, 1016) examination of why democracy survived in 
some European states between the world wars while authoritarianism and fascism emerged in others. Using 
previous empirical research, combinatorial logic, and statistical techniques they reduced their 61 original 
conditions down to 8 “super-conditions.” 
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statistical or asymmetric relationships for the fuzzy-set QCA portions that would follow. 
To facilitate the analysis, I used the earlier dichotomization of human-rights improvement 
for the outcome data. At the end of Chapter 6, I employed Schneider and Wagemann’s 
(2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach to QCA. This method conveniently leveraged the 
previous categorizations of proximate and remote conditions to achieve maximal 
parsimony. The remainder of Chapter 6 similarly aims to equip the reader with the 
necessary methodological toolkit for understanding the fuzzy-set analysis and 
interpretation given in Chapters 7 and 8.  
Chapter 6 begins by comparing the three principal sub-methods within the QCA 
portfolio: crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy-set QCA. I selected the fuzzy-set 
QCA method for a number of reasons: Fuzzy sets permit varying degrees of membership 
rather than solely full membership or full non-membership in a given set. This means 
they can be used simultaneously to conduct qualitative and quantitative assessments by 
evaluating both differences-in-kind and differences-in-degree (Ragin 2009; Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012). The partial membership accommodated by fuzzy sets is especially 
critical for evaluating the outcome of human rights. This allows gradations of human-
rights improvement rather than simple dichotomization of the outcome.  
Fuzzy sets require calibration of specific terms in accordance with theoretical 
and/or empirical standards. Chapter 6 describes this calibration process, along with a 
number of other QCA techniques, such as how necessary and sufficient conditions are 
evaluated according to measures of consistency and coverage. Truth tables also are 
discussed, along with minimization procedures and factoring. Additionally, the negation 
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of the outcome is explained. The chapter concludes with explaining the Two-Step 
Approach. In brief, Step One of this approach evaluates all remote conditions, in order to 
find those that most consistently had enabled (or constrained) the desired outcome. Only 
those remote conditions were then carried into Step Two, which added in all proximate 
conditions brought forward from Chapter 5 for the analysis.  
In Chapters 7 and 8, in order to ensure the full proper application of fuzzy-set 
QCA and not shortchange any of the steps of the outlined procedures, it was necessary to 
restrain evaluation of the two models to only the short-term period of two years after a 
civil war ended. Mid-term and long-term effects of disaggregated provisions are reserved 
for a future study.  
Chapter 7 applies the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) 
procedures in a systematic fashion to the first model of disaggregated power-sharing 
dimensions that interact within certain remote conditions. The chapter begins by 
calibrating conditions according to fuzzy-set standards, when possible. For example, 
whereas Chapter 4 uses a dichotomized operationalization of human-rights improvement, 
Chapters 6 provides a calibrated operationalization of significant human-rights 
improvement (SHRI). Fuzzy-set calibration, as indicated earlier, allows evaluation of not 
simply differences-in-kind, but also differences-in-degree. The term significant is added 
here in order to assess not only whether human rights had improved, but whether they 
had improved significantly. Chapter 7 uses this same operationalization of SHRI, by 
which I conducted the Two-Step Approach for the outcome of significant human-rights 
improvement as well as for its negation. The chapter factors the results and provides in-
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depth interpretation of various cross-case patterns. It concludes with generalizations and 
implications for power-sharing agreements writ large, as well as for Chapter 8.  
Chapter 8 replicates the analytical process used in Chapter 7. It shifts application 
of the fsQCA procedures to Model 2 and examines which causal combinations of 
individual, disaggregated provisions and remote conditions led to either significant 
human rights improvement, or to the negation of significant human rights improvement. 
Cross-case patterns are identified, along with a number of concluding generalizations and 
implications for future decision-makers, states, and belligerents involved in negotiated 
settlements. 
The final Chapter 9 compiles the findings from Chapters 5, 7, and 8 with 
comparisons across the chapters. Additionally, it presents proposals for a host of future 
studies that might further our theoretical knowledge and understanding of how to help 
states exiting civil war, particularly via negotiated settlements.  
In summary, this dissertation asks: Under what conditions do peace-agreement 
provisions significantly reduce the degree of political repression conducted by a state? 
The study specifically evaluated political, military, and territorial power-sharing 
agreements within the complex historical legacies and structural contexts of post-civil 
war environments. Human rights were measured in terms of the degree to which a 
governing regime politically had repressed and violated its citizens’ physical-integrity 
rights. The universe of cases in this study included thirty-six civil wars in twenty-six 
states that had terminated conflict between 1989 and 2007 via negotiated settlements. To 
address the “many variables—small number of cases” puzzle, the methodological 
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approach of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) was used as a means to 
examine different causal configurations; this involved two different models, including 
either aggregated power-sharing dimensions or disaggregated power-sharing provisions. 
Each of these sets of proximate conditions was combined with relevant remote conditions 
that had been shown to enable the desired result of significantly improved human-rights 
outcomes or to constrain this outcome, leading more readily to its negation.  
This project has significant implications on securing the peace for individuals 
within states exiting civil war. The aim is to provide decision-makers with a greater 
understanding of how different individual provisions—and combinations of these 
provisions alongside situational contexts relevant to each conflict—might shape both how 
a state can deter violence in the future as well as assure the population that they will not 
politically repress them after the conflict ends. 
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Chapter Two: Theories on Human Rights and Political Repression 
Human rights—those universal rights that everyone has as a human being—define 
and shape relations between citizens (who hold these rights) and states (who have certain 
obligations to uphold those rights) (Donnelly 2013; Freeman 2011; Schmitz and Sikkink 
2002). In other words, human rights constitute individuals and states of a particular type, 
and a state’s recognition of fundamental human rights creates, establishes, and shapes the 
state-societal relationship into something different than what it would be without the 
presence of such rights (Donnelly 2013).22 Civil war upends the state-societal 
relationship though: States shift from the essential protector of human rights to becoming 
the principal violator of these same rights.23  
This chapter aims to lay a theoretical foundation for the project by mapping out 
the intellectual terrain. The core of the research is exploration of the conditions under 
which states honor, or continue to violate, a specific group of human rights—alternatively 
known as physical integrity rights or personal integrity rights—after civil war has ended. 
The selection of physical-integrity rights was based on the extensive use of this variable 
                                                 
22 Donnelly observed that human rights not only contain codified, regulative rules and practices that legally 
define the minimum set of goods, services, opportunities, and protections. Just as importantly, they also 
“constitute individuals as a particular kind of political subject: free and equal rights-bearing citizens. And 
by defining the requirements and limits of legitimate government they constitute states of a particular kind” 
(2013, 16). 
 
23 Donnelly (2013) used these italicized terms to describe the state’s already complicated relationship with 
human rights even outside of civil war.  
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throughout the human-rights literature24 and because the violation of a person’s physical 
integrity is considered the most severe, egregious form of political repression.25  
The chapter explores the state-society relationship outlined by Donnelly, with 
specific focus on the state’s prominent role in securing these rights and its common 
violation of the rights. The theories explained in this chapter provide essential 
groundwork for the causal linkages established in Chapter 4 between peace-agreement 
provisions (the conditions) and significant improvement, or lack thereof, in the 
government’s honoring of physical integrity rights (the outcome).  
Scholars alternatively refer to violations of physical integrity rights as state 
terrorism or as state repression. The chapter begins by considering both of these 
approaches; the less pejorative term political repression is selected and defined in 
conceptual and operational terms. Political repression is then distinguished from other 
forms of mass political violence in that it serves as a form of governance.  
A brief discussion follows this regarding the critical deterrence-assurance 
dilemma that states face after civil war: In rebuilding a strong coercive capacity able to 
monopolize violence within the state and deter future conflict, those same capabilities 
inherently threaten the citizens. Contemporary scholarship extensively evaluates the 
                                                 
24 See, e.g. Bueno de Mesquite et al. 2005; Carey 2009; Davenport 1997, 2007b; Hafner-Burton and 
Tsuitsui 2005; Henderson 1991; Henderson 1993; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, 
Tate, and Keith 199; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986; Wood and Gibney 2010. 
 
25 The choice to evaluate individual security rather than other political, civil, and economic rights does not 
imply that these other rights do not matter. Rather, it recognizes that in post-civil war contexts, 
guaranteeing individual security is primary and essential. As one scholar put it well, “True political liberty 
can only occur when the security of the people is ensured” (Bonnemaison 2002, 40).  
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effects that negotiated settlements have on deterrence, proxying the latter by the state’s 
ability to prevent civil war recurrence.  
However, the state’s ability to assure its people—measured by the government 
decreasing its use of political repression—is only rarely addressed. Assurances must be 
enacted and enforced so that the government does not inflict political violence upon the 
populace. The chapter expounds on the causal mechanics of the deterrence-assurance 
dilemma, detailing how the government’s development of deterrence capabilities in post-
civil war contexts induces an internal security dilemma. This dilemma calls into question 
the government’s ability to credibly commit to the peace agreement terms and to 
legitimately assure its population that it will not threaten them with its improved 
deterrence capabilities.  
Finally, the chapter explains three principal drivers of state-based political 
repression, including the state’s motivation to repress, its opportunity to repress, and the 
availability to the government of alternative governance methods. The chapter closes by 
demonstrating that if a peace-agreement provision is to succeed in reducing the 
government’s use of political repression, it must decrease the government’s motivation to 
repress, decrease its opportunity to repress, or improve alternative governance 
mechanisms so that it does not need to resort to coercive measures. 
The State: Essential Protector or Principal Violator of Physical-Integrity Rights  
 Civil war upends the state-society relationship. By definition, civil war involves 
the government and the national army of an internationally recognized state engaging in 
armed conflict with one or more opposing factions that are able to effectively mount 
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resistance against the state, leading to more than a thousand deaths in a year and 
casualties on both sides (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). When civil war erupts, the 
government’s fight against opposing faction(s) can take on a number of forms beyond 
direct military action. Measures like torture, imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and 
kidnapping may be used against targeted individuals or groups in order to coerce and 
intimidate the opposition.26 A natural outgrowth of civil war violence is that the 
government correspondingly increases violations of its citizens’ physical-integrity rights 
(Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Civil war thus intensifies the risk that 
states become the principal violator of these rights rather than the essential protector of 
them. The scholarly literature is unsettled though regarding what phrase best describes 
the state’s violations of physical integrity rights. The next section briefly details this 
debate and justifies the project’s selection of terms. 
Defining the State’s Violations of Physical-Integrity Rights 
Physical-integrity rights are a subset of non-derogable rights. Non-derogable 
rights refer to those human rights that cannot be suspended, compromised or removed 
from the individual, even in a state of emergency.27 Non-derogable rights include 
political and civil rights designed to protect the individual’s liberties and freedoms 
against the state’s abuse and tyranny.28 The set of physical-integrity rights specifically 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Dallin and Breslauer (1970). 
27 Most human rights outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1948, are derogable; the government’s obligations to respect its citizen’s derogable human 
rights may be suspended temporarily during public emergencies (Murdie 2014; Richards and Clay 2012).  
 
28 Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) names seven non-
derogable rights, including: the right to life (Article 6), freedom from torture (Article 7), freedom from 
slavery (Article 8), freedom from contractual imprisonment (Article 11), freedom from unlawful 
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includes the right to protection from: (1) political imprisonment, (2) state-sanctioned 
torture, (3) disappearances, and (4) extrajudicial killings.  
Contemporary scholars use a variety of terms to describe violations of physical-
integrity rights by the state, including: state terrorism (Corradi, Fagen, and Garretón 
1992b; Kalyvas 2006; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986; Wood and Gibney 2010), political 
terrorism (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Gibney et al. 2014; Poe and Tate 1994; Wood and 
Gibney 2010), state repression (Davenport 2007a, b, c), and political repression 
(Goldstein 2001; Henderson 1991; Henderson 1993; Regan and Henderson 2002). The 
selection of different adjectives demonstrates that some scholars associate the abuse or 
violation of the right with the actor who is principally violating that right (i.e., the state) 
while others focus on the ends achieved by such acts (i.e., the political objectives). 
One argument against the use of terms like state terrorism and political terrorism 
is that they carry pejorative baggage by inappropriately connecting the state with terrorist 
acts. This linkage is worth engaging before the terms are too quickly jettisoned. In this 
vein, Schmid (2011, 68-69) delivered cogent analysis: 
By reserving the term ‘terrorism’ for non-state actors only, we neglect the 
multiple uses of terrorism by governments since the French Revolution and 
create, in effect, a double standard. It is true that the measured use of force by the 
state, when controlled by the constitution, the rule of law and the judiciary, and 
proportional to the actual threat, must be judged differently from vigilante or 
revolutionary “justice” which is not rule-based. However when a regime steps 
outside the legal principles while demanding adherence to them by its opponents, 
we are in a different situation. If a regime can conduct “terrorism” abroad, either 
directly or as a state sponsor, why should its domestic use not be called state or 
regime terrorism? Frankly, I see no good reason to exclude terrorism conducted 
by organs of a state from the conceptual reach of the term “terrorism.” The state 
                                                                                                                                                 
imprisonment (Article 15), the right to recognition as a person before the law (Article 16), and the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18). See Richards and Clay (2012) for further 
discussion on non-derogable rights. 
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might have a monopoly of legitimate force but it has to use it defensively and 
minimally in the framework of a social contract, a constitution, and the rule of 
law.29 
 
Shmid assessed that states choose to persuade, pressure, abuse, and violently 
coerce their opponents outside of legal principles and constitutional or judicial rule-based 
practices that are purposefully designed to constrain their use of force (69-70). When 
states violate physical-integrity rights, their actions and aims resemble those of 
terrorism,30 especially with respect to creating a broad, chronic state of fear through the 
use of psychological coercion and selective targeted violence.31  
However, in selecting which terms to use here in describing the state’s violations 
of physical-integrity rights, Barrett’s (in Schmid 2011, 68) argumentation is both 
reasonable and convincing: “While I agree that a state actor may, to all intents and 
purposes, commit an act which is indistinguishable from terrorism, I believe it should be 
called something else.” Based on this logic, and in order to distinguish the state’s 
violations from those violations made by non-state actors, the less controversial term 
political repression is used throughout the rest of this dissertation.  
                                                 
29 Scholarly disagreement here is less about tactics used by states and more about whether state actors 
should be included in a definition of terrorism as this decision shapes international law.   
 
30 Consider, for example, torture, which is one of the four types of physical-integrity rights violations: 
“Torture is first and foremost a political phenomenon…[that is] employed in a sophisticated and systematic 
way…by repressive governments…[in order] to control and destroy individual adversaries and their 
organizations” (Salimovich, Lira, and Weinstein 1992, 78). 
31 On this subject of creating fear, see Corradi et. al’s (1992a) collection of essays on how regimes 
intentionally instill fear through the combined use of physical repression, threats, repressive policies, and 
the absence of institutional protection. Their work details the experience from the individual’s perspective, 
showing the effects of the repressive experience and the psychological effects generated by fear. 
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Political Repression: Conceptual and Operational Definitions 
This study emphasizes the degree to which a state violates its citizens’ physical-
integrity rights, including the right to protection from political imprisonment, state-
sanctioned torture, disappearance, and extrajudicial killings. Conceptually, political 
repression involves  
“the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or 
organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of 
imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs 
perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.”32  
 
Operationally though, a simpler definition is required, for it is difficult to 
empirically verify the threatened use of sanctions and the deterrence of perceived beliefs. 
Here, Wood and Gibney’s (2010) definition provides a simple measure. Political 
repression is identified by “violations of physical or personal-integrity rights carried out 
by a state (or its agents)” (369). 
Distinguishing Political Repression from Other Mass Political Violence 
Political repression is distinct from, yet closely related to, other types of mass 
political violence like civil war, genocide, and reciprocal extermination. Kalyvas’s (2006) 
typology of mass political violence (Table 2 below) usefully delineated differences 
among these four ideal types33 based on two factors: (1) the production of violence, 
meaning whether the violence is “produced unilaterally (by one actor, usually the state) 
or bilaterally / multilaterally (by two or more competing actors)”; and (2) the aims of 
                                                 
32 See Davenport 2007b, 2. 
 
33 Ideal type is an appropriate term here. As Sambanis (2004) noted, groups often shift during a conflict 
from one form of violence to another. This makes strict categorization and coding of political violence 
rather difficult in practice.  
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violence, which are distinguished by “whether at least one political actor intends to 
govern the population it targets for violence” (26, 28).34 
Table 2: Typology of Mass Political Violence35 
 
Referencing this 2x2 model, Kalyvas distinguished political repression from 
genocide and mass deportation36 by the fact that with political repression, the government 
still intends to govern the intended population. This characteristic matches McCamant’s 
(1984) earlier declaration that political repression is best understood as a form of 
governance. Political repression differs from civil war in that the former involves one-
way violence by the government against a group of people; in the latter, violence is 
bilateral or multilateral. 
Rebuilding the State After Civil War: Balancing Deterrence and Assurance 
Post-conflict reconstruction of these states requires delicate balance between 
deterrence and assurance. Restoration of the state’s deterrent capability ensures that the 
state can prevent civil war recurrence; power must be wielded in such a manner that 
                                                 
34 The intent to govern is indicated by “whether the targets of violence have the option to surrender” (26). 
 
35 Adapted from Kalyvas (2006, 29). This project substitutes the term political repression where Kalyvas 
used the term state terror. 
36 Genocide is the physical elimination of targeted groups, while mass deportation is the spatial elimination 
of groups (2006, 30-31). 
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“individuals and groups refrain from engaging in serious conflict” (Saideman and Zahar 
2008, 2). Simultaneously, the government must assure its citizens that it will not threaten 
them with this same coercive capability; the government is obligated not to threaten the 
well being of its citizens.  
The challenge states have in balancing deterrence and assurance is not new. For 
example, Madison (in Hamilton et al., 2008, Federalist No. 51) concluded: 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty is this: You must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.  
 
Madison understood that deterrence alone is insufficient and dangerous; a government 
must also be obliged “to control itself”, to extend security guarantees to its own 
population without becoming a major threat to them. 
Gaps in the Literature 
The aforementioned arguments by Donnelly (2003, 2013), Madison (2008), and 
the applicable measures used by contemporary scholars are aligned and summarized in 
the table below in order to highlight research gaps.  
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Table 3: Government As Essential Protector and Principal Violator 
 
With respect to civil war outcomes, the extant literature has thoroughly explored 
the left side of this table (i.e. the state’s ability to protect and control the governed) by 
evaluating whether external intervention or negotiated settlements have helped the 
government sustain longer-term peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2010; Hartzell 1999; 
Licklider 1995; Regan 1998, 2002).37 Scholars have also evaluated external interventions 
and negotiated settlements in terms of their ability to help terminate civil wars (Olson 
Lounsbery, Pearson, and Talentino 2011; Regan 2002) and promote democratization 
(Downes and Monten 2013; Meernik 1996; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Von Hippel 
2000; Zürcher 2011; Zürcher et al. 2013).  
In comparison, scholarship has only rarely addressed the right side of the table—
evaluating government assurances in terms of human security—when considering civil 
war outcomes.38 At the time of this writing, no empirical studies considered how power-
                                                 
37 These scholars differ with respect to how long they believed peace must last before an operation or 
negotiated agreement could be deemed successful. In Regan’s (1998, 2002) view, success occurred as long 
as civil war did not recur within six months; Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2010) defined success as long as 
recurrence did not happen within a two-year window; finally, Hartzell (1999) and Licklider (1995) used a 
five-year window for civil war recurrence. 
38 Diehl and Druckman (2010, 1) attributed such gaps in comparative civil wars studies as due to scholars' 
myopic focus “on the factors thought to produce success rather than devoting attention to the criteria used 
to assess that success.” They proposed a multi-dimensional view of success in peace operations, based first 
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sharing provisions in civil wars affected the state’s violations of its citizens’ physical 
integrity rights.  
The research on third-party involvement in civil wars and in post-civil war 
recovery is similarly thin and underexplored with respect to state repression of physical-
integrity rights, and even thinner when constrained to third-party security guarantees. 
What literature does exist here has principally examined the effects of third-party 
interventions39 and peacekeeping operations on reducing civilian victimization and 
factional violence (Kathman, Gent, and Wood 2012; Kathman and Wood 2014)40, on 
mass killings (Kathman and Wood 2011), and on physical-integrity rights (Murdie and 
Davis 2010; Peksen 2012).41 With respect to the latter similar outcome, Murdie and 
Davis found that the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention in a state experiencing 
                                                                                                                                                 
on whether operations contained the conflict, settled the dispute, and abated violence and second on success 
in assigned peacebuilding missions (e.g. local security, election supervision, human rights protection, etc).   
39 Third-party intervention is distinctly different than third-party security guarantees. Conceptually, the 
latter involve “commitments of an outside power to deploy troops to protect the antagonists from each 
other should one of them defect from the agreement” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 749). Comparison is 
difficult since the two terms differ with respect to at least three key issues: timing (i.e. before conflict ends 
vs. after a negotiated settlement), direction of intervention (i.e. in support of the government or rebels vs. 
neutral), and purpose (i.e. bringing an end to a conflict vs. addressing the problem of credible commitment 
to a negotiated settlement).  
 
40 Kathman and Wood explored several closely related issues. Their most recent research (2014) found that 
the presence of larger numbers of UN peacekeeping troops is effective at protecting civilians from factional 
violence in an unstable post-conflict period. Kathman and Wood also demonstrated in an earlier study 
(2011) that third-party interventions—when backed by demonstrated resolve—do reduce in the long term 
the severity of mass killings and genocide. They theorized that this occurs because third parties shape the 
perpetrator’s decision-making calculus by changing the costs of policy implementation, thereby reducing 
the expectations of success. As noted in Kalyvas (2006) typology discussed in Chapter 2, genocide is 
categorically different than the violation of physical-integrity rights since the regime is not interested in 
governing these people over the long term. 
41 Peksen predominantly considered peace enforcement missions; Murdie and Davis evaluated 
peacekeeping missions only. 
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civil war did not lead to human-rights improvement; rather, their presence negatively 
affected physical-integrity rights.42  
Peksen’s (2012) causal argument—that third-party interventions made in support 
of governments increase that government’s capacity and that this increase in capacity 
automatically leads to increased political repression—is more highly contested 
(Davenport 2007c; Poe et al. 2000). Empirical evidence by these other scholars does not 
indicate that stronger governments automatically repress their people; rather, they 
respond to the previously discussed domestic threats, especially those that threaten the 
status quo. More often, it is weaker states that resort to repression, because their strength-
to-threat ratio is much lower than stronger states and, as a result, their motivation to 
repress is correspondingly higher (Poe et al. 2000).43 
More directly, scholarship has not yet examined, in any significant depth, how 
different provisions within negotiated settlements affect a state’s obligation to control 
itself by refraining from political repression. It is unknown whether the peace-agreement 
provisions that help a state deter civil war recurrence also help a state assure its citizens 
through recognition and protection of their physical integrity rights. It is also generally 
unknown how the different situational and historical contexts of these civil wars (e.g., 
variations in their duration or intensity) constrain or enable the improvement of these 
specific rights after a conflict ends.  
                                                 
 
43 Wood, Kathman, and Gent’s (2012) research corroborated Poe et al.’s argument—groups receiving 
support from external interveners are less inclined to use violence against civilians; weakened groups 
increase violence and killing of civilians. Of note, Russia’s external involvement in Syria has not followed 
this pattern as the Syrian regime has resorted to even greater levels of violence. 
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Government Assurances Unraveled by Civil War 
When individuals and groups reside within states where the central government 
effectively enforces rules, promotes order, and distributes power, they have little to fear. 
The state serves as a critical buffer between its citizens and the perils and insecurities of 
anarchy (Walter and Snyder 1999). However, when a government’s ability to control and 
rule breaks down—as experienced during a civil war—the buffer disappears; the 
Leviathan weakens, no longer holding the monopoly on the use of violence within its 
territory. Worse yet, the state itself turns against many citizens, using political repression 
to coerce those it perceives as opponents. In sum, “The modern state has emerged as both 
the principal threat to the enjoyment of human rights and the essential institution for their 
effective implementation and enforcement” (Donnelly 2003, 35). 
The Internal Security Dilemma  
The breakdown of a government’s ability to control and rule during civil war 
means “domestic groups face a world of uncertainty and unanswered questions” that 
persist even after the conflict has ended (Walter and Snyder 1999, 5). Groups begin to 
compete for security and power, grappling afresh with how power will be redistributed 
and whether other societal groups will “respect the status quo” or instead “take advantage 
of the situation to enhance their position within society” (Walter and Snyder 1999, 5). 
The security concerns of contending parties hinge on three key vulnerabilities. Prior 
belligerents fear their opponents will: (1) gain control of the new state’s coercive 
apparatus, (2) gain advantages regarding the new state’s distribution of political power, 
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and (3) gain advantages regarding the new state’s distribution of resources (Hartzell 
1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).  
The state represents one of these competing groups; as a central participant in the 
civil war, it is a biased party regarding power redistribution and therefore cannot credibly 
commit to protecting the opposition group(s) that it just recently fought in battle. Its 
involvement in the war—and the fact that all belligerents are politically and territorially 
co-located within the same state—creates a conundrum in negotiated settlements: How 
are the belligerents’ promises to be believed? How can prior combatants now living in 
close proximity provide realistic assurances? Walter (2002) termed this the challenge of 
credible commitment in resolving civil wars. In her view, the high stakes—should rivals 
cheat and exploit vulnerabilities rather than cooperate—creates a nearly impossible 
situation for combatants to credibly promise to abide by the negotiated terms after the 
agreement is signed and implementation begins.  
If the state’s coercive power is renewed after the war, opportunities are rife for the 
vicious spiral of security and power competition to re-ignite. Opposition groups are 
rightly concerned with how this power will affect their security. These deep concerns 
within post-conflict states create a “fear-producing environment” that encourages conflict 
between groups even if they lack aggressive aims (Walter and Snyder 1999). Hartzell 
(1999, 5) detailed this scenario well, highlighting the origins of the internal security 
dilemma after conflict has already ended: 
Ending a civil war calls for the reconstruction of central authority and the exercise 
of that authority by the state vis-a-vis society. The state, not rival groups, must 
now be vested with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, must reconstitute 
political power and enforce rules for the management of conflict, and must make 
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decisions regarding the redistribution of resources. Yet it is precisely these 
dimensions of state power that raise the specter of the security dilemma for 
groups in conflict. Accustomed to providing for their own security during the 
course of a civil war, groups in a divided society must now be concerned about 
the impact that the state’s use of coercive force, control of political power, and 
regulation of economic resources will have on their security.  
 
The conjunction of group vulnerability, lack of ability to credibly commit to 
peace terms, and the restoration of the state’s coercive capability instigates a strategic 
predicament within the state known as “the security dilemma.” This term defines “a 
strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors” where the actions of 
each party to improve its own security result in decreasing the security of the others 
(Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4). The pioneer of security dilemma theory, John Herz, 
concluded that individuals and groups caught in this strategic predicament are fearful of 
“being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals” so 
they react by acquiring “more and more power in order to escape the power of others. 
This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the 
worst” (1950, 157). A vicious action-reaction cycle of competition for security and power 
is initiated between opponents,44 with the cycle intensifying if no external arbiter or 
authority intervenes to reverse the conflict spiral (Booth 2008; Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; 
Walter 1997). 
                                                 
44 These competitions—both within the civil war and after its conclusion—have enduring consequences. 
Snyder and Jervis (1999, 22) for example, caution that the erosion of state authority as experienced in civil 
war “may not only create or awaken security fears but generate behavior that makes later situations much 
more intractable.” This is because the security competition typically manifests not as a Hobbesian war of 
all against all, but rather between groups who fight to capture the previously discussed dimensions of state 
powers. As a result, “the security of individuals becomes implicated with the fates of the contending 
groups”, meaning that personal security (i.e. one’s physical-integrity rights) and personal well being (i.e. 
one’s economic and social status) often become intertwined with one’s ethnic or group identity (22). 
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Resolving the Internal Security Dilemma 
Snyder and Jervis (1999, 17) detailed two prescriptive possibilities for resolving 
the security dilemma. First, if the question driving civil conflict is “Who rules?” (Betts 
1994), one potential solution is “to answer that question quickly and decisively” by 
establishing a Hobbesian Leviathan—“a sovereign authority capable of enforcing a 
hegemonic peace upon all the fearfully contending parties” (17). This solution vests the 
state with robust deterrence capability, but leaves no assurances for opposition parties 
whatsoever; much of the population, as Hartzell noted earlier, would remain grossly 
insecure.  
Alternatively, the contending parties might arrange a binding “institutional 
framework that guarantees their mutual self-restraint once they lay their weapons down” 
(Snyder and Jervis 1999, 18). Instead of establishing unlimited government power, the 
reconstituted regime would be constrained through arrangements like power-sharing 
schemes, new constitutional rules, and/or the presence of an external third-party 
guarantor. This solution set aligns with the writings of many classical liberal theorists—
from John Locke to Baron Charles-Louis de Montesquies, James Mill, Alexander 
Hamilton, and James Madison—who each posited that:  
Successful state building called for a careful balancing of two competing 
imperatives: limiting the power of the state in order to preserve individual liberty, 
and endowing government with sufficient means to uphold the law and to protect 
the constitutional order itself against foreign and domestic threats. These writers 
rejected Hobbes’ argument that an all-powerful ruler was needed to maintain 
domestic order and social life, but they did not entirely dispense with the 
Leviathan. They domesticated it. Lasting peace required both the protection of 
individual freedom and the existence of effective governmental institutions, since 
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the alternative to effective government was untenable: the insecure state of 
nature.45  
 
Empirical evidence backs their theoretical argument, demonstrating that the 
dissolution and isolation of “civil institutions capable of protecting or insulating citizens 
from state power” is known to increase political repression (Corradi, Fagen, and Garretón 
1992b, 2). Conversely, the intentional reconstruction of effective government institutions 
with appropriate checks and balances leads to improved human rights.  
Advocates of military, political, and territorial power-sharing agreements contend 
that the inclusion of these measures in the negotiated settlement necessarily restricts: (1) 
the exercise of central authority with respect to the use of force, (2) the enforcement of 
political rules, and (3) the redistribution of territorial resources, respectively. Such 
restrictions assure the opposition groups about their own security, which reduces their 
need to pursue power and security. In turn, this also reduces the threat to the government. 
The restrictions also limit the government’s opportunities to repress and may present the 
government with improved alternative governance mechanisms beyond coercion.  
The provision of third-party security guarantees helps to guarantee self-restraint 
by the government and aid former belligerents in overcoming the challenges of credibly 
commiting to institutional frameworks established in a peace agreement (Walter 1997; 
Walter and Snyder 1999; Walter 2002). In sum, this means that the inclusion of power-
sharing agreements and third-party security guarantees ought to reduce the level of 
political repression used by the state after war has ended.  
                                                 
45 This quotation is from Paris’s (2004, 50) superb distillation of the classical liberal theorists.  
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 To explain these causal stories in more depth, the three factors known to lead to 
increased political repression are first explored below. Chapter 4 then summarizes the 
current literature—regarding peace-agreement provisions and peace duration—and 
extends application of the former conditions to the outcome of political repression, using 
the three factors discussed below.  
Why States Politically Repress 
The use of political repression by violating an individual’s physical integrity 
rights—whether in the form of torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, or 
political imprisonment—is understood as a course of action initiated by the government. 
Governments often turn to this type of political repression as a means of governance, 
believing that “the state is master of society”; population coercion serves an essential role 
then in establishing and preserving political rule (McCamant 1984, 34).46 Under this 
logic, political repression does not necessarily end when conflict ends, since powerful 
pressures exist for the ruling regime to solidify centralized control; kidnapping, torture, 
and murder are often employed as state policy in order to secure victory (Lopez 1984).  
In order to find conditions that might mitigate or exacerbate the violation of 
physical integrity rights, this project first considers those factors that historically led to 
such increased political repression.47 Contemporary research on political repression 
empirically demonstrates that state-based political repression increases when: (1) higher 
                                                 
46 Also see Dallin and Breslauer’s (1970) discussion on political terror, in which they argue that 
government coercion is principally a means to exert political and social control. 
 
47 This argument was inspired by Fortna’s (2008, 82) use of causal logic to explain whether and how 
peacekeeping works in reducing war recurrence. Fortna began that exercise by thinking about ways that 
peace might collapse; to match the dependent variable (outcome in QCA), this project began by 
considering ways that political repression might increase. 
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levels of threat or political dissent increase the state’s motivation to repress; (2) the 
absence of institutional checks and balances on the government increases its opportunity 
to repress; (3) the government lacks alternative governance methods for establishing 
societal control beyond the use of coercion. Each causal mechanism is explored below. 
Motivation to Repress 
When the domestic status quo is challenged—when behaviors such as political 
dissension or political violence threaten “the political system, government personnel, the 
economy, or the lives, beliefs, and livelihoods of those with their territorial 
jurisdiction”—states are likely to respond with repression (Davenport 2007a, 7). 
Davenport (2007a, 7) aptly termed this “The Law of Coercive Responsiveness.” The 
empirical literature robustly demonstrates the principal driver of a state’s response is the 
intensity of the threat facing a regime. Increases in the level of political dissension and 
violence—whether in the form of strikes, riots, demonstrations, unrest or guerilla 
warfare—are consistently found to increase state repression (Carey 2009; Davenport 
1995; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Regan and Henderson 2002).  
Scholars have also shown that the intensity of the threat is typically reflected by 
the type or form of violence (e.g. demonstrations,  riots, civil war, etc) that threatens a 
regime. Carey (2010), for example, evaluated the effects of different forms of domestic 
dissent on the probability of state-repression onset. She concluded that both non-violent 
dissent (e.g., demonstrations and strikes) and relatively unplanned dissent (e.g., riots) 
elicit very little repression-response in comparison with greater threats such as guerrilla 
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attacks.48 Correspondingly, states engaged in civil war—arguably the greatest threat to 
the status quo—consistently increase political repression as a means of engaging against 
suspected opposition members (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  
Davenport’s law does not always hold true though. Sometimes intense threats do 
not lead to intense political repression. Empirical evidence shows that responses are, at 
times, moderated or altogether absent. To explain these exceptions, Poe, Tate, Keith, and 
Lanier (2000) proposed that the threat level is not the sole determinant of political 
repression. Instead, governments take into account the political strength of their regime 
relative to the threat before they choose to violate personal-integrity rights. According to 
this model, which they call the “strength-to-threat ratio,” leaders respond “either when 
they perceive levels of domestic threat (T) to be greater than their regime’s Strength (S), 
or when Threat has increased relative to the Strength of their regime, thus increasing their 
perception of the probability that their regime will be toppled” (29). When a 
government’s strength-to-threat ratio is low, it violates physical-integrity rights as a 
means to decrease the threat. Likewise, a state with a higher ratio is less likely to revert to 
political repression in comparison to a state where this gap is comparatively small. The 
weaker regime is more motivated to politically repress in order to avoid any further decay 
of their authority.49  
                                                 
48 Also see Davenport’s (2007b) repression model that emphasized when threats to the government become 
less severe, governments substitute non-violent repression techniques instead of violent repression. 
49 The use of coercion serves two purposes here: First, it influences the course of domestic opposition. 
Second, it signals to external parties that the regime still exerts a strong monopoly on the use of violence 
over their territory in spite of such threats (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). 
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Opportunity to Repress 
…once a system that permits peaceful party opposition is highly institutionalized 
and surrounded with legal protections. . . the costs of destroying it are likely to be 
extremely high. For a government can destroy the opposition only by wrecking 
the constitutional system.50 
 
The presence of certain democratic institutional restrictions reduces the 
government’s opportunity to repress. Institutional restrictions within democracies include 
such measures as electoral participation and competition, as well as executive constraints. 
Electoral participation and competition encourage the masses to participate in the 
democratic process. Governments operating under such restrictions reduce the degree of 
repression since higher levels of repression would more readily lead to contestation of 
political offices and removal from positions by being voted out of office (Bueno De 
Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007a). Executive constraints, meanwhile, refer to 
checks and balances on the decision-making powers of chief government executives. 
Such checks and balances include the institutionalized constraints imposed by various 
accountability groups; such as, a legislative assembly, the military, an independent 
judiciary (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). These constraints on executive decision-
making powers reduce the available repression opportunities.  
Such restrictions strengthen the institutional checks and balances on the regime 
and thereby constrain the degree of political repression (Davenport 2007a; Gates et al. 
2006; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005). Opportunities to repress abound in authoritarian 
regimes, since the government has little fear of accountability or attribution; evidence 
demonstrates that leaders in authoritarian regimes repress their citizens more than do 
                                                 
50 See Dahl (1966, xvi). 
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leaders in democratic regimes, for the citizens possess few effective legal mechanisms to 
counter their power in comparison their democratic counterparts (Davenport 2007b).  
 Notably, the mere presence of a democratic regime will not automatically reduce 
the likelihood of political repression. Elections alone, for example, “neither make a 
democracy nor are they inherently the best place to begin state-building. Instead, 
elections are effective when other institutional changes that ensure accountability are put 
into place” (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005, 456).51  
 Meaningful improvement in a state’s human-rights performance is only likely 
after a regime adopts and permits institutionalization of certain competitive measures, 
such as, executive constraints and multi-party competition, which are strongly associated 
with deeper accountability (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005). These scholars also 
determined that improved human rights are correlated with full democracy; governments 
shy of this mark do not lead to greater respect for physical-integrity rights. In other 
words, only states with higher levels of democracy, regardless of their election rules, 
were more respectful of human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Davenport 1995, 
1997; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; 
Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).52 Davenport and Armstrong (2004; 
2007b) further contested that a consistent relationship between democracy and respect for 
                                                 
51 Donnelly (2013) similarly warns against overemphasis on election mechanisms as the primary means to 
constrain rulers. Electoral democracies do not necessarily align with improved human rights. Rather, in his 
view, only liberal democracies reinforce human rights, for “The liberal commitment to individual rights 
more than the democratic commitment to popular empowerment makes contemporary liberal democracies 
rights-protective” (224). 
52 The specific variables and operationalization of regime type with respect to these findings is discussed 
further in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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physical-integrity rights only holds true once a very high minimum threshold53 of 
democracy has been passed; once beyond this level of democracy, authorities finally 
perceive constraints on their actions and reduce their use of political repression.  
Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
Coercion is just one of several options for governing state-society relations. 
Existing research shows regimes may also select from at least two alternative governance 
mechanisms, including (1) coopting the opposition and (2) cooperating with the 
opposition.54 The government’s ability to coopt the opposition is generally proxied by the 
level of economic development and by state capacity; its ability to cooperate is captured 
by regime type (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). When regimes possess increased 
capacity to coopt, or cooperate with, their populations, governments are constrained from 
pursuing coercion. Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 540) explained the causal linkage 
between governance alternatives and the level of political repression thusly:  
Alternatives (e.g., material and normative forms of influence) create distinct 
approaches to governance as well as advocates for each style. Both can hinder the 
coercive strategies of government by offering a different way of looking at the 
problem of sociopolitical order and different means to get there. When 
alternatives exist, then coercion and those who advocate for its use are compelled 
to justify, persuade, and compete with the others, thereby hindering them (at least 
when viewed relative to the other contexts that do not require such actions).  
 
Both alternatives are explored in more depth below. 
 
                                                 
53 This threshold is detailed in Chapter 5, in the section on Regime Type. 
54 The names and initial arguments for this three-pronged approach to alternative governance mechanisms 
originated from Fjelde and Soysa’s (2009) work entitled Coercion, Cooptation, or Cooperation? State 
Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961-2004. Fjelde and Soysa considered these three components as the 
key dimensions of state capacity that define a state’s relations with society. Where Fjelde and Soysa used 
these as pre-war predictors of civil war outbreak, they are applied here in the post-war context to state 
repression, as alternative mechanisms for governing a population. 
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Cooptation of the Opposition 
States with sufficient economic development or extractive taxation mechanisms 
can leverage economic gains to directly coopt rivals, or to expand welfare to larger 
opposition groups through public goods provisions, rather than resort to political 
repression as the primary means of governance. According to the scholars DeRouen et al 
(2010) and Taydas and Peksen (2012), high levels of economic development may 
improve the ability to coopt rivals and also reduce the need for third-party involvement in 
peace agreement implementation.  
Strong economic standing also may defray the level of threat facing a government 
(Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Empirical evidence provided by Hoddie and Hartzell 
(2003b) showed that peace agreements are more likely to be implemented at higher levels 
of economic development; in other words, civil war recurrence is less likely when states 
possess greater economic margin. Finally, a number of scholars (Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) found that the level of 
economic development—also called economic standing—decreases human-rights 
violations; and that poor states resort to violating physical-integrity rights more readily 
than rich states, who have more resources to distribute to oppositions groups they have 
coopted. 
Cooperation with the Opposition 
Cooperation within democratic institutions is advocated and understood as a 
cheaper, more effective societal control mechanism than coercion, especially in the long 
term (Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 540; Davenport 
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2007a). Democratic institutions—with an emphasis on voting, negotiation, mediation, 
and compromise—allow for nonviolent conflict resolution without the state resorting to 
physical repression (Davenport 2007b; Poe and Tate 1994). Davenport (2007a, 11) 
explained this logic, concluding, “Democracies provide an alternative mechanism of 
control through participation and contestation. They also weaken the justification for 
coercive activity by reducing the likelihood for human conflict and facilitating the 
conveyance of grievances.”  
Where states lack well-established democratic institutions, their ability “to resolve 
or suppress the conflicts of interest stemming from growing demands for political 
participation” is undermined (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 87). The unresolved tensions 
usually result in either “belligerence abroad” (in the form of interstate war) or an increase 
in domestic dissent and political repression (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 274). This 
increase in repression is often counterproductive, leading to escalated political dissension 
and violence. Nonetheless, regimes still revert to increased repression “not because it has 
a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to 
less violent alternatives” (Job 1992, 29). Governments that lack alternative governance 
mechanisms outside of coercion are thus more likely to revert to political repression to 
control the governed and preserve political rule. 
 Returning then to the beneficial constraints introduced by democracy—these 
constraints are not inviolate. Research indicates that while democratic institutions reduce 
the likelihood of a regime’s selection of political repression, this influence may be 
overwhelmed by higher levels of political conflict (Davenport 2007a, b). In sum, 
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democratic institutions introduce useful constraints on the government’s opportunity to 
repress, though strong threat levels can weaken these constraints. 
Summary 
 This chapter argued that scholarship has not yet examined, in any significant 
depth, how different provisions within negotiated settlements affect a state’s obligation to 
control itself by refraining from political repression. Therefore, this project focuses on 
government assurances after civil war has ended via negotiated settlement, by observing 
the state’s protection of physical-integrity rights. The chapter demonstrated that the 
government’s ability to assure its citizens is deeply unsettled during post-conflict 
reconstruction due to the challenge of credible commitment and the exacerbation of the 
internal security dilemma as the state regains its deterrence capabilities.  
 In accordance with previous scholarship, political repression was defined as 
unilateral political violence conducted by a state in order to govern its people. That is, a 
state that violates its citizens’ physical integrity rights engages in acts of political 
repression in order to coerce them and thereby retain societal control. In contrast, a state 
that protects physical integrity rights is evidenced by its refraining from political 
repression. 
 States were shown to increase their use of political repression when: (1) threats to 
the regime increase, which motivates the state to repress; (2) no restrictions exist on the 
power of authorities, which increases the state’s opportunity to repress without immediate 
costs or accountability; and (3) alternative governance mechanisms are absent, which 
leaves the government without the ability to coopt or cooperate with its citizens; coercion 
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becomes the sole avenue of governance. Conversely, states decrease their use of political 
repression—meaning human rights will significantly improve—when: (1) the threat to 
the regime is reduced; (2) when institutional checks and balances increase the costs and 
decrease the government’s opportunities to repress; and (3) when alternative governance 
mechanisms like cooptation and cooperation are robust, providing different options than 
coercion when threats arise. So then, if a peace-agreement provision is to succeed in 
reducing the government’s use of political repression, it likely must either decrease the 
government’s motivation to repress, decrease its opportunity to repress, or improve 
alternative governance mechanisms.  
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Chapter Three: Research Design 
This chapter establishes essential components of the research design. It begins by 
defining civil war and negotiated settlements alongside identification of datasets for 
verifying these conditions. This information both bounds the universe of applicable cases 
and informs the selection of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as the principal 
methodology. The selection rationale for QCA is clarified and key terms within the 
methodology—such as, multiple conjunctural causality, equifinality, and INUS 
conditions—are explained. 
The chapter then returns to the remaining requisite steps of the first phase of 
QCA, which includes: (1) identifying and defining the outcome; (2) identifying and 
defining the conditions; and (3) establishing a testable model (or models). Chapter 2 
accomplished much of the first step, defining the outcome of political repression as the 
violation by a government or its actors of its citizens’ personal-integrity rights. This 
chapter extends that discussion by identifying applicable datasets for human-rights data 
and demonstrating initial coding of the raw data. 
With respect to selection of conditions (i.e. variables), several methods are 
available to QCA researchers. The methods selected here were particularly informed by 
the inherent challenge within QCA of limited diversity—which is the reality that not all 
potential causal configurations are empirically represented by actual cases. An excess of 
conditions exacerbates the problem of limited diversity; prudent scholarship requires 
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reducing and refining the conditions to an optimal number and representation that enables 
the simplest explanation that sufficiently explains the outcome. That is, scholars must 
balance parsimony with explanatory sufficiency.  
Variable complexity was reduced in this project via the technique of categorizing 
conditions as remote or proximate conditions. The chapter explains this technique and 
then categorizes the conditions of this project accordingly; specific definition and 
elaboration of those conditions as well as the presentation of the two models is reserved 
for follow-on chapters.  
To recapitulate, the purpose of this chapter is identification of the pertinent 
datasets, cases, and conditions that encapsulate the analysis. This information, coupled 
with the theoretical background provided in Chapter 2 and the selected methodology of 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (also discussed here) establishes the necessary 
structural scaffolding and context upon which the hypotheses (proposed in Chapter 4) 
might be built and the multi-method analyses then begun.   
Universe of Cases: Negotiated Settlements 
By focusing on that peace-agreement provisions have on human rights outcomes, 
this project bounds the universe of relevant cases to the set of civil wars that ended in 
negotiated settlements. The other forms of civil war termination—including military 
victory by the government, military victory by the rebels, ceasefires, and stalemates—are 
excluded from the project.55 
                                                 
55 For analysis of how conflict termination type influences peace duration see Toft (2009). 
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Dataset for Negotiated Settlements 
Several existing datasets cover negotiated peace agreements that followed civil 
wars. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b), for example, investigated thirty-eight civil war 
settlements signed between 1945-1998. Mattes and Savun (2009) extended this dataset, 
covering peace agreements from 1945-2005. This project utilized the latter dataset, with 
two minor modifications to the timeline. First, the start date was delayed. Only civil wars 
with peace agreements initiated in 1989 or later were retained. This temporal shift was 
made for two reasons: (1) It controlled for the biased motivations of Cold War peace 
operations and third-party interventions;56 and (2) Negotiated settlements in civil wars 
that ended before the Cold War were rare. Even if the start date of the dataset was shifted 
to the earliest possibility of 1976—when human-rights data first became available—this 
would only have added two more cases overall (i.e., Chad 1979 and Zimbabwe 1979).57 
The second timeline modification was that the end date was extended to 2007. This 
maximized the available data on civil wars, while preserving a minimum of five years of 
human-rights data for observation.58  
Several direct benefits resulted from using Mattes and Savun’s (2009) research as 
an initial baseline: First, Mattes and Savun provided empirical data for disaggregated 
political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions during the timeframe of 
                                                 
56 This modification follows scholarly precedent. Fortna (2008, 2010) observed, for example, that the 
primary purpose of peacekeeping in civil wars prior to 1989 “was less to prevent the resumption of war 
than to contain the conflict to prevent direct superpower intervention.” She therefefore limited her study to 
the post-Cold War period. 
57 A number of civil wars occurred between 1976-1988, but the great majority of these ended in either 
government or rebel victory. 
58 When the dataset was initially compiled in November of 2014, PTS data was available through 2012 and 
CIRI data through 2011. As of January 2017, PTS data is now updated through 2015.  
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interest. Second, Mattes and Savun coded these provisions by indicating their presence 
(yes, or 1) or their absence (no, or 0). This dichotomization of power-sharing provisions 
ensured easy transferability into both the contingency tables and into QCA practices, 
without requiring further calibration of the raw data. 
Civil War and Negotiated Settlements Defined 
Mattes and Savun (2009) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b) defined civil wars 
using the four criteria of the Correlates of War (COW) project. The COW project 
identifies civil war occurrence when: (1) The conflict leads to at least 1,000 battle deaths 
per year; (2) the national government is one of the principal disputing parties; (3) both the 
national government and its adversaries demonstrate effective resistance; (4) the conflict 
occurs within a single state’s recognized territorial boundaries (Singer and Small 1982).59  
In turn, these scholars operationally verified the presence of negotiated 
settlements based on “representatives of opposing sides in a conflict” holding “face-to-
face talks” that led to the peace agreement (Mattes and Savun 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 
2003a, 309, 323). Notably their definition of settlements did not outline specific 
requirements that a negotiation must contain. Instead, provisions within peace agreements 
were reserved as independent variables. Likewise, in this project, peace-agreement 
provisions are used to differentiate between negotiated and their respective effects on a 
specific outcome of interest. 
                                                 
59 Under COW’s (Sarkees and Wayman 2010b) updated typology, civil war is but one type of intrastate 
war, distinguished by the involvement of a state’s government against a non-state entity. Two other types 
of intrastate war exist in this new typology: 1) regional internal wars and 2) intercommunal wars. This 
project uses the original typology.  
   76 
Dataset Extension and Benefits 
Negotiated settlements signed after 2005 were identified using the aforemen-
tioned definition of civil wars and the COW database. The PRIO/UCDP Peace 
Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011) was used to confirm these civil wars. The two-year 
extension from 2005 to 2007 caused the following changes: (1) previously recorded data 
for Sudan and Burundi was adjusted; and (2) the civil war in Nepal was added. The civil 
war in Chad was also considered because it was in the COW database and in the 
PRIO/UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. However, closer inspection revealed that Chad 
did not merit inclusion because the peace agreement failed to meet the previously 
discussed definition of a negotiated settlement.60  
When Mattes and Savun’s dataset was adjusted to encapsulate negotiated 
settlements in civil wars ending between 1989-2007, a total of thirty-six civil wars were 
shown to have occurred in twenty-six different states.61 Table 4 (below) summarizes 
these wars, along with each conflicts’ start and end years. The wars are organized 
chronologically by start year. When multiple conflicts occurred within the same state, a 
number was added after the state abbreviation to differentiate between these wars. For 
brevity in all tables hereafter, COW’s standardized three-letter state abbreviations 
(caseID) are used to identify the different cases.  
                                                 
60 Specifically, the Tripoli Accord (also known as the Tripoli Agreement or Tripoli Declaration) was more 
accurately an inter-state agreement signed on February 9, 2006 by President Al Bashir of the Republic of 
the Sudan and President Itno of the Republic of Chad rather than an agreement between the central 
government and internal opposition within its territory. The agreement itself—along with the full title of 
the agreement—makes this distinction clear, for it called urgently on “both parties to refrain from all 
interference in the internal affairs of the other party and from providing support to armed groups operating 
in either country” (UNSC 15 February 2006).  
61 Civil war recurred in Angola (three recurrences), Liberia (two recurrences), and in Croatia, Georgia, , the 
Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Of the 36 civil wars, 21 occurred in Africa. 
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Table 4: Civil Wars Ending in Negotiated Settlements, 1989-2007 
 
Why QCA Was Selected 
Two methodological challenges existed at the outset in addressing the effects of 
various peace-agreement measures on human-rights outcomes: First, the set of applicable 
cases was reduced by the focus on negotiated settlements and on the outcome of human 
rights. These limitations narrowed the maximum number of cases to thirty-six civil wars, 
which negated the use of regression tools. Other scholars like Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) 
surmounted this issue by counting multiple agreements within the same civil war as 
different cases.62 Their approach was not used here, given the probable bias toward civil 
wars resolved with multiple or incremental agreements versus those resolved with 
singular comprehensive peace agreements. Second, more variables had to be added 
                                                 
62 Where scholars like Mattes and Savun (2009) evaluated just three negotiated settlements for Liberia (one 
for each of its respective civil wars), Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) considered nine different agreements 
within those same three conflicts. Similarly, Jarstad and Nilsson evaluated Chad’s singular civil war using 
nine different agreements. Their coding process yielded 83 agreements over a similar time period of 
interest to this study and allowed them to conduct statistical analysis. 
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beyond the individual peace-agreement provisions introduced earlier; that is, the analysis 
needed to account for potential intervening variables or scope conditions. 
From these two challenges arose the classic “many variables, small number of 
cases” dilemma commonly found in comparative social science research (see, e.g., 
Lijphart 1971, 685; Lijphart 1975). This dilemma persists because neither quantitative 
nor qualitative methods produce resolution: predominant quantitative techniques are 
incapable of delineating the causal complexity necessary for small- and medium-N 
comparative research (Ragin 2008) and the sheer number of cases makes qualitative 
cross-case comparison via case studies unwieldy.  
Bridging the Methodological Divide 
To bridge the large methodological divide between the qualitative, case-oriented, 
narrative method and the quantitative, variable oriented approach, Ragin (1987, 2014) 
proposed an alternative methodology. Known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA), the method was designed to surmount the “small N, many variables” dilemma. 
Further, it allowed researchers who desired to test complex patterns in relatively small- to 
medium-sized datasets with a “synthetic, broadly comparative strategy”, one that sought 
to be “both holistic…and analytic” so that the cases would not be lost in the research 
process and so that more than a few cases could be comprehended, with the potential for 
at least modest generalization (Ragin 2014, xiv).  
QCA uniquely combines key features from both the case-oriented and variable-
oriented approaches. Regarding the former, QCA imports the capability to analyze causal 
complexity and to account for different combinatorial configurations, constellations, and 
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conjunctures of explanatory factors (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 1987, 2014). It 
accomplishes this by representing each individual case as a complex entity, holistically 
composed of a configuration of conditions (Marx and Dusa 2011; Ragin 2014; Rihoux & 
Lobe 2009). With respect to the variable-oriented approach, QCA imports its robust, 
analytical techniques; comparison of cases is made possible by data-reduction methods 
involving Boolean algebra and logic. In sum, the combination of qualitative components 
with cross-case comparison allows researchers to explore and identify “decisive cross-
case patterns, the usual domain of quantitative analysis” (Fiss 2012). 
Multiple Conjunctural Causation and INUS Conditions 
Perhaps QCA’s greatest strength lies in its fundamental assumption known as 
multiple conjunctural causation. This notion assumes that different combinations or 
intersections of causal conditions may lead to the same outcome. The accommodation of 
multiple conjunctural causation implies that: 
(1) most often, it is a combination of conditions that generate an outcome; (2) 
several different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome; (3) a 
given condition may have a different impact on the outcome depending on 
context. This allowance for greater causal complexity also implies that a causal 
condition may have opposite effects depending on context.63  
 
Context-free causality is, therefore, rejected in favor of context-sensitive causality that 
accounts for structural, enduring attributes of social entities like states (Marx and Dusa 
2011; Ragin 2014, 55).   
 The use of set-theoretic relationships and Boolean logic also allows QCA 
practitioners to consider and evaluate “those factors as causally relevant that alone are not 
sufficient or necessary” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 754) to an outcome of interest. 
                                                 
63 See Ragin (2014, xxii).  
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These factors are called INUS conditions. Mackie (1974, 79) first coined this acronym to 
describe situations where each respective condition is an “insufficient but necessary part 
of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.” When Mackie 
referred to the condition being part of another condition, he was referencing what QCA 
scholars alternatively call causal recipes or configurations of conditions. Fiss’s (2012) 
clarification of Mackie’s original definition usefully separates the four different aspects of 
the definition (see Figure 6 below):  
  
 Figure 6: INUS Conditions Defined64 
 QCA solution formulas, derived from truth tables and data reduction, commonly 
contain INUS conditions. These solutions contrast sharply with the approach of natural 
scientists who “attempt to establish causes that are either necessary or sufficient or both 
necessary and sufficient” (Ragin 2014, 27). 
In summary, QCA’s selection as the primary methodology was based on: (1) its 
capacity to deal with medium-N comparative research, which is critical given the limited 
number of cases here; (2) its holistic and analytic approach, combining features of 
qualitative, case-oriented research with cross-case comparisons; (3) its context-sensitive 
causality, accounting for structural, enduring attributes; (4) its systematic approach that 
                                                 
64 Reprinted from Fiss (2012). See Psillos (2002, 88-89) for an excellent illustration of an INUS condition, 
using the argument that a short circuit is an INUS condition for the outcome of a house fire. 
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involves the use of set-theoretic relationships, Boolean logic, and an assumption of causal 
complexity; and (5) its allowance for INUS conditions and for multiple conjunctural 
causation (i.e. the idea that different causal recipes may lead to the same outcome).  
QCA’s Lexicon 
QCA is distinguished from quantitative analysis in its examination of set relations 
rather than correlations. Rather than emphasizing the explanatory power of competing 
independent variables on the dependent variable, the core of QCA’s approach is oriented 
towards linking “configurations of causally relevant conditions to outcomes” (Ragin 
2014, xxi-xxii). Conditions “are not ‘independent’ variables” however; rather “they are 
expected to operate in combination” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 93). In addition, 
different sets (i.e. configurations or combinations) of conditions can lead to the same 
outcome. These fundamental differences necessitate an updated lexicon. The table below 
summarizes these terms; fuller explanations and applications are provided in Chapter 6.  
 
  
   82 
Table 5: Conventional vs. QCA Terminology65  
 
The Outcome 
The first critical phase in QCA involves identifying relevant cases, then 
identifying and defining the outcome of interest. The relevant cases were described 
above; the outcome of interest was conceptually and operationally defined in Chapter 2. 
Wood and Gibney’s (2010, 369) definition was selected: Political repression is 
recognized by “violations of physical or personal-integrity rights carried out by a state (or 
its agents).” 
Measuring Violations of Personal-Integrity Rights  
Political repression was measured using the Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset. 
This dataset aligns with Wood and Gibney’s operational definition of political repression. 
The Political Terror Scale provides an aggregated measure of personal-integrity rights on 
a country-year basis. Originally developed by Gibney and Dalton (1996), this annual 
measure was given greater currency by Poe and Tate (1994) and leveraged in a number of 
empirical studies (Carey 2009; Davenport 2007a, b; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and 
Keith 1999).  
                                                 
65 Table adapted from Ragin (2014, xxiii, Table A). 
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In the PTS dataset, state violence is assessed along three dimensions: (1) scope, 
which addresses the type of violence employed by the state (e.g., killing, imprisonment, 
etc); (2) intensity, meaning the frequency with which a state conducts a given type of 
violence over a given time period; and (3) range, meaning the portion of the population 
or segment(s) of society targeted by the government for abuse (Wood and Gibney 2010). 
Two individual reviewers subjectively assessed these three measures using content 
analysis of yearly Amnesty International and US State Department Country Reports. The 
reviewers used a fixed five-point coding scheme66 that capitalized on the aforementioned 
dimensions of scope, intensity, and range (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373): 
1. Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their 
views, and torture is rare or exceptional. . . . Political murders are extremely 
rare. 
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, a few persons are affected; torture and beating are exceptional. . . . 
Political murder is rare. 
3. There is extensive political imprisonment. . . . Execution or other political 
murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without 
trial, for political views is accepted. 
4. The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, 
disappearances, and torture are part of life. . . . In spite of its generality, on 
this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or 
ideas. 
5. The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. . . . The 
leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
 
 On this data scale, 1 indicates a very low level of physical-integrity rights’ 
violations, while 5 represents violence throughout the whole population. Two PTS scores 
(PTS-State, PTS-Amnesty) are published each year for each country, starting in 1976.  
                                                 
66 The five-point coding scheme “was adopted from a ‘political terror’ scale published by Freedom House 
in its 1980 yearbook” (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373). For this original yearbook, see Gastil (1980).   
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Rather than using just one score—and given that the information in the State Department  
and Amnesty International reports provides different though related annual measures of 
the abuse of physical-integrity rights (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999)—this project uses an 
average of these two scores as the measure of human rights at a given time period. 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human-Rights Database 
A second, well-respected measure of human rights, the Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) human rights database, also derives its categorical scores from the same source 
data. CIRI however prioritizes the US State Department Country Reports as its primary 
source and the Amnesty International Reports as its secondary source (Wood and Gibney 
2010, 375). Since both PTS and CIRI measures focus on the same types of violence and 
code from the same descriptive data, they expectedly correlate quite highly at 0.65 for 
PTS-Amnesty scores and approximately 0.73 for PTS-State scores (Wood and Gibney 
2010). However, the coding methodologies between PTS and CIRI differ significantly, 
which explains why the correlation is not stronger.  
PTS provides a single score (1 to 5) that collectively assesses multiple types of 
political repression. In contrast, CIRI presents a 9-point cumulative scale (0 to 8) that is 
the aggregated total of four ordinal indicators that gauge the government’s respect for its 
citizens’ physical-integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999a).67 Those indicators 
include extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture. These 
                                                 
67 For the CIRI dataset, higher scores represent decreased violations of physical-integrity rights, whereas 
with PTS, higher scores reflect increased violations of these rights. To aid in comparison and interpretation 
throughout this study, all CIRI scores were inverted in the datasets. This action aligned PTS and CIRI 
scores so that higher values indicated a higher level of human-rights abuses (i.e., more frequent, systematic 
violations by a government of physical-integrity rights).  
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four subcomponents are individually scored as 0 (no incidents in the category), 1 (1-49 
incidents of the abuse), or 2 (50 or more incidents involving this type of repression).  
In this study, the average PTS score is used as the primary human-rights measure. 
Findings in Chapter 5 were crosschecked against CIRI data.68 CIRI is useful as a 
robustness check given its use of the same source data but with a different coding 
scheme. PTS was preferred as the primary human rights measure given CIRI’s arbitrary 
coding threshold based on the occurrence of fifty incidents in a given country (Wood and 
Gibney 2010).69 In addition, CIRI data is missing from a number of civil wars: seven of 
thirty-six cases (19%) are missing data at two years after the war ended; four of thirty-six 
cases (11%) are missing this four years after the war; and at ten years after the war, nine 
of thirty-six cases (25%) are missing data.  
Coding the Outcome 
To evaluate the effects of different conditions on the respective human-rights 
measures, the year that a civil war ended is set as time t. The end of civil war was 
selected rather than the year of the peace agreement because conflict often extends a year 
past the agreement and because the presence of civil war is strongly correlated with 
worse human-rights practices (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The termination of civil war 
should therefore correspond with improved human rights, ceteris parabis.  
                                                 
68 Running an alternative fuzzy-set analysis against CIRI data at a given time period is a time-consuming 
endeavor best reserved for future studies. This rationale is discussed in Chapter 6 and in the final chapter. 
69 Adapting a practical example from Wood and Gibney (2010), this means that fifty incidents of torture in 
a very populous country like China are treated the same as fifty incidents that occur in a small country (i.e., 
both are scored as a 1 for this attribute). Moreover, a country that tortures 50 people is scored the same as a 
country that tortures 500 or 50,000 citizens (i.e., both are scored as a 2). 
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The coding of human-rights scores over time involved three key steps: First, raw 
human-rights scores (PTS-State, PTS-Amnesty, and CIRI) were gathered for four distinct 
time periods: the end of the war (t) and then two, five, and ten years after the war ended 
(i.e., t+2, t+5, t+10). The PTS-State and PTS-Amnesty scores were averaged to provide 
a single PTS score for each respective country-year. CIRI scores, as noted earlier, were 
inverted to match the coding direction of PTS scores (i.e. higher scores equal increased 
violations of those rights). 
The second step involved calculating the change in human-rights scores over 
time. Scores at each later time period (t+2, t+5, t+10) were compared with the original 
baseline score at time t by subtracting the score of the later period from the earlier period. 
These timeframes account for short-, medium-, and long-term effects by the various 
conditions on the outcome of human rights. The equation was oriented this way—rather 
than subtracting the earlier period from the later period—in order to align with the 
common QCA practice of operationalizing conditions so that positive scores refer to a 
desired outcome and negative scores indicate an undesired outcome. This made the third 
step of dichotomization fairly straightforward. Positive scores from Step Two, which 
indicate that human rights improved, were coded as 1; negative scores, where human 
rights became worse, were coded as 0. Since this project oriented to finding those 
provisions that lead to improved human rights, cases where human rights remained 
unchanged, were also coded as 0.70  
                                                 
70 Logically, a reduction in political repression over time only requires that either PTS-State or PTS-
Amnesty to improve. The other score can remain unchanged. This would result in a change over time of 
+0.5, which would be dichotomized in Step Three as 1 (i.e. human rights improved).  
   87 
A practical illustration using sample human-rights scores is helpful here: To 
calculate pts2 (the change in the average PTS score from t to t+2), the t+2 score was 
subtracted from t. If the average PTS score for a given country at time t was 3 and the 
PTS score at time t+2 was 5, the change over time was calculated -2. This value from 
Step Two is less than zero, indicating that human rights became worse. Therefore, Step 
Three would dichotomize this case as zero. Conversely, human-rights scores that are 
positive indicate that human-rights outcomes improved (political repression decreased).  
 To recap, the outcome of political repression was assessed using PTS and CIRI 
datasets. Three steps were used: (Step One) Raw data was captured for four distinct time 
periods; (Step Two) The change in political repression was calculated over time by 
comparing later scores to the level of political repression when civil war ended; (Step 
Three) Data from Step Two was both dichotomized (for Chapter 5 contingency table 
calculations) and calibrated (for fuzzy-set QCA purposes).71 Table 6 below summarizes 
how these steps were conducted for PTS scores with dichotomization; coding for CIRI 
followed this same procedure.72  
                                                 
71 Calibration of data is discussed in Chapter 6 and then performed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
72 Step Two involved establishment of three variables (pts2, pts5, and pts10) to capture the change in 
human-rights scores over the respective two-year, five-year, and ten-year time periods after war ended. Step 
Three involved dichotomization of these variables into a final outcome (pts2d, pts5d, and pts10d), based on 
whether human rights had improved (coded as 1) or not improved (coded as 0). The absence of 
improvement was evidenced by human-rights scores remained unchanged over time, or becoming worse. 
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Table 6: Example Steps for Coding Human-Rights Outcomes Using PTS
 
 Application of this coding construct to the thirty-six cases, revealed, as shown in 
Table 7, a nearly equal split between human-rights improvement (coded as 1) and lack of 
human-rights improvement (i.e. human rights remaining unchanged or becoming worse; 
coded as 0). This finding held relatively constant regardless of the time period.  
 Table 7: Human-Rights Improvement over Time (in Number of Cases)  
 
Selection of Causal Conditions 
The identification of QCA conditions must be strongly informed by theory. Berg-
Schlosser (2012, 41) asserted that just as case selection is informed by theoretical criteria, 
so to must QCA variables be selected via these same criteria. However, variable selection 
differs from case selection in that “a potential abundance of factors [need] to be 
considered” (41). Selection from the array of potential factors necessitates that 
researchers use some type of formal process in order to methodically narrow the field 
without losing significant and relevant information. Amenta and Poulsen (1994) tackled 
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this very issue for QCA scholars early on, identifying in their oft-cited article five 
different ways that these researchers can approach variable (i.e., condition) selection. 
Two of these methods are used here, including the perspective approach and the 
significance approach.73 Considered the most common method of dealing with 
complexity, the perspective approach involves evaluating a broad “mixed bag of 
variables derived from the main theoretical perspectives in an empirical literature” 
(Amenta and Poulsen 1994, 25). Given the relative dearth of contemporary literature 
directly covering the relationship between peace-agreement provisions and political 
repression, both literatures were considered to derive an initial set of applicable variables. 
Balancing Parsimony and Explanatory Sufficiency 
The selection of conditions also requires that enough conditions be included such 
that explanatory sufficiency is achieved but no so many conditions that parsimony is lost. 
The challenge here, as Einstein (1934, 282) put it “is to cover the greatest possible 
number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of 
hypotheses or axioms.” No formula or fixed ratio exists for determining how many 
conditions a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis ought to include.74 What is 
known is that fsQCA cannot handle indefinite explanatory conditions: QCA involves 
                                                 
73 Beyond the two approaches detailed in the text that follows, Amenta and Poulsen (1994, 25, 29) also 
discuss a comprehensive approach that relies on all theories and explanations, a second-look approach that 
adds back in “selected statistically insignificant measures to significant ones…to see if the rejected factors 
have complex effects on the outcome”, and a conjectural theory approach. For discussion on all five of 
these approaches, see Amenta and Poulsen (1994). Additionally, see Rihoux and Ragin (2009) who 
expound on selected published research that embodies each of these five strategies. 
74 Known benchmarks do exist though for crisp-set QCA (see Marx and Dusa 2011). Their table alerts 
researchers to potentially poor csQCA specification, allowing them to accept or reject an analysis based on 
the potential that random data would produce the same results as real data. At the time of this writing, no 
similar benchmark table is available for fuzzy-set QCA, though Schneider and Wagemann (2006, 757) 
considered it “not unusual” to evaluate a set of eight factors. 
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configurations of conditions; the number of potential configurations can be estimated by 
2n, where n equals the number of those conditions.75 This gives rise to QCA’s challenge 
of limited diversity—which is the phenomenon that not all of these potential 
configurations are empirically represented by an actual case (or cases, since many cases 
may cluster under several different configurations).76  
Practically speaking, this means the addition of each new variable exacerbates the 
problem of limited diversity. For example, the simultaneous inclusion of fifteen variables, 
as initially proposed with Model 2, would result in 215 (or 32,768) different 
combinations. If each case only aligned with a single causal combination, then at least 
32,732 of these causal combinations would be unrepresented by an empirical case.  
While some existence of limited diversity is always expected in the social 
sciences, this example demonstrates excessive limited diversity that must be addressed. 
That is, the number of proposed potential explanatory conditions needs appropriate 
reduction without stripping so much material that the proposed causal recipe cannot 
deliver sufficient explanations of the outcomes. To accomplish this, the project adhered 
to scholarly advice (Achen 2002; Amenta and Poulsen 1994; Berg-Schlosser and De 
Meur 2009) by employing a stepwise multi-methodological approach.  
First, the cross-tabulations of Chapter 5 are used to evaluate the bivariate 
relationships between each of these conditions and the outcome of political repression; 
                                                 
75 This estimate is only valid for crisp-set QCA since it uses dichotomized conditions. Non-dichotomized 
conditions raise the number of potential configurations significantly. 
76 When a configuration of variables is not empirically represented by a case, this row of the truth table is 
called a logical remainder. 
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statistically significant conditions were then retained for inclusion in the fuzzy-set QCA 
that followed. Additionally, non-statistically significant conditions were considered if the 
analysis revealed an asymmetric relationship; traditional statistical methods largely hide 
such relationships while QCA is specifically oriented to asymmetrical analysis.  
The Two-Step Approach to QCA—described in Chapter 6 and executed in 
Chapters 7 and 8—also drops less consistent conditions from further investigation. In this 
manner, the project also follows the significance approach to selecting conditions, for it 
only investigates measures that demonstrate significant statistical effects in pretests. This 
approach leads to the most parsimonious, explanatorily sufficient explanation. 
Remote and Proximate Factors 
When the initial perspective approach yielded a complex range of potential 
conditions, a number of techniques used by previous scholars were considered in order to 
organize this complexity. Fortna (2004a, 2, 35-37), for example, delineated between 
situational variables “over which those who would make peace have little or no 
control”—which she later referred to as “baseline prospects for peace”—versus deliberate 
attempts by actors to positively influence post-conflict peace. Although Fortna’s work 
was oriented toward evaluating durable peace following inter-state rather than intra-state 
wars, the delineation proved insightful and portable in its application to civil wars.  
Fortna’s distinction between situational, enduring variables and actor-influenced 
variables closely parallels Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) Two-Step Approach to 
reducing complexity in QCA. Schneider and Wagemann found that most social science 
phenomena are readily divisible into two main camps: remote factors and proximate 
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factors. Their Two-Step Approach leverages this division, providing researchers with a 
viable strategy to confront questions involving a large number of conditions. 
In their construct, proximate factors are evidenced by their variance over time and 
by their recent origins. Proximate factors represent “the products of (more or less 
conscious and purposeful) actions of human agency, if not human action itself” 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760). In this dissertation, proximate factors included 
various peace-agreement provisions such as aggregated and disaggregated power-sharing 
provisions and third-party security guarantees. These provisions represent intentional 
efforts by various actors to improve the peace after war. 
Proximate factors do not operate in isolation. Rather, they interact within certain 
structures, historical legacies, and contexts known as remote factors. Both types of 
factors are wholly necessary in some combination. In this regard, Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012, 254) disclosed that 
explanations that rely exclusively on remote (structural) factors provide for causal 
depth, but fall short of demonstrating the causal mechanisms that link deep, 
distant causes with an outcome. By contrast, explanations based on proximate 
factors display causal mechanisms (often, but not necessarily, at the micro-level). 
Consequently, a good causal statement consists of finding the right balance 
between the two core features: causal depth and causal mechanisms. 
 
In application to the present study, this means that regardless of how peace-agreement 
provisions are operationalized—whether in terms of aggregated power-sharing 
dimensions, disaggregated power-sharing provisions, or third-party security guarantees—
they must still be understood as “causal processes (proximate factors) which unfold 
within certain contexts (remote factors)” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 254).  
   93 
Remote factors are distinguished from proximate factors by three elements 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012): (1) They remain generally stable over time. (2) The 
origin of these factors is spatially or temporally distant from the outcome being 
explained. (3) As a consequence of these first two realities, remote factors reside 
“(almost) completely outside the reach of the conscious influence of present actors” who 
cannot easily alter them (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 760; 2012). In this study, 
remote factors included underlying conditions that serve as structural or situational 
antecedents to peace agreement initiation. Remote factors set baseline prospects for the 
post-civil war level of political repression; they may enable or constrain the influence of 
proximate factors to significantly reduce government violations after war ends. The 
differences between proximate and remote factors are summarized in Table 8 below. 
Table 8: Proximate and Remote Factors According to Schneider and Wagemann  
 
Proximate Conditions Evaluated in this Project  
All proximate factors in this project are unified by their inclusion as specific 
provisions within a peace agreement. One significant grouping of peace-agreement 
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provisions that is often codified therein is known as power-sharing agreements.77 These 
agreements establish “formal institutional rules” and other inclusive governing measures 
(Norris 2008, 23) that aim to include “multiple political actors in decision-making 
processes” (Binningsbø 2013, 107).78  
At stake then in the negotiation process is the establishment of “rules that, in 
addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate 
decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities 
competing for power” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b, 320). Indeed, whether power-sharing 
agreements are defined as rules or arrangements, the commonality is that they 
institutionalize changes in how power is shared among contending groups in the state’s 
decision-making institutions; those institutions are selected due to their control over 
critical political, military, economic, and territorial resources. Scholars are divided 
regarding over the benefits and pitfalls of such measures: Do power-sharing agreements 
allow warring parties to “develop vested interests in its stability and proper functioning” 
(Cammett and Malesky 2012, 3) and prevent a single group from readily controlling the 
various dimensions of state power in a manner that threatens others? Or is power sharing 
fraught with peril (LeBas 2014; Sriram and Zahar 2009), introducing perverse incentives 
that induce any opposition groups excluded from the peace agreement to become spoilers 
                                                 
77 Power-sharing agreements also prevail in a variety of situations beyond civil war resolution. See Norris’s 
(2008) seminal work for exploration of the influence of power-sharing institutions on developing and 
consolidating democratic regimes. 
78 Binningsbø drew primarily from Norris (2008) for this definition. 
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to the post-conflict peace process (Mehler 2009; Tull and Mehler 2005)79 and “as likely 
to recreate the security dilemma as solve it” if powerful external parties do not intervene 
and guarantee the settlement (Snyder and Jervis 1999, 19)? 
 To investigate the empirical effects of such provisions, the project establishes two 
sets of proximate conditions. The first set of proximate conditions (Set One in Table 1: 
Proximate and Remote Conditions) is based on a prominent, established method in 
contemporary literature for evaluating these peace-agreement provisions.80 This method 
aggregates and evaluates power-sharing provisions in alignment with the political, 
military, territorial, and economic dimensions they hold in common (see Figure 7 below):  
 
Figure 7: Types of Peace-agreement Provisions 
Political agreements involve the distribution of political power in the central government; 
military agreements concern the integration of rebels into the military force; territorial 
agreements allow for decentralization in some form; and economic agreements 
redistribute control over key state resources. 
                                                 
79 The literature on power sharing is unsettled by the fact that no definitional consensus exists on what 
power sharing is, nor is there cohesive agreement on its purpose and how to study it. As a result, the 
literature understandably reaches divergent conclusions regarding its effects on civil war settlements (e.g. 
Binningsbø 2013). 
80 See, for example, Cammett and Malesky (2012); Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 2007); Jarstad and Nilsson 
(2008); Walter (2002). 
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In this project, four aggregated dimension-based conditions are considered, 
including extensively institutionalized settlements, the presence (or absence) of a 
territorial power-sharing agreement, thick political settlements, and thick military 
settlements. The associated literature and projected influence of these conditions on 
political repression are discussed in the next chapter.    
Economic power-sharing agreements are excluded from this project for several 
reasons: (1) The use of economic power-sharing arrangements is rare compared to the 
other three forms. (2) The scant research that has explored this relationship has not yet 
found a positive or negative link between economic power-sharing and durable peace. (3) 
A preliminary probe of economic power sharing and human rights did not reveal any 
significant relationship. (4) This exclusion follows solid academic precedence (Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2003b, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 1997, 2002). 
The second set of proximate factors (Set Two in Table 1) includes seven specific 
disaggregated provisions found within the aggregated political, military, and territorial 
power-sharing dimensions. It additionally includes the presence (or absence) of robust 
third-party security guarantees. Identification of the political, military, and territorial 
dimensions—and their respective disaggregated provisions—is based on previous 
scholarship (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a; Mattes and Savun 2009). The definitions of 
these aggregate dimensions and disaggregated provisions are summarized in Table 9 
below and expounded in the next chapter.  
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Table 9: Political, Military, Territorial Power-Sharing Provisions 
 
Remote Conditions Evaluated in this Project  
With respect to remote conditions, eight factors were selected from the civil war 
literature, principally for their known effects on political repression. The project also 
initially considered factors known to strongly influence peace duration (i.e., civil war 
recurrence) and political violence. This extension honors an understated dissension-
repression nexus that exists, wherein increased dissension begets increased repression 
and increased repression begets increased dissension. A number of scholars have 
empirically verified this relationship, noting how state repression of civil and political 
rights (particularly of personal-integrity rights) is associated with escalation into dissident 
violence and a return to civil war; likewise, the return to violent protest leads to increased 
repression (Carey 2006; Davenport, Armstrong, and Lichbach 2005; Thoms and Ron 
2007; Young 2013).81  
                                                 
81 Of note, the relationship between repression and dissension is contested, due to inconsistent results.  
Different studies demonstrate statistically significant differences, though the relationships are alternatively 
shown as confirming positive, negative, and inverted U-shape relationships (Davenport 2007b). Lichbach’s 
(1987) theory accounts for this alternation, as he argues that dissidents substitute their alternative means of 
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Conflict traps may result not only from devastation to a target state’s economy 
(Collier 2007), but also from a repression-dissension cycle—the alternation among low 
levels of human-rights practices, increased violence, and civil war recurrence. The 
aperture of variables was expanded to account for this vicious cycle and interwoven 
relationship of violence, dissension, and repression. The eight remote factors include: (1) 
whether civil war had recurred after a negotiated settlement, (2) whether the civil war 
was driven by ethnic causes, (3) the costs of that conflict, (4) the duration of the conflict, 
(5) the regime type that existed after the conflict, (6) the size of the population, (7) the 
level of economic development in the state, and (8) the overall state capacity. 
Conclusion 
 After establishing the universe of cases for this project, which initially included 
thirty-six civil wars in twenty-six different states, this chapter shifted to 
operationalization, coding, and dichotomization of human-rights improvement. Datasets 
for civil wars and human rights information were established. The chapter then discussed 
why Qualitative Comparative Analysis was selected as the principal methodology. 
Selection was based largely on QCA’s capacity for addressing medium-N comparative 
research using a holistic, systematic method that leverages set-theoretic relationships to 
compare complex causal recipes leading to a specific outcome. Its ability to account for 
structural, enduring attributes—known as remote conditions—ensures a context-sensitive 
approach to causality. Remote conditions were then defined in comparison with 
                                                                                                                                                 
violent or non-violent protest based on state responses of repression. Moore’s (1998) comparative empirical 
study buttresses Lichbach’s theoretical approach. 
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proximate conditions. These terms were applied to this project through establishment of 
two sets of proximate conditions and a single set of remote conditions.  
Where Chapter 2 provided initial theoretical knowledge, including illumination of 
the intrastate security dilemma and how it unwinds the government’s ability to assure its 
citizens of their individual security after civil war ends, Chapter 3 built the project’s 
methological scaffolding. This included conceptually and operationally defining the 
outcome of interest and the universe of cases along with detailing the principal categories 
of proximate and remote conditions used to organize the array of factors under 
consideration in the next chapter. 
  
   100 
 
 
Chapter Four: Proximate and Remote Conditions 
Improvement in human rights—understood here as a reduction in the state’s use 
of political repression—requires certain combinations of proximate and remote 
conditions that, together, decrease the state’s motivation and opportunity to repress and 
improve alternative governance mechanisms beyond the use of coercion. While previous 
literature has explored factors that improve the government’s ability to deter violence, 
few scholars have considered the effects of those same factors on the government’s 
ability to assure the population that it will keep them secure.  
This chapter comprehensively amplifies all of the nineteen proximate and remote 
conditions. Amplification involves extensively detailing definitions, theory, empirical 
research, coding, and proposed hypotheses regarding how each condition is anticipated to 
affect political repression. The in-depth interpretation and application of each condition is 
intentional, falling in line with recommended best practices for QCA regarding 
transparent identification and description of selected conditions. The chapter explains the 
relationship of each condition to the three aforementioned causal factors82 that increase 
political repression by the state (i.e., motivation, opportunity, and alternative governance 
mechanisms), followed by proposed hypotheses and the coding of the conditions. 
The nineteen conditions are organized into three respective sets: Set 1 proximate 
conditions include factors that assess aggregated power-sharing dimensions. Set 2 
                                                 
82 See Chapter 2. 
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proximate conditions are drawn from the same dataset as Set 1, but differentiated by a 
focus on disaggregated power-sharing provisions. Set 2 also includes the individual 
provision of third-party security guarantees. Each set of proximate conditions is evaluated 
in conjunction with a single set of remote conditions that captures the situational and 
historical contexts of the states in which civil war has just ended.  
Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions 
 The literature on power-sharing dimensions predominantly examines the effects 
of power-sharing agreements on extending the peace in war-torn states. Enduring peace is 
understood as the absence of war. Usually, it is proxied by the number of months or years 
before civil war recurs.  
Three views predominate within the literature regarding the effects of different 
dimensions on peace duration: (1) Peace endures the longest when power is shared across 
more dimensions. Peace agreements that are extensively institutionalized—meaning 
those that involve more dimensions—matter the most; (2) Peace endures longest when 
power sharing in a single dimension is thick. In other words, provisions within the same 
political, military, and territorial dimension reinforce each other. However, scholars differ 
about which specific dimension matters most; (3) Enduring peace is unlikely with power 
sharing because it reifies differences and leads to rapid conflict recurrence. Power-
sharing agreements ultimately undermine human security and elevate the risk of fractured 
peace. These three perspectives are described below.  
View #1: Extensively Institutionalized Settlements Help the Peace  
Therefore, those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively 
institutionalized—that is, that provide institutional guarantees for each of the 
   102 
security threats antagonists face as the move toward a situation of centralized 
power—are the most likely to prove stable.83  
 
In Hartzell’s (1999, 6-7) view, the inclusion of additional power-sharing 
dimensions ought to reduce the concentration of power available to the government— 
especially “power that can be used to coerce others” such as occurs with political 
repression. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 2007) advanced this argument, concluding that 
each of the four power-sharing dimensions reinforce each other. This means that when 
negotiated settlements involve a greater degree of “settlement institutionalization” (i.e., 
more dimensions of power-sharing), the greater the chances for durable peace.  
Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) empirically verified that “the most extensively 
institutionalized settlements”—those that included power-sharing arrangements from 
more political, military, and territorial dimensions—produced the longest duration of 
peace (75). The logical argument carried forth here is that by implementing peace 
agreements that bear heavy costs for the signatory parties, former enemies deliver 
credible, concrete signals of their genuine commitment to peace and of their conciliatory 
intent (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a). 
In part, institutionalized settlements and costly signaling are positioned as 
contrarian logics to Walter’s (2002) notion of credible commitments secured via third 
parties. From Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2003b, 2007) perspective, the inclusion of multiple 
power-sharing dimensions serves as a clear and costly signal that is capable of 
overcoming security concerns and fears of opportunism by rivals; the costly signals 
inherent in extensive power-sharing guarantees and institutions can help establish “a self-
                                                 
83 See Hartzell (1999, 4). 
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enforcing peace,” one that does not necessarily require involvement of problematic third 
parties (2003b, 330). 
Walter, in contrast, believed third-party guarantees helped rivals overcome 
credible commitment challenges—something that unsecured power-sharing guarantees 
could not accomplish on their own. Walter downgraded the value of costly signals as the 
best path to peace since monitoring, verifying, and enforcing settlement compliance 
between rivals is extremely limited without third parties (Walter 2002, 24-26).  
A final counterpoint to Hartzell and Hoddie’s findings is the research by Jarstad and 
Nilsson’s (2008), which empirically discovered that the combination of political pacts 
with other power-sharing dimensions did not significantly affect the durability of peace.84 
To test a parallel argument to Hartzell and Hoddie’s conclusion that extensively 
institutionalized settlements improve peace, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Civil war peace agreements with extensively institutionalized 
peace settlements result in improved human rights. 
View #2: Thick, Individual Dimensions Help the Peace 
While Hoddie and Hartzell’s (2007) research purported that “more power-sharing 
is always better,” their use of an unweighted composite measure presumed equal 
contribution and effects from all dimensions. Other scholars concluded that this 
assumption was ill-founded and wrong (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 
2009). The principle counterargument offered by these scholars was that the thickness of 
individual power-sharing dimensions (e.g., political, military, territorial) mattered more 
                                                 
84 See footnote, previous chapter, regarding the significant differences between how Jarstad and Nilsson 
(2008) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 2007) established their respective sets of applicable cases.  
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than the total number of dimensions. In this regard, Mattes and Savun contended, “The 
reinforcing effect of particular provisions within one dimension should be even more 
pronounced than the reinforcing effect across dimensions” (748). Scholars differ, though, 
regarding which dimensions matter more, with some arguing for political power-sharing 
agreements (Mattes and Savun 2009), some for military power-sharing agreements 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), and some for territorial power-
sharing agreements (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).  
Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) argued, for example, that enduring peace is only 
associated with military and territorial power-sharing agreements (PSAs) that have been 
implemented. In their view, military and territorial peace agreements successfully delay 
civil war recurrence because these PSAs function as legitimate, costly signals due to their 
substantial economic and logistical implementation costs: the “implementation of those 
power-sharing provisions that entail great concessions for the signatories reflects a higher 
degree of commitment by the parties, and hence makes peace likely to prevail” (Jarstad 
and Nilsson 2008, 207). This especially holds true in comparison to easily implemented, 
and easily reversed, political power sharing that shows no significant effects on peace. 
In contrast, Mattes and Savun (2009) asserted that each additional provision 
within political power-sharing—defined as a representative electoral system and the 
guaranteed integration of rebels into cabinet posts and civil service—reduced the risk of 
civil war recurrence by about 29 percent. No other dimension realized statistically 
significant effects on peace duration. However, other scholars did not find any support for 
the notion that the presence of political power-sharing agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 
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2005) or the implementation of these political pacts (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) 
significantly affects the duration of peace. Regarding military power-sharing agreements, 
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a) found in their earlier research of sixteen cases (1980-1996) 
that successful implementation of military power-sharing agreements within five years of 
a civil war’s end had increased peace duration prospects.  
Economic power sharing is one of the few dimensions void of any support. The 
few studies (Binningsbø and Rustad 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 
2009) that individually consider economic power-sharing agreements have not found any 
statistically significant positive effects on peace duration.85 Findings on territorial power-
sharing mainly have demonstrated a positive relationship with peace duration (Hartzell 
2005; Hartzell and Hoddie 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Walter 2002); however, Lake 
and Rothchild (2005) argued that such provisions lead to greater political instability and 
renewed conflict. Additionally, territorial PSAs cannot technically be considered thick 
since the only two options are wholly exclusive; either autonomy or federalism can be 
granted, but not both.  
Based on these previous findings, the following hypotheses are proposed in 
relation to political repression: 
Hypothesis 2: Civil war peace agreements with thick political power-sharing 
agreements result in improved human rights. 
                                                 
85 Binningsbø and Rustad (2012) systematically investigated all post-conflict societies from 1946-2006 
using newly gathered economic data on wealth redistribution, land reforms, and resource allocation. Even 
this deep effort did not demonstrate any influence of economic power-sharing agreements (or “wealth 
sharing” as they called it) on bringing about successful peace after the conflicts ended. 
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Hypothesis 3: Civil war peace agreements with thick political power-sharing 
agreements result in improved human rights. 
Hypothesis 4: Civil war peace agreements with territorial power-sharing 
agreements result in improved human rights. 
In accordance with Mattes and Savun’s (2009) procedures, the thickness of 
political and military PSAs is operationalized using count variables to note the presence 
of specific provisions within each respective dimension. For example, each negotiated 
settlement was assessed for the presence of the following political power-sharing 
provisions: (1) whether legislative elections are conducted based on the principles of 
proportional or equal representation, (2) whether rebel groups are guaranteed a certain 
number of cabinet and ministerial posts, and (3) whether the rebels are guaranteed 
representation in the civil service (e.g., the police force). When the data was run, ten of 
the thirty-six negotiated settlements (28%) had all three political power-sharing 
provisions present. Seven (19%) settlements involved two provisions, and eleven 
settlements (31%) included just one of the political provisions.86  
Military thickness was similarly coded as a count variable, based on: (1) whether 
the disputing parties were integrated into the military defense force of the state, and (2) 
whether the rebels were guaranteed appointment to leadership positions in that defense 
force. Evaluation of the data showed that seven (19%) negotiated settlements included 
both military power-sharing provisions; sixteen cases (44%) had only one military 
provision in place, and just over one-third of the cases (13 of 36) did not have any form 
                                                 
86 Eight cases (22 percent) have no political power-sharing provision. 
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of military PSA provision. The general orientation of negotiated settlements vis-à-vis 
military and political thickness are summarized in the table below.  
Table 10: Count Variables for PSA Thickness 
 
View #3: Power-Sharing Agreements Hurt the Peace 
Unfortunately, neither power-sharing institutions nor third-party intervention 
provide more than a temporary Band-Aid for the critical underlying problems, 
which are uncertainty about the adversary’s intentions and inability to commit to 
the agreement.87  
 
A number of scholars share Downes’ (2006) theoretical concerns that power-
sharing does little to prevent conflict and, by giving the warring parties breathing space to 
regroup, may even increase it rather than reduce it (Horowitz 1985; Mehler 2009; Roeder 
and Rothchild 2005; Sisk 2013; Sriram 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2009). For example, 
Roeder and Rothchild (2005) believe that by satisfying the interests of those who initiate 
a civil war, power-sharing may incentivize the elites into threatening violence in the hope 
of extorting additional concessions. Tull and Mehler (2005) empirically verified this in 
their own study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, finding that political power-
sharing arrangements might reproduce violence and insurgency by creating perverse 
incentives that reward violent behavior. In addition, from her own analysis of Sri Lanka, 
Sudan and Colombia, Sriram (2008) similarly discovered that power sharing might 
                                                 
87 See Downes (2006, 52).  
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solidify cleavages between groups rather than resolve them. If what these scholars have 
concluded holds true for human-rights outcomes as well, then: 
Hypothesis 5: Civil war peace agreements with power-sharing agreements 
result in worse human rights.88 
These three main ideas about aggregated power-sharing dimensions, along with their 
corresponding hypotheses and selected proximate conditions for testing these hypotheses, 
are summarized in Table 11 below. 
 
Table 11: Theory and Hypotheses for Set 1 Proximate Conditions  
 
Disaggregated Power-Sharing Provisions 
A foundational argument of this project is that none of the aggregated approaches 
described above accurately portrays how power-sharing agreements affect human-rights 
outcomes. These approaches are suboptimal for several reasons: First, aggregated 
dimensions hide the potential that individual measures within the same aggregated 
dimension are working at cross-purposes, thus potentially negating or reversing expected 
                                                 
88 No additional operationalization is provided here because QCA allows for testing negative outcomes. 
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outcomes. Second, conditions known to build enduring peace do not necessarily lead to 
improved human rights: What secures the state and grants it the ability to deter violence 
may work at cross purposes to assuring the people of their individual security from 
political repression by the state.  
Goertz’s (2006) notion of three-level concepts provides an excellent means for 
reconsidering the conventional method of evaluating peace agreements using aggregated 
power-sharing dimensions. Goertz saw that social science researchers typically reverted 
to using the first two layers—known as basic and secondary levels—for their analyses. 
The basic level describes the general concept under investigation; in this case, power-
sharing agreements are the basic level. The secondary level captures the “constitutive 
dimensions of the basic-level” (Goertz 2006, 6). In this study, constitutive dimensions 
included political, military, and territorial power-sharing dimensions. 
Goertz insisted that many social science concepts necessitate deeper descriptions 
beyond the basic and secondary levels. The third-level, which Goertz (2006) called the 
indicator or data level, represents the substantive content that makes up a given 
dimension. This indicator level includes the various component parts that collectively 
compose each dimension. The argument made in this project aligns with Goertz in its 
contention that many contemporary studies of power sharing only look at the secondary 
level. Researchers erroneously presume that all measures within an aggregated dimension 
act equally in concert with each other.  
Instead, research should consider the third-level of concepts by looking at the 
specific indicators that make up aggregated dimensions. Seven disaggregated power-
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sharing provisions are evaluated in this project. Third-party security guarantees are also 
evaluated since these guarantees are an individual provision likely to reduce the threats to 
the government and its opportunity to repress.  
Disaggregated power-sharing provisions, organized by their respective 
dimensions, include the following: (Mattes and Savun 2009): (1) Political power-sharing 
agreements involve the distribution of political power in the central government, and 
such provisions may include: (a) conducting legislative elections based on the principles 
of proportional or equal representation, (b) guaranteeing rebels representation in a certain 
number of cabinet and ministerial posts, and (c) guaranteeing rebels representation in the 
civil service. (2) Military power-sharing agreements involve the integration of rebels into 
the state’s military forces, through provisions that: (a) guarantee integration of disputing 
parties into a joint defense force, and/or (b) guarantee representation of rebels in 
leadership positions of that defense force. (3) Territorial power-sharing agreements 
decentralize the authority of the government, through provisions that either: (a) allocate 
separate powers to sub-state units (federalism), or (b) provide autonomy to the rebel 
group to control local issues in a certain region (autonomy).  
Goertz’s Three Levels concept can now be visually integrated, using the following 
components: (1) the basic level of power-sharing agreements; (2) the aggregated 
dimensions that constitute the basic level; and (3) the disaggregated power-sharing 
provisions used as specific indicators within each dimension. Figure 8 below visually 
integrates these three elements. 
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Figure 8: Three Levels of Power-Sharing Agreements89 
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 2, the use of political repression—whether it 
involves torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, political imprisonment, or 
censorship—is a course of action initiated by the government; political repression is a 
form of governance. The review of political repression literature also demonstrated that 
state-based political repression increases (and human rights correspondingly worsen) as a 
function of three primary factors: (1) A government is motivated to repress when higher 
levels of hostility or political dissent threaten it. (2) A government has increased 
opportunity to repress when certain institutional checks and balances on the government 
are absent. (3) A government lacking alternative governance mechanisms naturally turns 
to coercion as its method of ruling the people.  
                                                 
89 The argument could be made that contemporary literature also uses a three-level concept: it involves a 
basic level of peace agreements, a secondary level of power-sharing agreements (alongside other non-
power-sharing agreements used in a negotiated settlement), and a third level of aggregated power-sharing 
dimensions. However, this argument is weakened since dimensions, by their nature, align more 
appropriately with Goertz’s definition for the second level and the reality that these dimensions require 
further indicators to verify their existence.   
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Each disaggregated provision is therefore evaluated in relation to political 
repression theory (i.e., to why states violate human rights and with respect to how a 
provision potentially affects these causal mechanisms and drivers of political repression). 
Hypotheses are then presented for the relationship of the condition to human-rights 
outcomes; coding for all provisions is dichotomous (presence = 1; absence = 0), in 
accordance with Mattes and Savun’s (2009) previously discussed dataset. 
 In keeping with Berg-Schlosser and De Meur’s (2009) advice regarding best 
practices for selecting conditions in small- and medium-N research designs, each 
condition concludes with a formulated hypothesis that connects the proposed condition to 
the outcome. The hypotheses for disaggregated provisions (and the remote conditions that 
follow) also account for Ragin’s (2008, 15) caution that “Set theoretic arguments are 
often erroneously reformulated as correlational hypotheses.”90 Two implications follow 
from Ragin’s statement: (1) Set theoretic hypotheses should account for asymmetry, 
where applicable. A correlational hypothesis might propose, for example, that democratic 
states do not politically repress, and that less democratic states do politically repress; an 
asymmetrical hypothesis might assert only that democratic states do not politically 
repress. (2) Recalling the earlier discussion on INUS conditions, set theoretic hypotheses 
should also account for necessity and sufficiency.  
                                                 
90 The hypotheses for aggregated dimensions were also connected to the outcome. However, since the 
current literature on aggregated power-sharing dimensions does not account for asymmetrical relations, and 
because the aggregation of conditions muddles the anticipated outcomes, these attributes of necessity, 
sufficiency, and asymmetry were not assigned. 
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Political Power-Sharing Agreements 
Political power-sharing agreements involve the distribution of political power in 
the central government through provisions. Three principal provisions are assessed:  
1. Legislative Elections Involving Proportional or Equal Representation (repleg):   
Research has revealed that when groups are excluded from the political process, 
they return to political violence more often (Gurr 2000; Stedman 1997). Indeed, 
“Exclusion from state power is a powerful predictor of rebellion” (Bogaards 2013, 75). 
Power-sharing literature argues that the incorporation of previously excluded actors into 
the political process may mitigate future political violence. The basic aim of proportional 
representation, according to Lijphart (1999, 36), is to “divide the parliamentary seats 
among the parties in proportion to the votes they receive”, thereby allowing “societal 
cleavages [to translate] into party-system cleavages.”  
Proportional or equal representation ensures equal voice for previously 
underrepresented parties. A more inclusive government—one with lower numbers of 
excluded, discontented, conceivably dangerous actors—also reduces the number of 
“spoilers” to the peace process (Bogaards 2013; Stedman 1997). This reduction in 
conflict spoilers means the threat to the government is reduced which, theoretically, 
should lead to a reduction in the government’s motivation to repress. Empirically, this 
idea has been verified. Data shows that national elections reduce repression of political 
and civil rights (Davenport 1997, 1998).  
 The holding of elections is not a guarantee, though, that political repression will 
decrease, for they involve many “points of contention as well as points of cohesion” 
   114 
(Davenport 1997, 520). With respect to the former, for example, the granting of 
government seats to prior belligerents may perversely incentivize other contending 
groups to pursue violence toward these ends; alternatively, groups may simultaneously 
pursue strategies of violence and politics in the pursuit of power (Jarstad and Sisk 
2008).91 The electoral process itself gives previously excluded actors two critical 
capabilities that may be abused: (1) the ability to mobilize (e.g., campaign, rally, 
distribute resources), and (2) the ability to communicate (e.g., distribute messages 
throughout society).  
In light of these tensions, Davenport (1997) proposed that only when governments 
consider the electoral process as a liberalizing, legitimating experience will they then 
decrease the amount of repression. This decrease is made in anticipation that the election 
will stabilize the state, solidify a national identity, educate the populace and, thereby, 
legitimize their role. Governments that instead view national elections as a threat—as 
disruptive events that challenge their established order—will employ repressive 
behaviors in order to regulate political behavior (Davenport 1997).92 Davenport proposed 
that full democracies will consider the electoral process as a liberalizing, legitimating 
experience, while non-democracies will consider elections as threats to the status quo.  
                                                 
91 Jarstad and Sisk (2008, 117) explored the trade-offs between inclusion and exclusion, concluding 
“Inclusion of warring parties in a power-sharing arrangement does not always end violence. At the same 
time, concessions to some warring parties can provide incentives for other parties to use violence in the 
pursuit of a share of power. When this is the case, inclusion of warring parties in a power-sharing 
arrangement may at best be a short-term solution to violence. In the worst case, inclusion of warring parties 
can escalate violence and give rise to new conflicts.” 
92 A third view is that the relationship of elections to political repression is non-existent (Davenport 1997). 
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Contrary to his expectations, the only statistically significant finding was that 
repressive behavior decreased for non-democracies. Of note, Davenport’s findings were 
based on all elections, not just those following civil wars. Civil wars may still change the 
decision calculus for governments as they approach the first post-conflict elections; 
namely, by increasing the potential that non-democratic governments view national 
elections as a threat again.  
The specific electoral design of proportional representation may also make a 
difference on political repression. In this regard, Lijphart (1999) concluded that elections 
with proportional representation (PR) serve to distribute and constrain political power. 
The legislative branch, for example, may constrain the decision-making powers of 
executive-branch elites through increased horizontal accountability between governing 
institutions (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010; O'Donnell 1998; Schedler 1999).  
Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) warned against the assumption that the vertical 
accountability resident within elections would lead to improved human-rights outcomes. 
Their study was designed to evaluate the “[g]rowing consensus that the critical feature 
that makes a full-fledged democracy respect human rights is the accountability of its 
politicians to voters” (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010, 1; additionally see Bueno De 
Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b). Many proportional representation systems lower 
this individual accountability by requiring competition among parties rather than among 
individual candidates.93  
                                                 
93 Cingranelli and Fillpov (2010) found significant variety in the respect for human rights even between 
governments holding PR elections in common. For example, larger magnitude districts were less likely to 
respect physical-integrity rights, particularly in comparison to systems where parliament members were 
elected via low-district magnitude. 
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In summary, proportional representation in the legislative branch is anticipated to 
lead to mixed outcomes overall. On the one hand, representation may reduce the 
government’s motivation to repress by guaranteeing political representation for 
previously excluded actors; those actors are less inclined to resort to political violence. 
Broader representation in the legislative branch is likely to increase horizontal 
accountability with the executive branch; in turn, this decreases the government’s 
opportunity to repress. 
 However, proportional representation (PR) elections alone cannot transform a 
government into a non-repressive agent. Any parties excluded from representation are 
more likely to resort to violence in order to secure similar concessions. This increase in 
violence raises the threat to the government and will likely lead to increased repression. 
Additionally, the gains in horizontal accountability are countered by the loss of individual 
accountability. The regime will perceive the presence of unaccountable, prior 
belligerents—now guaranteed representation in the legislative branch—as a threat. They 
will respond with increased repression. As a result of these mixed signals, the expectation 
is that 
Hypothesis 6: Legislative elections are not an INUS condition for either 
improved or worsened human rights.    
2. Guaranteed Rebel Representation in Cabinet and Ministerial Posts (repex)  
The guaranteed inclusion of rebels into certain cabinet and ministerial posts in the 
executive branch is principally oriented toward increasing horizontal accountability 
between governing institutions. Rather than “concentrating power in the hands of the 
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majority” where such power may be used to politically repress opponents, this 
“consensus model [of democracy] tries to share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety 
of ways” (Lijphart 1999, 33). The integration and dispersal of power serves to constrain 
the executive branch by increasing institutional accountability and increasing the costs of 
certain decisions. Mattes and Savun (2009, 742), for example, attest that the integration 
of rebels in different branches of government, especially in the legislative and executive 
branches, means that  
their enemies cannot decree or implement policies without their consent. Under 
these conditions, the rebels’ enemies will be unable to pursue any policies, 
whether military, economic, cultural, or relating to autonomy and federalism, that 
are detrimental to the rebels. The sharing of decision-making power helps ensure 
that other kinds of power-sharing are implemented and opens up the possibility 
for both groups to shape future policies.  
 
Increased accountability on executive decision-making power will decrease the 
government’s opportunity to repress.  
Aydin and Gates (2008) empirically verified that the presence of increased 
executive constraints94 strongly and negatively affects mass killings.95 Their discussion 
(76-77) of how an increase in the number of actors introduces significant institutional 
restrictions and imposes great costs on elites is worth quoting in length: 
Whether rulers govern through fear or welfare depends on the incentives that arise 
given a particular institutional arrangement . . . institutional restrictions on 
leaders’ access to political power raise the costs of repressive policies that target 
                                                 
94 Aydin and Gates follow previous scholars (Gates et al. 2006; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010) in 
defining executive constraints as constraints on the decision-making powers of the executive branch by the 
presence and activity of accountability groups that serve as a check and balance against that branch. 
95 As detailed in Chapter 2, mass killings parallel political repression in the unilateral production of 
violence by the state. Mass killings may not reach the threshold of genocide, though they hold in common 
that the government does not likely intend to govern the targeted population. This element differs from 
political repression, where the government intends to govern the population but still coerces it. 
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civil rights and liberties. However, when authority becomes concentrated, the 
number of actors that can challenge policies due to their divergent preferences and 
political support base falls, which also decreases the costs of bad public policies. 
With this in mind, executive decision-making constraints constitute the key 
institutional dimension shaping rulers’ incentives. Effective limitation points to 
the presence of accountability groups in the system, which substantially increases 
friction in policymaking. . . . In such an institutional environment [with multiple 
political actors], liberal governance leads to cooperation with other groups, 
expands societal consent and increases the legitimacy of the ruler. Repression of 
the masses, on the other hand, nurtures the relative strength of opponents and the 
power of rival ideologies.  
 
In their view, a political environment institutionally designed to limit executive power 
will cause even dominant political elites to reconsider the costs of increasing repression 
and the benefits of pursuing good governance. 
Integration of rebels into the executive branch carries more risk than these 
previous authors give credit. A counterposing view is that integration of rebels in the 
executive branch is not guaranteed to lead to improved human-rights outcomes. Just as 
“the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of 
political institutions” leads to political violence and instability (Huntington 2006, 4) 96, so 
too may the rapid inclusion of prior belligerents into the executive branch lead to political 
instability and violence. By granting rebels representation in the executive branch, and by 
circumventing the electoral process to do so, this specific political power-sharing 
measure provides instant positional authority to a previously hostile opponent. The rebels 
may leverage this newfound positional authority for mobilizing or for communication in 
                                                 
96 With respect to political violence and instability, Huntington was referring to a variety of military 
conflicts, including prolonged, irregular or guerrilla insurgency, brief revolts, coups and uprisings, and 
overt, militarily conventional wars (4). His principal thesis was that modernization’s premise was dead 
wrong—economic change and development were not the principal determinants of stable, democratic 
political systems but rather contributed, alongside rapid social change, to create violence and instability. 
The arguments made here regarding political power-sharing agreements largely parallel this logic. 
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an outsized manner. Concomitantly, reigning executive elites may anticipate that the 
reservation of positions in the executive branch for opposition groups will serve as a 
significant check on their authority; they will likely perceive this imposed representation 
as a significant threat to their own authority. Moreover, the binding influences of 
institutional constraints—even in strong democracies—is overcome when threat levels 
increase (Davenport 2007b, c) 
Mixed outcomes are anticipated for this power-sharing arrangement. New checks 
and balances on the executive branch will decrease a government’s opportunity to 
repress. Simultaneously, the guaranteed representation of prior belligerents in the 
executive branch will potentially increase, at least in the short term, its motivation to 
repress. This counterproductive blend of decreased opportunity but increased motivation 
means that 
Hypothesis 7: Rebel representation in the executive branch is not an INUS 
condition for either improved or worsened human rights.  
3. Guaranteed Rebel Representation in the Civil Service (repcs)  
The guaranteed representation of rebels into civil service positions represents the 
strengthening of an executive constraint. Integration of rebels into the civil service 
strengthens an additional accountability group, albeit one more disconnected from the 
repressive apparatus of the state. Civil service representatives are unlikely to be viewed 
as a significant threat to the regime, given their presence in a weaker government 
ministry. This makes the measure probably the easiest to implement of the three political 
power-sharing agreements. However, it also reflects how marginal the influence of civil 
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service representatives is on constraining executive or military action. Mixed outcomes 
are expected here as well—though, this is less due to contradicting influences on the 
causal factors leading to political repression and more about the nominal influence this 
measure has overall. On account of this, 
Hypothesis 8: Rebel representation in the civil service branch is not an INUS 
condition for either improved or worsened human rights.  
Military Power-Sharing Agreements 
Military power-sharing agreements involve the integration of rebels into the 
state’s military forces, through provisions that: 
1. Guaranteed Integration of Disputing Parties into Joint Defense Force (mil_rank)  
A host of scholars, including Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) and Jarstad and Nilsson 
(2008), have argued that military power-sharing provisions carry high logistical and 
economic implementation costs associated with integration of rebels into a joint defense 
force and into leadership positions. Because military pacts are more difficult to 
implement and carry higher costs than alternatives like political pacts, they effectively 
serve as costly signals of intent and commitment to an agreement. Costly signals, in 
Fearon’s (1995) view, help belligerents avoid political conflict and war since adversaries 
can more effectively communicate their capabilities and intentions.97 
In turn, this ability to communicate capabilities—and especially intentions—helps 
formerly hostile parties move past deep distrust made worse by war and establish credible 
                                                 
97 Not all scholars agree here that military integration of rebels positively influence peace duration though. 
Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008, 375, 381-2) found “no significant effect of [military integration] on peace 
duration in the short or long term”, though they also resisted drawing definitive conclusions about its 
overall efficacy given that integration is “is a messy process” and unclear results are likely due to a vast 
variety of integration provisions that are often poorly organized and/or incompletely implemented. 
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commitment to peace terms, since signals that are sent “have unavoidable costs attached 
to them” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 305; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008, 210-211). Although 
this study reviews peace-agreement provisions rather than implementation of those 
provisions, the reality is that the peace agreement process itself—the construction of a 
negotiated settlement—is the first series of significant, costly, and credible signals; 
agreement implementation is then the second important signal (Hoddie and Hartzell 
(2003, 313). So even establishing and agreeing to these military integration provisions 
involves an initial set of costly signals.  
Beyond the potential that military integration provisions serve as costly signals 
that help build trust and establish credible commitment (which would beneficially reduce 
the threat to the government), another possibility is that integration of rebels into the 
main military ranks will serve as a substantial new constraint on the executive branch, 
especially in cases where the regime relies upon the defense force as a primary means of 
implementing different forms of political repression. Integration destabilizes the state’s 
ability to quickly leverage its monopoly on the use of force towards coercive ends; it 
cannot readily rely on the military to politically repress on its behalf. Said differently, 
although alternative governance mechanisms are not necessarily strengthened, it is quite 
likely that the government’s coercive mechanism is weakened. Finally, former rebel 
combatants are not left in the lurch of individual vulnerability, where the government is 
re-arming while individuals and groups are forced to disarm and demobilize.  
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In sum, the reduction of threat combined with the addition of new executive 
constraints should result not just in extended peace, but also in reduced political 
repression. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 9a: Military integration in the main ranks is an INUS condition for 
improved human rights. 
Hypothesis 9b: The absence of military integration in the main ranks is an 
INUS condition for worse human rights. 
2. Guaranteed Representation in Leadership Positions of the Defense Force (mil_ldr) 
By and large, integration of rebels within military leadership roles is likely to hold 
similar benefits and risks to integration of rebels into the main ranks: First, the 
government is able to credibly commit to the peace agreement terms by sending costly 
signals of its intent; this should have similar beneficial effects on establishing a level of 
credible commitment that begins to build trust between former adversaries (Fearon 1995; 
Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; and Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).  
Second, the government’s abdication of leadership roles also markedly decreases 
the government’s opportunity to repress. Guaranteeing rebels certain leadership roles in 
the military provides a powerful new restriction against the government exercising its 
coercive capability. Indeed, this constraint serves two purposes, by restricting the 
government’s opportunity to coerce and by specifically weakening its coercive arm. With 
respect to the former element, even if the government uses the police rather than the 
military as its main agent of applying coercive repression, that police force is aware of 
this institutional change and is likely to limit the degree of repression. This also parallels 
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previous discussion on how changes in the electoral process of the legislative branch are 
likely to impact executive branch decisions.  
Third, every instance of the provision guaranteeing rebel representation in 
military leadership positions was always coupled with integration in the main ranks; that 
is, no cases existed of the military leadership provision on its own (the reverse was not 
always the case though). The coupling of leadership integration measures with integration 
into the main ranks likely strengthens the constraints on the government and sends even 
stronger signals that the government is fully committed to the peace agreement, given the 
higher costs incurred with integration across both leadership and followership ranks. 
Therefore, it is anticipated that 
Hypothesis 10a: Military integration of rebels in leadership positions is an 
INUS condition for improved human rights.  
Hypothesis 10b: The absence of military integration of rebels in leadership 
positions is an INUS condition for worse human rights.  
 Having assessed both military measures, and given their similar orientations, it is 
also possible now to conclude that the aggregated measure of thick military power-
sharing—meaning the presence of both military power-sharing provisions—is likely to 
lead to improved human-rights outcomes (i.e., less political repression).  
Territorial Power-Sharing Agreements 
Territorial power-sharing agreements decentralize the authority of a government 
through mutually exclusive provisions that: 
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1. Allocate Separate Powers to Sub-state Units (federalism)  
When a power-sharing agreement mandates federalism, the government still 
controls the territory. This provision minimizes the threat of full secession. Generally, a 
government’s control of its territory also reduces the level of political dissent (Bell et al. 
2013). Lower dissent levels, in turn, decrease the state’s motivations to repress. Also, by 
allocating separate powers to sub-state units, the process of federalism adds another 
accountability group to the government. This group serves as a new constraint on 
executive power that specifically guards the interests of opposition groups.  
Federalism—territorial decentralization98 as Lake and Rothchild (2005, 109-110) 
call it—often garners strong peacemaker support, because it aligns with: 
the political and spatial realities on the ground, especially the division of territory 
won on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. By granting each group a state-
within-a-state, peacemakers aim to mitigate fears of political exploitation and 
intergroup violence and, at least in part, to satisfy local demands for cultural and 
religious autonomy. At the same time, decentralization maintains existing external 
borders, and thus does not challenge the principle of territorial integrity central to 
contemporary notions of sovereignty. . . . In short, decentralization is believed to 
address the political insecurities and desire for self-determination that lead to 
conflict while respecting the principle that, if at all possible, sovereignty should 
not be dismantled.  
 
In combination, the increased accountability and reduced level of rebel dissent 
means that a government’s opportunity and motivation to repress are both decreased. The 
reduced level of dissent, in Lake and Rothchild’s (2005) assessment, is not attributable to 
the specific act or execution of federalism. Rather, it is the original offer of federalism in 
                                                 
98 Lake and Rothchild (2005) prefer the more generic term of territorial decentralization because it 
incorporates de facto cases, whereas federalism represents only the de jure form of territorial 
decentralization. Lake and Rothchild define territorial decentralization as the allocation of “authority over 
policy domains to different subnational governmental entities that are, themselves, defined in terms of 
territory, with municipalities, provinces, and the central government each responsible for different services 
and policy domains” (2005, 109). 
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a peace agreement that serves as a costly signal of the political majority’s moderation and 
intentions.  
The challenge of all territorial power-sharing measures is that while they may 
regulate and mitigate conflict in the short term, their long-term effect is to embolden the 
dissolution of the state. Nordlinger (1972, 32) cautioned in this regard that “The 
combination of territorially distinctive segments and federalism’s grant of partial 
autonomy sometimes provides additional impetus to demands for greater autonomy” and, 
when these demands are refused, “secession and civil war may follow.” For this reason, 
caution is in order with respect to the long-term implications of federalism. While 
federalism aids in the initial transition from civil war, in the long term it appears “an 
unstable arrangement that typically ends in either centralization or fragmentation” (Lake 
and Rothchild 2005, 110, 112).  
Only four of the thirty-six cases in this analysis involved federalism; most cases 
did not have this measure. Federalism is anticipated to have an asymmetric effect on 
political repression. Its presence leads to improved human rights, while its absence has no 
discernible impact. As a result, only the asymmetric hypothesis is presented here: 
Hypothesis 11: Federalism is an INUS condition for improved human rights in the 
short- and mid-term time periods. 
2. Allow Rebels to Control Local Issues in a Certain Region (autonomy) 
Federalism involves a grant of territorial decentralization, of certain authority 
over local issues. In contrast, autonomy—at least from the regime’s perspective—
represents a zero-sum loss of territory. Autonomy is not really territorial power-sharing 
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but rather power dividing; it does not induce or facilitate further face-to-face interactions, 
but rather splits a state into different zones, potentially reifying existing regional or ethnic 
differences and leading to increased suspicions by the governing regime. An autonomous 
region also provides rebels a territorial base—meaning a sanctuary from which to fight 
and regroup, as well as superior knowledge of the local population compared to that of 
the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Rebels may mobilize from this base against the 
government or seek refuge in it.  
The literature is divided on the benefits and dangers of autonomy. Scholars like 
Downes (2006, 52) have stressed that more borders lead to less conflict; and that partition 
is the ideal solution to resolving ethnic civil wars in deeply divided societies, because a 
“temporary Band-Aid” of third-party guarantees or power-sharing institutions will not 
resolve, in the long term, “uncertainty about the adversary’s intentions and ability to 
commit to the agreement.” Similarly, Kaufmann (1996, 137) believed that “only when 
the opposing [ethnic] groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves” is it 
fully possible to resolve, not just stop, these conflicts. However, not all scholars agree 
that territorial partition is a good solution to civil war. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 
(2009, 2014) quantitatively tested these theories, demonstrating that partition does not 
reduce the risk of return to civil war. Rather, the risk increased in a number of cases.  
What are the effects of autonomy on political violence? If plural societies require 
strong ties and allegiance of the rebels to the regime, as Lijphart (1999) argued, 
autonomy ultimately severs such ties and allegiances. In this vein, empirical analysis 
shows that when a government loses control of a territory, yet that territory still falls 
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within the state’s boundaries, political violence will likely increase (Bell et al. 2013, 246). 
Increased political violence will be viewed as a threat to the regime and will likely lead to 
increased repression. Pospiesza and Schneider (2013) corroborated this in their 
investigation of power-sharing institutions and arrangements: “granting autonomy to a 
rebellious region increases the danger that the relationship with the government turns 
violent again . . . constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution.” 
Given this context,  
Hypothesis 12a: Autonomy is an INUS condition for worse human rights. 
 
Hypothesis 12b: The absence of autonomy is an INUS condition for improved 
human rights. 
Notably, the two territorial power-sharing provisions are anticipated to result in 
opposite effects. This likely will lead to confusing results when using the aggregated 
territorial power-sharing dimension described earlier, for it simply accounts for the 
presence of either measure. 
Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees (r3psg) 
Third-party security guarantees are analyzed alongside disaggregated power-
sharing provisions since guarantees are also represented by an individual provision in a 
peace agreement. The theoretical argument for including third-party security guarantees 
was made earlier in Chapter 3, where its role in resolving the dual challenges of 
vulnerability and credible commitment was outlined. In short, the provision of an 
external, non-partisan guarantor helps belligerents credibly commit to the various terms 
of a peace agreement by raising the costs and difficulties in cheating. The government 
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and the people are both less threatened and less vulnerable; the government’s opportunity 
to repress is also reduced.  
However, not all guarantees are created equal. Correspondingly, they should not 
be treated as equally sufficient to the task. Even when promises are kept, third-party 
guarantees vary significantly in the strength of their commitment to verifying or 
enforcing the peace-agreement process. In this vein, Walter (2002), one of the first 
scholars to write on this issue, concluded that guarantees vary substantially with respect 
to the strength of their commitment for “enforcing or verifying the peace process and its 
display of force” (Walter 2002, 67).  
These difference in commitment and force structure matter, especially when peace 
agreements include such elements as the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) of belligerents. In the critical phase of post-conflict disarmament and 
demobilization, verification and monitoring missions are largely insufficient to the task of 
assuring the security of belligerents. Security guarantees that lack either the ability to use 
force if necessary (i.e., an insufficient mandate) or the necessary military force to coerce 
combatants are less likely to succeed in demobilizing and disarming rebels. This leaves a 
serious viable threat in place against the regime and is likely to lead to intensified 
political repression. 
In contrast, robust third-party security guarantees reduce fear, especially for 
belligerents who are particularly vulnerable as they disarm and demobilize. This 
reduction in fear especially holds true when security guarantees include both a mandate 
the use of force if necessary and sufficient peacekeeping forces to guarantee that 
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mandate. The disarmament and demobilization of rebels removes the potential of violent 
threat to the regime’s stability. By decreasing this threat, third-party security guarantees 
effectively decrease the primary motivation of the regime to politically repress its 
citizens.  
Robustness also matters when peace-agreement terms do not formally include a 
provision for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. In 
such cases, credible commitment by prior belligerents is still required with respect to the 
other terms of the peace agreement. The presence of a robust peacekeeping force 
stabilizes internal security, allowing for a pattern of trust to develop between former 
combatants.  
By definition, robust third-party security guarantees include mandates that 
authorize the use of force (if necessary), alongside a sufficient footprint size to execute 
the mandate. When security guarantees involve a significant deployed force, and a more 
extensive mandate that allows for the use of force, they are more likely to affect political-
repression levels than their less extensive, under-manned counterparts. Missions that lack 
either a sufficient mandate or the necessary forces to execute that mandate are expected 
to be less effective at reducing a state’s degree of political repression in a post-civil war 
context. Robust guarantees—backed by a strong mandate and sufficient soldiers on the 
ground—are anticipated to consistently lead to significant human-rights improvement by 
both reducing the threat to the government and its opportunity to repress. The 
expectation, based on these arguments, is that 
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Hypothesis 13a: Robust third-party security guarantees are an INUS condition 
for improved human rights. 
Hypothesis 13b: The absence of robust third-party security guarantees is an 
INUS condition for worse human rights. 
Differentiating Third-Party Security Guarantees 
Walter’s (2002) operationalization is a useful starting point for showcasing the 
diverse types of third-party presence. Walter argued that most variation in third-party 
security guarantees (3PSGs) is captured by two key components: (1) the type of mandate 
(i.e., the mission parameters and rules of engagement, scaled from simple verification and 
observation to peace enforcement), and (2) the footprint size (i.e., the size of that 
verification or enforcement force). Walter proposed five categories of third-party security 
guarantees, based on variations in these two parameters (see Table 12 below).    
 
Table 12: Walter’s Typology of Third-Party Security Guarantees 
 
Modifying Walter’s Typology 
Walter’s typology requires several adjustments in order to align with the 
argument made here that robust third-party security guarantees—those with a mandate to 
use force if necessary and sufficient personnel necessary to back up this mandate—are 
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more likely to lead to decreased political repression than less robust guarantees (or no 
guarantee). First, Walter’s initial two categories (designated as 0 and 1) were combined 
into one category. This aligned well with Walter’s own contention that promises of 
intervention without a mandate or force are wholly ineffectual99; external provisions 
without substantial implementation are just empty promises and their anticipated effect 
on human rights is negligible.  
Second, an alternative term was selected to operationalize the robustness of third-
party guarantees: mandate strength replaced type of mandate.100 Mandate strength refers 
to the mission objective, rules of engagement, and level of force that is authorized. 
Walter’s use of footprint size was retained since this term is commonly used in the 
literature for describing the number of personnel deployed on the ground for a given 
mission.101  
Third, Walter’s data needed full revision, since her dataset ended in 1992. Two 
variables were selected for coding 3PSGs according to her theoretical argument, though 
the terms were slightly modified. To operationalize mandate strength, Fortna’s (2008) 
Classification of Peacekeeping Missions was used. This classification was selected 
                                                 
99 Walter (66-67) argued that security guarantees essentially do not exist when the third party fails to arrive 
or if it arrives with a significantly reduced mandate, regardless of the original promises. She manually 
removed cases where a third party offered help during negotiations but then failed to provide assistance.  
100 The use of combined indicators (mandate strength + footprint size) to gauge a guarantee’s robustness is 
an effort to assess them beyond simple presence or absence in a provision. In this same vein, future studies 
should investigate power-sharing provisions in a more robust fashion, perhaps using Jarstad & Nilsson 
(2008) idea of implementation. As discussed in the conclusion, this approach brings its own challenges. 
101 See, for example, Edelstein (2009). 
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because Mattes and Savun (2009) used Fortna’s data for their project102 and because it 
assesses mandate strength in great detail. With respect to the latter, for example, 
interpositional and multidimensional missions accommodate in their mandates for 
disarming and demobilizing factions. These missions are only lightly armed in 
comparison to peace-enforcement missions, which involve the strongest mandates: 
Peace enforcement missions involve substantial military forces to provide security 
and ensure compliance with a cease-fire. They have a mandate to use force for 
purposes in addition to self-defense. . . . Most Chapter VII103 missions do enjoy 
the consent of the belligerents, at least at the beginning of the mission. But unlike 
Chapter VI missions,104 they are not obligated to part should they lose that 
consent. Other peace enforcement missions enjoy the consent of one side (most 
often the government), but not necessarily the other. In other words, Ch VII 
missions may have the consent of the belligerents, but it is not a necessary 
condition for their operation (7). 
  
Fortna’s mission classifications are summarized in Table 13 below.    
  
                                                 
102 Mattes and Savun (2009) used Fortna’s (2004) data for their project. Fortna generally mirrored Doyle 
and Sambanis’s (2000; 2006) typology with respect to various types of peacekeeping missions that exist.  
103 Peace enforcement missions are also called Chapter VII missions. 
104 Chapter VI missions are also called consent-based missions. Chapter VI missions include all 
verification, interpositional, and multidimensional missions. 
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Table 13: Fortna’s Classification of Peacekeeping Missions105 
 
 
 Walter’s three categories of mandate strength—i.e., no mandate, verification, and 
armed force—do not fully capture the range of armed force provided within mandates. As 
noted earlier with respect to Fortna’s classifications, interpositional and multidimensional 
missions are only lightly armed in comparison to peace-enforcement missions. Therefore, 
to better capture the range of force allowed in these mandates, Walter’s category of armed 
force was broadened into two categories: armed peacekeeping mission (i.e., 
interpositional and multidimensional missions) and peace enforcement mission. Fortna’s 
classifications can then be aligned and coded according to this extension of Walter:   
  
                                                 
105 Fortna’s (2008) dataset covered conflicts up to 2004. Fortna’s coding handbooks (“data notes”) are 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm. Missing data was resolved using specific UN 
Security Council Resolutions, UN peacekeeping operations (2015) and data on intrastate wars from the 
Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010a) project and Mullenbach’s (2013a, b) dataset and dispute 
narratives.  
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Table 14: Fortna’s Missions Matched to Mandate Strength    
 
As shown in the table above, four levels of mandate strength were considered in 
this project: (1) no mandate; (2) verification mission; (3) armed peacekeeping;  and (4) 
peace enforcement. Footprint size was operationalized using the number of personnel 
deployed from Mullenbach’s (2013b) dataset. Mullenbach accounted for the maximum 
number of international peacekeeping personnel (including military troops, 
military/civilian monitors, and civilian police) who deployed during a given mission.106  
 When these modifications and data updates were blended with Walter’s original 
typology, a spectrum of third-party security guarantees emerged. The principle 
supposition undergirding this new typology (see Table 15 below) is that the most viable 
and effective guarantees are those that combine a strong mandate with significant 
footprint size. Based on this combined requirement, peace-enforcement missions that 
involved a smaller footprint size were deemed less robust than armed peacekeeping 
missions that had larger footprints sufficient to execute their assigned mandate. 
  
                                                 
106 This specific variable was named pknum1 in Mullenbach’s dataset. 
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Table 15: Initial Extension of Walter’s Third-Party Security Guarantees 
   
 
All thirty-six cases were then coded according to this spectrum. The initial coding 
revealed that verification cases were rare, with just five of the third-six cases falling into 
category one or two. Furthermore, the footprint size for verification missions was usually 
small; only one civil war fit category two by having greater than five-hundred personnel 
(Guinnea-Bissau). Given the rarity of verification missions, and the common use of a 
smaller footprint size for such missions, categories one and two were collapsed from the 
initial extension. This yielded the following final typology for comparison of robust 
third-party security guarantees: 
Table 16: Author’s Proposed “Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees” 
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 The breakdown of the case types (Table 17 below) demonstrates that seven of the 
thirty-six cases (19%) had no third-party presence. Five cases (14%) involved third-party 
security guarantees with a verification mandate; only one of those five cases involved 
more than five-hundred observers in country (Guinea-Bissau). Fully two-thirds of the 
negotiated settlements (24 of the 36) involved security guarantees backed by armed 
personnel (categories two, three, four). Nine of those armed mandates (25%) involved 
less than 5,000 troops107; fifteen cases (42%) involved an armed peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement mandate with at least 5,000 or more deployed personnel. Of those fifteen 
cases, only four guarantees involved interpositional or multidimensional missions. 
Table 17: Robust 3PSG Typology Applied to Negotiated Settlements 
 
 
An additional important finding shown in this table is that the most robust form of 
security guarantee (i.e., type 4 guarantee involving peace-enforcement mission and at 
least 5,000 armed personnel) was also the most common type of guarantee. The presence 
of at least 5,000 personnel tended to be coupled with the strongest mandate of peace 
enforcement. Still, less than one-third of all negotiated settlements concluding between 
1989-2005 involved the most robust type of third-party security guarantee. 
                                                 
107 Only one civil war—in Moldova—involved a third-party security guarantee with a peace enforcement 
mandate and less than 5,000 personnel; at its peak, just 1,200 armed personnel were involved. Moldova is 
rather unique in this dataset. Its civil war was short in duration (just 7 months) and the total deaths just 
reached the 1,000 death threshold required for consideration as a civil war. With a smaller population as 
well, the smaller deployment size per capita was potentially substantial enough to affect human rights. 
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Remote Conditions 
Situational variables . . . refer to characteristics of the situation between the 
belligerents, over which those who would make peace have little or no control. 
Some of these are “pre-existing conditions,” that is, conditions at the time of the 
cease fire. . . . [C]hanges after a cease-fire is in place might also affect its 
prospects.108  
 
As noted earlier, peace agreements and third-party security guarantees do not 
operate in isolation. Other factors might be helping to do the explanatory work. A number 
of underlying conditions serve as structural and situational antecedents to peace 
agreement initiation. These antecedents set the context within which peace agreements 
operate. Peace-agreement mechanisms must be considered in combination with these 
factors, because they aid in rendering an effect more or less probable. Moreover, power-
sharing arrangements are insufficient on their own to explain changes in human rights. 
Remote conditions may result in a variety of combinatorial effects when coupled with 
various power-sharing measures. Ultimately, the addition of situational and structural 
factors helps guard against spurious inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  
Where proximate conditions such as power-sharing agreements and third-party 
security guarantees represent intentional efforts to improve the peace after a war, 
structural and situational factors describe characteristics of the post-conflict situation over 
which belligerents hold little influence or sway.109 What situational conditions are 
relevant here? As noted earlier, while few scholars directly explore the relationship 
                                                 
108 See Fortna (2004, 83). 
109 This distinction parallels Fortna’s (2004, 2, 35-37) delineation between situational variables (what she 
also called “baseline prospects for peace”) versus deliberate attempts by actors to positively influence post-
conflict peace. Although Fortna’s work was oriented toward evaluating durable peace following interstate 
wars, the delineation proves insightful and portable to civil wars. Additionally, this bifurcation strategy 
aligns the data with the two-step approach used recommended for use within QCA.  
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between peace agreements made in civil wars and political repression outcomes, these 
two literatures provide fertile empirical soil from which to consider probable remote 
factors likely to enhance or attenuate the influence of peace agreements and third-party 
security guarantees on political repression outcomes.110  
 Eight remote conditions were initially considered: civil war recurrence, conflict 
ethnicity, conflict costs, conflict duration, regime type, economic development, state 
capacity, and population size. These conditions are expected to affect political repression 
through the three causal mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2, which include: (1) the 
motivation of the government to politically repress, (2) the opportunities available to the 
government to repress, and (3) the types of alternative governance mechanisms required 
or available to the government in lieu of pursuing repression.  
In relation to these causal mechanisms, the literatures on civil war and political 
repression demonstrate that the threat to the regime can be proxied by whether or not 
civil war recurs, by whether the conflict was driven by ethnic issues, by the costs of the 
conflict, and by its duration. In turn, the government’s opportunity to repress is captured 
by the population size and by the type of regime that exists after the conflict ends, 
especially with respect to its degree of democracy. Finally, a government’s ability to 
leverage alternative governance mechanisms is proxied by its level of economic 
development, by state capacity, and by regime type. The table below summarizes these 
                                                 
110 The introduction briefly introduced these conditions and Chapter 2 summarized them in Table 4: 
Motivation, Opportunities, and Alternative Governance Mechanisms.   
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eight situational conditions in relation to the principal causal factors known to affect the 
state’s decision to politically repress.111  
 Table 18: Motivation, Opportunities, and Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
 
These eight remote conditions capture issues pertinent to each state and civil war. 
As explained in Chapter 3, these conditions largely fall outside of actor influence. In this 
project, they are used as scoping conditions. Their concomitant effects on the state’s 
decision to repress may enable or constrain the influence of actor-influenced peace-
agreement provisions on affecting political repression.  
Motivation to Repress 
A threatened government is motivated and likely to respond to threats with 
political repression. The (1) recurrence of civil war, (2) conflict ethnicity, (3) costs of a 
conflict, and its (4) duration are four prominent factors that shape how much a 
government is likely to feel threatened. Each of these is examined below. 
                                                 
111 Population size and regime type affect both the government’s opportunity to repress and alternative 
governance mechanisms. With respect to the latter component, an increase in population size creates the 
need for more alternatives while the type of regime shapes the alternatives that are available. 
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1. Civil War Recurrence and Enduring Peace 
The basic logic here is simple. Authorities are assumed to prefer political order 
(quiescence, obedience, and active political support) to disorder (mass unrest) 
because it influences the perception of government legitimacy and performance. 
When the status quo is challenged, those in government may expand efforts to 
stabilize the situation by applying coercion . . . every investigation of the topic 
finds that behavioral challenge increases repression.112 
 
When behavioral challenges113 (e.g., violent dissent and political conflict in the 
form of protests, riots, guerrilla warfare, civil war) threaten a governing regime, political 
authorities reflexively increase state repression as the preferred (and perceived) most 
effective response mechanism at their disposal (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; 
Davenport 1995; Harff 2003). Indeed, domestic threats to a regime, especially in the form 
of a civil war, are empirically confirmed as the most pervasive driver of increased 
repression by a government (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  The recurrence of civil war—
conceptually defined as “large scale internal violent behavior” (Davenport 2007b, 85)—is 
arguably the most significant form of domestic violence that can threaten a post-conflict 
regime. Poe, Tate, and Keith’s (1999) findings demonstrated in this regard that civil war 
recurrence affects physical-integrity rights more than any other evaluated factor. In 
decreasing order of influence, other factors—like economic development, population 
size, and the existence of a democratic regime—also affected physical-integrity rights. 
Given these substantial theoretical and empirical findings, the expectation is that 
Hypothesis 14a: Civil war recurrence is an INUS condition for worse human 
rights.  
                                                 
112 See Davenport (2007b, 83-84). 
113 This term is used by Davenport to encompass the full range of potential political disorder and conflict. 
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Hypothesis 14b: The absence of civil war recurrence is an INUS condition for 
improved human rights. 
Operationally, the existence of civil war was verified using the seminal definition 
of Small and Singer (1982) discussed in Chapter 3. Civil war recurrence was verified 
using Mattes and Savun (2009) dataset and the Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 
2010a). To align with QCA best practices, the coding and terminology was established so 
that the presence of peace was coded as “1” in order to correspond with the anticipated 
presence of improved human rights (also coded as 1); correspondingly, civil war 
recurrence was coded as “0” since it is anticipated to lead to worse human rights (also 
coded as 0). This means that civil war recurrence, and its antithesis of peace, are coded as 
follows:  
0 = civil war recurrence 
1 = peace (i.e., no civil war recurrence at t+2, t+5, t+10)114 
Under this coding scheme, eight civil wars recurred at t+2, seven recurred at t+5, 
and six recurred at t+10 (see Table 19 below for specifics). The remaining states were at 
peace during those time periods. The condition accounting for civil war recurrence is also 
referred to by its relational opposite of enduring peace.  
 
  
                                                 
114 For simplicity, the residual effects of civil war recurrence were not coded, but only the recurrence of 
civil war within a given year that human-rights outcomehuman-rights outcomes were measured. 
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Table 19: Civil War Recurrence at t+2, t+5, t+10 
 
 
2. Ethnic vs. Non-Ethnic Wars 
Conflicts caused and driven by identity issues—such as ethnicity and/or religious 
grievances—are generally understood as highly intractable and non-divisible conflicts 
compared to wars motivated by socio-economic or ideological concerns (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Licklider 1995). Ethnic mobilization during the war 
leads to exclusion and targeting of minority groups.  
Anxieties persist long after a conflict ends. In ethnically mobilized societies, 
ruling elites are more likely to exploit these identity differences and pursue mass killings 
as a political survival strategy (Aydin and Gates 2008).115 Similarly, Petersen and 
Staniland (2008, 98-99) observed that ethnic status reversals cause increased resentment 
and fear. These components especially prevail within the military structure, often 
triggering rapid escalations to violence as ethnic actors pursue quick re-establishment of  
“the ‘just’ social order” (99).  
                                                 
115 Aydin and Gates (2008) validated this finding using two different measures of ethnic polarization. 
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Ethnicity also affects civil war recurrence. When ethnicity was the issue at stake 
in a civil war, the breakdown of negotiated settlements increased 197 percent (Mattes and 
Savun 2009). Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b, 328) likewise concluded that when 
belligerents in a conflict were divided along ethnic lines, the risk of civil war recurrence 
increased four-fold in comparison to all other conflicts. 
The introduction of power-sharing mechanisms is unlikely to resolve these 
tensions. Power-sharing agreements will cause structural and disruption of the ethnic 
representations within political and military institutions; such changes are likely to breed 
fear and resentment and cause increased political violence rather than reducing it (Aydin 
and Gates 2008). Power-sharing agreements may also provide avenues for elites to 
mobilize their political base around ethnic-based platforms; such ethnic mobilization 
favors even greater exclusion of minority groups. In parallel with these theories and 
empirical evidence, it is anticipated that  
Hypothesis 15a: Ethnically-driven civil wars are an INUS condition for worse 
human rights.  
Hypothesis 15b: Non-ethnic wars are an INUS condition for improved human 
rights. 
 Several options exist for testing the role of ethnicity, including data from 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009)116 and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Because the data 
from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl was already dichotomous, it was used as the 
primary variable for testing the role of ethnic-driven wars on human-rights outcomes. To 
                                                 
116 Missing data from Sambanis’s dataset was replaced by consulting Mattes and Savun’s (2009), 
Mullenbach’s (2013a) dispute narratives, and DeRouen and Heo’s (2007) compendium on civil wars.  
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align with best practices of QCA, their coding method was inverted so that expected 
conditions would align with expected outcomes. Since ethnic conflict is anticipated to 
align with worse human-rights outcomes, the coding used for non-ethnic conflict is:  
0 - if the war was driven by ethnic issues  
1 - if the war was not driven by ethnic issues 
When this coding was applied to the universe of cases, twenty-one of the thirty-six cases 
(58%) were found to be driven by ethnic issues, while fifteen civil wars (42%) were non-
ethnic wars.  
Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) ethnic data was then used to corroborate the findings. 
Mattes and Savun (2009) dataset on negotiated settlements in civil wars included (and 
extended) Fearon and Laitin’s data, so the necessary information was readily available.117 
The coding was also inverted here, which yielded the following:  
0 - if the civil war was driven by ethnic identity 
1 - if the civil war had some ethnic component 
2 - if the war was not over ethnic issues 
Under this coding methodology, nineteen civil wars (53%) were driven by ethnic issues, 
eleven civil wars (30%) involved some ethnic component, and only six cases (17%) had 
no ethnic component.  
3. Duration of the Previous War 
Two opposing views exist regarding the effects of war duration on the longevity 
of peace following negotiated settlements. Under one view, war duration may exhaust 
                                                 
117 In Mattes and Savun’s (2009) dataset, this variable is called issue at stake. 
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rivals, leading to a mutually hurting stalemate and conflict “ripeness” in which rivals are 
both ready to negotiate and fully implement peace-agreement provisions (Zartman 2000, 
2001). Additionally, longer wars reveal more information about the enemy’s intentions 
and capabilities (Mattes and Savun 2009). This combination of exhaustion and additional 
information helps to overcome the animosity and lack of trust between rivals; negotiated 
settlements are no longer viewed by one or both rivals as an opportunity to momentarily 
regroup but rather to finally pursue peace under the terms of negotiated settlement 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).  
Empirically, this view is supported by a number of authors who found that longer 
wars lead to longer peace (Fortna 2004b; Walter 2004). Initial research by Hartzell, 
Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) also corroborated Zartman’s theory, showing that civil 
wars with longer duration may experience a reduced risk of recurrent violence. However, 
other scholars have not observed any significant effect of civil war duration on civil war 
recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Mattes and Savun 2009).  
An opposing perspective to the notion of mutually hurting stalemates is the 
argument that the animosity between long-term rivals generally increases over time, 
which reduces trust between the parties. Further, long wars reflect intractable, very 
difficult to resolve issues. In this construct, negotiated settlements primarily represent 
opportunities for belligerents to regroup. Regrouped parties, with long-simmering 
animosities, represent a persistent threat to a government’s status quo and political 
repression will increase. While empirical evidence largely favors the former logic, this 
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project contends that when the evaluated outcome is shifted from enduring peace to 
political repression, then 
Hypothesis 16a: Long civil wars are an INUS condition for worse human 
rights.  
Hypothesis 16b: Short civil wars are an INUS condition for improved human 
rights. 
Previous scholarship is followed (Mattes and Savun 2009) in measuring conflict 
duration as the logged number of months a war lasted.118 Dichotomization of this 
continuous variable is discussed in Chapter 5. 
4. Costs of Civil War 
One method for gauging the severity of a conflict—also commonly referred to as 
the costs of the civil war—is by counting the number of battle-related deaths. The 
common logic here is that states that experienced intense wars with high numbers of 
overall deaths are more likely to witness civil war recurrence due to widespread hatred 
and distrust across the state. However, empirical findings vary wildly on this matter. 
Doyle and Sambanis (2000) showed that more severe wars are significantly and 
negatively correlated with the recurrence of violence; Walter (2004) did not observe any 
relationship. Meanwhile, Hartzell and Hoddie (2001) concluded that higher intensity 
conflicts increase the risk that violence will recur and Mattes and Savun (2009) verified 
that when civil war costs were higher, negotiated settlements broke down 45 percent 
more.    
                                                 
118 In contrast, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) instead use the logged number of years since the conflict first 
became active. 
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Post-conflict state repression may be affected by the costs of the previous war if 
the number of deaths shapes the amount of trust that exists between domestic enemies. 
Lower levels of trust lead to even deeper problems of credible commitment and increase 
the likelihood of cheating on agreements than in wars that had fewer deaths. However, 
high civil war costs may also be overcome when prior belligerents reach a mutually 
hurting stalemate. Sheer numbers alone will not reveal when this point has been reached 
since these numbers are not adjusted with respect to the state’s population size.119 Given 
the potential for variation from state to state—meaning whether higher costs lead to a 
mutually hurting stalemate or to lingering distrust—the asymmetric expectation is that  
Hypothesis 17: Civil wars with low costs are an INUS condition for improved 
human rights.  
In line with other scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b; Mattes and Savun 2009), 
civil war costs are measured by dividing the number of battle-related deaths (in the 
thousands) by each war’s duration, then logging the results. Dichotomization of this 
continuous variable is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Opportunity to Repress 
The government’s opportunity to repress is shaped by the presence of institutional 
restrictions that curtail political repression by raising the political costs and increasing 
accountability. Democratic institutions, assessed by regime type, provide the greatest 
degree of institutional checks and balances on a government’s opportunity to repress.  
                                                 
119 War duration, in contrast to total number of deaths, is more comparative across states. This constancy 
lends to the expectation that war duration is a more reliable predictor as compared to the costs of the war. 
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Regime Type 
In describing regime types, the literature on democracy delineates between states 
undergoing democratic transition (i.e., a movement away from authoritarian rule toward 
democratic rule)120 and those demonstrating democratic consolidation (i.e., where 
democracy has become, in the words of Giuseppe di Palma (1990), “the only game in 
town”).121 In application, this differentiation affords the theoretical possibility that, while 
power-sharing provisions introduce new constraint mechanisms to a regime,122 these 
mechanisms do not constrain authorities’ behavior until higher levels of democracy are 
reached. Stated differently, transition to democracy is not enough to guarantee that 
political repression decreases; rather, democratic consolidation—evidenced by higher 
levels of institutionalization and behaviors—is required before authorities begin to 
recognize any constraints on their use of coercion to govern. The logic here is that 
political leaders in more democratic regimes 
have both less opportunity and less willingness [emphasis added] to repress when 
faced with domestic or international conflict: less opportunity because the 
structure and limited nature of democratic governments make extensive use of 
repression more difficult to arrange; less willing because of the variety of outlets 
through which conflict can be channeled for possible resolution and also due to 
socialization processes that guide citizens of democratic polities toward the belief 
that nonviolent means of resolving conflicts are preferred over violence.123  
 
                                                 
120 See, for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Mainwaring et al. (2000). 
121 Also see Diamond (1994) and Schedler (1998). For a substantial discussion of democracy as it relates to 
repression and human rights, see Davenport (2007b). 
122 Such constraints are imposed via mass- and elite-oriented behaviors of participation, competition, and 
executive constraints. In turn, these constraints are correlated with “increased political freedoms, better 
civil-military relations, and a pro-human rights norm. . .Democracy gives individuals a voice to articulate 
human rights concerns and a mechanism with which to punish human rights abusers” (Murdie and Davis 
2010, 56). Also see Davenport (1997, 2007a, 2007b) for detailed exploration of democratic constraints. 
123 See Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999, 293).  
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Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 551) empirically verified the existence of a minimum 
democratic threshold, concluding that  
authorities do not perceive any constraints on repression or alternatives to social 
control until the highest levels of democracy have been achieved; up to this point 
authorities are not deterred nor dissuaded from violating human rights. After this 
threshold of democratic institutionalization and behavior has been passed, 
however, then the constraints on authorities become greater, the alternatives 
become clearer, and the likelihood of repression is decreased.  
 
Non-democratic regimes, and regimes with low levels of democracy, are unlikely to 
perceive constraints on their opportunity to repress. Conversely, highly democratic 
regimes will be dissuaded from the use of political repression. In accordance with 
previous scholarship, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 18a: Highly democratic regimes are an INUS condition for 
improved human rights.  
Hypothesis 18b: Regimes lacking high levels of democracy are an INUS 
condition for worse human rights. 
Defining democracy in conceptual and operational terms is difficult, given 
persistent debate in the field. The majority of researchers124 adopt a procedural definition 
based on Dahl’s (1971) conception of “polyarchy” (i.e., rule by many). Dahl proposed 
two key dimensions of democratization, including competition (public contestation) and 
participation (inclusiveness). Within democratization literature, the Polity (version IV) 
measure of democracy—robustly developed by Gurr and various associates over the last 
several decades (Gurr 1974; Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1990; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; 
                                                 
124 See, for example (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Alvarez et al. 1996; Coppedge, Alvarez, and 
Maldanado 2008; Coppedge et al. 2011; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010; Vanhanen 2000).  
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Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010)—“stands as the best comparative indicator of 
procedural democracy in terms of its incorporation of structural constraints on political 
participation and contestation” (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 545).  
In contrast, the Freedom House score measures political rights and civil liberties. 
Because this current project is evaluating an outcome of human rights, a definition of 
democracy was needed that did not conflate democracy with human rights.125 The Polity 
IV dataset was therefore selected to measure democracy, using the specific variable of 
polity2 which ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Chapter 5 details 
the selection of appropriate dichotomization thresholds for this variable.  
Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
Coercion via political repression is one method of social control. Rather than 
coercing the populace via the repression of physical-integrity rights, the government 
might instead cooperate with its citizens through democratic institutions. Democratic 
cooperation is advocated and understood as a less costly, more effective societal control 
mechanism, assessed best by evaluating the degree of democracy in a given state (Dallin 
and Breslauer 1970; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Alternatively, governments might 
also coopt elites and citizens through economic inducements or the provision of public 
goods. Here, the level of economic development proxies the potential for cooptation 
(Davenport and Armstrong 2004). When a regime possesses alternative means by which 
to convince or coopt the population to follow its rule, political repression is less 
necessary; human rights are likely to improve. Governments revert to coercion via the 
                                                 
125 Munck and Verkuilen (2002) cautioned against using maximal definitions that conflate democracy with 
other concepts. They specifically referenced Freedom House’s index for its inclusion of excess attributes. 
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repression of physical-integrity rights most often when alternative governance 
mechanisms, like cooperation and cooptation, are unavailable or cost too much.  
Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 540) proposed that alternative mechanisms 
effectively serve as a constraint to political repression, because alternatives (e.g., material 
and normative forms of influence) create distinct approaches to governance as well as 
advocates for each style. Both can hinder the coercive strategies of government by 
offering a different way of looking at the problem of sociopolitical order and different 
means to get there. When alternatives exist, then coercion and those who advocate for its 
use are compelled to justify, persuade, and compete with the others, thereby hindering 
them (at least when viewed relative to the other contexts that do not require such actions). 
When alternatives and advocates do not exist, however, then coercion and its advocates 
have free reign (in this case, there is nothing else that can be done to establish, maintain, 
and extend practices and beliefs).   
This means that when governments rule their people, they choose from alternative 
governing mechanisms, such as coercion, cooperation, and cooptation. The mechanism of 
coercion via political repression was explained in-depth in Chapter 2; the mechanism of 
cooperation via democratic institutions was detailed in the preceding section. This section 
focuses on the ability of a state to coopt its people. Three different conditions are 
considered: (1) the size of the population, which places greater demands on any available 
resources and provides increased opportunities to repress; (2) a government’s economic 
development; and (3) state capacity. The latter two measures proxy the state’s capacity to 
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coopt the population; they represent the supply side of the equation while population size 
represents the demand side. 
Population Size 
Larger populations may increase a state’s pursuit of political repression through 
one of two possible mechanisms. (1) A large population may experience greater 
repression simply by increasing the number of opportunities when people might rebel or 
be repressed by the government (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). 
Larger populations also enlarge the base within which a state can hide or diffuse its 
expanded use of political repression (Murdie and Davis 2010). (2) Larger populations 
stress the supply and distribution of natural resources (Henderson 1993; Murdie and 
Davis 2010; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and of social and political resources (Huntington 
2006). This magnified demand can result in scarcity, all of which may amplify the degree 
of political violence and state repression.  
This causal chain is made clear using an extension of Huntington’s (2006) 
arguments (made earlier in this chapter) about the stresses placed on a government by 
rapid social and economic change. A larger population naturally increases the necessity of 
creating complex, effective, political institutions that can respond to demographic 
challenges and to increased social and political participation, ceteris parabis. Moreover, 
when conflict and political violence begin, political institutions are difficult or impossible 
to form (Huntington 2006). The lack of sufficient institutions exacerbates scarcity, which 
leads to more opportunities for popular revolt (Davies 1969; Gurr 1970) and for 
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repression (Murdie and Davis 2010). Empirically, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) 
substantiated that population size is the most robust correlate of civil war eruption.  
Larger populations increase the demands on limited resources. Scarcity follows,  
often leading to political violence and revolt from the citizens and more repression from 
the government. As a result,   
Hypothesis 19a: States with larger populations are an INUS condition for 
worse human rights.  
Hypothesis 19b: States with smaller populations are an INUS condition for 
improved human rights.  
 Population-size data was taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) and 
updated using The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2011). Dichotomization 
of this continuous variable is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Economic Development  
The level of economic development within a state, also referred to as its economic 
standing, is consistently found to increase its respect for physical-integrity rights 
(Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; 
Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Empirical evidence by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b), for 
example, showed that successful implementation of peace agreements increases at higher 
levels of economic development.126 In a later study, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007, 80-81) 
                                                 
126 Also see Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 262) who documented that higher per capita income reduces the 
duration of conflict: “A 10% increase in per capita income is associated with a 5% reduction in the duration 
of conflict.” In evaluating this causal linkage, they proposed that higher per capita income represents “the 
opportunity cost of conflict to society, and so one interpretation is that it is proxying this social cost.” 
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discovered that the risk of return to civil war is also reduced by higher levels of economic 
development.  
Strong economic standing may defray the level of threat facing a government; that 
is, revolts due to scarcity are less likely when more valued goods are generated and 
distributed (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). 
Redistributionist policies may satisfy aggrieved protestors, making such rebellions less 
likely (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). The distribution of economic benefits, such 
as public goods and services throughout a state, coopts individuals and groups; at the 
same time, it may also provide those same individuals with additional resources to resist 
repressive regimes if they wish (Murdie and Davis 2010; Poe and Tate 1994). According 
to other scholars, high levels of economic development may both increase alternative 
governance mechanisms and reduce the need for third-party involvement in peace 
agreement implementation (DeRouen et al. 2010; Taydas and Peksen 2012). In line with 
this scholarship, the asymmetric expectation is 
Hypothesis 20: Economically developed states are an INUS condition for 
improved human rights.  
 Economic development was captured used a slight modification to Poe, Tate, and 
Keith’s (1999) operationalization of this concept. Where they used GNP per capita, this 
project uses the more common and accessible GDP per capita to control for economic 
explanation.127 The natural log of GDP per capita is used to tighten the model fit. Chapter 
                                                 
127 GDP/capita was used to proxy economic development since this measure assesses the strength of the 
state’s economy within its boundaries, whereas GNP includes the production of a state’s citizens in foreign 
lands, even if those funds do not flow back to that state. 
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5 details the dichotomization of this continuous variable, with data acquired from Mattes 
& Savun (2009) and The World Bank (2016b). 
State Capacity 
Recent literature suggests that state capacity is better than economic development 
at assessing the government’s real capacity to govern its people without coercing them. 
Hendrix (2010, 273), for example, argued: 
If the state is capable of repressing, then the likelihood of capture will be higher 
and rebellion will be less likely. If the state is capable of accommodating 
grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of 
autonomy rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements within the party 
system, then the motivation for violent rebellion will be lessened and conflict will 
be less likely. 
  
According to this viewpoint, the decision of citizens to violently rebel against 
their government accounts for the state’s repressive capacity as well its ability to 
accommodate or coopt the opposition through the redistribution of resources and power. 
A state with strong repressive capability and the capacity to coopt or accommodate rebels 
is less likely to experience rebellion; conversely, a state with limited capacity to repress 
its people or to accommodate them means rebels will choose more often to fight. 
State capacity also potentially affects the types of peace-agreement measures it 
might implement. Weaker states lack the necessary revenue to fund institutional changes. 
Measures that involve extensive implementation costs in such states are likely to fail. 
Meanwhile, higher levels of economic development correlate with an increased 
likelihood that peace agreements will be fully implemented (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b). 
Finding a solid measure for state capacity (rather than the strongly related idea of 
economic development) is quite difficult. Definitions vary widely, with some scholars 
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proxying state capacity with the “quality of government” (Taydas and Peksen 2007) and 
others defining it as “the state’s ability to accomplish those goals it pursues, possibly in 
the face of resistance by actors within the state” (DeRouen et al. 2010, 335).  
Hendrix’s work (2010) provides an excellent foundation for measuring state 
capacity. Hendrix evaluated fifteen different operationalizations of state capacity offered 
by other scholars. He then identified three principal dimensions of state capacity which 
proved common across all fifteen measures. These dimensions included: (1) rational 
legality (a state’s bureaucratic and administrative capacity), (2) rentier-autocraticness, 
and (3) neopatromoniality.  
Hendrix concluded that while no single variable can adequately model the 
multidimensional aspects of a state’s capacity, the variable of total taxes/GDP (as a proxy 
for a state’s revenue-generating capacity) proved highly correlated with all three state 
capacity dimensions. Moreover, “revenue generation is not simply correlated with state 
capacity, is its sine qua non: that which the state must be able to do if any other goals are 
to be pursued” (Hendrix 2010, 283). State capacity was proxied using Kugler and 
Arbetman’s (1997, 279) variable of relative political capacity.128 Hendrix lauded this 
measure for its ability to address “the limitations of basic tax capacity by creating a ratio 
of a state’s actual to predicted tax revenue (total taxes/GDP).”  
Cross-tabulations and preliminary QCA procedures were run to investigate the 
relationship of these conditions against political repression. No definitive relationships 
                                                 
128 For extensive discussion on relative political capacity, as well as other measures for evaluating a state’s 
capabilities with respect to reach, allocation, and extraction, see Kugler and Tammen’s (2012) work on The 
Performance of Nations and their corresponding datasets. 
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were found in the cross-tabulations, despite consideration of three different alternative 
thresholds of 0.9, 1, and 1.1. The crisp-set QCA procedures resulted in constant truth 
table contradictions regardless of which other variables were considered or thresholds 
were used. The absence of any findings should perhaps not come as a surprise. The 
challenge in using “Basic measures of tax capacity, such as total taxes/GDP” is that they 
unfortunately “do not distinguish between states that rely on administratively 
sophisticated revenue instruments and those that do not” (Hendrix 2010, 279).129 
In summary, the hypothesis that state capacity affects human-rights outcomes was 
tested using the strongest current proxies for this condition (as assessed by experts within 
the field like Hendrix). No evidence was found that state capacity related to state 
repression, regardless of adjustments in the thresholds. Given the lack of any clear 
relationships with human-rights outcomes, state capacity was not included in Chapter 5 
discussion or in the fuzzy-set analysis.  
This should not be interpreted to mean that such relationships do not exist. Rather, 
an insufficient number of corresponding cases of political repression, with available state 
capacity data, restricted robust exploration of potential relations. Hendrix came to a 
similar conclusion, asserting that while “State terror [political terrorism] is both real and 
understudied . Unfortunately, there is insufficient data about cross-national events data to 
examine the relationship between state terror and state capacity” (2014, 330). When this 
data becomes available, state capacity should be reassessed.  
                                                 
129 While relative political capacity attempts to correct for this, it also still masks those states that derive 
“significant revenue from non-tax sources” which represent states that naturally “will have fewer incentives 
to access societal resources and will not have pecuniary incentives to invest in monitoring and coercive 
capacity” (Hendrix 2010, 279). 
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Conclusion 
Chapter 4 evaluated three sets of conditions: (1) Set 1 proximate conditions 
addressed theories about aggregated power-sharing dimensions; (2) Set 2 proximate 
conditions covered disaggregated, individual measures like power-sharing provisions and 
third-party security guarantees; and (3) remote conditions accounted for situational and 
historical contexts pertinent to each state. Theoretical and empirical evidence was 
presented for all of these conditions and the anticipated effects of each condition on the 
outcome of human rights were described. Hypotheses were projected, followed by 
explanation of the specific indicators used to represent each condition.  
The chapter began with a review of the contemporary power-sharing literature on  
aggregated power-sharing dimensions (i.e., Set 1 proximate conditions).  Three general 
camps of arguments were considered: (1) More power-sharing is better. Whether more of 
certain power-sharing dimensions is better (i.e., thick political settlements, thick military 
settlements, or the presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement), or 
whether less power-sharing is better for human-rights outcomes. (2) Power-sharing 
dimensions reinforce each other (i.e., extensively institutionalized settlements) and 
improve post-war conditions. Additional provisions within certain dimensions reinforce 
each other and improve post-war conditions (i.e., thick political settlements, thick 
military settlements, or the presence of any type of territorial power-sharing agreement). 
(3) Power-sharing is dangerous. This discussion helped to identify four proximate 
conditions for testing the hypotheses (recall Table 11 above).  
  
   159 
Table 20: Hypotheses on Set 2 Proximate Conditions and Remote Conditions  
 
 
Under the central premise that an aggregated approach to evaluating negotiated 
settlements is problematic and misleading, an alternative evaluation method was then 
described using disaggregated individual provisions. This portion included discussion on 
seven disaggregated power-sharing provisions found within the political, military, and 
territorial dimensions, as well as robust third-party security guarantees. The projected 
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effects of these conditions on the outcome diverge significantly from each other (see the 
summary in Table 20 above); different provisions, even within the same dimension, are 
projected to have opposing effects. 
Finally, this chapter evaluated situational and historical contexts—called remote 
conditions in QCA—that form the baseline prospects for significant human-rights 
improvement. Proximate factors operate within these remote conditions, and their 
potential to affect the level of political repression pursued by the state is alternatively 
enabled or constrained based on the remote conditions that exist within the state. 
The goal of this project was to investigate peace-agreement provisions, 
particularly power-sharing measures and third-party security guarantees, using these two 
different combinations of conditions: Model 1 to evaluate aggregated power-sharing 
dimensions within remote contexts, and Model 2 to evaluate disaggregated peace-
agreement provisions (including individual power-sharing measures and third-party 
security guarantees) within these same remote contexts.  
These models primarily differ with respect to whether power-sharing provisions 
are evaluated individually (disaggregated) or by dimension (aggregated): 
Model 1:  Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions 
Model 2:  Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions 
 The ultimate objective in using Models 1 and 2 was to determine which 
combinations of conditions helped or hindered governments exiting civil war in honoring 
the physical-integrity rights of their citizens. An overall reduction in the number of 
proposed conditions is advisable before implementing QCA methods. As outlined in 
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Tables 12 and 20, this project involved a total of nineteen different conditions. This 
relatively high number of initial conditions is not unprecedented or rare in QCA 
scholarship.130  
These conditions were partially divided into the two different models, reducing 
the number of conditions being simultaneously considered. Initially, Model 1 involved 
eleven conditions in total (four proximate and seven remote conditions); Model 2 
involved fifteen conditions (eight proximate and seven remote).  
Scholars like Rihoux and De Meur (2009a, b) unilaterally caution that while a 
perspectives-based approach (as was used here) lowers the risk of variable omission, the 
iterative process can become quite time-intensive as researchers must refine and re-
operationalize conditions. They recommend the use of stepwise analysis to eliminate 
superfluous conditions and arrive at a parsimonious model. The next chapter was 
intentionally designed toward achieving this very objective.  
                                                 
130 Rihoux (2001) for example, used a perspective-based approach to set his range of conditions. He 
covered 26 potential conditions in his examination of factors influencing organizational change. His set of 
cases was similarly small, involving just 14 different political parties spanning 12 Western European states. 
This explanation of Rihoux’s earlier work was provided in Rihoux and Ragin (2009).  
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Chapter Five: Quantiative Analysis of Proximate and Remote Conditions 
Now that theoretical foundations have been laid, hypotheses established, models 
proposed, and raw data gathered, the second phase of QCA known as the “analytic 
moment” (Rihoux and Lobe 2009, 229) could fully commence. Following the advice of 
several QCA scholars (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27-28), the analytic stage 
began with “stepwise multi-methodological procedures” to reduce the overall complexity 
of the two models. The purpose of this chapter was to identify strong bivariate 
relationships—whether symmetrical or asymmetric in nature—and leverage these 
insights to reduce the total number of conditions under consideration, especially with 
respect to Model 2 since it initially contains 15 proximate and remote conditions. 
 Reduction in the total number of conditions under consideration was facilitated 
by statistical techniques, specifically via the use of contingency tables (also called cross 
tabulations or cross tabs). Contingency tables were designed for evaluation of bivariate 
relationships, such as those between each of the proposed conditions and human-rights 
outcomes. These tables illustrate statistical significance and the direction of the 
relationships between the variables. Strong bivariate relationships between proximate or 
remote conditions and the outcome were retained for use in the fuzzy-set analysis.  
Of note, correlational methods only assess relationships in a symmetrical manner. 
They focus simultaneously and equivalently on “the degree to which instances of the 
cause produce instances of the outcome . . . and on the degree to which instances of the 
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absence of the cause are linked to the absence of the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 21). Since 
QCA was designed for asymmetrical analysis, those conditions that demonstrate strong 
asymmetrical relationships, as evidenced in the tables themselves, are also retained for 
use in fsQCA. In sum, the insights gained from the contingency-table observations help 
refine and reduce the initial number of proposed conditions, which creates a more 
favorable ratio between the number of conditions and the number of cases. 
The chapter begins by briefly explaining the statistical tools used here for 
analyzing the contingency tables, such as the chi-square statistic, Cramer’s V coefficient, 
and Fisher’s exact test of independence. The remainder (and bulk) of this chapter is 
dedicated to applying and analyzing the bivariate relationships between each of the 
conditions and the human-rights outcomes. Relationships are assessed across the three 
previously discussed periods (two years after the civil war ends; five years after the war; 
and ten years after the war, as compared to when the war ended), using both the Political 
Terror Scale and the CIRI human-rights measures.131 
The nineteen proximate and remote conditions are reviewed in order of the 
respective set into which they were initially categorized (Set 1 proximate conditions; Set 
2 proximate conditions; remote conditions).132 The naming conventions for these 19 
conditions are summarized in Appendix 1. Most of the remote conditions involved either 
ordinal or continuous interval data, so discussion there begins with justification of 
selected thresholds, followed by analysis using contingency tables. The chapter concludes 
                                                 
131 See Chapter 3 for definitions and operationalization of these periods and terms. 
132 Recall Table 1: Proximate and Remote Conditions. Per discussion and evaluation in Chapter 4, state 
capacity was removed from further consideration. 
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with an analysis of whether any conditions are considered necessary for states to 
experience improved human rights.  
Tools for Analyzing Contingency Tables 
A primary concern of researchers is determining whether or not a relationship 
exists between variables. Contingency tables, also called cross-tabs, are a simple 
quantitative method for testing such correlations.133 For categorical data used in 
contingency tables, tools like the chi-square statistic and Fisher’s exact test prove useful 
for testing whether or not a statistically significant relationship exists. However, these 
measures are limited in that they do not indicate the nature of the relationship (i.e. its  
strength and direction). To accomplish the latter, measures of association—like the phi 
correlation and Cramer’s V—help gauge the association between variables. Each of these 
four tools is expounded briefly below. 
Relational Tests: Chi-Square Statistic & Fisher’s Exact Test 
The first, and perhaps most common, statistical test for examining whether a 
relationship exists between two categorical variables is Pearson’s chi-square test. This 
test is “an extremely elegant statistic based on the simple idea of comparing the 
frequencies you observe in certain categories to the frequencies you might expect to get 
in those categories by chance” (Field 2009, 688). The observed chi-square statistic must 
be compared to the chi-square distribution,134 If the observed statistic exceeds the known 
                                                 
133 In the simplest contingency table (a 2x2 table), the values compare the presence or absence of a cause 
against the presence or absence of an outcome.  
134 The chi-square distribution has known properties based on the desired probability and the number of 
degrees of freedom (e.g. for a 2x2 matrix, df = 1, yields critical values of 3.84 (p = .05) and 6.63 (p = .01). 
In contrast, for a 3x2 matrix, df = 2 yields critical values of 5.99 (for p = .05) and 9.21 (p = .01). 
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distribution, then the relationship is statistically significant at either p < .05 or p < .01 and 
the null hypothesis—that there is no association between the two variables—can be 
rejected (Field 2009). The rejection of the null hypothesis does not reveal the direction of 
the relationship or its strength though. 
One important caveat applies to the chi-square test: The chi-square test is only 
considered accurate for 2x2 contingency tables when the expected frequencies in each 
cell are greater than five, and for tables larger than 2x2, when two conditions prevail: (1) 
no more than 20 percent of all expected counts are less than five; and (2) each individual 
expected count is one or greater (Field 2009, 690; Yates et al. 1998). When the chi-square 
test is not usable due to violation of these standards, then Fisher’s exact test of 
independence—designed to compute the exact probability of chi-square statistics and 
improve accuracy in small sample sizes (Field 2009)—is substituted. As with the chi-
square, Fisher’s exact test only identifies whether or not a relationship is statistically 
significant; it provides no information about the degree or direction of that relationship 
(Freeman and Campbell 2007).  
Measures of Association: Phi Correlation and Cramer’s V 
 The phi-coefficient and Cramer’s V coefficient are chi-square-based measures that 
measure the strength of the relationship between two variables.135 For interpretation 
purposes, phi values vary between -1 and 1. This permits analysis of positive and 
                                                 
135 Phi and Cramer’s V both account for sample size. Phi is equal to the square root of chi-square divided 
by n, where n equals the same size. Cramer’s V is quite similar, with one small change—the square root of 
chi-square is divided by n times m, where m is the smaller of (rows - 1) or (columns -1).  
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negative associations, as well as the strength of relationships. 136 In contrast, Cramer’s V 
varies between zero and one. For both measures, a generally accepted convention is that 
low absolute values of 0 to 0.3 indicate a negligible-to-weak relationship; values between 
0.31 to 0.7 indicate a moderate-to-substantial relationship; and values 0.71 or higher 
indicate a strong-to-very-strong relationship.  
Application of Contingency Tables 
Using the four statistical tools listed above, the following procedures were applied 
to each bivariate relationship: The first step involved determining whether a statistically 
significant relationship existed between the causal condition and the outcome. The null 
hypothesis was either accepted or rejected based on tests of independence. When the 
minimum expected frequency in each cell was five or greater, the chi-square test was 
used; in all other cases, Fisher’s exact test was used.  
Given that QCA accounts for asymmetric and for the combinatorial effects of 
factors arranged in various causal recipes—and that contingency tables use a symmetric 
approach to evaluating relationships—the parameters for significance were broadened 
here. So then, rather than only addressing significance at p < .05, additional relationships 
were highlighted to include those that either: (1) approached or were below significance 
at p < .10 and/or (2) where a strong asymmetric relationship appeared that might be 
masked by the symmetric approach of contingency table statistics; or (2) the strength of 
the proposed relationship was assessed using measures of association. For 2x2 tables, the 
                                                 
136 In tables larger than 2x2, phi may be greater than 1.0, which makes interpretation difficult and non-
intuitive. Also, for 2x2 tables, Cramer’s V = phi. 
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phi-coefficient was used; tables larger than this required Cramer’s V coefficient. To 
summarize, each condition was evaluated for the following: 
1. Did a statistically significant relationship exist?  
· Present the hypothesis and the null hypothesis. 
· Assess null hypothesis using tests of independence. 
a. Evaluate chi-square (if frequency in cells five or greater).  
b. If chi-square not possible, use Fisher’s exact test. 
2. How strong was the relationship?  
· Assess relationship using measures of association. 
a. For 2x2 tables, use phi-coefficient.  
b. For tables larger than 2x2, use Cramer’s V coefficient.  
These procedures were applied, in turn, to three sets of conditions: (1) proximate 
conditions testing contemporary power-sharing literature theories about power-sharing 
dimensions, including dimension institutionalization and strength as well as territorial 
power-sharing; (2) proximate conditions testing theories about robust third-party security 
guarantees and disaggregated power-sharing dimensions; and (3) remote conditions 
testing the situational and historical variety of post-civil war contexts. As outlined in 
Chapter 3, the change in human-rights outcomes (i.e., changes in PTS or CIRI scores) 
was evaluated over three time periods (i.e., t as compared to t+2, t+5, and t+10; the 
dichotomized values were captured in the variables pts2d, pts5d, and pts10d).  
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Set 1: Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions  
Since the first set of conditions aggregated power-sharing dimensions, several 
conditions were initially added to aid in preliminary cross-case comparison of civil wars 
ending in negotiated settlements. These two conditions included: (1) the presence of any 
type of political power-sharing agreement (ppsa), and (2) the presence of any type of 
military power-sharing agreement (mpsa). This helped to gauge the extent to which these 
different dimensions had been used. The presence of territorial power-sharing agreements 
(tpsa) already had been captured in this regard, so no additional measure was needed.  
Once the data was run for all Set 1 conditions and human-rights outcomes (see 
Appendix 2), the widespread use and preference for political power-sharing agreements 
(ppsa) in negotiated settlements became clear. Nearly four of every five negotiated 
settlements—fully 78 percent of the civil wars (28 of 36) ending in peace agreements 
between 1989-2005—involved at least one political measure. In contrast, military power-
sharing measures (mpsa) were present in only 64 percent (23 of 36) of all peace 
agreements, and territorial measures were used in only 33 percent (12 of 36). 
The four original conditions proposed here for testing the various theories about 
aggregated power-sharing dimensions included: (1) extensively institutionalized 
settlements (eis), (2) thick political power-sharing settlements (th-ps), (3) thick military 
power-sharing settlements (th-ms), and (4) territorial power-sharing agreements (tpsa). A 
deeper perusal of these conditions, in relation to human-rights outcomes (the right side of 
Appendix 2), reveals the wide variety, complexity, and seemingly contradictory effects of 
those conditions. The first civil war in the Philippines, for example, involved an 
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extensively institutionalized settlement as well as both a thick military and political 
settlement and the use of territorial agreements. Even so, human-rights outcomes did not 
improve for either PTS or CIRI across all three-time periods, with the sole exception of 
ciri2d. The negotiated settlement in Burundi involved an identically thick and extensively 
institutionalized agreement. Of the five human-rights conditions where data was 
available, four showed an opposite outcome of that in the Philippines: Human rights 
improved.  
With this intermediate volume of cases, it was very difficult to identify accurate 
trends across the different conditions and outcomes. Cross-tabulations were used to 
elucidate relational significance and the direction and strength of influences, if any. 
Appendix 2 summarizes the data used for the respective bivariate contingency tables; all 
conditions were coded in accordance with procedures described in Chapter 4.137 The first 
condition of extensively institutionalized settlements illustrates the quantitative analysis 
in detail; thereafter, the explanatory background material is truncated. 
Extensively Institutionalized Settlements (eis)  
In order to test whether a relationship exists between extensively institutionalized 
settlements (eis) and human-rights outcomes, the following hypotheses were evaluated: 
Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between institionalization and HR 
outcome 
Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between institionalization and HR 
outcome 
                                                 
137 The principal technique used to operationalize these conditions was count variables. 
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The initial evidence (depicted in Tables 21, 22, and 23 below)138 appeared to 
support the existence of a relationship, although the direction of that relationship is 
counterintuitive, for it runs opposite of what contemporary scholarship 
has proposed. Table 21 shows extensively institutionalized settlements versus pts2d (i.e. 
the change in the level of political repression from time t to time t+2, dichotomized).139 
The data indicates that when settlement institutionalization is nonexistent (eis = 0), 
human rights are guaranteed to improve in all such cases (four in this instance). That is, 
100 percent of the cases without any power-sharing agreements resulted in improved 
human rights.  
Table 21: Contingency Table for eis and pts2d 
 
The inverted relationship between institutionalization and improved human-rights 
outcomes held relatively strong when only one dimension was added (71 percent of 7 
cases). Incorporation of two or three power-sharing dimensions in a peace agreement 
showed little correspondence with the change in political terror-scale scores, over time; 
both led to nearly equal numbers of cases with improved or worse outcomes.  
                                                 
138  In each of these tables, the outcome variable of human rights is shown in the rows, while the 
independent variables are shown in the columns. 
139 The change in the score is dichotomized to indicate whether human rights improved (1) or worsened (0). 
See Chapter 3 for coding of the outcome. 
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To evaluate whether a statistically significant relationship is present, the 
contingency table is examined using tests of independence. The table below illustrates the 
calculations performed by the IBM SPSS Statistics package, with respect to expected 
counts used to generate Pearson chi-square.  
Table 22: Expected Counts for eis and pts2d 
 
This table reveals that four cells (50%) have an expected count less than five, 
which is well above the 20 percent maximum recommended by Yates et al. (1998). 
Therefore, the calculated chi-square value of 5.38 was ignored and Fisher’s exact test of 
0.16 was used.140 Fisher’s exact test fell outside the desired α level of .05 for rejecting the 
null hypothesis. As a result, while the relationship between institutionalization and pts2d 
appears to be negative, the relationship was not statistically significant.  
The relationship between eis and pts5d (i.e. the change in PTS score from time t 
to time t+5, dichotomized) was also not statistically significant since Fisher’s exact test 
was 0.147. The influence of settlement institutionalization at two and five years on 
                                                 
140 SPSS did not calculate Fisher’s exact test in tables larger than 2x2, so Lowry’s (2015b, c) online 
calculators were used to obtain these probability values. 
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human rights might become more clear when considered in combination with certain 
situational factors as evaluated within QCA.  
Finally, the visual relationship between settlement institutionalization and pts10d 
was more pronounced than in the previous two explorations. While the chi-square score 
was high at 8.767 (which for df=3 would surpass the critical value of 7.81 associated with 
an α level of 0.05), chi-square could not be used due to expected counts exceeding the 20 
percent maximum. The substitute of Fisher’s exact test was calculated as 0.023, 
indicating that the null hypothesis could be rejected in this case. That is, some type of 
relationship exists between these variables in the long term. In addition, Cramer’s V was 
0.508, indicating a quite strong relationship between the variables. The relationship 
oscillated like a sine wave, though: All six cases with thin settlement institutionalization 
(i.e., just one power-sharing dimension) resulted in improved human rights. Increases in 
institutionalization then led to worse human-rights outcomes,141 followed by improved 
human-rights outcomes.142  
Table 23: Contingency Table for eis and pts10d 
 
                                                 
141 Nineteen cases involved two power-sharing dimensions. Twelve of the nineteen cases (63%) led to 
worse human rights.   
142 Five peace agreements involved all three power-sharing dimensions. Four of the five cases (80%) led to 
improved human rights. 
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The institutionalization of settlements was also checked against CIRI data. Ciri5d 
closely mirrored the direction and intensity of previous PTS findings (see Table 24 
below). Nine cases were coded with either low (i.e. 1 dimension) or nonexistent 
settlement institutionalization. All nine of these cases (100 percent) resulted in improved 
human rights. Inclusion of more power-sharing dimensions yielded a muddled 
relationship between the two variables. The computed value for Fisher’s test was 0.093, 
again short of the common rejection standard of 0.05; the negative direction of the 
relationship was clear here, though, and the strength of the relationship was moderately 
strong, with Cramer’s V of 0.459. 
 
Table 24: Contingency Table for eis and ciri5d 
 
This research revealed that marginal or non-inclusive negotiated settlements 
generally had led to better human-rights outcomes in all three periods. In contrast, more 
inclusive or fully inclusive settlements were non-definitive; better or worse human-rights 
outcomes may occur with nearly equal consistency. The null hypothesis that no 
relationship exists between extensively institutionalized settlements (eis) and human-
rights outcomes can be rejected, but only for the longest time period (using pts10d). The 
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direction and strength of relationship were clearest in the mid-term period, with ciri5d 
approaching the rejection standard at 0.93.  
Preliminarily, the relationship between extensively institutionalized settlements 
and human-rights outcomes appears to be the inverse of what the literature proposed. 
Thin or nonexistent PSA institutionalization was consistently associated, over all time 
periods, with improved human rights; extensively institutionalized settlements resulted in 
more muddled findings in the short and mid-term periods.  
Thick Political Settlements (th-ps)  
 What is the influence of thick individual dimensions on human-rights outcomes? 
Do reinforcing effects within military or political dimensions matter more than 
reinforcing effects across dimensions, as captured with institutionalization? Political 
thickness tests the following hypotheses:  
Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between political thickness and HR 
outcome 
Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between political thickness and HR 
outcome 
 The null hypothesis held for all three time periods and both PTS and CIRI 
outcomes. Ciri5d was the only measure marginally close to rejecting the null hypothesis, 
with Fisher’s exact test score of 0.131. Looking at the cross-tabulations for ciri5d (Table 
25 below), it was apparent that semi-thick political dimensions (those with two political 
power-sharing provisions) consistently resulted in improved human-rights outcomes. All 
six cases in this category improved. However, for the nine cases with the thickest power-
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sharing dimension, the results were almost equally split between better and worse human 
rights. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 75 percent of the cases (6 of 8) that did not 
include any political power-sharing provisions resulted in improved human rights.  
Table 25: Contingency Table for th-ps and ciri5d 
 
These results beg the question: Is there something unique about which political 
PSA measures were included and which were excluded? And do certain combinations 
work really well? When looking at the specific combinations of political provisions for 
the six cases coded here with th-ps of [2], five cases involved repex in combination with 
some other political measure and four involved repcs. Unfortunately, quantitative tools 
cannot account for the multi-causal complexity of different factors interacting. The 
argument for analyzing disaggregated political provisions using cross tabulations and 
fuzzy-set QCA is made strong by these findings. Chapters 6 and 7 consider such 
combinatorial effects through the use of fuzzy-set QCA. 
 Although political thickness might contribute to reducing the probability of civil 
war recurrence, its effects on human-rights outcomes has been quite varied and is 
unsubstantiated. No relationships of statistical significance were found between thick 
political power-sharing agreements and PTS or CIRI outcomes at any time period. As 
discussed earlier, this might be due to the potential that different political measures 
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actually work at cross-purposes with each other. In this vein, a review of the contingency 
tables revealed that different measures included in the aggregated measure (or different 
combinations of them) might be creating divergent effects on human rights. However, 
this possibility cannot be confirmed from the aggregated data. 
An additional idea spurred by these findings is that the presence (or absence) of 
any political power-sharing agreement (ppsa) might be creating more significant effects 
than the thickness of the dimension itself. Since this condition was easily available and 
already introduced, the potential relationship was quickly tested using a null hypothesis 
that no relationship exists between the presence of the political power-sharing dimension 
and human-rights outcomes.  
The short-term data was striking. The relationship between ppsa and pts2d, with 
χ2 = 6.9 was well within the critical region to reject the null hypothesis at the p < 0.01 
level of significance. The contingency table (see Table 26 below) and the calculated 
value of phi at -0.44 together indicated a moderately strong negative association between 
the presence of the political power-sharing dimension and human rights. Thirteen cases 
had no political power-sharing provision in the peace agreement. Eighty-five percent of 
those cases (11 of 13) resulted in improved human rights, whereas the presence of the 
political power-sharing dimension more often resulted in worse human rights. 
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Table 26: Contingency Table for ppsa and pts2d 
 
The strength of this relationship began to fade though at the five-year point. While 
the relationship was still negative (phi = -0.248), it did not reach the level of statistical 
significance (i.e., χ
2 for pts5d = 2.2 < 3.84 for p < 0.05).143 Nevertheless, a statistically 
significant relationship was confirmed between the political PSA dimension and pts2d. 
This relationship indicated a strong negative association between the political power-
sharing dimension and human-rights outcomes in the short term. Human-rights outcomes 
are more likely to improve when political power-sharing agreements are absent. 
Thick Military Settlements (th-ms) 
Hoddie and Hartzell (2003a) and Jarstad and Nilson (2008) claimed that the 
thickness of military measures in power-sharing agreements influences human rights 
more significantly and positively than political power-sharing measures, because the 
latter set are more easily implemented and more easily reversed than military measures. 
The following hypotheses were examined in this regard: 
Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between political thickness and HR 
outcome 
                                                 
143 Data for ciri5d corroborated this finding. Chi-square was 1.949 and phi was -0.247. No other CIRI 
aggregated data was close to significant. 
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Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between political thickness and HR 
outcome  
 The first relationship tested was th-ms and pts2d. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected since Fisher’s exact test was 0.033,144 below the p < 0.05 significance threshold. 
Notably the relationship was opposite of what was proposed by contemporary literature 
(see Table 27 below).  
Table 27: Contingency Table for th-ms and pts2d 
 
Cramer’s V was computed as 0.441, indicating a strong association between the 
two variables. The data also indicated a negative relationship. As depicted, negotiated 
settlements without any military power-sharing measures consistently resulted in 
improved human rights in the short term (85% of 13 cases); over half of the cases (11 of 
20) that experienced improved human rights were those that lacked any military power-
sharing agreements.  
In contrast, negotiated settlements with one or two military measures were 
inclined, by an almost 2:1 ratio, to experience worse human rights over the same period. 
                                                 
144 Pearson’s chi-square for military thickness and pts2d was 7.016, well past the p < 0.05 value of 5.99 for 
df=2; however, Fisher’s exact test was more appropriate since two of the six cells (>20%) had an expected 
count less than 5. 
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Over time, however, this relationship seemed to erode. Fisher’s exact test for pts5d was 
calculated as 0.318 and for pts10d, 0.99. No significance was found between military 
thickness and any CIRI scores. As with the political PSAs, the presence of any military 
power-sharing agreement (mpsa) was also tested in order to gauge the effects of this 
dimension on human-rights outcomes. No significant relationships were found at any 
time period for either PTS or CIRI scores. 
Territorial Power-Sharing Agreements (tpsa) 
One-third of the thirty-six cases involved territorial power-sharing agreements by 
granting either autonomy or federalism. As with the previous prominent theories, the 
following hypotheses were examined: 
Null hypothesis H0: No relationship between territorial power-sharing 
agreements and HR outcome 
Alternative hypothesis H1: Relationship between territorial power-sharing 
agreements and HR outcome 
While chi-square values for all PTS and CIRI scores were legitimate (i.e., zero cells had 
expected counts less than five),145 none of the calculated statistics led to outright rejection 
of the null hypothesis.  
The relationship between tpsa and ciri5d did approach significance at p < 0.05.146 
Notably, the phi value was -0.307, indicating a moderate negative relationship, which is 
                                                 
145 Since territorial power-sharing agreements simply gauged presence or absence rather than a count value 
of how many provisions existed (as seen with institutionalization and political/military thickness), this 
resulted in a 2x2 contingency table. Naturally this reduced the number of possible cells and ensured a 
usable chi-square statistic. 
146 Chi square was assessed at 3.023. A critical value of 3.84 or greater was necessary to cross the 
significance threshold. 
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quite evident in Table 28 below. When territorial power-sharing agreements were absent, 
76 percent of the twenty-one cases resulted in improved human rights; in contrast, the 
presence of territorial power-sharing agreements resulted in slightly more cases of worse 
human rights during the same time period. This moderate negative relationship held for 
ciri2d and ciri10d, as well as pts2d and pts10d; none of these approached statistical 
significance, but the asymmetric relationship merits further investigation.  
   Table 28: Contingency Table for tpsa and ciri5d 
 
Set 1 Summary  
A host of contemporary scholars studying power-sharing agreements contend that 
such provisions matter significantly for seeking to reduce civil war recurrence. The 
literature is divided between whether the inclusion of more power sharing is better (i.e., 
extensively institutionalized settlements) or more of certain dimensions is better. A third 
camp contends that power sharing is actually rather dangerous to the peace that follows. 
Contrary to the expectations of both advocacy camps, power-sharing 
agreements—when assessed by aggregated dimensions—do not positively affect human-
rights outcomes. Indeed, when relationships do exist, they always indicate an inverse 
relationship:  
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1. Less extensively institutionalized settlements are very likely to experience 
 improved human rights over all time periods; the record for more extensively 
 institutionalized settlements is muddled.  
2. In the short term, the absence of any type of political power-sharing measure 
 is very likely to lead to improved human rights; the presence of such measures 
 is more likely to lead to worse human rights.147  
3. In the short term, less military thickness consistently leads to improved human 
 rights; more thickness tends to lead toward worse human rights.  
4. The absence of territorial power-sharing agreements in the mid-term 
 consistently leads to improved human rights; the presence of such agreements 
 leads almost equally to better or worse human rights.  
Contrary to expectations, political thickness did not reveal any significant 
relationship. Table 29 below summarizes these findings, along with all calculations for all 
the tests of independence for Set 1 conditions and both human-rights outcomes (PTS and 
CIRI, over the three different time periods). 
  
                                                 
147 As noted earlier, this same analysis for the presence or absence of military power-sharing measures did 
not reveal any significant relationships. 
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Table 29: Tests of Independence for Set 1 Conditions and Human-Rights Outcomes 
 
Set 2: Disaggregated Power-Sharing Provisions and Robust 3PSGs 
The challenge of using Set 1 conditions, such as aggregated measures like the 
thickness of political and military power-sharing dimensions or extensively 
institutionalized settlements, is that a dimension-based approach to the field assumes that 
all measures within a given power-sharing dimension shape outcomes in similar fashions 
(i.e., in the same direction). The reality is that different measures within the same 
dimension can counteract each other and dilute the observed outcomes. This obscures the 
influence of different conditions, potentially hiding any individual measures that actually 
work in direct opposition to expected influence patterns.  
Disaggregation of power-sharing measures is necessary for revealing actual 
effects from each provision. Disaggregation removes the assumption that all provisions 
within a dimension operate in concert. Set 2 conditions include seven disaggregated 
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power-sharing provisions found within the three previously discussed dimensions. Robust 
third-party security guarantees are included here given that guarantees are a similar, 
individual provision included within many peace agreements.  
 The disaggregated power-sharing provisions were already dichotomized, with 
presence of a provision coded as 1 and absence coded as 0. Dichotomization of robust 
guarantees is still necessary, so the discussion begins there, followed by presentation of 
the dichotomized data for all Set 2 conditions and cross-tabulation analysis.  
Dichotomization of Robust 3PSGs 
Chapter 4 proposed a spectrum of robust third-party security guarantees. 
Dichotomization of this spectrum is problematic since it was designed to capture a range 
of values based on the premise that the pairing of ever-stronger mandates with larger 
footprint sizes (i.e., more deployed armed personnel) leads to ever-increasing 
improvements in human-rights outcomes. Any dichotomization of a range like this is 
imperfect at best.  
Under this challenge, the decision was made to evaluate the most robust 
guarantees—those with sufficient mandate strength (i.e., an authorization to use force) 
coupled with sufficient footprint size (i.e., more than 5,000 armed personnel on the 
ground to execute the mandate)—against all other guarantees. The combination of these 
two elements was expected to consistently and positively affect human-rights outcomes. 
Using the spectrum of third-party security guarantees provided in Chapter 4, only 
categories three and four fit these qualifications. Both involved at least 5,000 armed 
personnel and both authorized the use of force; category three is an armed peacekeeping 
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mission, while category four is a peace enforcement mission. This yielded the following 
dichotomization profile:  
Table 30: Dichotomization of Robust 3PSGs (r3psg) 
  
This dichotomization yielded twenty-one non-robust missions (coded 0) and fifteen 
robust third-party security guarantees (coded 1).  
Dichotomized Data for Set 2 Conditions 
With dichotomization of third-party guarantees completed, all data for Set 2 
conditions was then coded and results summarized in Appendix 3. The human-rights 
outcomes (the right side of the chart) are, of course, the same for all three sets. A number 
of insights arose when comparing the disaggregated provisions. Each political power-
sharing provision was used almost the same number of times: proportional representation 
in legislative elections (repleg) occurred eighteen times; guaranteed representation in the 
executive branch occurred eighteen times; and guaranteed representation in the civil 
service occurred nineteen times. Political power-sharing provisions were used in a 
multitude of combinations.  
Comparatively, the inclusion of the provision guaranteeing military integration in 
the main military-force structure was favored three-to-one over the provision 
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guaranteeing integration of rebels into the military leadership (23 cases versus just 7). 
Interestingly, every time that integration into military leadership was offered, it was 
always paired with integration into the main military force structure. Finally, settlements 
with autonomy occurred at twice the rate as federalism. Since autonomy and federalism 
are mutually exclusive measures, this represented twelve unique cases of territorial 
power-sharing agreements.  
Political Provisions: Legislative, Executive, & Civil Service Representation 
In negotiated settlements, the rebels and the government might agree to a number 
of alternative provisions that redistribute political power in the central government. This 
includes legislative elections based on principles of proportional or equal representation, 
the guarantee of a certain number of cabinet and ministerial posts in the executive branch, 
and the guarantee of rebel representation in the civil service.  
Interestingly, no significant relationships were found to exist between any of these 
three political power-sharing measures and aggregated human-rights outcomes, at any 
time period.148 The closest relationship approaching significance was between civil 
service (repcs) and pts10d. Over this longer time period, the guarantee of rebel 
representation in the civil service carried a mild negative association (phi of -0.244). This 
negative association was evidenced by a greater than 2:1 ratio of states without the civil 
service provision experiencing an improvement of overall human rights (see Table 31 
below). In contrast, states with civil service representation generally experienced worse 
human rights during the same time period. The overall relationship was deemed not 
                                                 
148 The full set of calculations for all Set 2 conditions is provided later in Table 40. 
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significant, for the chi-square statistic of 2.030 did not cross the critical threshold, even at 
p < 0.10. 
    Table 31: Contingency Table for repcs and pts10d 
 
Military Provisions: Integration in the Main Ranks and in Leadership  
Military power-sharing agreements involve the integration of rebels into the 
state’s military forces, through provisions that either guarantee rebel representation in the 
leadership positions of that defense force, or guarantee integration into the main ranks of 
a joint defense force. In this study, no significant relationships were found between 
integration in leadership positions and human-rights outcomes over any of the three time 
periods.  
In contrast, the contingency tables investigating military integration into the main 
ranks (milint) revealed a strong, negative relationship with human-rights outcomes, 
especially early on after war has ended. In the short-term period, the relationship between 
milint and pts2d was statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level of confidence; Pearson’s 
chi-square test of 6.959 exceeded the critical threshold of 6.63. The association between 
these two variables was negative, with a moderately strong phi of -0.440. This negative 
relationship was strongest when integration was absent: In 85 percent of cases without 
military integration of rebels into a joint defense force (11 of 13 cases), human rights 
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improved; meanwhile, 61 percent of states with integration (14 of 23 cases) resulted in 
worse human rights over this time period (see Table 32 below).  
   Table 32: Contingency Table for milint and pts2d 
 
 At the five-year point (using pts5d), the negative direction of association still 
held. Nine of thirteen states (69%) without military integration experienced improved 
human rights, while thirteen of twenty-three states with integration (57%) underwent 
worse human rights (see Table 33 below). The relationship is asymmetric, with the 
absence of the provision indicating a stronger relationship with human-rights outcomes 
than is shown with its presence. However, the relationship was not statistically 
significant, with chi-square of 2.21, falling short of the critical distribution value for p < 
0.10 of 2.70.  
 Table 33: Contingency Table for milint and pts5d 
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Territorial Provision: Federalism 
Federalism is one of two types of territorial power-sharing agreements. It is 
defined as the decentralization of governmental authority through provisions that allocate 
separate powers to sub-state units. The use of federalism as a territorial measure occurred 
in only four of thirty-six cases during the observed time period from 1989-2005. In the 
short term, one state (South Africa) experienced worse human rights, while the other 
three states (X, Y, Z) improved. At both the mid-term period (pts5d) and the long-term 
period (pts10d), federalism was distinguished by the fact that 100 percent of the cases 
with this provision (4 of 4) resulted in improved human rights.149 The relationship 
between the federalism provision and human-rights outcomes is asymmetric as evidenced 
by the even split between better and worse outcomes for non-federal cases (see table 
below).    
For the relationship between federalism and pts5d, the shift of the South Africa 
case from worse human rights to improved human rights resulted in a shift in Fisher’s 
exact test from 0.613 (for pts2d) to 0.106. This significant shift demonstrated the 
significance of even a single case when the relationship is asymmetric and only a small 
number of the asymmetric cases exist. Without additional cases of federalism to evaluate 
here, a statistically significant relationship is not possible. 
  
                                                 
149 The delayed reversal for the South Africa case may be attributed to the time necessary to fully 
implement federalism and realize its effects. 
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Table 34: Contingency Table for federalism and pts5d 
 
Territorial Provision: Autonomy 
Autonomy, the second type of territorial power-sharing agreement, involves 
decentralization of governmental authority through provisions that provide autonomy to 
the rebel group to control local issues in a certain region. In this study, autonomy 
provisions were present in eight of the thirty-six peace agreements. As with federalism, 
the effects of autonomy were delayed, perhaps due to the time needed to implement such 
measures. At the five-year point (using ciri5d), 75 percent of those cases with autonomy 
present (6 of 8) had worse human rights, while nearly 80 percent of the cases without 
autonomy (19 of 24) experienced improved human rights (see Table 35 below).150 This 
moderately strong, negative association (phi of -0.427) was statistically significant at p < 
0.01.  
  
                                                 
150 The autonomy-pts5d contingency tables did not corroborate this same relationship. 
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 Table 35: Contingency Table for autonomy and ciri5d 
 
At the ten-year point, autonomy was still negatively associated (phi of -0.494) 
with human-rights outcomes. In 85 percent of cases (6 of 7), the presence of autonomy 
led to worse human rights; its absence led to improved human rights by a 2:1 ratio (see 
Table 36 below). This relationship was also statistically significant, with Fisher’s exact 
test at 0.028, p < 0.05.  
Table 36: Contingency Table for autonomy and pts10d 
 
Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees 
In the short- and mid-term periods of two and five years, robust guarantees did 
not have any statistical effects. In the long term, the presence of third-party security 
guarantees demonstrated a statistically significant relationship, with a Pearson chi-square 
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score of 4.97, p < 0.05.151 As observed in Table 37 below, just shy of 80 percent of the 
cases (11 of 14) with robust third-party security guarantees resulted in improved human 
rights.152 The absence of such guarantees more often resulted in worse human rights. The 
relationship was moderately positive, with phi equal to 0.382. 
Table 37: Contingency Table for r3psg and pts10d 
 
Data for r3psg-ciri10 largely corroborated this long-term relationship between 
robust security guarantees and human-rights outcomes. Indeed, the effects of robust 
3PSGs presence were even clearer: 100 percent of the nine cases with robust guarantees 
resulted in improved human rights (see Table 38 below).153 Fisher’s exact test was 0.059, 
falling just shy of significance at the p < 0.05 level. Phi in this case was 0.418, indicating 
an even stronger positive relationship than with pts10d.  
                                                 
151 An alternative dichotomization (3psgv2) was also considered, where 3PSGs were coded as robust only if 
they involved peace enforcement missions and at least 5,000 personnel (category 4). In this second version, 
twenty-five missions were considered non-robust (coded 0) and eleven missions were considered robust 
third-party security guarantees (coded 1). For 3psgv2 and pts10d, third-party presence resulted in decreased 
political repression in eight out of ten cases. This relationship, while moderately positive (phi of 0.314), fell 
short of statistical significance, with Fisher’s exact test equal to 0.128. The primary measure used in the 
text is more useful in indicating when human rights will change based on security guarantees. 
152 Human rights data is not yet published for Sudan (2005) and Nepal (2006) at the ten-year point, so only 
34 cases could be evaluated here. 
153 As detailed earlier in Chapter 3, the total number of cases is lower because CIRI data is missing for 
many civil war cases. 
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Table 38: Contingency Table for r3psg and ciri10d 
 
The relationship between robust guarantees and human-rights outcomes appears 
largely asymmetric: states with the presence of robust third-party security guarantees 
experienced improved human rights, while the absence of these guarantees was much less 
definitive in consistently leading to worse human rights. QCA capitalizes on such 
asymmetries, which is why these are highlighted here.  
Set 2 Disaggregated Provisions Summary 
A central argument of this dissertation is that contemporary theories about which 
peace-agreement provisions matter most are erroneously based on aggregated dimensions 
that can obscure the effects of different measures within the same power-sharing 
dimension. Such aggregation generally assumes that these different measures act in 
concert rather than in opposition. This variance in effects means that when measures are 
aggregated, the observations may dilute results or lead to misinterpretation.  
Both of these possibilities—dilution of results and misinterpretation of 
evidence—are evident in the results found here. With respect to dilution, consider the 
previous results for thick military settlements (th-ms) and pts2d which indicated a 
relatively significant, negative relationship. When the two military measures were 
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disaggregated, the significance and intensity of the relationship was clearly attributable to 
military integration of rebels into the main ranks rather than to both measures. The 
inclusion of the integration of military leadership only served to dilute the results (see 
Table 39 below) below).   
The potential for misinterpretation of evidence is manifest when considering the 
aggregated measure of territorial power-sharing agreements (tpsa). This aggregated 
measure indicates the presence of either autonomy or federalism. The cross-tab evidence 
demonstrates very opposite effects for these two territorial provisions: The presence of 
federalism asymmetrically leads to improved human rights; the absence of federalism is 
non-definitive. In contrast, the relationship of autonomy to human rights is symmetric, 
with the presence of autonomy leading to worse human rights and the absence of 
autonomy leading to improved human rights. Aggregation dangerously obscured the 
results, which were almost completely opposite of each other. Researchers would quite 
likely draw incorrect conclusions as a result of using the aggregated measure. All Set 2 
tests of independence are summarized in Table 39 below.  
The element of time is an important consideration for individual provisions. 
Military integration into the main ranks, for example, immediately and negatively 
affected the human-rights outcomes; however, the significance of this negative effect 
faded before five years was reached. In contrast, the effects of robust third-party security 
guarantees improved over time, reaching statistical significance at ten years after the 
conflict ended. Similarly, the effects of autonomy were felt mostly at the mid- and long-
term periods. Theoretically, these differences might be attributable to the speed of 
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implementation; military integration is expected to be faster than implementing  
autonomy and robust third-party security guarantees.  
Table 39: Tests of Independence for Set 2 Conditions and Human-Rights Outcomes 
 
Alternatively, the effects of these measures may be more clear and consistent 
when such measures are evaluated as part of causal recipes with other conditions. The 
reality is that these individual measures are never enacted in isolation, but rather as a 
portfolio of options employed into a variety of different situational and historical 
contexts. QCA is, in this regard, an effective analytical tool for evaluating such increases 
in causal complexity. 
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Set 3: Remote Conditions 
Remote conditions represent the constant, stable situational and structural factors 
that largely reside outside actor influence (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012). These 
conditions may constrain or enable the ability of proximate factors to affect the outcome. 
Of the seven remaining remote factors in this study, four were continuous variables (i.e., 
war costs, war duration, population size, economic development), two already had been 
dichotomized (i.e., non-ethnic conflict, enduring peace), and one was a discrete variable 
(i.e., regime type).  
In their original forms, continuous and discrete variables are not easily usable in 
contingency tables. So, to re-code those five remote conditions for quantitative analysis, 
the best practices of configurational comparative methods were followed (Rihoux and De 
Meur 2009b). This involved dichotomizing these conditions in a transparent manner 
based on theoretically relevant, empirically verifiable grounds.154 Whenever the 
substantive literature was unclear regarding specific thresholds (i.e., as regarding the 
costs of civil war, war duration, and population size), cluster analysis of the data was 
used to identify appropriate cutoffs. The Tosmana QCA software has a thresholdsetter 
tool specifically developed for this very purpose (Cronqvist 2011). Thresholdsetter 
facilitates simple cluster analysis and threshold identification by visually depicting data 
distribution.  
Several conditions yielded distributions with multiple potential thresholds. Each 
of these thresholds was crosschecked using a full set of contingency tables. The main text 
                                                 
154 Dichotomization was selected rather than recoding into three or four respective categories given the low 
number of total cases. 
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provides coding and data for the primary threshold that was hypothesized to have the 
greatest effect; robustness checks using alternative thresholds are then summarized in the 
footnotes. 
Dichotomization of Remote Conditions 
All of the remote conditions were coded “so that their presence ([1] value)” would 
be “theoretically expected to be associated with a positive outcome ([1] outcome value)” 
(Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 42). After dichotomizing the five continuous and discrete 
variables, each of the remote factors was evaluated vis-à-vis its relationship with human-
rights outcomes over the three respective time periods.  
Costs of the Civil War  
 The measurement of civil war costs involved dividing the number of battle-related 
deaths (in the thousands) by the war duration, then logging the result.155 Since this result 
provided interval-scaled data, an appropriate threshold was necessary for transforming 
the data into dichotomous data for the contingency tables. No definitive theoretical or 
empirical threshold is known in the literature; cluster analysis of the data, using the 
Tosmana thresholdsetter tool, was used to establish a threshold. The visual illustration of 
the war costs (see Figure 9 below) yields a clear threshold at a value of 6.5—just above 
the tight cluster centered near the mean and sufficient to differentiate this group from 
civil wars with more significant total costs. 
                                                 
155 These calculations were already performed for the majority of cases used here by Mattes and Savun 
(2009); missing data was procured followed these same procedures. 
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Figure 9: Tosmana Depiction of Logged Costs with Dichotomization Threshold156 
 
Because low costs are expected to result in improved human rights, while high costs 
typically result in worse human rights, the following dichotomization was used: 
0 = states with costs ≥ 6.5 (high costs) 
1 = states with costs < 6.5 (low costs)  
With this threshold, eleven cases had high costs (≥ 6.5; coded 0) while nineteen had low 
costs; data was missing for six of the cases. 
Civil War Duration 
War duration was calculated based on the logged number of months that the war 
lasted (Mattes and Savun 2009). The reason for using logarithms here was made clear by 
first visualizing the unadjusted, raw data. The graph below represents the number of 
months that civil war lasted, mapped out for all thirty-six conflicts (Figure 10). 
Establishing a clear line of demarcation was difficult since several outliers skewed the 
full graph; further, the cluster at the far left was nearly impossible to decipher. 
                                                 
156 The red lines on these charts indicate the median while the green lines indicate user-set parameters. 
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Figure 10: Duration of Civil Wars Ending in Negotiated Settlements (in months) 
 
The logged duration of civil war, visualized using Tosmana’s thresholdsetter, helped 
annunciate differences in the data and highlighted appropriate thresholds (see Figure 11 
below).157   
 
Figure 11: Logged Duration of Civil Wars, with Thresholds of 24, 48, 84 Months 
Three different thresholds were established using the Tosmana trendsetter chart 
above: 24 months (natural log of 3.18), 48 months (natural log of 3.87), and 84 months 
(natural log of 4.43). Cross-tabulations were run for each of these three thresholds against 
                                                 
157 Mattes and Savun’s (2009) dataset was missing civil war duration for several cases. This missing data 
was rectified using the start month and end month in UCDP/PRIO’s dataset (Petterssonn 2015) to calculate 
the civil war duration in months. 
   199 
the outcome of human rights; the two-year threshold had the greatest discernible effect on 
human rights.158 Since the hypotheses proposed that short durations improve human-
rights outcomes and long civil wars lead to worse human rights, civil war duration was 
coded as follows:  
0 = natural log of duration is ≥ 3.178 (2 years) = long duration 
1 = natural log of duration is < 3.178 (2 years) = short duration 
Under this coding, twelve cases involved short civil war and twenty-four cases involved 
long civil wars.159  
Population Size 
Population data was taken from Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) and 
updated using the World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2011). As with the 
war’s duration, the population size was logged in order to improve model fit with a more 
normal distribution. Tosmana’s thresholdsetter (Cronqvist 2011) was used to assess an 
appropriate threshold corresponding to the resulting data (see Error! Reference source 
not found. below).  
A clear threshold was available at approximately 16. Iteratively, a threshold of 10 
million people (with a natural log of 16.12) closely corresponded to this demarcation 
while also preserving the cases assigned to each category. Since smaller states were 
expected to experience less political repression, coding proceeded as follows:  
                                                 
158 Results from the other thresholds are provided, as appropriate, in the footnotes for the cross-tab analysis 
section on civil war duration. 
159 According to the other two thresholds, sixteen cases cases involved civil wars longer than four years; 
twelve civil wars lasted longer than seven years. 
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0 = population ≥ 10M (natural log of 16.12) 
1 = population < 10M (natural log of 16.12) 
Using this threshold, fifteen civil wars involved states with populations greater than 10 
million people; twenty-one wars involved populations with less than 10 million people. 
 
Figure 12: Population Threshold using Tosmana - 10 million (natural log 16.12) 
Regime Type 
Regime type was captured using the polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010). Polity2 is a single-scale continuum, ranging from -10 
(full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Scholars commonly distinguish democratic 
states as those with polity2 scores of six and higher (see, for example, Rasler and 
Thompson 2005; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Based on this 
threshold, regime type was assessed using the following coding: 
0 = Polity Score < 6 = Non-Democratic 
1 = Polity Score ≥ 6 = Democratic  
Under this coding, eight cases were considered democratic at t+2, eleven at t+5, and 
fourteen at t+10.  
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Two additional thresholds (Polity IV ≥  +7 or +8) were examined in order to 
check the effects that shifting this threshold might have on human-rights outcomes. These 
higher thresholds were based on Davenport and Armstrong’s (2004) finding that only 
higher Polity scores (e.g. +8, +9, and +10) caused the state to decrease its politically 
repressive behavior.160 The limits used in this project of +6, +7, and +8 were lower than 
these authors for two reasons: First, their analysis involved all states in the world, not just 
those exiting a civil war. Second, very few cases meet these higher thresholds right after 
civil war. For example, the higher threshold of 8 and above constrained the number of 
civil war cases to just four cases at t+2, five cases at t+5, and eight cases at t+10.  
Economic Development 
 Economic development was used to gauge a state’s capability to coopt its citizens. 
When a government possesses alternative means for governing its citizens, that regime is 
less likely to revert to political repression. Cooptation is quite unlikely if a government 
cannot raise its citizens beyond absolute poverty—a level of economic development 
personified by daily struggle for survival.  
Perhaps the most apt definition of absolute poverty was provided by Robert 
McNamara (1980, 17), then president of The World Bank who declared it as “a condition 
of life so limited by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality, and low life 
expectancy as to be beneath any rational definition of human decency.” Operationally, 
The World Bank identified absolute poverty as earning less than $1.25 per day, at 2005 
                                                 
160 Davenport and Armstrong (2004) argued that only the highest Polity level measures—those often 
ignored in the literature—reduce political repression the most. Specifically, they concluded “there are 
essentially three different categories of democracy, each with a different influence on state repression: one 
that has no effect (values 0-7), an intermediate category with some negative effects on repressive behavior 
(values 8-9) and another category with a strong negative effect on state repression (value 10).”  
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purchasing power parity exchange rates (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2009). At $1.25 
per day, absolute poverty is equal to $456 per year (GDP per capita). The natural log of 
$456 GDP per capita is 6.12; this natural logged result was set as the demarcation 
threshold.  
Under the expectation that high economic development corresponds with 
improvement in alternative governance mechanisms—specifically the ability to coopt 
citizens—and that the possession of such alternative causes governments to decrease their 
use of political repression, economic development was coded as follows: 
0 = GDP/capita < $456 (natural log 6.12) 
1 = GDP/capita ≥ $456 (natural log 6.12) 
This coding yielded fifteen cases below the threshold (coded 0), and twenty-one above 
the threshold (coded 1).  
An additional threshold was also tested using The World Bank’s moderate poverty 
line of $2 a day for middle-income economies (2010). Moderate poverty describes 
subsistence with little beyond the minimal necessities for sustaining life. Over the course 
of a year, this is equivalent to $730 GPD per capita or a logged result of 6.59.161 The 
moderate poverty line coincidentally equals the mean and the median for the universe of 
cases; it is shown as the red line in Figure 13 below and yields an equal split of eighteen 
cases above and eighteen cases below the set threshold.  
                                                 
161 This threshold of $730 differs slightly from The World Bank’s (2016a) threshold of $765, used 
elsewhere to analytically distinguish states with low income economies from those with lower middle 
income economies. 
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Figure 13: GDP/Capita Thresholds Set At Absolute Poverty and Moderate Poverty 
Summary of Dichotomizations for Remote Conditions 
 Raw data for all remote conditions was procured from the previously mentioned 
sources and collated (see Appendix 4), then recoded according to the proposed 
dichotomization thresholds detailed in Table 40 below. Where possible, these thresholds 
were based on empirical, case-based knowledge and theoretical understandings; when 
such thresholds were unknown, substantive criteria were referenced and case 
distributions were evaluated along a continuum using cluster analysis and Tosmana’s 
thresholdsetter tool designed for QCA. The recoded data for all remote conditions is 
summarized in Appendix 5. The data in this table were used for the contingency table 
analyses that follow.  
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Table 40: Dichotomization Thresholds for Remote Conditions  
 
Ethnic vs. Non-Ethnic Conflicts  
Ethnic conflicts are expected to lead to worse human-rights outcomes, while 
states with non-ethnic civil wars are expected to experience improved human rights. This 
expectation was verified by the relationship between non-ethnic conflicts and ciri2d. 
Over the short-term period, 90 percent of non-ethnic conflicts (9 of 10 cases) resulted in 
improved human rights while 68 percent of the cases involving ethnic conflict (13 of 19 
cases) resulted in unchanged or worse human rights (see Table 41 below). This 
relationship was statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level (Fisher’s exact test = 
0.005).162 Phi, the preferred measure of association for 2x2 contingency tables, was 
                                                 
162 Although Pearson’s Chi-Square was 8.955, one cell of the four had an expected count less than five. 
Fisher’s test was used for this reason.  
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0.556, indicating a rather strong positive relationship. No other PTS or CIRI scores 
approached significance over the other time periods.  
Table 41: Contingency Table for Non-Ethnic Conflicts and ciri2d 
 
To verify Sambanis’s coding of non-ethnic conflicts, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)163 
tripartite coding of ethnic conflicts was also evaluated. The closest relationship between 
this alternative coding for ethnic conflicts and human-rights outcomes was at pts10d. 
Over this longer-term period, 80 percent of non-ethnic wars (4 of 5 cases) and 73 percent 
of partially ethnic wars (8 of 11 cases) resulted in improved human rights while outright 
ethnic conflicts more often resulted in unchanged or worse human rights (61 percent, or 
11 of 18 cases). While this relationship was shy of statistical significance, the positive 
orientation (Cramer’s V of 0.366) corroborated the direction and the strength of the 
relationship between non-ethnic conflicts and human rights.164  
                                                 
163 As detailed in Chapter 4, their coding was inverted so that 0 represented civil war driven by ethnicity; 1 
represented war with some ethnic component; and 2 indicated the war was not over ethnic issues. 
164 Fisher’s exact test was only 0.139. The relationship between Fearon & Laitin’s tripartite coding and 
ciri5 matched this as well: a positive relationship (Cramer’s V of 0.360) though shy of significance 
(Fisher’s exact test score of 0.149). 
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Costs of the Civil War 
The costs of the civil war were not found to have any significant relationship with 
PTS or CIRI scores at any of the three respective time periods. No strong asymmetric 
relationships were observed either.  
Duration 
 This project hypothesized—in contrast to the prevailing expectations of the extant 
literature—that long civil wars lead to worse human rights while short civil wars more 
often lead to improved human rights. The primary threshold of dichotomizing civil war 
duration at the two-year point was statistically significant in relation to pts2d, with a chi-
square test score of 5.625, p < 0.05. Specifically, 83 percent of the civil wars lasting less 
than two years in length (10 of 12 cases) resulted in improved human-rights outcomes 
(e.g. less political repression) physical-integrity rights at t+2. The relationship was 
moderately asymmetrical, with stronger results for the presence of this condition as 
compared to its absence (i.e. longer duration war, coded as 0; see Table 42 below). The 
association between these variables was strongly positive at Phi = 0.395. 
 Table 42: Contingency Table for duration and pts2d 
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The positive orientation of this relationship was consistent throughout the 
observed periods. For pts5d and pts10d, states with longer conflicts (those coded as 0) 
experienced better or worse rights at a relatively equal basis; states with shorter conflicts 
(those coded as 1) experienced better human rights at least two times more often than 
they experienced worse human rights. However, the relationship was not statistically 
significant for these years nor was any CIRI score statistically significant.  
In accordance with earlier described procedures, the other thresholds of four years 
(natural log value of 3.87) and seven years (natural log value of 4.43) were also 
evaluated, since these values corresponded with clear demarcations between data clusters 
(see Figure 10). Civil war duration at four years closely approached significance for the 
same human-rights outcome of pts2d.165 The seven-year threshold was not relationally 
significant for any time period. 
Enduring Peace 
In the short term, the recurrence of conflict soon after the end of the war did not 
appear to invoke significant changes in government repression; no effects were observed 
on pts2d or ciri2d. The recurrence of civil war in the mid-term period, however, 
guaranteed that human rights did not improve. One-hundred percent of the seven cases 
with civil war recurrence failed to experience improved human rights; meanwhile, 66 
percent of the cases where peace held at t+5 (19 of 29 cases) experienced improved 
human rights (see Table 43 below). The peace-pts5d was statistically significant, with 
                                                 
165 The chi-square score was 3.803, compared to 5.625 for the two-year threshold.   
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Fisher’s exact test = 0.002, p < 0.01. Phi was 0.519, confirming a strong positive 
association between the two variables.  
Table 43: Contingency Table for Peace at t+5 and pts5d 
 
The long-term relationship of peace with improved human rights was significant 
for both pts10d (Fisher’s exact test of 0.066) and ciri10d (Fisher’s exact test of 0.091) at 
the p < 0.10 level. The seemingly substantial drop in statistical significance from t+5 to 
t+10 is attributable to a single outlier case where civil war recurred and human rights 
improved. The first civil war in Liberia (LIB1, 1989-1993) was this rare exception, with 
civil war recurring from 2002-2003. Human rights improved in this war by 0.5 over the 
ten-year period, meaning that either PTS-Amnesty or PTS-State was rated one point 
higher, but not both. The marginal change in human rights for this single case caused the 
drop in statistical significance.  
Enduring peace was critical to human-rights improvement, especially as more 
time passed after the end of the civil war. The relationship of peace to human-rights 
outcomes was strongly asymmetric; that is, its absence more strongly led to a change in 
outcome, compared to its presence. This asymmetry would especially show up in a fuzzy-
set analysis that asymmetrically evaluates when human rights worsen. 
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Population Size 
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that larger populations place greater 
demands on their governments, often exceeding the capacity of those governments to 
effectively respond. At five years after the war, negotiated settlements involving 
populations less than 10 million people were two times more likely to experience 
improved human-rights outcomes (14 vs. 7 cases); conversely, populations larger than 10 
million people were only half as likely to experience improved human-rights outcomes (5 
vs. 10 cases; see Table 45 below). The mid-term relationship between population size and 
pts5d was significant, with chi-square = 3.901, p < 0.05. Phi was 0.329, indicating a 
moderately positive relationship.  
 
Table 44: Contingency Table for population and pts5d 
 
 
This result corroborated previous empirical evidence, suggesting that states with 
larger populations are more likely to violate physical-integrity rights than those with 
smaller populations. At pts10d, the chi-square test score was 2.591, just shy of 
significance for p < 0.10.  
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Regime Type 
 The expectation from empirical and theoretical literature is that highly democratic 
regimes lead to improved human rights and regimes lacking such high levels of 
democracy experience worse human rights, ceteris parabis. The contingency tables show 
that regime type was strongly associated with improved human rights in the short and 
mid-term periods. This significant association was only evident in CIRI outcomes, not in 
PTS outcomes. For example, the regime type at t+2—assessed at a threshold of ≥ 6—was 
significant in relation to ciri2, with Fisher’s exact test = 0.035, p < .05. Phi was 0.442, 
indicating a moderately positive relationship in line with expectations. Of the eight cases 
with a polity score of 6 or greater at t+2, all but one case experienced improved human 
rights (7 of 8 cases; see table below). 
Table 45: Contingency Table for regime type and ciri2d 
  
 Similarly, regime type at t+5 was significant (0.049 Fisher’s test, p < 0.05) and 
moderately positive (0.391 Phi) in relation to ciri5. The relationship at t+5 was even 
stronger in an asymmetric sense, with 91 percent of the cases with democratic regimes 
(10 of 11) experiencing improved human rights. Of note, the threshold of polity scores ≥ 
6 was the most useful demarcation for regime type, yielding several statistically 
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significant results; when regime type was dichotomized at polity scores ≥ 7 and ≥ 8, no 
significant relationships were found for any time period. 
Economic Development 
Economic development was tested using dichotomization thresholds at 6.12 and 
6.59, corresponding with absolute and moderate poverty, respectively. Neither threshold 
revealed any statistically significant relationships with human-rights outcomes.  
In order to account for the potential that this lack of relationship was due to 
erroneous thresholds based solely on theoretical perspectives, two natural thresholds from 
cluster analysis of 7.12 (approximately $1240/capita) and 8 (approximately $3000/capita) 
were also considered. The former yielded nine states above the threshold, while the latter 
showed just four states above the threshold. In neither case was there a statistically 
significant relationship between GDP/capita and aggregated human-rights outcomes.  
Summary of Remote Conditions 
Two remote conditions—namely civil war costs and economic development—did 
not indicate any relationship with human-rights outcomes (see Table 47 below). This does 
not perfectly guarantee that no relationship exists. With contingency tables, the 
verification of a statistically significant relationship via Pearson’s Chi-Square Test or 
Fisher’s Exact Test permits rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e., that no relationship 
exists) with a certain degree of confidence; however, a non-significant test result does not 
permit acceptance of the null hypothesis (Lowry 2015a, Chapter 8). Nonetheless, given 
the absence of any significance across two different human-rights outcomes and three 
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different time periods—and the absence of asymmetries in the contingency tables—these 
two remote conditions are excluded from the fuzzy-set analysis that follows. 
The direction of relationship for all remaining situational factors was as expected 
though the time periods varied: The presence of ethnic war strongly led to worse human 
rights in the short term while the absence of ethnic war was moderately associated with 
improved human rights. In the short term, wars of short duration (less than two years) 
were strongly and asymmetrically associated with improved human rights. Civil war 
recurrence, in the mid- and long-term periods, consistently prevented human-rights 
improvement; peace, on the other hand, more often allowed human rights to improve.  
Larger populations in the mid-term experienced unchanged or worse human rights 
and smaller populations experienced improved human rights, at a 2:1 ratio for each 
scenario.. This finding is in line with the hypotheses (H19a/19b), but contrary to the 
empirical literature. Finally, democratic states in the short and mid-term periods were 
strongly associated with improved human rights using CIRI. Non-democratic states—
those with less than 6 on the polity IV score—generally experienced worse human rights. 
All of these findings are summarized in the table below: 
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Table 46: Tests of Independence for Remote Conditions & Human-Rights Outcomes 
 
Analyzing the Necessity of Proximate and Remote Conditions  
Parsimonious solutions in a QCA often eliminate necessary conditions, so the use 
of contingency tables helps “to see if any of the causal conditions might be considered 
necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the outcome” (Fiss 2012). Such assessments 
are possible using the row percentages within contingency tables, as compared to the 
column percentages that were reported in all the tables above. The crucial calculation for 
identifying necessary conditions is the percentage of cases in which both the causal 
condition and the outcome are present (i.e., cell #2 in Table 47 below). Since 100 percent 
consistency is exceptionally rare in the social sciences, Fiss set a threshold score of 90 
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percent consistency across those instances. When the value of cell #2 exceeds 90 percent, 
this indicates a probable necessary condition.166  
Table 47: Contingency Tables: Cause Is Necessary But Insufficient167 
 
All contingency tables for the nineteen conditions were reviewed in relation to 
both sets of human-rights outcomes and across the three different time periods. The only 
factor that crossed the 90 percent threshold in cell #2 was enduring peace, defined as the 
absence of civil war recurrence at the respective time period. Indeed, enduring peace 
approached and crossed this threshold consistently across all three-time periods: (1) In 
the short term, cell #2 for pts2d was 85 percent and for ciri2d was 93 percent. (2) In the 
mid-term for pts5d, cell #2 was 100 percent (19 of 19 cases). (3) In the long term, cell #2 
was 95 percent for pts10d (18 of 19 cases), and 90 percent for ciri10d (18 of 20 cases). 
The presence of enduring peace, therefore, was a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for human rights to improve.  
Conclusion 
This chapter was intentionally designed to help reduce the overall complexity of 
the two proposed Models 1 and 2 by using cross-tabulations and statistical analysis that 
                                                 
166 With respect to cell #2, Fiss (2012) concluded, “if all instances (or almost all instances) agree in 
displaying a particular causal condition, then that condition might be interpreted as a necessary condition.” 
167 Table adapted from Fiss (2012). 
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identified statistically significant bivariate relationships. The strength and direction of 
these relations were highlighted and the respective proximate and remote conditions were 
retained for later fuzzy-set analysis. Since QCA is an asymmetric methodology, the 
contingency tables also were evaluated for any strong asymmetric relationships. Together 
these insights informed the retention and exclusion of conditions for fuzzy-set QCA. 
For the contingency-table analysis, the nineteen proposed conditions were 
organized into three sets: Set 1 proximate conditions (testing aggregated power-sharing 
dimensions) included extensively institutionalized settlements, thick political settlements, 
thick military settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreements. The findings for 
these conditions were contrary to previous empirical findings. In the main, human rights 
consistently improved when military power-sharing agreements were thinnest, territorial 
power-sharing agreements were absent, and peace agreements were less institutionalized. 
The thickness of political settlements was not found to be significant here, though the 
absence of such agreements led to improved human rights. Since QCA accounts for 
causal complexity and how various combinations of conditions react differently, and 
because the first model does not involve excess conditions, the political thickness 
condition was retained for fuzzy-set analysis along with the other three aggregated 
measures. 
With respect to Set 2 conditions—which include individual and disaggregated 
peace-agreement provisions—no significant or asymmetric relationships were found for 
any of the disaggregated political measures (repleg, repex, repcs) or for integration of the 
military leadership (mil_ldr). The fuzzy-set analysis in Chapter 8, therefore, initially 
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prioritized the four remaining factors of military integration in the main ranks, robust 
third-party security guarantees, autonomy, and federalism.168  
With respect to the third set (remote conditions used in both models), no 
significant or asymmetric relationship was found between civil war costs and human-
rights outcomes, regardless of whether an outcome was assessed by a change in PTS or in 
CIRI scores. War-cost data also were missing for six cases. Since fuzzy-set QCA cannot 
account for or run an analysis with missing data169—and given the lack of any significant 
or asymmetric relationship with civil war costs and human rights—this condition was 
dropped from the fuzzy-set analysis.  
The remote condition of economic development also failed to demonstrate any 
significant or asymmetric relationship with human-rights outcomes, even when assessed 
against both the changes in PTS and CIRI scores. This condition was initially kept in the 
fsQCA process, both because the fuzzy-set QCA calibration method can more robustly 
account for theoretical and empirical arguments in ways that dichotomization may have 
hidden and because of the strong theoretical arguments for cooptation and alternative 
governance mechanisms. 
In summary, the observations in this chapter led to the permanent removal of one 
remote condition (war costs) from both models and semi-permanent removal of four 
proximate conditions from Model 2. Chapters 7 and 8 discuss these decisions further. 
                                                 
168 Chapter 8 details why each of these measures was included and why certain adjustments were made to 
the final composition of conditions for fuzzy-set analysis. 
169 Tosmana software is able to run crisp-set QCA and multi-value QCA when data is missing. However, it 
does this by running a case with missing data as if it is two cases—one with the missing variable marked as 
present and one with the missing variable marked as absent. 
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Chapter Six: Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)  
In this project, the second phase of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)—
also known as the analytic moment—involved stepwise multi-methodological 
procedures. Chapter 5 presented the first stages of the analysis, using contingency tables 
to illuminate significant symmetric and strong asymmetric relationships that existed 
between proximate or remote conditions and the outcome of human rights. The analysis 
hereafter is based on a specific technique of Qualitative Comparative Analysis known as 
fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). The principal purpose of this chapter is to explain the tools, 
terminology, and techniques that will be used to conduct the analysis and interpretation of 
results.  
The conversation begins by distinguishing fuzzy-set QCA from the other two 
techniques falling under the umbrella of the QCA method. This foray affords quick 
discussion of the substantial research efforts initially attempted using these other 
techniques and it demonstrates why fsQCA was selected as the ideal approach for this 
project. The discussion shifts to description of the formalized process and logic behind 
calibrating conditions and outcomes. The notations and operations of Boolean algebra are 
then detailed, followed by definitions for necessary and sufficient conditions; parameters 
of fit and truth tables are established as useful tools for establishing those conditions. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with brief description of Schneider and Wagemann’s 
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(2012) two-step process and a summarization of the strengths and weaknesses of fuzzy-
set QCA.  
QCA: A Formalized Set-Theoretic Method 
A fundamental assumption of QCA is that social phenomena are rarely the 
outcome of a single factor. Rather, social phenomena result from various combinations of 
factors that jointly produce an outcome. Scholars alternatively substitute terms like 
constellations, conjunctures, causal recipes, and casual paths to signify those 
“configurations of causally relevant conditions” that lead to an outcome (Ragin 2014, 
xxi-xxii). QCA involves comparing these multiple configurations170 using set theory; sets 
have specific membership criteria and individual cases are evaluated for their 
membership, non-membership, or partial membership in multiple sets.  
Three sub-methods of QCA exist: crisp-set QCA, multi-value QCA, and fuzzy set 
QCA. Initially this research project used crisp-set QCA based on the dichotomous coding 
conducted in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, the resulting data were deeply laden with multiple 
contradictions, due to the loss of key discriminating data that commonly occurs when 
dichotomizing information in medium-sized datasets (Herrmann and Cronqvist 2009).171 
Multi-value QCA (mvQCA) was also considered, but even with the use of multiple 
values and adherence to Meur’s (2009a) recommended best practices for resolving 
contradictory configurations, the contradictions remained unresolvable. And 
                                                 
170 A configuration is most simply understood as “a specific combination of factors (or stimuli, causal 
variables, ingredients, determinants, etc.— we call these conditions…) that produces a given outcome of 
interest” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, xix). 
 
171 Resolution of these contradictory configurations was attempted by following Rihoux and De Meur’s 
(2009a, 49-50) recommended best practices, including: (1) adding condition(s) to the model; (2) removing 
and replacing condition(s) from the model); (3) re-examining operationalization of various conditions by 
adjusting the dichotomization thresholds; and (4) reconsidering the outcome variable itself.  
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unfortunately while mvQCA allows for conditions to be measured at multiple values, the 
technique does not allow for using multiple values of the outcome. 
Before switching automatically to fuzzy-set QCA—which accommodates 
multiple values for a given condition or outcome—a preliminary test was run to observe 
how much “analytically relevant information” (Skaaning 2011, 404) was lost when the 
human-rights outcome was dichotomized. The probe compared changes in the data when 
two thresholds were used instead of one. This effort (see Appendix 6) solidly affirmed the 
need to evaluate the human rights outcome via a range of values rather than simple 
dichotomization. As detailed below, fuzzy set QCA accommodates this necessity. 
Fuzzy-Set QCA 
In many respects, fuzzy sets are simultaneously qualitative and quantitative, for 
they incorporate both kinds of distinctions in the calibration of degree of set 
membership. Thus, fuzzy sets have many of the virtues of conventional interval-
scale variables, especially their ability to make fine-grained distinctions, but at the 
same time they permit set theoretic operations.172 
 
Fuzzy-set QCA preserves the set-theoretic, configurational approach of the other 
QCA methods while accommodating partial set membership in both the conditions and 
the outcome (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2009). This feature allows cases to “vary in the 
degree to which they satisfy membership criteria” (Ragin 2014, xxiv), meaning that 
gradations of set membership and non-membership are possible. The technique also 
requires conversion of the original ordinal or interval raw data into fuzzy-set scores using 
a process called calibration (described in the next section). By allowing for degrees of 
membership, fuzzy sets simultaneously conduct qualitative and quantitative assessments 
                                                 
172 See Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 89. 
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by evaluating both differences-in-kind and differences-in-degree, respectively (Ragin 
2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 27). 
Fuzzy-Set Calibrations 
The purpose of calibration is to interpret and transform raw data according to 
transparently selected parameters and thresholds. Indeed, “It is impossible to conduct 
meaningful fuzzy set-theoretic analysis without attending to issues of calibration. All 
fuzzy sets must be interpreted according to external standards” (Ragin 2008, 8). 
Thresholds identify key points at which conditions affect a given outcome. In practical 
terms, calibration is the “process of assigning set membership”, where membership sets 
are defined using thresholds or boundaries that establish “zones of inclusion and 
exclusion” for a given condition or outcome (Mahoney, as quoted in Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 24).  
By calibrating the degree of set membership, fuzzy sets permit blurring of 
boundaries between membership and non-membership (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 
27-28). Fuzzy-set membership scores range from 0 to 1, with the qualitative value of 1 
representing full membership and 0 signifying full non-membership. These scores at 
either end of the continuum represent qualitative anchors (or thresholds) beyond which 
variation in that condition is considered irrelevant by the researcher.173 Meanwhile, 
scores between the two anchors of full membership (1) and full non-membership (0) 
represent various degrees of partial membership. Partial membership means “Fuzzy sets 
preserve the capability of establishing difference-in-kind between cases (qualitative 
                                                 
173 As Ragin (2008, 83) declared, a critical feature of fuzzy sets is “the fact that in order to calibrate a fuzzy 
set it is necessary for researchers to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation.” 
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difference) and add to this the ability to establish difference-in-degree (quantitative 
difference) between qualitatively identical cases” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 27).  
Calibration in fuzzy-set QCA involves defining (via theoretical and empirical 
knowledge): (1) what constitutes a set, (2) what indicator represents this target set, and 
(3) whether the direct or indirect method of calibration will be used. Researchers are 
advised to use external criteria (i.e., substantive, empirical, or theoretical knowledge) in 
order to conceptualize, define, and label these target sets (Engeli and Allison 2014; Ragin 
2008). This knowledge also informs the second key step of selecting an appropriate 
indicator for representing the target set, as well as defining the target set in terms of set 
theoretic language (Ragin 2009). The third step, after defining the target set and its 
indicator, is to select either either the direct or indirect method of calibration to transform 
the raw data. All calibrations conducted herein follow this three-step process.  
Direct and Indirect Calibration 
The principle distinction between these two calibration methods is that “The 
direct method utilizes precise specifications of the key benchmarks, while the indirect 
method requires only a broad classification of cases” (Ragin 2008, 96). In the indirect 
method, the researcher establishes interval-scale values and their associated fuzzy scores 
according to selected “knowledge-based, qualitative groupings” that roughly approximate 
the degree of set membership for each group of cases (Engeli and Allison 2014; Ragin 
2008, 96). Common conceptualizations of indirect calibration include a three-value fuzzy 
set (1=fully in, 0.5=neither fully in nor fully out, 0=fully out) and a four-value fuzzy set 
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(1=fully in, 0.67=more in than out, 0.33=more out than in, 0=fully out), though any 
number of potential combinations and assigned scores are possible.174  
In every instance, the fuzzy-set values can be assigned a verbal description that 
expresses its degree of membership. In other words, membership scores indicate “the 
extent to which a case belongs or does not belong to a theoretically defined set of cases” 
(Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 93). A commonly accepted standard for labeling the 
various degrees of partial membership (adapted here from Engeli, Rihoux and Allison 
2014, 95; Ragin 2000, 156; and Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 29) is as follows:  
Table 48: Suggested Labels for Fuzzy-Set Membership Scores 
 
In the direct method of calibration, the researcher must specify values on the 
interval scale that correspond with three qualitative anchors or breakpoints: (1) an upper 
threshold (which constitutes full membership; (2) a lower threshold (which constitutes 
non-membership, or 0); and (3) a crossover point (defined as “the point of maximum 
                                                 
174 As Ragin notes, “the stronger the empirical basis for making qualitative assessments of set membership, 
the more precise the calibration of the values of the interval-scale indicator as set membership scores” 
(2008, 96). For additional calibration examples, see Ragin (2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012). 
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indifference about membership versus non-membership,”175 or 0.5) (Ragin 2008, 985-94; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 32). The original raw data (i.e. the interval-scale values) 
are transformed into fuzzy-set values using the three qualitative benchmarks established 
by the researcher (2009).176  
Both the direct and indirect method were used to calibrate conditions in follow-on 
chapters. Assigned thresholds and calibration values were made in accordance with the 
above procedures and executed in a transparent fashion based on empirical and 
substantive insights. Four additional methodological elements were followed:  
1. Researchers may mix and match dichotomized conditions with fuzzy-set 
conditions; no restrictions or adjustments are necessary. Effects: Those 
conditions that were naturally dichotomized (e.g., presence/absence of a 
disaggregated power-sharing provision, etc.) were retained in this format.  
2. Whatever technique or type of condition is used, a best practice for coding 
conditions is to set their direction so that the presence of a condition is 
theoretically expected to result in a positive outcome (Rihoux and De Meur 
2009a, 42). Effects: All conditions were oriented accordingly. 
3. When substantive, empirical and/or theoretical grounds for establishing 
thresholds are not available or possible, Rihoux and De Meur (2009a) 
recommended that technical methods (such as cluster analysis of case 
                                                 
175 Ragin alternatively defined the crossover point as “the value of the interval-scale variable where there is 
maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is more in or more out of the target set” (2008, 86). This point is 
not necessarily represented by empirical cases, but it should have a theoretical or substantive basis. 
176 Computer software uses these three qualitative anchors, along with a logistic function, to transform the 
data. This process is discussed more in the calibration of several conditions in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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distribution) be used, but only to the extent that such clusters make sense. 
Effects: This technique was used to establish appropriate thresholds for 
population size. 
4. With fsQCA, not all variation is considered meaningful or “equally relevant” 
(Greckhamer and Mossholder 2011, 268); researchers should “distinguish 
between relevant and irrelevant variation” (Ragin 2008, 83). In practical 
application, this means that when upper and lower thresholds are established, 
the raw data that exist beyond these anchors are considered irrelevant by the 
researcher. Effects: Irrelevant data are explained in Chapters 7 and 8, 
alongside the selection of these thresholds.  
Boolean Algebra and Fuzzy-Set Theory 
Boolean algebra’s use of symbolic calculations requires, as with any new 
language, that its respective notations and operations are understood before engaging in 
further analysis (Rihoux and 
De Meur 2009a, 34). This 
project follows the notations 
employed by Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012) in their 
seminal textbook on set-
theoretic methods (summarized 
in Box 1 and described briefly 
here): Uppercase letters 
  Box 1: Notations & Operations of Boolean Algebra 
UPPERCASE = the presence of a condition 
lowercase = the absence of a condition  
 
Logical AND (Boolean multiplication: indicates set 
intersection, combined conditions) 
 A*b = Ab = min (A,b) 
 
Logical OR (Boolean addition: indicates set union, 
alternate conditions) 
 A+b = max (A,b) 
 
−>  indicates a sufficient condition; “leads to. . .”  
 
Fuzzy set and Crisp Set Negation   
 ~A = 1 – A 
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indicate the presence (i.e., 1)  of a condition while lowercase letters indicate the absence 
(i.e., 0) of a condition. Two basic operators—logical AND, logical OR—provide the 
primary means for assigning set relations. A logical AND, represented by the 
multiplication (*) symbol indicates set intersection. Set intersection is defined as a 
conjunction of two (or more) conditions that together form a causal path leading to an 
outcome (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 101). A case’s degree of membership in this 
causal combination is calculated by taking the minimum membership score in the 
respective conditions.  
A logical OR, represented by the addition (+) symbol, refers to the set union of 
alternative conditions, in which two or more sets are joined in a union of sets. The logical 
OR means that either one condition or the other may lead to the same outcome. Since the 
logical OR indicates alternative conditions, the fuzzy-set membership of a case is 
assessed by taking the maximum of the respective membership scores (Ragin 2008, 71; 
Ragin 2009, 96). A third basic operator—the arrow symbol (−>)—is employed to 
indicate the causal link between a set of conditions and the outcome being explained 
(Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 34-35). Finally, the negation of a  set value is found by 
subtracting the case’s membership value in that set from 1 (symbolically, ~A = 1 – A) 
(Mello 2014, 51).  
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Analyzing Set-Theoretic Relations 
Influential causal relations, such as necessity and sufficiency, are indicated when 
certain types of set relations exist. Necessity is about gauging shared antecedents while 
sufficiency is about assessing 
shared outcomes (Ragin 2014, 
xxviii). In practice, a 
condition is defined as 
necessary “if it is always 
present when the outcome 
occurs,” meaning “the 
outcome cannot occur in the 
absence of the condition” 
(Rihoux and Ragin 2009, xix). 
Sufficient conditions are evident “if the outcome always occurs when the condition is 
present. However, the outcome could also result from other conditions” (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009, xix). Box 2 summarizes various combinations of these terms; the latter 
notion of multiple conjunctural causation is particularly applicable in this analysis and 
when using fsQCA. 
Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
Two goodness-of-fit measures, consistency and coverage, are used to identify 
necessary and sufficient conditions by evaluating each of the different causal paths. 
Consistency measures the degree to which the empirical evidence fits a set-theoretic (i.e., 
Box 2: Defining Necessary & Sufficient Conditions 
“A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only 
cause that produces an outcome and it is singular (that is, 
not a combination of cases).  
 
A cause is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of 
producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this 
capability.  
 
A cause is necessary but not sufficient if it is capable of 
producing an outcome in combination with other causes 
and appears in all such combinations.  
 
Finally, a cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it 
appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions 
that produce an outcome” (Ragin 2014, 99-100) 
 
Furthermore, “In situations where causation is multiple and 
conjunctural, there may be no necessary or sufficient 
conditions for an outcome of interest” (Ragin 2014, 27).  
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set-subset) relationship (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2008).177 A causal path is 
considered consistent when its “similar configuration of conditions leads to a similar 
outcome” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison, 2014, 102).  
Measuring Consistency  
Scholars customarily identify necessary conditions using a threshold of 0.90 
consistency178 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012), almost necessary conditions using a 
threshold of 0.80 consistency (Ragin 2003, 182), and substantially inconsistent 
conditions—those configurational paths that should be considered “non-robust and 
unreliable”—with scores below 0.75 (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102; Ragin 
2008). Necessary conditions in this project are identified using these parameters.   
Scholars traditionally use less rigid consistency thresholds when evaluating 
sufficient conditions.179 Researchers are generally commended to rule out consistent 
values near or below 0.5, where contradictions exist in (almost) half of the evaluated 
empirical evidence, and pursue values at or above 0.75 consistency when possible (127). 
In establishing high consistency thresholds, a practical trade-off is triggered: higher 
consistency scores often result in lower coverage (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 149). 
This project explores such trade-offs and explains why specific thresholds were selected.  
                                                 
177 For detailed explanation of the consistency and coverage formulas, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 
Chapter 5). 
178 Note that the necessity threshold of 0.90 corresponds with the aforementioned 90% consistency 
threshold used by Fiss (2012) to identify necessary variables within contingency tables. 
179 In their QCA textbook, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) strongly implored researchers to refrain from 
strict imposition or justification of a consistency threshold for sufficient conditions based on rigid 
methodological benchmarks or some sort of “universally accepted consistency threshold, akin to the 
(largely non-reflected) use of the 95 percent confidence interval in inferential statistics” (127-128). Rather, 
researchers should think of goodness-of-fit tools as “numerical summaries that describe the data patterns in 
the underlying dataset” (148), thus using their specific research projects to guide any such decisions (128). 
 
   228 
Measuring Coverage  
Coverage is an assessment of a condition’s significance. Coverage serves as “a 
gauge of empirical importance or weight” (Ragin 2008, 101), revealing the proportion of 
an outcome that is explained or “covered” by a causal condition (or a combination of 
conditions) (Berg-Schlosser 2012; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).180  
Unlike consistency, no minimum threshold exists for coverage scores; the decision rests 
with the researcher. This project follows the common practice used in small- and 
medium-N comparisons of requiring only a single case in order to analyze a specific path; 
that is, every causal configuration matters (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 10). Causal 
paths with high frequency were also evaluated in depth; this step is recommended when 
conducting research with potential policy recommendations (Rihoux et al 2014, 102). 
All three of the different coverage measures available to researchers are used in 
the next two chapters. These include: (1) Solution coverage indicates the proportion of 
outcome membership covered by the complete solution term. (2) Raw coverage indicates 
the proportion of outcome membership explained by a specific causal path (i.e., set of 
conditions). (3) Unique coverage indicates the proportion of outcome membership 
exclusively explained by a specific causal path (i.e., by a set of conditions) (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2010, 2012).  
Truth Tables and Sufficient Conditions  
While computer software was used to quickly calculate measures of consistency 
and coverage for necessary conditions, the calculation of these measures for sufficient 
                                                 
180 The closer a coverage measure is to 1.0, the greater the number of cases that are covered by a specific 
path (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102). 
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conditions required truth-table procedures. These procedures represent the core of any 
set-theoretic analysis using QCA, for: 
[T]he truth table elaborates and formalizes one of the key analytic strategies of 
comparative research—examining cases sharing specific combinations of causal 
conditions to see if they share the same outcome. Indeed, the main goal of truth 
table analysis is to identify explicit conditions between combinations of causal 
conditions and outcomes.181  
 
The truth-table procedure provides a visual map of all “the logically possible 
combinations of causal conditions that lead to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the 
outcome” (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 97).182  
In fuzzy set truth table construction, respective cases potentially have partial (i.e. 
varied or differentiated) membership in every available truth table row (Berg-Schlosser 
2012, 97; Ragin 2009, 100, 104). To resolve this complexity, this project follows the 
standard practice of aligning each case with the respective causal path where it is most 
strongly representative (i.e. “more in than out” of that configuration) (Berg-Schlosser 
2012, 97, 99; Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).183 
Truth Table Minimization Process 
A fundamental step in the analysis of truth tables is the reduction of logical 
complexity. This reduction is made possible via the so-called Quine-McCluskey 
algorithm. This algorithm involves a stepwise reduction of the possible combinations of 
                                                 
181 See Ragin (2008, 24-25). 
182 This analysis uses a minimum frequency of a single observation to warrant inclusion of a configuration 
in the truth table. A specific configuration may also correspond with several actual observed cases.  
183 This practice was made possible by the discovery that “Each case can have only one membership score 
greater than 0.5 in the logically possible combinations formed from a given set of conditions” (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009, 106). 
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conditions in order to obtain the shortest possible causal combination—also commonly 
called the minimal solution.  
Before researchers run the Quine-McCluskey minimization procedure using 
various QCA software programs, they must determine: (1) the consistency score, and (2) 
how they will deal with limited diversity. The consistency score is “used as a cutoff value 
for determining which causal combinations pass fuzzy set theoretic consistency and 
which do not” (Ragin 2009, 109). A common practice is to analyze multiple thresholds in 
order to assess the trade-offs and consequences of raising or lowering the consistency 
cutoff. 
Fuzzy-set QCA also forces researchers to make an explicit decision about how 
they will deal with logical remainders (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 758). Logical 
remainders—defined as those causal combinations and fuzzy-set corners that lack at least 
one empirically strong case—occur because of limited diversity in empirical data; “[t]he 
observed data are far less rich than the potential property space delineated by the 
conditions” (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27). Three options exist: (1) Logical 
remainders “can be avoided altogether,” which results in a complex solution. This 
solution is a more conservative, safe estimate since it minimizes using only actual 
empirical observations; however, the resulting solution is often quite complex and 
difficult to interpret (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 99). (2) Logical remainders can 
be “used without explicit evaluation of their plausibility,” which yields a parsimonious 
solution. All empirical cases and all logically possible cases (even if empirically 
unrepresented) are included in the procedure. (3) Or logical remainders can be “used 
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selectively, based on the researcher’s substantive and theoretical knowledge,” which is 
considered the intermediate solution (Ragin 2009, 120). Some logical remainders are 
retained here, but only for plausible conditions that are informed by the researcher’s 
theoretical and substantive knowledge of how these conditions are expected to affect the 
outcome (Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 99; Ragin 2009, 110, 118). 
In summary, truth tables allow researchers to disentangle causal complexity. The 
truth table is strategically organized around the idea that cases with shared causal 
pathways might be examined to see whether their outcomes are also shared. The process 
necessitates a number of explicit researcher decisions, from establishing consistency or 
coverage thresholds to selecting the appropriate minimization technique.  
Truth tables are employed throughout Chapters 7 and 8 in order to explore and 
identify shared causal conditions that shape human-rights outcomes. The decisions made 
throughout the analytical process are backed by theoretical and substantive justification 
and are all transparently shared so that others may replicate or adjust follow-on research. 
Negation of the Outcome 
Analysis of the negation of the outcome—though uncommon still in 
contemporary literature184—is critical to validating a researcher’s causal argument. The 
analysis of a given truth table may reveal that certain conditions are sufficient for an 
outcome to occur. But because set-theoretic relationships do not assume symmetry 
                                                 
184 Although Schneider and Wagemann (2010, 2012) concluded that it is ‘good practice’ to analyze the 
negation of the outcome, Mello’s (2013) analysis of twenty-four fsQCA peer-reviewed, published articles 
found that only seven of these studies evaluated the negation of the outcome.  
   232 
between causes and effects,185 researchers cannot infer from these sufficient conditions 
what the sufficient conditions will be for the non-occurrence (or negation) of that 
outcome. Key insights are possible from analysis of the latter. For example, if a certain 
causal pathway consistently leads to both the outcome and the negation of the outcome, 
then 
serious doubts arise about the explanatory strength of the conditions employed. 
Likewise, a meaningful analysis of the non-outcome necessitates the inclusion of 
negative cases, which can strengthen the confidence in the fsQCA results for both 
analyses.186  
 
Two-Step Approach for fsQCA 
Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach is grounded in the 
understanding that actor-influenced variables (i.e. proximate conditions) “unfold within 
certain [situational and historical] contexts” (i.e. remote conditions) that enable or 
constrain their influence (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012, 254). This approach 
aligned with the natural division of causal factors in this project into two distinct sets; 
Chapter 3 distinguished proximate and remote conditions by their spatiotemporal 
differences. Chapter 4 then defined and operationalized these conditions.  
Both steps in the Two-Step Approach involve the construction of truth tables.187  
In the first step, the truth table is based exclusively on evaluating the remote conditions 
and the outcome of interest. Logical complexity in the truth table is reduced using the 
                                                 
185 In contrast, when correlations test the relationship between a cause and effect, they simultaneously test 
the relationship between the absence of that cause and the absence of the same effect.  
 
186 See Mello (2013, 14). 
 
187 The outline of these principles is based on Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) example of a two-step 
process in which they explain and demonstrate the approach, as well as their QCA textbook (2012, 254-5, 
315). 
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Quine-McCluskey minimization procedure oriented to obtaining the parsimonious 
solution and using intentionally lower consistency thresholds. The parsimonious solution 
reduces complexity of the initial model by treating logical remainders—defined as those 
causal combination and fuzzy set corners that lack at least one empirically strong case 
(Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009, 27)—“without explicit evaluation of their 
plausibility” (Ragin 2009, 120).188 The deliberate underspecification (lowering) of the 
consistency threshold helps to derive remote conditions that may enable the outcome 
while not overly constraining the results. This first step allows researchers to derive 
“outcome-enabling conditions”—understood as the contextual conditions “under which a 
given outcome is more likely to occur than other contexts” (Schneider and Wagemann 
2006, 761)—all while retaining space for improvement in the overall solution once 
proximate factors are added in the second step. 
 The purpose of the second step is to unravel those combinations of remote 
conditions and proximate conditions that led to the outcome. Multiple truth tables are 
constructed: each “outcome-enabling” remote condition from Step One is individually 
run alongside the full set of proximate conditions. Logical minimization using Quine-
McCluskey procedures is made stringent by higher consistency thresholds and by 
selection of the complex solution, which discards all logical remainders and opts instead 
for minimization based solely on actual empirical cases. The resulting solution yields 
those sufficient causal paths that consistently lead to the outcome. All of the truth tables 
run in the second step are then consolidated into a single table. 
                                                 
188 This means that all empirical cases and all logically possible cases (even if empirically unrepresented) 
are included in the procedure.  
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Of note, this two-step process largely negates the utility of the coverage 
calculations (for sufficient conditions), since coverage is assessed in separate truth-table 
procedures against each individual remote condition and these coverages are thus non-
applicable since they cannot account for the entire table. However, the previously 
discussed addition of frequency considerations supplements the absence of this measure. 
Strengths and Limitations of Fuzzy-Set QCA 
QCA was selected for this study because of its capacity to address small- and 
intermediate-N comparative research, combined with its systematic approach that allows 
for context-sensitive causality and multiple conjunctural causation. This latter 
characteristic allows researchers to compare different causal pathways, as well as cases 
with similar combinations of conditions and their effects on the outcome.  
Certain disadvantages and burdens are inherent in QCA, as well. A greater onus is 
placed on researchers who use its techniques. For example, the QCA framework is 
analytically malleable in that it flexibly accommodates—better said, it requires—a 
number of methodological decisions by the researcher, many of which have been detailed 
in this chapter. In addition, QCA encourages retroductive analysis, involving continual 
movement back and forth between theory and empirical data (recall Figure 5). The 
combination of these two characteristics places a particularly strong burden on scholars 
who use QCA to transparently explain their decisions and to base them on theoretical or 
empirical knowledge. 
Making policy prescriptions based on QCA or other set-theoretic research 
methods alone is potentially risky. QCA is able to explore “context-sensitive and 
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historically bound explanations” where equal weighting is given “to each particular case 
including deviant ones or outliers. . . .” (Berg-Schlosser 2012, 85), but it does not account 
for spatiotemporal analysis. That is to say, QCA does not examine how the order or 
timing of conditions affects an outcome; the sequencing of conditions at such critical 
junctures is unaddressed. Indeed, causal chains and sequences “might be masked by what 
appears to be a cross-section conjunction on the macro level” (Beach and Rohlfing 2015, 
4). And research in closely related fields has demonstrated that the sequencing of 
conditions can be absolutely critical. For example, the success of post-conflict state 
building often hinges on well-designed sequencing of reconstruction measures (Paris and 
Sisk 2009).  
Another disadvantage is that while fuzzy-set QCA identifies causal 
configurations, it is limited in verifying the exact causal mechanisms at play. QCA does 
provide rapid inroads to case comparisons by using common causal configurations that 
lead to the same outcome. QCA is definitively case-oriented; it should not be considered 
equivalent to case study analysis though. A tradeoff always exists between the number of 
cases originally considered (the breadth) and the degree of intimacy that is gained with 
each individual case (the depth) (Rihoux and Lobe 2009).  
Ideally, a QCA study is followed by further analysis, such as process tracing of 
selected case studies that can examine and corroborate the theorized causal pathways.189 
A promising new proposal yet to be explored in-depth by researchers is the integration of 
                                                 
189 For this reason, scholars like Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994) followed-up their Boolean-based 
analysis later with comparative case studies to examine these causal mechanisms more closely (see Berg-
Schlosser and Mitchell 2016). 
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cross-case analyses with process tracing, using set theoretic methods. Several scholars 
(Beach and Rohlfing 2015; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013) have proposed mixed-method 
practices for pursuing this integration further. 
A final disadvantage of fsQCA is its potential sensitivity to researcher coding, 
though comparative scholarship on this issue is thin.190 For this reason, advocates of 
QCA continually emphasize the transparent selection of coding thresholds based on 
specific theoretical and empirical grounds. 
Conclusion 
This chapter serves as a foundational guide for the analytical procedures of fuzzy 
set QCA applied hereafter. The chapter showed how the specific method of fsQCA 
employs calibration, formal logic, Boolean algebra, and set theory to analyze the 
necessity and sufficiency of various configurations of conditions that lead to an outcome 
(or to its negation). These terms and tools were defined and explained. Additionally, the 
specific tools necessary for understanding goodness-of-fit measures like consistency and 
coverage, as well as truth-table procedures, were also covered. The chapter closed by 
detailing how the Two-Step Approach will be used in the forthcoming analyses in 
Chapters 7 and 8. It also addressed limitations of the selected research design. 
Fuzzy-set QCA represents a rigorous methodological alternative to prevailing 
social science methods. These latter methods measure the net effects of individual 
variables rather than assess configurations of conditions. In comparison, QCA at its core 
                                                 
190 On the subject of QCA coding sensitivity, Skaaning (2011, 405) replicated three different studies to 
explore this issue and found that while QCA findings are sensitive to minor adjustments, the modifications 
in most cases “did not have much—if any—impact.” In addition, fuzzy-set QCA was found to be less 
sensitive than crisp-set QCA. Skaaning was hesitant to generalize these findings given the small-N 
analysis. 
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assumes multi-conjunctural causation and equifinality, which “allows for different, 
mutually non-exclusive sufficient conditions, or paths, for the outcome” (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 326). The Two-Step Approach particularly emphasizes and accounts for 
historical and situational context that might shape the potential effects of actor-influenced 
conditions. The unique methodological advantages and perspectives of fsQCA blossom in 
the analysis and interpretation that begins now. 
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Chapter Seven: Fuzzy-Set QCA of Model 1, Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions 
This and the next chapter investigate the effects of peace-agreement provisions on 
human-rights outcomes in civil wars that ended 1989-2007. Two different models are 
investigated. The principal difference between these models is how they approach 
investigating the various peace-agreement provisions offered within peace agreements. 
This chapter investigates Model 1, which includes aggregated power-sharing dimensions 
(proximate Set 1 conditions) and situational, historical contexts called remote conditions. 
The next chapter investigates Model 2, which involves disaggregated peace-agreement 
provisions (proximate Set 2 conditions) and the same set of remote conditions used in the 
first model.  
This chapter mobilizes fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to 
evaluate how aggregated power-sharing dimensions (Set 1 proximate conditions) 
combine and interact within certain remote conditions to influence human-rights 
outcomes. The investigation builds upon the theories and hypotheses first detailed in 
Chapters 2 and 4, and the examination of bivariate relationships conducted via 
contingency tables in Chapter 5. The methological tools covered in Chapter 6 are used 
here to elucidate necessary and sufficient causal recipes that lead to either the desired 
outcome of significant human rights improvement (SHRI), or to the negation of this 
outcome (~SHRI).  
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All four original proximate conditions—including extensively institutionalized 
settlements, thick political settlements, thick military settlements, and territorial power-
sharing agreements—were retained for fsQCA. Three-letter identifiers were used to 
designate these proximate conditions, as shown in Table 49 below.  
 Table 49: Aggregated Power-Sharing Dimensions 
     (Proximate Set 1 Conditions) 
 
  
This chapter evaluates how these four proximate conditions operate within 
different situational and historical contexts. These contexts, referred to in this dissertation 
as remote conditions, enhance or constrain the likelihood that different proximate factors 
influence a given outcome. The following remote conditions were retained from the 
bivariate analysis in Chapter 5: 
Table 50: Remote Conditions Retained for fsQCA 
 
  
As detailed in Chapter 6, this evaluation will use Schneider and Wagemann’s 
(2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach and the methodology of fuzzy-set Qualitative 
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Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to investigate the causal combinations of proximate and 
remote conditions leading to the outcome and to the non-outcome. To facilitate this 
process, all non-dichotomous conditions and outcomes were calibrated in accordance 
with the procedures outlined in the previous chapter. Conditions and outcomes that 
required calibration included: (1) the Set 1 proximate conditions of extensively 
institutionalized settlements, thick political power-sharing, and thick military power-
sharing; (2) the remote conditions of civil war duration, population size, regime type, and 
economic development; and (3) significant human-rights improvement (i.e., significant 
reduction in the state’s use of political repression).191  
The chapter begins with these calibration procedures. Following calibration, the 
analysis includes separate procedures for investigating the outcome, then its negation. 
The reason for these separate procedures is based on QCA’s asymmetric nature, wherein 
the results for the negation of the outcome cannot be inferred (or simply inverted) from 
the results of the outcome. This is a strength and benefit of QCA. Chapter 4 demonstrated 
the limits of symmetric analyses, such as cross-tabulation tables, that may obscure the 
asymmetric influence of a given condition on an outcome. For these reasons, both the 
outcome and its negation must be considered separately.  
Fuzzy-Set Calibrations 
In accordance with best practices (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a), the raw data was 
calibrated based on theoretically relevant, empirically verifiable grounds. Where the 
substantive literature was unclear regarding specific thresholds, clustering techniques 
                                                 
191 Dichotomous conditions like territorial power-sharing provisions, non-ethnic conflict, and enduring 
peace are already operationalized for fsQCA. Set 2 proximate conditions are calibrated in the next chapter. 
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were used to identify appropriate cutoffs. All conditions were coded “so that their 
presence ([1] value) is theoretically expected to be associated with a positive outcome 
([1] outcome value)” (Rihoux and De Meur 2009a, 42). 
Set 1 Proximate Aggregated Conditions 
Three of the four proximate conditions in Set 1—including extensively 
institutionalized settlements, thick political power-sharing, and thick military power-
sharing—require calibration. The condition of territorial power sharing is already 
dichotomized based on the presence or absence of either territorial provision (i.e., 
autonomy or federalism) in a negotiated settlement. 
Extensively Institutionalized Settlements 
In considering calibration parameters for any proposed condition, the foremost 
issue is discerning an appropriate definition of the target set, followed by consideration of 
how indicators map to that target set. For this first condition, the target set is defined as 
extensively institutionalized settlements (condition identifier: EIS). This target set 
embodies the theory proposed by Hartzell and Hoddie (2007, 75), wherein “the most 
extensively institutionalized settlements” produce the greatest impact on the outcome of 
interest. The qualifier extensively is necessary for establishing the degree of 
institutionalization in negotiated settlements.  
The specific indicator that maps to this target set is the composite measure of 
settlement institutionalization, which was defined in Chapters 4 and 5. To briefly recap, 
institutionalized settlements are assessed by a composite measure that varies from 0 to 3 
in accordance with the additional presence of respective political, military, and territorial 
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power-sharing dimensions. In a substantive sense, extensively institutionalized 
settlements are negotiated settlements where all three dimensions of power sharing are 
included. Such settlements are considered full members in the fuzzy set and recoded as 1. 
Cases definitively not in the EIS set (i.e., full non-members) were identified by the 
absence of any power-sharing measures, and coded for fuzzy-set analysis as 0.  
How should the other institutionalized settlements—those involving just one or 
two dimensions—be calibrated? The first method considered here was a four-value 
fuzzy-set scheme used by Ragin (2008) to assign the interval values of 0.0 (“fully out”), 
0.33 (“more out than in”), 0.67 (“more in than out”), and 1 (“fully in”). These rigid 
settings, however, do not accurately capture Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2007, 82) empirical 
finding that “higher levels of settlement institutionalization lower the risk of a return to 
civil war.” This finding showed that the absence of any power-sharing institutions 
resulted in an increased risk of civil war recurrence by 420 percent. Comparatively, the 
addition of just one power-sharing institution increased the risk of civil war recurrence by 
153 percent.192 As Hartzell and Hoddie astutely observed, while the inclusion of 
additional dimensions initially results in an increased risk of civil war recurrence, this 
still represents a risk level reduction compared with when all such measures are excluded. 
Meanwhile, the presence of three or more types of power-sharing institutions in a 
settlement represented a breakpoint, with civil war recurrence reduced by 40 percent.  
If each additional power-sharing dimension (assessed as increased membership in 
the set of extensively institutionalized settlements) further reduces the risk of civil war 
                                                 
192 This finding parallels Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2003b, 327) earlier work which found that “inclusion of 
power-sharing provisions in any of the four categories reduces the likelihood of settlement failure by 53%.” 
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recurrence, how should this partial membership be properly transformed? Ragin (2008) 
accommodated for this possibility, clarifying that his illustrated settings were not 
prescriptive, rigid principles. Rather, “the specific translation of ordinal ranks to fuzzy 
membership scores depends on the fit between the specific content of the ordinal 
categories and the researcher’s conceptualization and labeling of the fuzzy set” (Ragin 
2008, 32).193 This underscores “the fact that researchers must use substantive and 
theoretical knowledge” so that the “calibration of degree of membership in sets” might be 
purposeful and meaningful rather than mechanical (Ragin 2008, 32).  
In this instance, the presence of even a single dimension of power sharing 
significantly improves the outcome, compared to its absence. Therefore, partially 
institutionalized settlements are considered more “in” the set of extensively 
institutionalized settlements than “out” of the set, and are represented with a 
corresponding fuzzy score of 0.67. The relationship between institutionalization and 
outcomes is considered exponential, with increasing membership in the set of extensively 
institutionalized settlements resulting in ever improving outcomes with respect to peace 
duration. For this reason, mostly institutionalized settlements were coded as 0.9, 
representing cases that were “almost fully in.” The following table summarizes the 
fuzzy-set scores for this target set: 
 
  
                                                 
193 Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 29) substantiated this approach, stating that “different intervals 
between the fuzzy-set membership scores are possible: it is perfectly fine if a fuzzy set shows membership 
scores of, say, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6 and 1, if theoretical considerations warrant it.” 
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Table 51: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Extensively Institutionalized Settlements 
(EIS) 
 
Thick Political Settlements 
The next target set was defined simply as thick political settlements (condition 
identifier: TPS). This set exemplifies Mattes and Savun’s (2009) contention that political 
power-sharing agreements reduce the risk of civil war recurrence. Indeed, they found that 
each additional political power-sharing provision reduced that risk by 29 percent. The 
specific indicator used here was the count measure of political power-sharing thickness 
discussed in Chapter 3. This measure varies from 0 to 3, with the maximum value 
indicating that a negotiated settlement provides for three specific political measures; 
including representative legislative elections, as well as guaranteed integration of rebels 
into cabinet posts in the executive branch and into posts in the civil service.  
The two target sets of exclusively institutionalized settlements and thick political 
settlements were both converted from four-value scales. However, where 
institutionalization had an exponential or multiplicative effect on the outcome (i.e., each 
additional dimension significantly improved the results), the effects from thick political 
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settlements were considered more additive in nature. The calibration scores accounted for 
this additive nature by using equally spaced intervals. Also, the inclusion of even a single 
political measure was assumed to produce at least some positive effects; partially thick 
political settlements, with just one political settlement, are therefore scored above the 
crossover threshold. This results in the following fuzzy-score calibration:  
      Table 52: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Thick Political Settlements (TPS) 
 
  
Thick Military Settlements  
Calibration of thick military settlements (condition identifier: TMS) closely 
resembled the calibration done for thick political settlements (TPS). The military 
condition accounted for the assertions of Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a) and Jarstad and 
Nilsson (2008), who found that military power-sharing agreements are strongly 
associated with durable peace because they function as legitimate, costly signals between 
war rivals. The indicator used here to map thick military settlements was the count 
measure of military power-sharing thickness discussed in Chapter 3. This count measure 
varies from 0 to 2, with the maximum value indicating that a negotiated settlement 
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provides for guaranteed integration of rebels into a state’s joint-defense force and into 
leadership positions of that same force. 
Calibration of a three-value fuzzy set is somewhat trickier than sets with four 
values. A number of scholars have cautioned against rigidly following Ragin’s (2008, 31) 
proposed solution of setting the three values at 0 (“fully out”), 0.5 (“neither fully in nor 
fully out”), and 1(“fully in”). Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 28) warned that assigning 
cases with a fuzzy-set membership score of 0.5 demonstrates “we are unable to say for an 
individual case whether it is more a member of the set or more a non-member” of that set. 
Many QCA software programs drop all cases where values are exactly 0.5.194  
The middle value in this set, defined as those peace agreements involving only a 
single military power-sharing provision, was not ambiguous. Rather than setting this 
value at 0.5, proper calibration places this above the threshold (i.e.., as residing mostly in 
the set of thick military settlements). The presence of a single military integration 
measure is very good for a negotiated settlement. Scholars contended that the presence of 
a single measure demonstrated a costly signal that the government was ready to distribute 
authority within its own coercive apparatus (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015). Fuzzy-score 
calibration for thick military settlements was set as follows: 
 
     
  
                                                 
194 Both fsQCA and kirq software programs are known to drop such cases. 
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Table 53: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Thick Military Settlements (TMS) 
 
 
Remote Conditions 
Next, the remote conditions of civil war duration, population size, regime type, 
and economic development were calibrated. Enduring peace and non-ethnic wars were 
already dichotomized.  
War Duration  
War duration was the first condition discussed that involved calibrating interval-
scale variables. The target set for this condition was states that experienced very short-
duration civil wars (condition identifier: SW). A six-value fuzzy set, as described by 
Ragin (2008), was initially considered for establishing appropriate values. Using previous 
thresholds of two years, four years and seven years,195 the set was demarcated as shown 
(in Table 54 below). 
This calibration provided a decent initial approximation; however, the 
demarcations using these intervals were sub-optimal. A simple illustration of the data 
demonstrates this: A war that lasts 23 months is not so different from one that lasts 24 or 
                                                 
195 See Chapter 5 for discussion about these thresholds. 
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25 months such that it would warrant a drop in score from 0.8 (“mostly in” the set) to 0.6 
(“more in than out” of the set). How, then, should this condition be calibrated? 
Table 54: Six-value Fuzzy-score Calibration for Short-duration Civil Wars (SW) 
 
An alternative calibration method that more accurately accounts for the diversity 
of conflict duration, without using intermittent thresholds, is the direct method of 
calibration (Ragin 2008, 85-94). As briefly discussed earlier, this approach requires 
specifying three qualitative anchors: (1) an upper threshold (i.e., constitutes full 
membership), (2) a lower threshold (i.e., constitutes non-membership), and (3) a 
crossover point (i.e., “the value of the interval-scale variable where there is maximum 
ambiguity as to whether a case is more in or more out of the target set” (Ragin 2008, 86)). 
The purpose of these benchmarks is to “transform the original interval-scale values to 
fuzzy membership scores” (Ragin 2008, 85). When applied here, the direct method 
replaced the rough approximations found in the original six-value fuzzy calibration 
scoring with a “fine-grained calibration of the degree of membership of cases in sets, 
with scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0” (Ragin 2008, 85). 
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The use of qualitative anchors, when based on an explicit rationale, also made it 
“possible to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation” (Ragin 2008, 33). For 
example, the upper threshold of full membership in the set of states that experienced 
short-lived civil wars was intentionally established as civil wars that were shorter than 
twelve months. The upper threshold was set beyond the known threshold of two years 
discussed earlier in order to capture some of the variation that exists in shorter 
conflicts.196 Setting the threshold at twelve months was also equivalent to asserting that 
the difference between a war that lasts four months and one that lasts eleven months is an 
irrelevant distinction; both are considered full members within the set.    
Two components informed the lower threshold of non-membership: (1) the 
previous Tosmana-established threshold of seven years197, and (2) Fearon’s (2004) 
finding that the median for non-coup and non-revolutionary wars was approximately nine 
years. The lower threshold was set at ten years—one year beyond Fearon’s median—in 
order to capture variety below these respective thresholds. This also set a conservative 
boundary for defining the point at which variation in war duration would be considered 
inconsequential.  
With respect to setting the crossover point, the previous Tosmana-established 
threshold of four years was initially considered as the point of maximum ambiguity. 
Closer investigation of the thirty-six cases revealed, though, that five years was a better 
                                                 
196 See Chapter 4. Also, this two-year threshold closely aligns with Fearon’s (2004) estimation that the 
median civil war duration for coup-related or popular revolutions is approximately 2.1 years. 
197 See Chapter 4. Additionally, Appendix 11 demonstrates the importance of the seven-year threshold with 
respect to robust third-party security guarantees: in short, robust guarantees involving peace enforcement 
are particularly rare in long duration conflicts beyond 7 years. 
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middle threshold. Two civil wars that lasted between four to five years informed this 
adjustment. In general, human rights improved in both, indicating that the crossover point 
needed to shift to the five-year period. In Azerbaijan, human rights improved over the 
short- and mid-term periods, with no human-rights data available for the long-term 
period. In Sierra Leone, human rights were initially worse in the short term, but then 
improved. The worsening of human rights in the short term is likely related to the 
recurrence of civil war at t+2. 
The five-year threshold also was close to halfway between the median for civil 
wars involving coups or revolutions (2.1 years) and the median for non-coup, non-
revolutionary wars (9 years). Therefore, the crossover threshold was set at five years 
instead of four, since this appeared to demarcate a more accurate threshold for where 
ambiguity was most prevalent. Of note, the process used here to set the lower threshold 
highlights an aforementioned strength of QCA; namely, QCA encourages retroductive 
analysis, with a continual dialogue and exchange between theory and data. 
To summarize the following thresholds were established for the set of states that 
experienced short-lived civil wars (SW): full membership (< 1 year), non-membership (> 
10 years), and crossover point (5 years). To capture relevant variation, these anchors were 
set close to, but outside of, known anchor points described in the literature.198 With these 
three qualitative anchors established, the original interval-scale data could then be 
transformed into fuzzy membership scores (Ragin 2008, 85). This transformation was 
                                                 
198 From this literature, war duration represents both the length of the conflict and potentially a proxy of the 
type of conflict. 
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accomplished using Rubinson’s (2015) software program that calculated the “direct” 
method of calibration once the thresholds were determined.199 
Population Size 
The target set for population size is states with small populations (condition 
identifier: SP). This definition aligns with extensive theoretical and empirical evidence 
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Henderson 1993; Huntington 2006; Murdie and Davis 2010; 
Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) that larger populations experience increased political 
repression. This increased repression is due to a variety of mechanisms, including, inter 
alia, increased demographic demands on socio-economic and political institutions as well 
as resource scarcity. States with smaller populations experience fewer of these stressors, 
which leads to less political repression. The specific indicator that maps to this target set 
is the interval-scale data of population size discussed in Chapter 4.  
The current literature does not establish external criteria corresponding to clear 
anchors. Therefore, for the crossover threshold, the previously established and tested 
Tosmana-based threshold of 10 million people (a natural log of 16.12) was used (see 
Chapter 4). The upper threshold for full membership was set at 1 million, below the 
lowest population size for the set. This ensured that all variation was captured given the 
lack of external criteria. The lower threshold was established to correspond with states 
having populations of 50 million people or more; this threshold was five times the 
crossover value and aligned with a clear threshold in the available data (see figure below; 
note that 17.73 represents the natural log of 50 million people).  
                                                 
199 Users wishing to replicate this data or leverage this software should note that the inversion function is 
necessary given that the calibrate function assumes increasing values are associated with upper thresholds. 
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Figure 14: Population Thresholds Using Tosmana - 10 and 50 million 
 
By way of review, suitable anchors for the set of less populated states (SP) are: 
(1) an upper threshold of full membership at 1 million people (natural log 13.82), (2) a 
crossover threshold at 10 million people (natural log 16.12), and (3) a lower threshold of 
full non-membership at 50 million people (natural log 17.73). With these three qualitative 
thresholds, Rubinson’s (2015) QCA add-on was again used to run the direct method of 
calibration for the target set.200 
Economic Development 
As with the war costs condition, economic development did not demonstrate any 
significant relationship with human-rights outcomes (see Chapter 5 contingency tables), 
even when assessed at all three time periods and using both PTS and CIRI data. This 
condition was initially included in the fuzzy-set analysis, due to the clarity of potential 
thresholds that matter and the strength of prior empirical relationships; fuzzy-set QCA 
calibration can account for these thresholds and reveal relationships otherwise hidden by 
dichotomization.  
                                                 
200 See calibration of short wars for further discussion of this tool. 
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For economic development, the target set was defined as states with at least 
moderately developed economies (condition identifier: ME). As discussed in Chapter 4, 
stronger economic standing empirically corresponds with successful implementation of 
peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003b) as well as with an increased level of 
respect for physical-integrity rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b; Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The probable causal 
relationship between economic standing and political repression is that regimes with at 
least moderate economic development may leverage the distribution of economic goods 
coopt in order to coopt rebels and opposition elements, rather than coerce them (Poe and 
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 294). 
The specific indicator that maps this target set is the interval scale data of GDP 
per capita (see previous discussion in Chapter 4). States with full membership in this set 
are considered to possess high enough levels of economic standing that alternative 
governance mechanisms, such as the distribution of public goods and the coopting of 
rebels or opposition elements, are a consistently viable option. An appropriate upper 
threshold here is $3,036. This corresponds with The World Bank’s (2016) minimum 
amount for classification as a state with an “upper-middle income.”201 The lower 
threshold (full non-membership) is $456, corresponding with The World Bank’s 
definition of absolute poverty, as defined in Chapter 4. The crossover point is $765.  
The crossover point was selected in accordance with a distinguishing threshold 
used by The World Bank. Specifically, the World Bank (2016) classified states that sat in 
                                                 
201 For further discussion on The World Bank’s selection of these thresholds, on comparing levels of 
development, and on the limitations of different economic measures, see Soubbotina and Sheram (2000). 
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the range above this crossover point, but below the upper threshold (i.e., $766-$3,035 
GDP/capita) as “lower-middle-income states.” In turn, all states below this crossover 
anchor are classified as “low income states.” Therefore, these anchors distinguish 
between those states below the absolute poverty line (considered full non-members) and 
those above this poverty threshold but still below the moderate poverty line. This latter 
group resides below the crossover point. States that fall in this range merit appropriate 
calibration as “almost fully out,” “mostly out,” “more out than in,” and variations in-
between. Likewise, the aforementioned “lower-middle-income states” are considered 
above the crossover point and have been assessed as “more in than out,” “mostly in,” 
“almost fully in,” and variations in-between. 
In sum, befitting anchors for the set of at least moderately developed states (ME) 
are: (1) an upper threshold of full membership at $3,036 (minimum threshold for upper-
middle-income states), (2) a crossover threshold of $765 (dividing between low-income 
and lower-middle-income states), and (3) a threshold of full non-membership at $456 
(which corresponds with absolute poverty). As with the previous two target sets, these 
three qualitative anchors were input into available software to run a direct calibration 
method on this target set. By using this calibration process rather than “mere mechanistic 
rescalings of national income,” the resulting values “reflect the position of external 
criteria via the three qualitative anchors. The use of such external criteria is the hallmark 
of measurement calibration” (Ragin 2008, 91). 
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Regime Type 
The target set for regime type is defined as highly democratic states (condition 
identifier: HD). The selected indicator used to map this set was the Polity score from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).202 The Polity score is an aggregated 
variable of regime type on a 21-point scale, ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full 
democracy). The definition of the target set encapsulates Davenport and Armstrong’s 
(2004) finding that only highly democratic states (i.e., polity scores of 8, 9, and especially 
the highest score of 10) had experienced less political repression by the state.  
The potential relationship between democracy and human rights was explored 
using known thresholds within the empirical literature. Full membership in the set of 
highly democratic states (HD) was established at a Polity score of 10, in alignment with 
Davenport and Armstrong’s (2004) findings. Full non-membership was set at a Polity 
score of -10. Polity scores of 8 and 9 were considered “almost fully in” and given a 
fuzzy-set score of 0.9. The Polity scores of 6 and 7 were considered “mostly in” the set 
and assigned a fuzzy score of 0.8. This latter score was based on two factors: First, 
Davenport’s study was not limited to post-civil war contexts; scores may matter 
differently in such situations. Second, other scholars like Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) 
corroborated this possibility, showing that in post-civil war contexts, a Polity threshold of 
6 and above corresponds with reduced political repression. Polity scores 0 to 5 were 
considered somewhat democratic and “more in than out” of the set. They were scored 
closely to the crossover threshold for this reason, with a fuzzy score of 0.6. Negative 
                                                 
202 See Chapter 4 for further discussion on this measure. 
   256 
polity scores were calibrated using the mirror image of these positive scores. The 
resulting fuzzy-score calibration for this set is summarized in the table below.  
Table 55: Fuzzy Score Calibration for the Set of Highly Democratic 
Countries (HD) 
  
In comparison with the decision about whether to include war costs, the 
arguments for including regime type were empirically robust, with the literature 
consistently finding regime type as an explanatory variable for the degree of political 
repression. The contingency tables from Chapter 5 corroborated the empirical literature 
by demonstrating that non-democratic states often experience worse human rights, 
whereas democratic states more consistently experience improved human rights. The 
earlier discussion about war costs noted that QCA software is not able to run an analysis 
with missing fuzzy-set data. Three different cases were missing the Polity score, 
including the civil wars in Bosnia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Inclusion of this condition 
in the fuzzy-set analysis required the loss of those three cases. 
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Adjustment of the case studies at this later stage is not anomalous within QCA 
research. Indeed, the selection of cases to be studied is a key element of QCA, involving 
researcher discretion throughout the process. The selection and adjustment of these cases 
is “not a one-way street, but rather a back-and-forth process during which cases are added 
and dropped based on preliminary empirical evidence and updated conceptual insights” 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 293). The strength of empirical evidence about regime 
type was balanced against the loss of three cases from the dataset; the condition was 
retained. 
Human-Rights Outcomes 
Chapter 4 dichotomized the change in human-rights score over time, for the 
purposes of optimized contingency tables (see Chapter 5). Restricting the outcome to a 
binary result was both useful and necessary for symmetrically assessing statistical 
significance, given the small number of total cases. In shifting the analysis from cross-
tabulations to QCA, one key consideration was whether the outcome of human rights 
ought to be kept in dichotomous form or expanded to account for the broader range of 
actual outcomes. Selection of a binary outcome necessitated the use of a crisp set, or 
multi-value QCA. Calibration of the outcome required use of fuzzy-set QCA. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the latter method of fsQCA is preferred because it captures both 
the qualitative difference between human rights improving or becoming worse, as well as 
the quantitative difference of how much improvement or degradation of human rights 
occurred.  
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To assess the outcome condition of human rights, the target was defined as cases 
where significant human-rights improvement occurred over time (condition identifier: 
SHRI). The qualifier of significant improvement was included because of the way fuzzy 
scores work. If the target had instead been defined as cases where human rights 
improved, all variation in the amount of improvement would become lost data; all scores 
with any improvement at all would be granted full membership (i.e., scored 1.0) and the 
actual degree of improvement would be considered an irrelevant variation.203 In contrast, 
setting the target with a higher threshold for full membership captured the degree of 
human-rights improvement. This accommodated a more comprehensive assessment of 
the effects of power-sharing agreements and various remote factors on the full range of 
human-rights outcomes.  
To evaluate the change in human-rights outcomes over time, the previously 
established indicators of pts2, pts5, and pts10 were used (see Chapter 3, Table 7). Full 
membership in the set of cases where significant human-rights improvement occurred 
over time (SHRI) was associated with an improvement in the Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
of 2 or more points over the respective time period.204 Countries with a change in the 
PTS score of 1.5 are considered “almost fully in” (fuzzy score 0.9), and states with a 
change of 1 are considered “mostly in” (fuzzy score 0.8). In this study, a score change in 
PTS of 0.5 reflected that only one of the respective aggregated scores (PTS-Amnesty or 
PTS State) had changed. These states are considered “more in than out” of the set. The 
                                                 
203 See earlier discussion, this chapter, on the use of qualitative anchors for distinguishing the difference 
between relevant and irrelevant variation. 
204 The maximum positive change over time was a total of four points, assuming that a state moved from 
the worst ranking of 5 to the best ranking of 1. 
   259 
assigned fuzzy score of 0.6 reflects that some human-rights improvement occurred, but 
this improvement was not significant enough to substantiate corroboration by both PTS-
Amnesty and PTS-State. 
In a similar fashion, states with either a decrease in score of -0.5 or no change in 
the score are considered “more out than in” in a given target set. Those with no change 
are considered below the threshold, under the following rationale: (1) The level of 
political repression used by the state did not decrease despite the fact that the civil war 
ended and that civil war itself is a primary driver of political repression. (2) The target set 
assesses improvement, which means that presence above the crossover point necessitates 
evidence of improvement in some measure; absence of improvement falls below the 
threshold. (3) States with an original PTS score of 5 cannot become worse violators of 
human rights. They are already scored at the worst ranking. If they are scored again at 
t+2 with a PTS average score of 5, then logically they should be scored below the 
crossover threshold. 
Finally, states with a decrease in their PTS score of -1 or more are considered 
“fully out” of the target set. A score like this indicates that both of the respective 
aggregated scores (PTS-A and PTS-S) demonstrate that human rights worsened in that 
state.  Based on these factors, the following fuzzy scores were assigned for this target set: 
 
  
   260 
   Table 56: Fuzzy Score Calibration for Significant Human-rights improvement 
(SHRI)   
 
This calibration model requires that states be able to improve their scores by at 
least two points or more, which means that the original PTS score at time t would need to 
be at least three for a given state. A state lacking this prerequisite would never be able to 
achieve full membership in the set of states demonstrating significant human-rights 
improvement.  
Two cases from the original dataset had PTS scores less than three at time t: 
Papua New Guinea (score of 2) and Tajikistan (score of 2.5). Preliminary crisp-set truth 
table constructions highlighted the problems with including such cases in QCA. In short, 
the parsimonious equation demonstrated eleven different possible causal recipes. One 
state—Papua New Guinea (PNG)—was a consistent contradiction through seven of these 
combinations. An exhaustive comparison of conditions revealed that the principal unique 
feature of Papua New Guinea was that its original score of 2 left little room for human 
rights to improve. Resolution of contradictions in the crisp set analysis was nigh 
impossible without removal of this outlier case.  
Based on this logic, these two cases were removed from the final fuzzy-set 
analysis. All other civil wars ended with scores of three or worse. This reduction of two 
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cases—plus the loss of three cases when including the regime type as a condition—
resulted in a total of thirty-one cases for fsQCA purposes. 
Necessary Conditions: SHRI and ~SHRI 
This section investigates potential necessary conditions that contribute to either 
the outcome of (1) significantly improved human rights (condition identifier: SHRI) or to 
(2) the negation of the outcome (~SHRI). A potentially necessary condition is indicated 
whenever instances of an outcome are a subset of instances of that condition. Said 
differently, a necessary condition is a superset of the outcome, meaning that the condition 
“must be present for the outcome to occur, but its presence does not guarantee that 
occurrence” (2004). As discussed earlier in Chapter 6 (“Negation of the Outcome”), 
separate analysis of the outcome’s negation is advised due to the asymmetric nature of 
QCA (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). The additional analysis may confirm 
the causal logics underlying the positive cases or generate unique insights on its own.  
Substantively, necessary conditions are assessed using the measures of 
consistency and coverage, as detailed in Chapter 6. In accordance with these procedures, 
each condition and its negation are tested separately against both outcomes (i.e., SHRI, 
~SHRI). Consistency is evaluated first. A consistency-value for a given condition at a 
threshold of 0.90 or higher indicates a necessary condition. A consistency threshold of 
0.85 or greater is used to indicate an “almost necessary” condition.205 Conditions that 
reach either of these thresholds are assessed further with respect to coverage. 
                                                 
205 Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommended the necessity threshold of 0.90. Ragin (in Goertz and 
Starr 2003, 182) used 0.80 as a threshold for “almost necessary” conditions. Note that the necessity 
threshold of 0.90 in QCA corresponds with the 90% consistency threshold used by Fiss (2012) to identify 
necessary variables within contingency tables (see Chapter 5). 
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The consistency and coverage calculations (summarized in Appendices 6 and 7) 
show that the presence of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) is a necessary 
condition for the absence of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI). This 
relationship occurs with 0.92 consistency and 0.53 coverage. No other remote conditions 
or Set 1 proximate conditions reach the threshold of a “necessary” or “almost necessary” 
condition. This finding, which is contrary to many conventional arguments about power-
sharing, demonstrates that the addition of more power-sharing dimensions is a 
“necessary” condition for political repression, at least in the short-term period of two 
years after a civil war has ended. Based on this finding, the “more is better” approach to 
power-sharing agreements should be approached with caution.  
Significant Human-Rights Improvement (SHRI) 
 What conditions lead to significantly improved human rights when civil wars end 
in negotiated settlements? Do specific pathways exist that corroborate the previously 
outlined theoretical expectations? To address these questions and inspect the sufficient 
conditions that lead to the outcome, the fuzzy-set analysis below follows a sequence of 
procedures according to Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) Two-Step Approach. Step 
One addresses the remote factors only, in order to identify conditions that enhance and 
enable the applicable outcome of SHRI. Step Two analyzes these enabling conditions 
individually, alongside proximate factors.  Figure 15 summarizes these steps and the 
applicable conditions examined at each stage. 
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  Figure 15: Two-Step fsQCA Applied to Remote and Set 1 Proximate Conditions 
For quick recognition, all remote conditions use a two-letter identifier, while all 
proximate conditions use a three-letter identifier. As discussed in Chapter 6, the presence 
of a condition is indicated by all uppercase letters, while absence of that condition is 
indicated by the symbol “~” preceding these letters.  
Step One: Search for Human-Rights Enhancing Remote Conditions 
The two-step analysis introduced by Schneider and Wagemann (2006) is a method 
for addressing the “small N—many variables” problem by reducing the complexity of too 
many variables. With the conditions already divided into the two main camps of remote 
and proximate factors the authors’ approach of examining remote factors only is followed 
in this first step. This exclusion helped derive “outcome-enabling conditions” from the 
range of remote factors. Outcome-enabling conditions are understood as those 
combinations of contextual conditions “under which a given outcome is more likely to 
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occur than other contexts” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 761). They represent the 
remote conditions most likely to enable the outcome.206 
In accordance with QCA procedures, the model uses Boolean expressions. The 
model involves a sufficiency test of all six potential remote conditions: 
NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * MD ≤ SHRI. 
The * indicates AND. Capitalization signifies the presence of a condition and ~ signals 
the absence of a condition. The ≤ signifies that the entire expression to the left represents 
a subset of the expression to the right (Schneider and Wagemann 2006).  
Per the Two-Step Approach, the sufficiency test of remote factors is deliberately 
underspecified. Lower-consistency thresholds are used to help reduce the complexity of 
the initial model while leaving space for improvement once proximate factors are added 
in the second step. Chapter 6 detailed that consistency refers to how well the empirical 
evidence fits a given set-theoretical relationship. Selection of a consistency score is used 
to set “a cutoff value for determining which causal combinations pass fuzzy set-theoretic 
consistency and which do not” (Ragin 2008, 135).  
A consistency threshold of 0.7 was initially considered, for this setting matched 
the threshold used by Schneider and Wagemann (2006). However, this threshold yielded 
an unwieldy solution, with ten different causal recipes of two to three conditions each; all 
six conditions were present in at least one of these causal combinations. Such a solution 
does not achieve the dual objective of parsimony and explanatory sufficiency. Higher 
                                                 
206 Likewise, when used to examine the negation of the outcome, the identified conditions are those most 
likely to enable the outcome’s negation—said in reverse, when looking at the negation of the outcome, the 
identified “outcome-enabling conditions” constrain the desired outcome.   
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consistencies only increased the complexity; therefore, to reduce the complexity, a 
slightly lower threshold value of 0.65 was used.207  
The sufficiency test is demonstrated with a fuzzy-set truth-table construction,208 
which visually depicts the different combinations of conditions represented by the actual 
data. Each row in a truth table represents a logically possible combination of the different 
assessed conditions. Truth tables contain 2x potential combinations, in which X equals 
the number of conditions. In this case, 26 (or 64) different combinations were possible. 
Table 57 (below) demonstrates that 19 of the 64 rows in the truth table are represented by 
the thirty-one cases. This means empirical evidence is missing for 45 potential 
combinations (rows 20-64). These missing combinations (i.e., logical remainders in 
QCA) demonstrate the common situation in social science of limited diversity (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2006). Fuzzy-set QCA forces researchers to consciously decide how to 
treat empirically missing combinations.209 With the Two-Step Approach, Schneider and 
Wagemann (2006) direct researchers to use the most parsimonious solution210 in this first 
step. This selection deliberately underspecifies the model while delivering outcome-
enhancing solutions for use in Step Two. 
                                                 
207 Measures of consistency may range from 0.0 to 1.0. Selection of 0.65 means that causal combinations 
with scores between 0.0 and 0.65 represent significant inconsistency. 
208 Here Ragin’s (2008) recommendations are used, along with fsQCA and Kirq software. 
209 According to Ragin (2008, 150), “A causal combination that lacks empirical instances and therefore 
must be imagined is a counterfactual case.” QCA requires researchers state how they will deal with these 
counterfactuals. For an in-depth discussion on this issue, see Ragin (2008, Ch 8, 9). 
210 Chapter 6 established that the parsimonious solution means the researcher allows the QCA software to 
include and apply all simplifying assumptions to the logical remainders. 
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Table 57: Consistency Test of Remote Conditions for SHRI 
 
 
Other key information is displayed in this truth table. First, the number of cases 
represented by each causal configuration is shown as N*. Each case is represented once, 
aligned with that causal combination where its fuzzy-set membership score is greater than 
0.5 (see Ragin 2008, 131). Second, the consistency value in this table signifies “the 
degree to which the fuzzy set membership scores of all cases in a combination are 
consistent with the statement that this combination of conditions is sufficient for the 
outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 781). Rows 1-17 demonstrate consistency 
greater than 0.65 in achieving the desired outcome of significant human-rights 
improvement. The truth table thus reveals those conditions that are sufficient to the 
outcome. This information is initially not very informative given the significant number 
of rows represented. 
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To obtain a more succinct answer, QCA leverages the rules of Boolean algebra to 
minimize the truth table.211 In fsQCA, truth-table minimization is accomplished via the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm, which is performed by QCA software. Ultimately, this 
minimization leads to identification of combinations of conditions that sufficiently 
produce the outcome (Ragin 2014, 93-97; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 104-111). A 
sufficient condition means that an outcome “almost” always occurs when that causal 
condition (or combination of conditions) is present. The sufficiency analysis of the 
remote conditions using this process leads to the following parsimonious solution: 
NE + ~SW + EP —> SHRI 
Here the ‘—>’ indicates an “if-then” relationship, wherein if one (or more) of 
these remote conditions exists, the outcome is “almost always” present. Recalling that in 
Boolean language the + means OR, the equation shows that the presence of non-ethnic 
conflicts (NE) OR the absence of short wars (~SW) OR the presence of enduring peace 
(EP) “almost always” leads to significantly improved human-rights outcomes (SHRI).  
 Three important observations arise from this specific solution: First, the existence 
of three separate contextual conditions confirms that no individual remote factor is 
necessary for human rights to improve. A review of the raw coverage and the unique 
coverage for these conditions corroborates this fact; the raw and unique coverages for the 
three remote conditions, as well as respective civil wars corresponding to those 
conditions, are summarized in Appendix 9. Raw coverage refers to the “percentage of all 
                                                 
211 Minimization involves implementing fundamental rules, such as the following: “If two Boolean 
expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition 
that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, 
combined expression” (Ragin 2014, 93). 
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cases’ set membership in the outcome covered by a single sufficient path of an equifinal 
solution term” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 332). The highest raw coverage by a 
single sufficient remote pathway—the presence of enduring peace (EP)—is 81 percent. 
 The unique coverage of enduring peace refers to the percentage of the outcome 
uniquely covered by this pathway—meaning those cases not also covered by the absence 
of short wars (~SW) or the presence of non-ethnic civil wars (NE). The unique coverage 
of enduring peace is only 40 percent. The equation shows that states with certain 
contextual circumstances are more likely to experience significant improvement in 
human rights. These circumstances vary. No single remote condition is necessary.  
Second, all three contexts produce similar consistency values: the presence of 
non-ethnic civil wars (NE) is 0.58; the absence of short wars (~SW) is 0.60; the presence 
of enduring peace (EP) is 0.60. The lower-consistency values here are expected, because 
the Two-Step Approach “explicitly relies on the fact that the first step yields inconclusive 
results” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770).  
Third, two of the three conditions—namely, the presence of non-ethnic wars (NE) 
and the presence of enduring peace (EP)—are in alignment with theoretical expectations 
and with the preliminary cross-tab analysis in Chapter 5. The association of longer wars 
(~SW) with improved human rights is contrary to the hypothesized relationship. 
However, ~SW does align with much of the contemporary empirical literature, which 
argues that longer civil wars facilitate a higher potential for human-rights improvement 
(see Chapter 4). What remains unknown, though, is whether the effects of this remote 
factor change when combined with proximate conditions. Indeed, it is too early to 
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conclude the actual impact of any of these conditions upon the civil wars. At this time, it 
can only be noted that these three remote conditions are outcome-enabling conditions.  
Step Two: Evaluating SHRI…Proximate Factors in Remote Contexts 
The purpose of Step Two was to formulate the different causal pathways that led 
to an outcome. Proximate factors react differently, given certain remote contexts. The 
process involved examining the different combinations of proximate factors as they 
interacted within these three different remote contexts. Following Schneider and 
Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) procedures, analyses were conducted using the three remote-
context conditions noted above: non-ethnic conflict (NE), short wars (SW), and enduring 
peace (EP). Each of these remote conditions was individually evaluated in combination 
with all Set 1 proximate conditions (i.e., EIS, THP, THM, TPS; see  Figure 15 above). 
The consistency-threshold criteria for passing the sufficiency test was raised to 0.80,212 
with the same requirement retained that at least one case must demonstrate membership 
higher than 0.5 in a causal combination in order for that causal pathway to be 
recognized.213 Step Two is more conservative than Step One in that the use of all 
                                                 
212 A higher sufficiency threshold of 0.85 was considered as well, but a significant tradeoff occured at this 
point. While solution consistency increased nominally, the solution coverage substantially dropped off. For 
example, in the first analysis of non-ethnic conflict paired with all four proximate factors, when the 
sufficiency threshold was raised from 0.8 to 0.85, the resulting solution consistency increased from 0.85 to 
0.89, but coverage dropped from 0.50 to 0.32. Similarly, for this same shift in sufficiency threshold, the 
pairing of enduring peace with the proximate factors resulted in an increased consistency from 0.86 to 1.0 
and a drop in coverage from 0.53 to 0.26. No change occurs for the pairing of short wars as this threshold 
does not affect any rows in the truth table. This exchange corroborates the consistency-coverage tradeoff 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
213 This threshold is higher than that of Schneider and Wagemann (2006) who use a consistency threshold 
criterion of 0.70 for both Step One and Step Two. Ragin (2008, 136), in contrast, recommends a cutoff 
value not less than 0.75, although his threshold refers to a single-step procedure rather than the two-step 
process used by Schneider and Wagemann. 
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counterfactuals is rejected (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012). In QCA terms, this 
rejection occurs when researchers select the complex solution.  
Table 58 below summarizes all nine sufficient causal recipes that result from 
application of the aforementioned procedures and constraints, including the combination 
of individual remote contexts with proximate power-sharing agreement configurations, 
and that lead to significant human-rights improvement. With the exception of Paths 4 and 
5 (p4, p5), all the paths in this table involve multiple memberships. All of these paths also 
demonstrate a consistency of 0.80 or greater.  
Table 58: Sufficient Paths Toward SHRI214 
 
This stronger consistency demonstrates Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 770) 
contention that:  
Only when proximate factors are added to the analysis in the second step should 
the solution terms be found that combine remote and proximate factors and that 
lead to an (almost always) consistently sufficient result. In this sense, proximate 
factors increase the consistency of the solution terms by making the conjunctural 
                                                 
214 The colors in this table are provided to enable quick recognition and comparison of similar conditions 
across cases. 
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solution terms more specific, theoretically complex and thus empirically 
consistent.215  
 
Table 58 also personifies Ragin’s (2008, 149) declaration that “causation is 
complex and very often involves specific combinations of causal conditions (or causal 
‘recipes’).” In this vein, the improvement of human-rights outcomes that follow 
negotiated settlements in civil wars are not the result of single isolated variables. Neither 
remote nor proximate factors alone satisfactorily account for the outcome. Rather, 
significant human-rights improvement is the result of complex conjunctural causation, in 
which different remote and proximate factors jointly combine to produce a reduction in 
the state’s use of political repression. Scholars refer to this notion that a given outcome 
may arise from different causal pathways or combinations of conditions as equifinality, 
(George and Bennett 2005; Mackie 1974; Ragin 1987, 2008). 
A few additional observations are noteworthy: First, the absence of any form of 
power-sharing agreements is by no means a showstopper for SHRI. Path 2 (p2) and Path 
9 (p9) illuminate that all four cases where power-sharing agreements were completely 
absent—Angola 1975-1989, Azerbaijan 1989-1994, Croatia 1991-1992, and the 
Philippines 2000-2000—experienced a reduction in political violence despite the total 
absence of these measures. Interestingly, all of these were also considered ethnic 
conflicts. A closer look shows that Path 2 (p2) a subset of Path 9 (p9), with the sole 
difference being the inclusion of this ethnic-conflict factor. 
                                                 
215 Schneider and Wagemann argued, in other words, that when proximate factors are merged with the 
remote factors, the two-step process naturally leads to increased consistency of the final solution terms.  
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Second, all nine causal recipes that led to significant human-rights improvement 
involved the absence of thick military power-sharing agreements. This finding serves as a 
significant caution to policymakers and merits further investigation. Chapter 8 explores 
this issue by disaggregating the military power-sharing dimension into its two 
components (integration into the main ranks of the military, and integration into 
leadership positions of that same military force) to observe whether one factor matters 
more than the other and to see if they are both dangerous to human-rights outcomes. 
Third, when war duration (the condition of SW) was considered in the first step—
which involved remote factors only—it appeared that long-lasting wars mattered most for 
attaining significant human-rights improvement. Guatemala’s civil war (p5) is the sole 
case matching the argument that long-duration civil wars make a consistent positive 
effect on significant human-rights improvement. More predominantly, the reverse held 
true: when short civil wars were combined with proximate factors, significant human-
rights improvement occurred,. This situation is most demonstrable by examining several 
of the pathways together. Starting with Path 3 (p3) and Path 4 (p4), the following 
equation is found (Equation 1):  
(1) SHRI = SW * EIS * THP * ~THM * ~TPS (p3) + SW * EIS * ~THP * ~THM 
* TPS (p4) 
This Boolean equation can be simplified by factoring. Much like standard algebraic 
factoring, Boolean factoring can help clarify an equation by highlighting a specific 
condition or by simplifying an equation; either situation helps identify necessary 
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conditions and causally equivalent conditions (Ragin 2014, 100-101). Factoring of 
Equation 1 (i.e., simplifying where duplicate conditions exist), results in: 
(2) SHRI = SW * EIS * ~THM (THP * ~TPS + ~THP * TPS) 
This reveals that significant improvement of human rights is likely when wars of 
short duration are answered by extensively institutionalized settlements that 
simultaneously avoid thick military power-sharing agreements. Within that context, thick 
political power-sharing agreements (THP) and territorial power-sharing agreements 
(TPS) lead to improved human rights (SHRI), as long as the presence of these features 
are not combined. That is, when thick political settlements are present (THP), then 
territorial power-sharing agreements must be absent (~TPS), and vice versa. This inverted 
relationship also holds true for the other pathways, except for those that involve the 
absence of all power-sharing agreements (i.e., Path 2, Path 9).  
Fourth, if these latter two pathways (where all power-sharing agreements are  
absent) are momentarily ignored, all remaining pathways would include extensively 
institutionalized settlements (EIS). SHRI outcomes consistently follow when agreements 
are extensively institutionalized. This insight is not particularly helpful since earlier 
analysis also showed that this same condition—the presence of extensively 
institutionalized settlements (EIS)—is a necessary condition for the absence of 
significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI). This does, however, show the difficulty 
in accurate, useful interpretation of aggregated power-sharing dimensions. 
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Fifth, comparison of Paths 3, 5, 7, and 8 shows that when EIS is combined with 
thick political-power sharing (THP) and the absence of thick military power-sharing 
(THM), the desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement is obtained.  
Sixth, territorial power-sharing agreements (TPSAs) appear common in Paths 1, 
4, 5, and 6. Combining these three pathways (Equation 3): 
(3) SHRI = NE * EIS * ~THM * TPS (p1) + SW * EIS * ~THP * ~THM * 
TPS (p4) + ~SW * EIS * THP * ~THM * TPS (p5) + EP * EIS * ~THM * 
TPS (p6) 
the equation can then be simplified to read:  
(4) SHRI = EIS * ~THM * TPS (NE + SW * ~THP + ~SW * THP + EP) 
 In translation, this equation shows that SHRI is more likely when extensively 
institutionalized settlements (EIS) combine with the absence of thick military settlements 
(~THM) and the presence of territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS). In turn, the 
three remote factors of non-ethnic conflicts, short wars, and enduring peace are 
influential, though largely substitutable. Also, the presence of short wars (SW) combines 
with the absence of thick political power-sharing agreements (~THP), while the inverse 
of both conditions also holds true (i.e.., ~SW combines with THP). As noted earlier, thick 
power-sharing agreements often occur with short wars and lead to SHRI, but not when 
territorial power-sharing agreements are present (see earlier discussion regarding p3 and 
p4). This combination of conditions is still rather complex, leaving policymakers without 
definitive guidance about which individual measures matter and should be included 
within a negotiated settlement and which should be excluded.   
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Negation of Significant Human-Rights Improvement (~SHRI) 
What conditions lead to the negation of significant human-rights improvement 
(~SHRI) when civil wars end in negotiated settlements? What causal recipes might be 
identified that correspond with theoretical expectations? To address these issues, the 
fuzzy-set analysis applies the same sequence of procedures demonstrated with respect to 
Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach.  
Step One: Search for Human-Rights Constraining Remote Conditions 
Analysis of the negation of significantly improved human rights uses the same set 
of remote conditions and Set 1 proximate conditions as was used for examining SHRI. 
The initial model involved a similar sufficiency test of all six potential remote conditions 
but with the altered outcome: 
NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * MD ≤ ~SHRI. 
The next requirement was selecting an appropriate threshold for identifying causal 
combinations that pass fuzzy-set theoretic consistency and those that do not (Ragin 
2008). As before, the sufficiency test was intentionally underspecified in this first step by 
using lower consistency thresholds. Initially, the same threshold of 0.65 as used for SHRI 
was evaluated. However, this yielded an overly complex truth-table solution, involving 
five separate pathways. The initial truth-table solution was:  
~SP + ~NE + ~SW*~HD + ~SW*~MD + EP*~HD. 
All of these conditions, outside of enduring peace, coincided with theoretical 
expectations for the negation of human rights. That is, human rights are expected to be 
worse when populations are large (~SP), when ethnic wars occur (~NE), when wars are 
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long and strong democracies are absent (~SW*~HD), and when wars are long and the 
economy is not at least moderately developed (~SW*~MD). The final causal 
combination demonstrated the critical nature of strong democracy. Stated differently, in 
the absence of a highly democratic regime (~HD), even the existence of enduring peace 
(EP) does not change a government’s use of political repression after a war ends. The 
consistency and coverage for these factors and their corresponding civil wars are 
summarized in Appendix 10.  
This initial solution was overly complex, with all six remote factors present in 
least one of the causal recipes. Use of a complex recipe when all remote factors are 
present would yield an excessive amount of counterfactual cases and exacerbate the 
problem of limited diversity when the remote conditions are combined with proximate 
factors in Step Two. Therefore, a lower threshold of 0.64 was used instead. This very 
slight shift in threshold resulted in almost exactly the same exact truth table solution 
coverage (an increase from 0.95 to 0.96) and solution consistency (slight decrease from 
0.49 to 0.47, respectively); consistency and coverage results are summarized in Appendix 
11. The minor decrease in solution consistency was well worth the tradeoff, yielding a 
much more parsimonious solution involving just three singular conditions rather than the 
complexity highlighted above.  
The truth table for this consistency test is displayed in Table 59 below. Each row 
indicates a logically possible combination; that is, a potential causal recipe. Since there 
were six remote conditions, the number of potential combinations was 26 (or 64). The 
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table shows that nineteen of the sixty-four potential combinations are represented by the 
thirty-one cases. Empirical evidence is missing for the remaining forty-five rows.  
Table 59: Consistency Test of Remote Conditions for SHRI 
 
Truth table minimization is accomplished within QCA software by selecting the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm and the parsimonious solution. Minimization identifies 
conjunctural combinations that sufficiently produce the negation of the outcome. In this 
case, the sufficiency analysis of the remote conditions at 0.64 consistency yielded the 
following parsimonious solution: 
~NE + ~SW + ~SP —> ~SHRI 
The ‘—>’ shows an if-then relationship. In shorthand, the equation states: if ~NE 
or ~SW or ~SP, then ~SHRI. This signifies that the absence of non-ethnic wars (~NE) 
OR the absence of short wars (~SW) OR the absence of small populations (~SP) almost 
always leads to the negation of significantly improved human-rights outcomes (~SHRI). 
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More succinctly, ethnic wars, long wars, and large populations generally prevent 
improvement in human rights after civil wars. Political repression is more likely when 
these conditions increasingly are present.  
Several important observations resulted from this specific solution: First, all of 
these conditions are in alignment with theoretical expectations regarding ethnic wars, 
long wars, and large populations leading to worse human rights.  
Second, no individual factor on its own is sufficient to cause the negation of 
significant human-rights improvement. The raw coverage for each of these conditions 
confirmed that no condition fully covers all cases. The most common and consistent 
condition was the absence of small populations (~SP), with a raw coverage of 66 percent 
of the cases; the absence of non-ethnic conflicts (~NE) and the absence of short wars 
(~SW) each covered 55 percent of the cases.  
Third, the low percentages of unique coverage (Table 60 below) indicated that 
these three individual conditions overlap significantly. This means that the great majority 
of cases leading to the negation of the outcome involved two or three of these proximate 
conditions.  
Table 60: Raw and Unique Coverage & Consistency (Step One, 
~SHRI) 
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Fourth, the consistency values were fairly strong for ~SP (0.69) and ~SW (0.61), 
but weak for ~NE (0.43). As noted in the earlier section on SHRI, low consistency is 
expected for this first step. The solutions are intentionally inconclusive, leaving room for 
the addition of proximate conditions to refine the conjunctural combinations. 
Finally, the conditions found in the parsimonious solution for ~SHRI resemble, 
but do not duplicate, the inverse of the parsimonious solution for SHRI. Overlaying the 
Step One findings from both the outcome (SHRI) and the negation of the outcome 
(~SHRI) exposes several similarities and differences: 
NE + ~SW + EP —> SHRI 
~NE + ~SW + ~SP —> ~SHRI 
First, when remote contexts are considered on their own, the presence of non-
ethnic wars led to the outcome and the absence of this same condition led to the negation 
of the outcome. Second, the absence of short wars (i.e., the presence of long wars) led to 
both the outcome and to the negation of the outcome.216 The third condition of enduring 
peace was not as critical to the outcome’s negation. Rather, it was replaced by the 
absence of small populations. This latter shift in conditions personifies QCA’s 
asymmetric nature. What remains to be seen is how proximate conditions interact within 
these different remote contexts and observe what causal pathways lead to the negation of 
the outcome. 
                                                 
216 Recall that when this remote condition was examined alongside Set 1 proximate conditions with respect 
to the outcome (SHRI), the presence of short wars (SW) was much more common than its absence. 
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Step Two: Evaluating ~SHRI…Proximate Factors in Remote Contexts 
This section considers all of the proximate factors as they operate within these 
three different remote contexts. This combination of conditions reveals the different 
causal recipes that sufficiently lead to the negation of an outcome. The process involved 
applying each remote context from the parsimonious solution—e.g., non-ethnic conflict 
(NE), short wars (SW), and small populations (SP)— to the four proximate factors of 
EIS, THP, THM, and TPS. The consistency threshold criteria was again raised to 0.80, 
with the requirement that at least one case had membership higher than 0.5 in a causal 
combination.217 For Step Two, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm was applied in a 
conservative fashion, using only empirical instances and rejecting all counterfactuals.  
The resulting complex solution yielded the following eight sufficient causal 
recipes (see Table 61 below), which led to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI).  
Table 61: Sufficient Paths Toward ~SHRI
 
                                                 
217 A lower threshold of 0.70 was also considered, following Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) example. 
This caused significant problems in the consistencies of various pathways within the truth table solution. 
For example, when the remote condition of small population was combined with the proximate conditions 
to produce a solution, the three resulting pathways yielded low consistencies of 0.76, 0.72, and 0.61. 
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A number of observations may be made from the above table, beyond the clear difference 
that this complex solution involved several causal combinations with only one case each 
(see Paths 1, 3, 4):218  
First, two pathways are distinguished by the presence of the remote condition 
rather than the anticipated absence of those conditions. This includes Path 1, in which the 
presence of short wars (SW) combined with other factors to result in unimproved human 
rights, and Path 5, in which the presence of small populations (SP) combined with other 
factors for the same result. In these remote contexts (SW and SP), human rights are 
theoretically anticipated to improve.  
What proximate factors overcame these human-rights enabling conditions? Do 
aggregated power-sharing dimensions help illuminate what matters most here? Consider 
Path 5 (causal combination: SP * EIS * ~THP and THM), where the presence of a small 
population was overcome in the two civil wars of GRG1 (Georgia, 1st civil war) and 
SIE1 (Sierra Leonne, 1st civil war). The condition of extensively institutionalized 
settlements (EIS) is not particularly informative with respect to which dimensions matter 
most. This leaves the absence of thick political agreements and/or the presence of thick 
military settlements as a principal explanatory factor in the first civil wars in Georgia and 
in Sierra Leone for why human rights became worse despite the presence of a small 
                                                 
218 Note that the cases represented in each of these combinations are also present in another causal recipe: 
SIE1 from Path 1 is in Path 5; GUA from Path 3 is in Path 7; and SUD1 from Path 4 is in Path 8. 
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population.219 More refined analysis is difficult without considering the specific 
provisions or in-depth cross-case comparison beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Second, no paths exist that contain the remote condition of non-ethnic civil wars 
(NE or ~NE). Why is this? Earlier, it was shown that ~NE had a low consistency of just 
0.43 in the original parsimonious solution for ~SHRI. This inconsistency continued when 
the condition was combined with the proximate factors, as evidenced by the lack of any 
paths present with this factor. Said differently, all potential rows in the truth table where 
NE was combined with other proximate factors involved causal combinations below 0.80 
in consistency. Civil war ethnicity appears to matter here, at least when aggregated 
dimension conditions are combined with it.   
Third, the proximate condition of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) 
was present in all the pathways, confirming that this is a necessary condition for the 
negation of the outcome (~SHRI). This makes even more sense when recalling that in the 
four cases where power-sharing dimensions were completely absent, all the cases 
resulted in improved human rights. Naturally then, given the calibration protocol 
assigned to the EIS condition for fsQCA purposes, the remaining cases all have some 
degree of institutionalized settlements. Nevertheless, the reality that this is a necessary 
condition for the outcome negation, but not a necessary condition for the outcome, is a 
cautionary reproach to exuberant advocacy for power-sharing agreements as a civil war 
panacea.  
                                                 
219 The Sierra Leone case was also present in Path 1, where the combination of thick military settlements, 
with an absence of thick political settlements, also overcame the purported benefits of short war. 
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Fourth, there are three causal pathways (Paths 3, 4, and 8) that include the 
presence of territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS). The presence of the first civil 
war in Sudan (SUD1) in two of these paths (Path 4 and Path 8) alerts us to the potential 
that one of these paths is a subset of the other. In comparing these two paths, Path 4 adds 
the qualifier of ~SW, making Path 4 a subset of Path 8. Path 8 is therefore compared to 
Path 3. The resulting causal combination (Equation 5): 
(5) ~SHRI = ~SW * EIS * THP * ~THM * TPS (p3) + EIS * ~THP * THM * 
TPS (p8) 
can be simplified, using factoring, to read: 
(6) ~SHRI = EIS * TPS (~SW*THP*~THM + ~THP*THM) 
 The elements in the parentheses represent substitutable sets of conditions. This 
factored combination illuminates that human rights are unlikely to improve when 
extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) combine with territorial power-sharing 
(TPS) AND when either (1) thick political settlements are represented in the negotiated 
settlement, but thick military settlements are absent OR (2) the inverse situation, meaning 
that thick political settlements are absent and thick military settlements are present.220 
Long wars (~SW) also play a factor in two of the three cases represented by these causal 
pathways.  
 Unfortunately, the proximate aggregated conditions used here do not inform 
decision-makers about what types of territorial power-sharing agreements or military 
power-sharing provisions are represented here. Disaggregation would show, for example, 
                                                 
220 Long wars are present in the former and in half the cases of the latter. 
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that all the cases from these three causal pathways (GUA, SUD1, GRG1) involved 
territorial autonomy, not federalism.  
Fifth, Paths 6 and 7 largely parallel each other. We can simplify these two 
pathways from (Equation 7): 
(7) ~SHRI = ~SP * EIS * THP * ~TPS (p6) + ~SP * EIS * THP * ~THM (p7) 
 
to (Equation 8): 
(8) ~SHRI = ~SP * EIS * THP (~TPS + ~THM) 
In translation, this combined equation reveals that improvement in human rights is 
unlikely when the respective states involve large populations, when the negotiated 
settlements are extensively institutionalized, and when thick political agreements are 
pursued. The absence of territorial power-sharing agreements and the absence of thick 
military settlements are substitutable conditions. This equation situation covers seven 
cases (including the DRC, ANG4, NEP, ANG3, ANG3, CAM, GUA). 
Conclusion 
One of the most analytically fruitful features of fs/QCA is that one can also 
specify the non-occurrence of the outcome as a dependent variable. Social 
scientific theories are not always symmetric (i.e. the explanation of the occurrence 
of the outcome does not directly lead to the explanation for its nonoccurrence).221 
 
This asymmetry—and QCA’s advantage in exploring this asymmetry—was the 
principle reason this chapter (and the next) explored both the outcome and the negation 
(or non-occurrence) of the outcome. The first step in the Two-Step Analysis demonstrated 
the asymmetry of remote conditions on political repression: when investigating those 
remote conditions leading to the outcome (significant human-rights improvement, or 
                                                 
221 See Schneider and Wagemann (2006, 781). 
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SHRI), the presence of enduring peace (EP) was a strongly consistent factor. 
Investigation of the same remote conditions leading to the negation of the outcome 
(~SHRI) did not reveal that the absence of enduring peace (~EP) was a consistent factor. 
Rather, a more consistent condition leading to the non-occurrence of improved human 
rights was the absence of small populations (~SP). The second step then evaluated how 
proximate conditions interacted within the different remote contexts that enabled the 
outcome or enabled the outcome’s negation. This chapter specifically reviewed Set 1 
proximate conditions, which assess prominent theories regarding aggregated power-
sharing dimensions.  
Another important finding in this process is that states exiting civil war via 
negotiated settlements, and any parties assisting them in such negotiations, should 
recognize that no single pathway exists that will significantly improve human-rights 
outcomes in these post-civil war contexts. Nine different causal pathways involving 
various combinations of remote and proximate conditions led to the desired outcome.  
While certain remote and proximate conditions inform us about what causal 
combinations lead to significant human-rights improvement, these conditions cannot be 
automatically inverted under the expectation that the resulting combinations will lead to 
worse human rights. Rather, as accomplished here, it is best to run the Two-Step 
Approach, again, for the negation of the outcome. Eight different causal pathways led to 
the negation of the outcome. Only one pathway was found to lead to both the desired 
outcome and to the negation of the outcome.222 
                                                 
222 The causal recipe of ~SW*EIS*THP*~THM*TPS was present in both Table 62 (p5) and Table 65 (p3), 
each represented by the case of Guatemala.  
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Nor are power-sharing agreements necessary or sufficient for human rights to 
improve. In this regard, four cases were found where power-sharing agreements were 
completely absent in all forms. In all four of these cases, the states experienced a 
reduction in political repression despite the total absence of power-sharing measures. Of 
note, these conflicts were also all considered ethnic wars—and ethnic conflicts are 
expected to lead to increased political repression more than non-ethnic conflicts. 
Somehow, despite this shared remote condition of ethnic conflict, the absence of power-
sharing agreements led to less political repression.  
This does not mean that power-sharing agreements should be delinked from their 
respective situational and historical contexts (e.g., remote conditions), for these remote 
conditions enable or constrain the likelihood that the outcome occurs. Excepting the four 
aforementioned cases—and the anomalous case of Guatemala where long war led to 
improved human rights—all other causal pathways involved the presence of the remote 
condition leading to the presence of significantly improved human rights. That is, the 
relationship between the remote condition and the outcome responded as hypothesized. 
Table 58 detailed how this held true for non-ethnic wars (NE) with two cases at 0.83 
consistency (p1), for short wars (SW) with five cases at 0.91 consistency (p3) and one 
case at 1.0 consistency (p4); and for enduring peace (EP) with three cases at 0.80 
consistency (p7) and five cases at 0.94 consistency (p8). The most common and 
consistent remote conditions found in causal combinations leading to significant human-
rights improvement were the conditions of human-rights improvement enduring peace 
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(EP) and of short duration wars (SW). Of note, the condition of short duration wars 
contradicts much of contemporary literature (recall Chapter 4 discussion). 
Not all power-sharing agreements are created equal, either. Significant human-
rights improvement is more likely when thick military power-sharing agreements (THM) 
are absent. Indeed, all nine causal recipes involved the absence of such measures. 
Meanwhile the combination of extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) and thick 
political settlements (THP), operating within the aforementioned remote factors, is likely 
to lead to improved human rights. Territorial power-sharing agreements (TPS) work best 
when these two former conditions (EIS and THP) are obtained.  
When inspecting how the proximate and remote conditions shape the non-
occurrence of the outcome (~SHRI), a number of asymmetric observations arise. First, 
human rights are unlikely to improve when the country has a large population (~SP) or 
when the war is long in duration (~SW). The presence of a small population (SP) or a 
short war (SW) is no guarantee, however, that human rights will improve. Both of these 
latter remote contexts were overcome by the causal combination of EIS * ~THP * THM. 
In translation, this causal pathway indicates that something in the combination of thick 
military settlements (THM), extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS), and the 
absence of thick political settlements (~THP) consistently resulted in human rights 
stagnating or becoming worse.  
Another observation is that extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) were 
common throughout the pathways that led to both SHRI and ~SHRI. The general 
symmetry of this condition across both outcomes demonstrated the inherent shortfalls in 
   288 
using an aggregated measure of peace-agreement provisions rather than disaggregated 
individual provisions. Of note, extensively institutionalized settlements were only 
considered a necessary condition for the negation of the outcome.  
Another example of how aggregated measures muddy the follow-on analysis is 
evident in looking at the negation of the outcome. This study showed—in Paths 3, 4, and 
9—that human rights are unlikely to improve when extensively institutionalized 
settlements (EIS) are combined with territorial power-sharing AND either (1) the 
presence of thick political settlements (THP) but the absence of thick military settlements 
(~THM) OR (2) the inverse situation, meaning the absence of thick political settlements 
(~THM combine with the presence of thick military settlements. Without disaggregating 
the political, military, or territorial power-sharing dimensions, researchers would not 
know if a specific individual provision is causing these alternations.  
This study showed the limits of using aggregated dimensions of power-sharing 
agreements rather than the individual measures. To further the analysis, Chapter 8 
disaggregates the various political, military, and territorial measures to assess their 
potential effects within the same remote contexts discovered in the Step One analyses for 
both SHRI and ~SHRI. Additionally, it explores how third-party security guarantees 
shape these respective outcomes.  
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Chapter Eight: Fuzzy-Set QCA of Model 2, Disaggregated Power-Sharing Measures 
and Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees    
When a civil war ends in negotiated settlement, what conditions lead to 
significant human-rights improvement? The previous chapter addressed this question by 
considering how different combinations of remote conditions (i.e., the historical and 
situational contexts of real previous conflicts) and proximate conditions (i.e., aggregated 
power-sharing dimensions) affected the desired outcomes. This chapter follows a similar 
pattern and methodology. The same remote conditions and desired outcomes are retained, 
as is the adjusted universe of cases that considers civil wars ending in negotiated 
settlements between 1989-2007.223 The Two-Step Approach is again used for the fuzzy-
set analysis.  
The principal difference between these two chapters is that where Chapter 7 
evaluated aggregated dimensions of power-sharing agreements (Set 1 proximate 
conditions) within varied remote conditions, this chapter assesses disaggregated peace-
agreement provisions (Set 2 proximate conditions), which includes individual power-
sharing measures and third-party security guarantees.  
                                                 
223 The original dataset included 36 cases, which were all investigated in Chapter 5 (though with 
adjustments to each bivariate analysis based on available data). Chapter 7 detailed the necessary adjustment 
to this original dataset due to identified discontinuities: the three cases of Bosnia, Lebanon, and 
Afghanistan were removed in order to retain the condition assessing the degree of democracy; the two 
cases of Papa New Guinea and Tajikistan were removed as these cases did not accommodate significant 
improvement of the human rights condition. See Chapter 7, calibration sections on regime type and human-
rights outcomehuman-rights outcomes, for further details. 
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In answering the introductory question about those conditions that lead to 
significant human-rights improvement, this chapter builds substantially on the content of 
previous chapters. To review briefly: The theoretical basis of Chapter 8 is principally 
found in Chapter 4, which proffered a number of distinct remote and proximate 
conditions that might shape human-rights outcomes after the conclusion of a civil war. 
The second set of proximate conditions was defined and operationalized there. Chapter 5 
then quantitatively examined the effects of each remote and proximate factor on human-
rights outcomes over three time periods.  
This process revealed that four of the Set 2 proximate conditions—namely all 
three disaggregated political power-sharing measures and the provision for integration of 
rebels into the military leadership—lacked any evidence of significant or asymmetric 
relationships over all three periods. Therefore, the analysis initially prioritized the four 
remaining factors of military integration in the main ranks, robust third-party security 
guarantees, autonomy, and federalism.224 Deeper investigation of necessary condition 
leading to the outcome and to its negation, discussed herein, demonstrates that the 
condition of territorial federalism ought to be removed from consideration; the chapter 
also explains why the condition of rebel integration into the military leadership was a 
worthy substitution for inclusion.  
Given that all individual power-sharing provisions were already dichotomized 
(see Chapter 4), this chapter begins by calibrating the only remaining proximate 
                                                 
224 Chapter 8 details why each of these measures was included and why certain adjustments were made to 
the final composition of conditions for fuzzy-set analysis. 
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condition of robust third-party security guarantees.225 Necessary conditions are then 
discussed and identified. The Two-Step Approach to fuzzy-set QCA is applied, starting 
with the same remote conditions as calibrated in the previous chapter. These conditions 
remain the same because the situational and historical contexts of each civil war did not 
change. Indeed, the first step procedures and findings are the same for this reason; this 
chapter briefly reviews those findings, then carries the relevant remote conditions into the 
second step based on whether those conditions either enhanced significant human-rights 
improvement (SHRI) or constrained such improvement (~SHRI).  
In the second step, these remote conditions are combined with selected 
disaggregated proximate conditions to observe those sufficient paths—those causal 
recipes or combinations—that consistently led to either the outcome of significant 
human-rights improvement (SHRI) or to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI). The 
outcome and its negation are addressed in separate processes, each using this Two-Step 
Approach. This dual process is recommended by a number of scholars (Ragin 2008; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2010) because of QCA’s asymmetric nature which prevents 
researchers from automatically concluding that the results leading to an outcome will also 
lead to the negation of that outcome. By including analysis of an outcome’s negation, a 
researcher thus validates the initial findings.226  
                                                 
225 In Chapter 4, a spectrum of third-party security guarantees was proposed (see Table 17: Author’s 
Proposed “Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees”) based on a theoretical extension to Walter’s 
(2002, 67) original typology. Calibration is based on this previous operationalization in terms of the 
combination of mandate strength and the size of the actual deployed peacekeeping force sent to uphold the 
third party’s mission. 
 
226 This process either strengthens confidence in the results or alternatively raises questions about the 
explanatory strength of certain causal configurations (Mello 2013, 14; Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 
408-409).  
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Once the Two-Step Approach identifies sufficient causal pathways, the analysis 
of the outcome and of its negation continues with a number of comparative observations 
and specific findings about these different causal recipes.  
Fuzzy-Set Calibration of Robust Security Guarantees 
When robust third-party security guarantees were defined in Chapter 4, according 
to a combination of mandate strength and the size of the deployed peacekeeping force, an 
ordinal scale was selected to establish a spectrum of the robustness of each guarantee. 
One of five potential scores was assigned to each case, with the range of experience 
extending from no guarantee (scored as 0) to a guarantee involving a peace-enforcement 
mandate alongside the deployment of an armed peacekeeping force of at least 5,000 
personnel (scored as 4). 
By way of review, the bivariate analysis conducted in Chapter 5 applied a 
dichotomized definition of robust third-party security guarantees in order to retain high 
significance for the contingency tables.227 Robust third-party security guarantees228 were 
found statistically significant over the long term for both the change in PTS and CIRI 
human rights scores over time. From the contingency tables, the absence of guarantees 
generally led to a nearly equal split between human rights improving or worsening; the 
presence of guarantees dramatically increased the likelihood of improved human rights.  
                                                 
227 These contingency tables were designed as a pre-evaluation of the different conditions in the study; use 
of the five-part scale in Chapter 5 would have diluted the category-to-case ratio below acceptable statistical 
standards and negated the purpose of these tables.  
228 Under dichotomization, robust guarantees were those with peace-enforcement mandates and a 
deployment of 5,000 personnel; all other guarantees were considered non-robust. 
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In shifting from the quantitative analysis of Chapter 5 to fuzzy-set theoretic 
analysis, it is important to recall that “Fuzzy sets allow for degrees of membership, thus 
differentiating between different levels of belonging anchored by two extreme 
membership scores at 1 and 0” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 28). The 
dichotomization profiles used in Chapter 5 to distinguish robust from non-robust 
guarantees unfortunately discarded important differences between combinations of 
mandates and deployed personnel, which cannot be fully captured by re-dichotomizing 
the threshold. Recapturing this data is possible via fuzzy-set calibration. 
Chapter 6 detailed the calibration process, explaining how data calibration is a 
prerequisite for any meaningful fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin 2008, 8). For this specific 
condition, the target set was defined as robust third-party security guarantees (condition: 
R3P). Full membership within the R3PSG was defined by the combined presence of 
sufficient mandate and significant deployed armed personnel commensurate with the 
challenges of executing that mandate—especially to the challenging task of rebel 
demobilization and disarmament. The specific indicator that maps onto this target set is 
the “Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees,” (see Chapter 4, Table 17).  
Fuzzy-score calibration of this spectrum used the following theoretical decisions: 
1. Third-party guarantees that involve a fully robust mandate and sufficient 
footprint size (i.e., include a peace-enforcement mandate coupled with a large 
deployment force of at least 5,000 personnel) were coded as 1 (i.e., considered 
“fully in” the fuzzy set).  
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2. Guarantees that limited use of force to self-defense (e.g., interposition and 
multidimensional mandates)—when coupled with a sufficient footprint of 
5,000 or more personnel—are expected to have almost as great an impact as 
their more robust cousins. With a strong, but not fully robust mandate, these 
guarantees were considered “almost fully in” the set of robust third-party 
security guarantees and were assigned a fuzzy set score of 0.9. 
3. When an armed mandate loses the requisite personnel, this undersized 
footprint in country is expected to highly reduce the positive influence of such 
guarantees; these guarantees were still considered “more in than out,” 
meaning that they possess the potential to positively affect human rights, 
though not at the same degree as occurs with more robust guarantees. These 
guarantees were assigned a fuzzy set score of 0.67. 
4. Chapter 4 detailed a theoretical argument regarding verification missions that 
diverge from scholars like Walter (2002). Here, small mandates and small 
footprints are considered non-robust and thus inadequate to the task of 
overcoming commitment problems; human rights are unlikely to improve. 
This group of guarantees is coded below the crossover point at 0.33 (i.e. 
“better than nothing” but also “more out than in” the target set).    
5. Finally, the absence of any third-party security guarantee was definitively out 
of the target set and assigned a fuzzy-set score of 0.  
All of these calibration decisions are summarized in the table below: 
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Table 62: Fuzzy-Score Calibration for Robust Third-Party Security Guarantees 
 
Under this coding protocol, and using the adjusted set of 31 cases, ten cases were 
below the crossover threshold and twenty-one cases were above the threshold. Of the 
twenty-one cases above the threshold, less than half were fully robust (eight cases total). 
Four cases were mostly robust and nine cases were “more in than out” of the target set, 
with an armed mandate but an undersized deployed force (i.e. footprint) for enforcing 
that mandate.  
Calculating Necessary Conditions for SHRI and ~SHRI 
Following scholarly advice and precedence (Mello 2014; Ragin 2008, 71; 2009, 
96), necessary conditions were tested first. After that, a truth-table analysis was 
conducted in search of sufficient conditions. The presence of a necessary condition—
explained extensively in Chapter 6—means that whenever an outcome occurs, that 
specific condition is present. Necessity is about assessing shared antecedents, by 
identifying conditions that are required for an outcome to occur (Ragin 2014). 
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Identification of necessary conditions, especially when those conditions are manipulable 
by actors, may establish important policy implications for decision-makers to consider in 
social interventions such as negotiated settlements (Ragin 2000, 203). Knowing whether 
a necessary condition will constrain or enable an outcome is vital to considering these 
potential policy implications (Ragin 2000). 
Consistency and Coverage 
Necessary conditions are identified using two goodness-of-fit measures known as 
consistency and coverage.229 Consistency measures the constancy with which an identical 
causal configuration leads to a similar outcome. Consistency is calculated by observing a 
given causal recipe  across different cases to see whether this configuration of conditions 
results in the same outcome. Conventionally, conditions that meet or surpass a threshold 
of 0.90 consistency are treated as necessary conditions, while those that reach a threshold 
of 0.85 consistency are considered “almost necessary” conditions (Ragin 2003, 182; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012).  
In contrast, coverage gauges the empirical significance of a configurational path 
by calculating the proportional relationship between a given set of conditions and the 
outcome that is explained (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). No minimum 
thresholds exist for coverage scores, and a known tradeoff exists between obtaining 
higher consistency scores and a corresponding reduction in coverage scores (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012, 149). Coverage scores still inform researchers about empirical 
relevance. While all causal paths matter in small and intermediate-N comparisons, 
                                                 
229 See Chapter 6 for an in-depth explanation and operationalization of these terms. 
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researchers conducting the latter type of analyses should consider the frequencies with 
which different causal paths occur, because this has potential policy implications (Engeli, 
Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102). 
Necessary Conditions 
Each condition and its negation was tested for consistency and coverage vis-a-vis 
both outcomes (SHRI and ~SHRI). The calculations for necessity of Set 2 proximate 
conditions (summarized in Appendices 6 and 7)230 show that the absence of federalism 
(~FED) is an almost necessary condition for SHRI, at 0.89 consistency and 0.56 
coverage. In addition, this same condition (absence of federalism, or ~FED) is also a 
necessary condition for the absence of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI), 
with 0.92 consistency and 0.44 coverage. The finding that the absence of federalism 
consistently leads to both the outcome and its negation at nearly equal rates effectively 
negates its utility as a necessary condition in either case. Moreover, it elucidates an 
interesting conundrum that is less highlighted in scholarship on QCA methodology—
namely, that researchers should be cautious about including conditions in QCA that 
rarely occur in the selected universe of cases.231 The inclusion of such conditions may 
lead to spurious findings about the necessity of that condition (or its negation), especially 
if the researcher fails to analyze the negation of the outcome.  
                                                 
230 No remote conditions met the stated thresholds for necessary conditions.  
231 In this regard, Chapter 5 detailed that the preponderance of cases did not involve federalism as a 
measure; only 4 of the original 36 cases involved this provision. And a closer look at the contingency tables 
there shows an asymmetric relationship, wherein the absence of federalism lead equally to improved or 
worse human rights while the presence of federalism consistently lead to improved human rights. This 
relationship fell shy of statistical significance given the low number of cases with federalism present. 
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An additional insight is that the absence of integrated military leadership (~IML) 
falls just shy of classification as an almost necessary condition for the significant 
improvement of human rights (SHRI), at 0.84 consistency and fairly high coverage of 
0.62. This finding affords additional support to the ever-stronger argument that 
significant human-rights improvement requires the absence of the provision for 
integrating rebels into the military leadership (see Table 20: Hypotheses on Set 2 
Proximate Conditions and Remote Conditions, specifically H10a/b). Any further 
relationship needs to be confirmed in the Two-Step Approach for fsQCA. Beyond these 
findings on federalism and the integration of military leadership, all other Set 2 proximate 
conditions are substantially below the accepted standard. 
Significant Human-Rights Improvement (SHRI) 
When a civil war ends in negotiated settlement, what conditions lead to 
significant human-rights improvement? Do distinct causal pathways exist that 
substantiate previously discussed theoretical expectations about disaggregated power-
sharing provisions and third-party security guarantees? These questions were addressed 
using fuzzy-set QCA procedures and Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) Two-Step 
Approach. The latter accounts for proximate conditions operating within a variety of 
historical and situational contexts and helps reduce overall causal complexity. 
Step One of the approach involves evaluating the remote factors by themselves in 
order to pinpoint human-rights enhancing conditions that enable an outcome by 
establishing a situational context “under which a given outcome is more likely to occur 
   299 
than other contexts” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 761). Step Two then evaluates the 
enabling conditions one by one alongside the set of proximate factors.  
Step One: Search for Human-Rights Enhancing Remote Conditions 
The six remote conditions and initial equation used here (i.e., NE * SW * EP * SP 
* HD * MD —> SHRI) are the same as those tested in Chapter 7. Therefore, analysis of 
Step One for the proposed outcome of significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) 
already was conducted.232 That analysis found, using a deliberately underspecified 
consistency threshold and the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, the following parsimonious 
solution: 
NE + ~SW + EP —> SHRI233 
This equation indicates that if certain remote conditions are present in a state 
exiting civil war—namely, the presence of non-ethnic conflicts (NE) OR the absence of 
short wars (~SW) OR the presence of enduring peace (EP)—then significant human-
rights improvement is a likely outcome. Three observations followed from this solution: 
(1) No individual remote condition was necessary for human rights to improve; the raw 
coverage of enduring peace (EP) was quite high though, at 81 percent. (2) The 
consistency values for these three remote conditions were intentionally low. This aligned 
with the purposeful design of producing “inconclusive results” in Step One that leave 
space for refinement in Step Two when proximate conditions are added (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2006, 770). (3) The presence of non-ethnic wars (NE) and the presence of 
                                                 
232 The findings of the first step for the negation of the outcome are also included later in the chapter. 
233 Recall that in Boolean language, the + means OR while the —> indicates an if–then relationship. 
   300 
enduring peace (EP) were in alignment with theoretical expectations as laid out in 
Chapter 2 and with the preliminary analysis conducted in Chapter 4. The association of 
longer wars (~SW, or the absence of short wars) with improved human rights was 
contrary to the theoretical position and to earlier findings in Chapter 5.234 The 
relationship of this remote condition with human-rights outcomes changed when 
combined with aggregated power-sharing dimensions; the relationship may similarly 
change here when combined with disaggregated power-sharing provisions.   
Step Two: Evaluating SHRI…Proximate Factors in Remote Contexts 
The objective of the second step is to determine the different causal pathways that 
lead to an outcome, including varied configurations of remote and proximate conditions. 
This step aims to unravel and examine the different combinations of proximate factors as 
they operate within different remote contexts (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012).  
To accomplish Step Two, individual truth tables were constructed for each 
outcome using the remote conditions discovered in Step One and individually examining 
these alongside a select group of proximate conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 
254). Not all eight proximate conditions from Set 2 could be included in the second step.   
Even though the splitting of conditions into two separate sets dramatically reduced the 
number of logical remainders (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 762),235 the inclusion of 
all disaggregated provisions would still result in a hefty 320 multi-dimensional corners 
                                                 
234 The latter found, for example, that short-duration conflicts are correlated with improved human rights, 
while long-duration wars have led almost equally to either better or worse rights. 
235 The Two-Step Approach provided a remarkable contraction of logical remainders by well over 95 
percent compared to a fuzzy-set analysis evaluating six remote conditions and eight proximate conditions 
together in a single step. The respective truth table in such an analysis would have involved an unwieldy 
214 (i.e., 16,348) corners for this intermediate-N study.  
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against 31 empirical examples; the number of corners exceeds the number of cases by 
approximately ten-fold. 
In order to preserve a tighter condition-to-case ratio and keep the logical 
remainders low, a reduction in the number of proximate conditions was required. An 
appropriate initial construct here was to start with the same combination of six remote 
conditions and four proximate conditions used in Chapter 7. Together, those two steps 
resulted in 80 different corners of the vector space, with 2
6 (i.e., 64) rows in Step One and 
2
4 
(i.e., 16) rows in Step Two. This total was slightly more than double but less than triple 
the number of cases.236  
Selecting Proximate Conditions 
Which four factors are expected to matter most and, therefore, should be retained? 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the previous contingency table analysis 
identified four proximate conditions most likely to affect human-rights outcomes: (1) the 
military integration of rebels into the main ranks of a joint defense force (IDF), (2) 
autonomy (AUT), (3) robust third-party security guarantees (R3P), and (4) the military 
integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML). 
Although federalism always led to improved human rights in the mid- and long-
term periods (and in three of four cases in the short term)237, the decision was made to 
                                                 
236 The inclusion of five proximate conditions in Step Two rather than four was also considered, for this 
only mildly raised the total number of corners to 96 (i.e., 64 rows from Step One and 2
5 or 32 rows from 
Step Two). While this shift added just 16 corners, the addition of a single condition consistently resulted in 
a sharp increase in the number of individualized cases. That is, almost every causal path was represented by 
just a single case when five proximate conditions were included in the second step. 
 
237 For the fuzzy-set analysis, the civil war in Bosnia was excluded due to missing data about regime type. 
This left just three cases with federalism in the short term: Two of these three cases (Burundi and Moldova) 
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exclude federalism from the fuzzy set analysis. This decision was due both to the rarity of 
the measure and to the conflicting simultaneous identification of the absence of this 
provision (~FED) as a necessary condition to both significant human-rights improvement 
(SHRI) and the negation of that improvement (~SHRI).238  
Previous discussion on necessary conditions also noted that the absence of rebel 
integration into military leadership positions (~IML) fell just shy of an almost necessary 
condition for significant human rights improvement (SHRI) at 0.84 consistency and 
coverage of 0.62. Since this finding paralleled theoretical expectations that significant 
human-rights improvement required the absence of this measure, the provision for 
integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML) was added in as the fourth 
proximate condition.  
To review, four proximate conditions were selected from the eight disaggregated 
peace-agreement provisions based on preceding evidence of statistically significant 
relationships, necessary relationships, and/or asymmetric relationships with human-rights 
improvement. The final four conditions for consideration in the second step here are: (1) 
the military integration of rebels into the main ranks of a joint defense force (IDF), (2) 
autonomy (AUT), (3) robust third-party security guarantees (R3P), and (4) the military 
integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML).  
Following Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) procedures, each remote 
condition from Step One—i.e., the remote context conditions of non-ethnic conflict (NE), 
                                                                                                                                                 
each experienced improved human rights outcomes; political repression in South Africa became slightly 
worse over that time period. 
238 See previous discussion, this chapter, about necessary conditions. 
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short wars (SW), and enduring peace (EP)—was individually evaluated in combination 
with all of the four selected proximate conditions (i.e., IDF, AUT, R3P, and IML). In an 
additional robustness check, all three political power-sharing provisions were added 
individually as a fifth condition (described in the next section). The full process and 
applicable conditions are summarized in the updated figure below.  
 
Figure 16: Two-Step fsQCA for Reduced Set 2 Proximate Conditions 
 In Step Two of this study, the consistency threshold criteria for passing the 
sufficiency test was raised to 0.80. This threshold is higher than the threshold of 0.70 
used by Schneider and Wagemann (2006) and also higher than Ragin’s recommended 
cut-off value of no less than 0.75.239 Additionally, in order for a causal pathway to be 
evaluated, at least one empirical case had to demonstrate membership higher than 0.5 in 
that vector space. Finally, this second step was intentionally conservative through its use 
                                                 
239 As noted in Chapter 7, Ragin’s (2012, 29) threshold refers to a single-step procedure rather than the two-
step process used by Schneider and Wagemann. 
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of the complex solution that fully rejects all counterfactuals and bases the results solely 
on empirical cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2012). 
Robustness Checks 
In order to cross-examine the selection of 0.80 as the consistency threshold, a 
second evaluation was made using a higher consistency threshold of 0.85 for Step Two. 
An important tradeoff occurred at that point. Small gains in the overall solution 
consistency resulted in a substantial loss of overall solution coverage. For example, when 
the consistency threshold was increased from 0.8 to 0.85 for the pairing of the first 
remote condition of non-ethnic conflict (NE) with the four selected proximate factors, the 
solution consistency increased mildly from 0.82 to 0.87; however, the solution coverage 
dropped dramatically from 0.56 to just 0.38. The pairing of short wars (SW) with the 
proximate factors was less severe. Consistency remained almost exactly the same, at 
approximately 0.87; the solution coverage dropped from 0.55 to 0.51. Finally, the third 
analysis—combining enduring peace (EP) with the proximate factors—did not show any 
changes in the solution consistency or coverage, because no truth-table rows were 
affected by the small increase in the consistency threshold.  
The small adjustment in consistency thresholds resulted in tradeoffs with the 
coverage of those causal pathways (i.e., a reduction in the number of cases covered by 
those paths). This finding corroborated the consistency-coverage tradeoff emphasized by 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 149) and discussed in Chapter 6. Based on these 
tradeoffs, the threshold of 0.80 was retained. A 0.80 threshold accommodated broader 
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comparison and generalizability given its blend of high consistency with greater 
coverage. 
An additional robustness check made here was the inclusion of a fifth proximate 
condition alongside the previous four proximate conditions. Each of the three excluded 
political power-sharing conditions—i.e., rebel representation in the (1) executive branch 
(EXE), (2) legislative branch (LEG), and (3) civil service (CIV)—was considered as a 
potential fifth condition. The same process was following of individually pairing the 
outcome-enabling conditions from Step One with the full set of proximate conditions 
(though with this fifth condition added to the latter set). This process confirmed previous 
suspicions that adding a fifth condition would likely lead to excessive complexity and to 
causal recipes individualized to single cases. This held especially true for executive 
representation (EXE) and legislative representation (LEG), with the former involving 
sixteen different causal pathways, six of which involved singular cases. 
Even when cases were not individualized, the additional fifth condition 
consistently diluted the raw coverage of the different causal pathways, creating similar 
effects to that of increasing the consistency threshold from 0.80 to 0.85. Also, in 
reviewing the resulting causal pathways, neither the presence nor the absence of the 
added conditions consistently led to the desired outcome of significantly improved 
human rights. One interesting insight was that the causal pathway with the highest 
coverage for each of the three added conditions (LEG, EXE, CIV) included the presence 
of short wars (SW) with the absence of autonomy (~AUT); two of these three paths also 
included robust third-party security guarantees, as shown below:  
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(1) SW * ~LEG * ~IML * ~AUT * R3P  
 0.85 consistency, 0.23 raw coverage, 6 cases 
(2) SW * EXE * ~IML * ~AUT * R3P   
 0.86 consistency, 0.27 raw coverage, 6 cases  
(3) SW * ~CIV * ~IMM * ~IML * ~AUT  
 0.86 consistency, 0.34 raw coverage, 8 cases 
Other causal pathways negated placing too much stock in the presence or absence of the 
added political power-sharing provision. 
General Observations  
The original Step Two process—involving the combination of each outcome-
enabling condition with the four selected proximate power-sharing measures—resulted in 
a combined total of nine causal recipes (see Table 63 below). These causal recipes 
represent the sufficient causal configurations that led to significant human-rights 
improvement (SHRI). Except for the first two pathways (p1, p2)—both represented by 
the single case of El Salvador (SAL)—all of the causal paths demonstrated multiple 
memberships.  
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Table 63: Sufficient Paths Toward SHRI 
 
All of the causal paths demonstrated a consistency score of 0.80 or greater. This 
contrasts with Step One, where the remote contexts viewed on their own produced much 
lower consistency values of 0.58 (NE), 0.60 (~SW), and 0.60 (EP). The addition of 
proximate factors increased the overall consistency of the causal pathways by making 
these conjunctural solutions “more specific, theoretically complex and thus empirically 
consistent” (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770). This increased specificity eventually 
bumps against a certain threshold with inherent tradeoffs. As illustrated earlier, adding 
even one more condition can result in almost double the number of causal pathways with 
only nominal gains in the overall consistency.  
In similar fashion to Model 1, this second model demonstrates that remote and 
proximate factors, viewed in isolation, do not satisfactorily account for significant 
human-rights improvement (SHRI) following negotiated settlements in civil wars. 
Rather, complex causation—involving multiple pathways and “specific combinations of 
causal conditions” or “causal recipes” (Ragin 2008, 149)—led to the outcome. Human 
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rights improve (i.e., political repression decreases) when certain proximate factors are 
employed in specific remote contexts. The latter serve as scope conditions that 
alternatively constrain or enable the capacity of proximate factors to affect an outcome.  
The nine pathways shown in Table 67 also demonstrate equifinality because the 
outcome of significant human-rights improvement arose from multiple pathways. These 
paths also exhibit what Ragin (2008) termed multiple conjunctural causation, which is 
evidenced by the combination of different remote and proximate factors in a variety of 
solutions that each produce a reduction in the state’s use of political repression. 
Specific Findings 
Seven comparative observations may be made across the causal pathways about 
specific conditions and combinations of conditions: 
1. The Absence of Power-Sharing Measures 
As with Model 1, the absence of individual power-sharing provisions did not 
prevent human rights from still improving significantly. This finding was anticipated 
based on Model 1, which demonstrated earlier (with four strong cases) that where there 
were no power-sharing dimensions, human rights still improved. The expectation, then, 
was that this finding would hold for disaggregated provisions as well. In this same vein, 
Path 8 (p8) in Table 67 revealed that when the assessed power-sharing measures of IDF, 
IML, AUT, and R3P were completely absent, human rights still improved significantly. 
Four states strongly represented this causal configuration, including: Angola 1975-1989, 
Azerbaijan 1989-1994, Guinea Bissau 1998-1998, and the Philippines 2000-2000.240  
                                                 
240 Comparatively, Model 1 included the first civil war in Croatia, which is absent here from Model 2. The 
causal pathways are dissimilar in that Model 2 adds the qualifier of ~R3P. The civil war in Croatia involved 
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2. The Absence of Military Power-Sharing Measures 
The absence of all military measures (e.g., ~IDF and ~IML) in negotiated 
settlements consistently aligned with the improvement of human-rights outcomes after a 
civil war ended. This extended the findings from Model 1 where all nine causal recipes 
that had led to significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) involved the absence of 
thick military power-sharing agreements. The disaggregation of the military power-
sharing dimension into its constituent conditions thus indicated that the absence of both 
conditions from a negotiated settlement was associated with human rights improving 
after a civil war had ended. 
Paths 3-9 (Table 67: p3-p9) all led to significant human-rights improvement when 
both military power-sharing conditions were absent. Notably, each of these pathways was 
represented by at least two and as many as ten different cases. Coverage, in other words, 
was quite large for most of these paths since these specific causal combinations explained 
many of the cases.  
3. The Presence of Military Power-Sharing Measures 
Two causal paths (Path 1 and 2) included both the presence of military integration 
into the joint defense force (IDF) and the presence of rebel integration into the military 
leadership (IML). Notably, these two causal paths are represented by the single outlier 
case of El Salvador (SAL). This outlier is worth evaluating more deeply in order to 
discern what other conditions in that civil war might have accommodated the presence of 
the IDF and IMF conditions while still resulting in improved human rights after the war.  
                                                                                                                                                 
a semi-robust third-party security guarantee (fuzzy set score of 0.67); therefore that civil war has an overall 
different causal configuration than Path 8. 
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How did the Salvadorian negotiated settlement overcome the seemingly negative 
effects of military measures on human-rights outcomes? From the conditions noted above 
in Paths 1 and 2, the El Salvador conflict was considered a long-lasting, non-ethnic war. 
Autonomy was not granted in the negotiated settlement. The third-party security 
guarantee included a multidimensional mandate (Fortna’s Type 3 mission) but with only 
a small corresponding structure to enforce that mandate. Theoretically, this combination 
of a strong mandate with an undersized footprint would, on its own, help marginally 
improve human-rights outcomes 
Case study analyses of the Salvadorian civil war revealed additional key insights 
about the conflict. Lasting from 1979-1992, the civil war exemplified in its final years 
what Zartman (2000, 2001) called a mutually hurting stalemate, because the rivals were 
both exhausted.241 The conflict had originated as an “agrarian insurgency” (Wood 2003, 
2), with the disenfranchised rural poor persistently mobilizing in a protracted conflict 
against economic elites whose interests had long converged with military elites who were 
overly eager to extort the populace and protect the status quo (DeRouen and Heo 2007; 
Stanley 2010; Wood 2000, 2003).  
In late 1989, the opposition—known as the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN)—failed in its efforts to reignite the conflict; the 
government simultaneously recognized that it could not win militarily (Zartman and De 
Soto 2010). The peaceful compromise was arguably delayed by the United States 
                                                 
241 Indeed, Zartman and de Soto (2000) specifically reference El Salvador as a fundamental exemplar of this 
stalemate in their guide to peacemakers on how to recognize conflict ripeness and time mediation efforts 
when belligerents are most amenable to a negotiated settlement. 
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externally intervening in support of the weaker government and by the civil war’s 
corresponding role as a proxy conflict during the Cold War.242  
To review, it appears that one critical factor that potentially enabled the 
integration of rebels into the main military ranks (IDF) and into military leadership 
positions (IML) in El Salvador’s negotiated settlement was that the conflict was deeply 
exhausting for the rivals.243 Once proxy support was removed, negotiations quickly 
gained traction. This exhaustion, combined with a third-party security guarantee—
nominal as it was with respect to the strength of its presence—was extensive enough to 
improve human-rights outcomes despite both forms of military integration that elsewhere 
have proved inhibitory to positive human-rights outcomes.  
4. The Role of War Duration 
When war duration was considered in Step One (i.e., using remote conditions 
only), the results indicated that long-lasting wars (~SW) matter most for significantly 
improving human-rights outcomes. However, the combination of war duration with the 
proximate conditions revealed that, in the main, the reverse holds true. The sole exception 
to this was El Salvador (Path 2), as discussed above.  
                                                 
242 The peaceful compromise was arguably delayed by the US externally intervening in support of the 
weaker government and by the civil war’s corresponding role as a proxy conflict in the Cold War. 
Rosenblum (in DeRouen and Heo 2007, 345) argued, for example, that peace finally arrived “When both 
sides came to see their economic and political interests as better served by compromise than through 
continued bloodshed—a decision that might have been reached a decade—and tens of thousands of civilian 
lives—earlier, had it not been for the external context of the Cold War and US opposition to a negotiated 
settlement.” 
243 Several other unique factors may have buttressed this specific negotiated stalemate. One scholar (Wood 
2000) noted that democracy in El Salvador was “forged from below—meaning that it was initiated by the 
insurgency and took root in the peace-agreement terms. Those peace agreement terms also included 
legalization of the FMLN opposition as a legitimate political party, as well as placing civilians in charge of 
all security forces (4-5). These conditions may be worth exploring in future research on peace agreement 
initiatives that influence human-rights outcomes. 
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The paths that involved the remote condition of war duration (Path 3 and 4) were 
compared by combining the two paths into a single equation (Equation 1): 
(1) SHRI = SW * ~IDF * ~IML * ~AUT (p3) + SW * ~IDF * ~IML * R3P 
(p4) 
This combination from the initial Boolean analysis was then simplified with factoring, a 
procedure that helps to clarify an equation and identify causally equivalent conditions 
(Ragin 2014, 100-101). Simplifying Equation 1 to account for duplicate conditions 
resulted in:   
(2) SHRI = SW * ~IDF * ~IML (~AUT + R3P) 
This simplified equation indicated that significant human-rights improvement is 
likely when wars of short duration (SW) are combined with negotiated settlements that 
exclude both forms of military power-sharing provisions. The peace agreement does not 
include any provision for rebel integration into the main ranks of that state’s defense 
force (~IDF) or for integration into military leadership positions (~IML). The two 
remaining conditions—the absence of autonomy (~AUT) OR the presence of robust 
third-party security guarantees (R3P)—are causally equivalent, substitutable conditions.  
That is, the presence of third-party security guarantees OR the absence of autonomy 
power-sharing measures, when combined with these other three conditions (i.e. SW * 
~IDF * ~IML), is sufficient for the outcome of significantly improved human rights.244  
  
                                                 
244 The first civil war in Liberia (LIB1) is a sole exception to the outcome. While LIB1 has strong 
membership in this causal pathway, its outcome is below the threshold at a fuzzy set score of 0.4. This 
fuzzy set score means the PTS score did not change over the measured two-year period. Civil war was 
recurring (~EP) at that two-year point when human rights were measured.  
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5. The Role of Enduring Peace 
In Step One, using only remote conditions, the presence of enduring peace (EP) 
corresponded with the expectation of significantly improved human-rights outcomes. The 
second step corroborated this expectation. The causal combination in Path 5 had the 
highest consistency level (at 0.93) of any causal pathway.  
Given that Paths 4 and 5 involved remarkably similar conditions leading to 
significant human-rights improvement, these paths were combined for further exploration 
(Equation 3): 
(3) SHRI = SW * ~IDF * ~IML * R3P (p4) + EP * ~IDF * ~IML * R3P (p5) 
Simplifying Equation 3 resulted in:  
(4) SHRI = ~IDF * ~IML * R3P (SW + EP) 
This simplification unveils that the remote conditions of short war (SW) and 
enduring peace (EP) are causally equivalent when combined with robust third-party 
security guarantees (R3P) and the absence of all military power-sharing provisions (i.e. 
rebel integration into the defense force (~IDF) and into the leadership of that military 
(~IML)). Further investigation shows that while raw coverage is great for both pathways, 
their respective unique coverage is much smaller: Path 4 uniquely covered the first civil 
war, in Liberia (LBR1);245 Path 5 uniquely covered the second civil war, in Georgia 
(GRG2). All other cases were jointly covered. Additionally, these causal paths were both 
subsets of Path 7, which does not involve any remote conditions. Path 7 shows that the 
combination of ~IDF * ~IML * ~R3P leads to SHRI. As subsets of this path, paths 4 and 
                                                 
245 See earlier footnote on Liberia. 
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5 principally differ in that each causal pathway adds a single remote condition. In both 
cases this addition of a single condition led to a greater overall consistency of that causal 
pathway: overall consistency increased from 0.86 (p7) to 0.9 (p4) and 0.93 (p5). 
6. Autonomy with Third-Party Security Guarantees 
Path 9 (p9) was unique in that it was the only pathway where the territorial 
power-sharing measure of autonomy was present (AUT). This pathway covered two 
cases, including the second civil war in Georgia (GRG2) and the civil war in Guatemala 
(GUA). This causal pathway did not uniquely cover either case; both cases were present 
in a number of other causal paths and sometimes in the same causal path (p5, for 
example). In addition, Path 9 was similar to Paths 4 and 5 in that it was also a subset of 
Path 7. Path 9 differed from Path 7 by the addition of the autonomy provision (AUT), 
which helped improve the overall consistency from 0.86 (p7) to 0.90 (p9). 
Theoretically and empirically, the presence of autonomy power-sharing measures 
in a negotiated settlement suggests that worse human rights will result. Yet, human rights 
slightly improved (+0.5 in PTS score) in the short term for both cases. Why? One 
common component to both cases was the presence of enduring peace (EP; see p5). The 
non-recurrence of civil war is central to providing an atmosphere for human rights to 
improve. Beyond this similarity, the remote contexts for the two civil wars varied on the 
remaining assessed conditions. The civil war in Georgia (Abkhazia) was short in duration 
(SW, 1992-1994) and ethnic in nature (~NE), while the Guatemalan civil war was 
incredibly long (~SW, 1963-1996) and non-ethnically based (NE).246  
                                                 
246 Like the long-lasting, intense civil war in El Salvador, the Guatemalan civil war found a substantial part 
of its roots in a class-based conflict pitting an oligarchic elite against an insurgent peasant population. 
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One possible explanation for the similar outcome of improved human rights is 
that the inclusion of robust third-party security guarantees in both civil wars mitigated the 
negative influence of autonomous measures. How robust were these guarantees though? 
The civil war in Georgia-Abkhazia involved an interpositional mandate (Fortna’s Type 2 
mission), along with an armed peacekeeping force of 2,542 people (Mullenbach 2013c). 
This combination of an armed mandate with an undersized footprint was graded “more in 
than out” of the set of robust third-party security guarantees. A matching fuzzy set score 
of 0.67 was assigned. Such a combination of mandate and force structure was anticipated 
to mildly but positively influence the government’s honoring of physical-integrity rights 
after the conflict. 
Similarly, the Guatemalan civil war involved an interpositional mandate (Fortna’s 
Type 2 mission), though with a smaller footprint of just one hundred forty-five people 
(Mullenbach 2013c). The combination of mandate and force structure was also assigned a 
fuzzy score of 0.67, indicating a strong mandate with an undersized footprint. It is 
possible that the presence of these semi-robust third-party security guarantees attenuated 
the negative potential effects that autonomous power-sharing measures are expected to 
make on human-rights outcomes. The causal mechanisms need further exploration.  
7. Third-Party Security Guarantees 
Six of the nine sufficient pathways involved the presence of robust third-party 
security guarantees. Only one causal path consistently involved the absence of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unlike El Salvador, a mutually hurting stalemate was not fully reached. In the lead-up to and immediately 
following signed negotiations on human rights, for example, the government continued to target returning 
refugees and unarmed civilians with attacks by death squads (Rosenblum and Lunsford in DeRouen and 
Heo 2007, 329-49 and 385-402, respectively). Lunsford also contended that class divisions in Guatemala 
aligned with ethnic identities. The classification of this civil war as a non-ethnic conflict is thus disputed. 
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guarantees (p8). That path was discussed as the first finding, for it was also made distinct 
by the total absence of all power-sharing provisions as well. Third-party security 
guarantees are discussed in more depth below, given the presence of this provision in one 
of the paths with wide coverage (p7, eight cases).  
Implications  
A central finding of this study was that none of the hypothesized factors was a 
necessary or sufficient condition on its own for significant human-rights improvement. 
Instead, multiple conjunctural combinations of select conditions (i.e., various causal 
pathways) were able to account for, with strong consistencies, the observed instances of 
this improvement. Table 63 above lays out the full array of sufficient paths that led to 
significant human-rights improvement.  
So, how well did the paths discussed therein cover cases where human rights had 
improved? Table 64 below illustrates the breakdown of all thirty-one cases based on their 
calibrated fuzzy set scores. Of the thirty-one cases studied here using fsQCA, eighteen 
involved at least nominal improvement in human rights (+0.5 change in PTS score; 
fuzzy-set score of 0.6 or higher) over the two years following civil war. Of these eighteen 
cases, the causal pathways in this analysis covered 67 percent of the cases (12 total). 
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Table 64: Coverage of Sufficient Pathways for SHRI247 
 
This initial coverage is somewhat deceiving. Consider a slight refinement to the 
previous question—and one that aligns more appropriately with the design of this project: 
How well did the paths discussed in Table 67 cover the cases where human rights 
significantly had improved? The benchmark of significant human-rights improvement, as 
explored in Chapter 7, is a change in PTS score of +2.0 or more over time. Recall, 
though, that changes of +1.0 or more in that score were deemed “almost fully” in this set 
and were correspondingly scored with fuzzy-set scores of 0.8.  
With this in mind, how well did the selected remote and proximate conditions 
perform in producing a set of causal pathways with high consistencies that account for 
cases where human rights improved by +1.0 or more? Table 68 substantiates that the 
causal paths covered 82 percent of these cases (9 of 11).248 In contrast, looking only at 
those cases where human rights had improved marginally (i.e., fuzzy-set score of 0.6), the 
resulting causal pathways covered just 43 percent of the cases (3 of 7).249  
This means that the causal pathways unveiled by using fuzzy-set QCA and the 
Two-Step Approach effectively captured those combinations of remote and proximate 
                                                 
247 The fuzzy set score for the human-rights outcome was calibrated in Chapter 7.  
248 The sufficient causal pathways do not cover LBR3 or SIE2. Both cases are discussed later below. 
249 Specifically the pathways do not cover ANG3, ANG4, BUI, and MZM. 
   318 
conditions that lead to significant human-rights improvement. This process also 
incorporated three cases (of seven) with just nominal human-rights improvement and one 
case (out of ten) where human rights became nominally worse.250  
Predominant Pathways 
When research has potential policy recommendations, another recommended 
procedure is to account for the frequency of different causal paths (Rihoux et al 2014, 
102). In this regard, when the sole outlier case of El Salvador is momentarily excluded 
(Paths 1 and 2), two predominant pathways (Paths 6 and 7) cover all remaining cases. 
These two paths are supra-sets; all other paths are subsets of these paths: Paths 3 and 8 
were subsets of Path 6; they started with the causal combination found in Path 6 (~IDF * 
~IML * ~AUT), then added the conditions of SW and ~R3P, respectively. Paths 4, 5, and 
9 were subsets of Path 7; they started with the causal combination found in Path 7 (~IDF 
* ~IML * R3P) and added, respectively, the additional conditions of SW, EP, and AUT. In 
all subsets, the addition of a single condition reduced the total number of cases covered 
(i.e. coverage), while also raising the overall consistency as compared to the initial path.  
Combining the two predominant causal paths into one equation resulted in 
Equation 5: 
(5) SHRI = ~IDF * ~IML * ~AUT (p6)251 + ~IDF * ~IML * R3P (p7)252 
                                                 
250 This outlier case, as discussed in an earlier footnote, was LIB1. 
251 Cases with strong membership in the first combination (p6) included: ANG1, AZE, CRO1, CRO2, 
GNB, LBR1, LBR2, MLD, NEP, PHI2. 
252 Cases with strong membership in the second combination (p7) included: CRO2, LBR1, LBR2, CRO1, 
GRG2, GUA, MLD, NEP. A number of cases overlapped both combinations. The first combination 
uniquely covered ANG1, AZE, GNB, PHI2, while the second combination uniquely covered GRG2 and 
GUA. 
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Simplifying this equation via factoring resulted in Equation 6:  
(6) SHRI = ~IDF * ~IML (~AUT + R3P) 
This simplified, succinct equation covered 72 percent of the cases (8 of 11) where 
human rights improved by +1.0 change in the PTS score over two years.253 A major 
implication of this equation, applicable to all actors involved in the negotiated settlement 
process, is that if those actors desire significant human-rights improvement, the most 
consistent pathway toward this end is to exclude all military power-sharing provisions 
from peace agreements. The integration of rebels into the defense force (IDF) and into the 
military leadership (IML) should not be included in peace agreements if improvement of 
human-rights outcomes is desired in the short term after civil war has ended.  
Under this same rationale, another implication of Equation 6 is that peace 
agreements ought to exclude territorial autonomy. Finally, robust third-party security 
guarantees are a causally equivalent condition to the exclusion of autonomy for obtaining 
significantly improved human-rights outcomes. The current data suggests that inclusion 
of robust third-party security guarantees might overcome including autonomous measures 
as long as the two aforementioned military measures are excluded. Path 9 has 
demonstrated this possibility, but the shallower coverage of just two cases (GRG2 and 
GUA) and the nominal improvements made in both cases (only +0.5 improvement in 
PTS score) should attenuate strong exuberance for such an approach. 
  
                                                 
253 The Salvadorian civil war, as discussed earlier, is not captured by this more succinct equation. 
   320 
Two Missing Cases Where SHRI Occurred  
The full set of sufficient pathways covered all but two cases where human rights 
significantly had improved by +1.0 or more in the PTS score (i.e., fuzzy-set score of 0.8 
or higher; seeTable 67 above). These two cases included the second civil war in Sierra 
Leone and the third civil war in Liberia.  
What do these civil wars hold in common, and how do they compare with the 
previously discussed sufficient equation (Equation 6) for describing cases where 
significant human-rights improvement occurred? Both of the excluded conflicts were 
short wars (SW) with enduring peace (EP). Neither included measures of autonomy 
(~AUT) nor integration into the military leadership (~IML). Principally, they differed 
from the sufficient causal pathways by their inclusion of measures for integrating rebels 
into the military defense force (IDF).  
How then did human rights improve so much (i.e., a full +1 improvement in PTS 
score for Sierra Leone and +1.5 improvement in PTS score for Liberia), despite inclusion 
of the military provision for rebel integration into the defense force? One possible 
explanation is that the beneficial remote contexts of short wars and enduring peace, 
combined with the simultaneous inclusion of fully robust forms of third-party security 
guarantees, overcame any potential negative effect of this rebel integration into the 
defense force. With respect to robust third-party guarantees, both of these negotiated 
settlements included the strongest mandate possible. Peace-enforcement missions 
(Fortna’s Type 4 mission) were established. These strong mandates were coupled with 
military footprints well beyond the proposed 5,000 troop minimum for a robust 
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guarantee: in Sierra Leone, a maximum of 17,455 peacekeepers were deployed to enforce 
the mandate; in Liberia, 17,045 peacekeepers were deployed (Mullenbach 2013c). 
Negation of Significant Human-Rights Improvement (~SHRI) 
When civil wars end in negotiated settlements, what conditions lead to the 
negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI)? Do certain causal recipes 
(i.e., combinations of these conditions) exist that substantiate previously discussed 
theoretical expectations regarding disaggregated power-sharing measures and third-party 
security guarantees?  
Studying the negation of an outcome helps to validate causal arguments. If the 
same combination of conditions that led consistently to an outcome also led to the 
negation of that outcome, then the explanatory strength of the selected conditions and 
causal pathways is in question (Mello 2013, 14). A key component of examining the 
negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI) is checking for duplicate 
pathways that led sufficiently to each outcome. Here is an additional component: Because 
QCA is based in set-theoretic methodology, the testing of the non-occurrence of an 
outcome also checks the potential asymmetric nature of conditions. 
The sequence of procedures used here, and defined below, also followed 
Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) Two-Step Approach: in Step One, searching for the 
remote conditions that constrained human-rights improvement by using lower 
consistency thresholds along with the parsimonious solution; then in Step Two, observing 
how proximate factors like third-party security guarantees and disaggregated power-
sharing measures operated within those historical and situational contexts. The second 
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step raised the consistency threshold criteria to 0.80, with the requirement that at least 
one case had membership higher than 0.5 in a causal combination, and the use of the 
complex solution. 
Step One: Search for Human-Rights Constraining Remote Conditions 
The six remote conditions used here in Step One (i.e., NE * SW * EP * SP * HD * 
MD) are the same as those tested in Chapter 7. As a result, the analysis of this first step—
investigating the negation of the significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) 
outcome—already has been completed. Using a deliberately underspecified consistency 
threshold and the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, that analysis found the following 
parsimonious solution: 
~NE + ~SW + ~SP —> ~SHRI 
In shorthand, the equation states that if ~NE OR ~SW OR ~SP, then ~SHRI. This 
equation, indicates that when certain remote conditions are present in a state exiting a 
civil war—namely, the absence of non-ethnic wars (~NE) or the absence of short wars 
(~SW) or the absence of small populations (~SP)—then the outcome of significant 
human-rights improvement is likely negated (~SHRI). Stated differently, three contextual 
(remote) conditions generally prevent improvement in human rights after a civil war: 
ethnic war, long war, and large population. Five observations followed from this 
solution:  
1. None of these three contextual conditions is individually necessary for the 
negation of human rights. Indeed, raw coverage for the most common and 
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consistent condition involving the absence of small populations (~SP) had 
reached just two out of three cases. 
2. The low percentages of unique coverage—ranging from 0.06 (~SP) to 0.08 
(~SW) and 0.19 (~NE)—indicated that the remote conditions overlapped 
substantially, with many cases involving two or three of them.  
3. The consistency values were strong for ~SP (0.69) and ~SW (0.61), but 
weaker for ~NE (0.43). Lower consistencies were expected in Step One since 
intentional constraints were designed to produce “inconclusive results” that 
accommodated refinement when proximate factors were added in Step Two 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 770).  
4. The remote conditions aligned with theoretical expectations: Ethnic war, long 
war, and large population were all expected to lead to worse human rights.  
5. The remote conditions found in this parsimonious solution for ~SHRI closely 
resembled the mirror inverse of the parsimonious solution for SHRI.  
Step Two: Evaluating ~SHRI…Proximate Conditions in Remote Contexts 
The purpose of Step Two was to consider the selected proximate factors as they 
operated within the three different remote contexts. This illuminated the different causal 
recipes that had led to the negation of the outcome. In accordance with procedures, each 
remote context from the parsimonious solution—including non-ethnic conflict (NE), 
short war (SW), and small population (SP)—was compared alongside the same four 
proximate factors of military integration of rebels into the main ranks of the joint defense 
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force (IDF), integration of rebels into military leadership positions (IML), autonomy 
(AUT), and robust third-party security guarantees (R3P).  
Based on earlier discussion in this chapter as well as in Chapter 5, the theoretical 
expectation is that the remote contexts of ethnic war (~NE), long-duration war (~SW), 
and the absence of a small population (~SP) will more often lead to the negation of an 
outcome by constraining the effects of actor-influenced conditions. With respect to 
proximate conditions, the presence of military integration of rebels into the main ranks of 
the joint defense force (IDF) and into military leadership positions (IML) will generally 
lead to worse human rights. The absence of either military provision is not a guarantee 
that worse human rights can be avoided though. In turn, the presence of the territorial 
autonomy provision is expected to consistently lead to worse human rights.  
Finally, the relationship of third-party security guarantees (R3P) is less 
determinate with respect to the negation of significant human-rights improvement. This is 
due to an asymmetric relationship: When security guarantees are present in the short 
term, human rights are highly likely to improve. When such guarantees are absent, human 
rights may or may not get worse; the data in Chapter 5 is divided here.  
Robustness Checks 
A higher threshold of 0.85 was again used to crosscheck the consistency threshold 
of 0.80 and to consider which set was more appropriate for analysis. As with previous 
evaluations, trade-offs were evident, though they were not gross here. The higher 
threshold consistently yielded increases in the overall solution consistency that generally 
paralleled the losses in overall solution coverage (i.e., the number of cases covered). 
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When the remote condition of short wars (SW) was paired with the four proximate 
factors, for example, the raised threshold resulted in an increased solution consistency 
(from 0.82 to 0.94) but a drop in solution coverage (from 0.46 to 0.31). Likewise, the 
pairing of small populations (SP) with proximate conditions provided an increase in 
overall solution consistency (from 0.74 to 0.85) but a more minor loss in coverage from 
(0.52 to 0.46). Interestingly, the pairing of non-ethnic conflict (NE) with the proximate 
factors resulted in decreases for both consistency and coverage, from 0.76 to 0.72 and 
from 0.31 to 0.18, respectively.  
The tradeoffs with this higher threshold seem worth considering its use, given that 
overall coverage loss is comparatively small. Closer inspection raises a prominent 
concern though. The higher threshold of 0.85 resulted in ten causal pathways, but only 
three of these paths were represented by multiple cases and just two had high 
consistencies.254 That is, the causal pathways with this higher threshold were typically 
represented by a single case rather than by multiple cases. Comparatively, the threshold 
of 0.80 provided twelve causal pathways with all but two represented by multiple cases.  
 For the main analysis, the threshold of 0.80 was retained, both to align with the 
previous analysis of the outcome and also because it blended still-high consistency above 
scholarly recommendations while retaining greater coverage. After the threshold was set, 
the Quine-McCluskey algorithm was applied to produce the complex solution, which is a 
more conservative result based on the use of empirical instances and the rejection of all 
counterfactuals (Ragin 2008, 136). 
                                                 
254 These two paths with multiple cases and high consistencies are discussed later below. 
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 An additional robustness check was conducted involving the examination of each 
of the three excluded political conditions of rebel representation in the executive branch 
(EXE), legislative branch (LEG), and civil service (CIV). As discussed earlier, each 
condition was considered as a fifth condition alongside the previous four proximate 
conditions. Just like the analysis for the outcome of SHRI, this process confirmed that 
adding a fifth condition consistently resulted in sufficient causal recipes that were 
individualized to single cases. For example, the addition of the LEG condition resulted in 
fifteen sufficient causal recipes. Thirteen of these fifteen causal paths were represented by 
only one case. In reviewing the resulting causal pathways for all three political power-
sharing measures—both with respect to those leading to the outcome and those leading to 
the negation of the outcome—neither the presence nor the absence of any of these added 
conditions consistently resulted in the outcome or the negation of the outcome.  
General Observations and Specific Findings 
Following Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) procedures, each remote 
outcome from Step One was individually reviewed (i.e., truth tables were made) in 
combination with all four proximate conditions (i.e., IDF, IML, AUT, and R3P). This 
resulted in a combined total of twelve causal recipes, as shown in the table below: 
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Table 65: Sufficient Paths Toward ~SHRI 
 
Five comparative observations may be drawn from this table: 
 
1. The Effects of Remote Conditions Writ Large 
The majority of sufficient paths and strong cases that had led to the negation of an 
outcome involved these three anticipated contextual conditions: (1) ethnic conflict (~NE), 
represented by two causal paths and four distinct strong cases; (2) long wars (~SW), 
represented by three causal paths and five distinct cases; and (3) large populations (~SP), 
represented by two causal paths and eight distinct cases. As discussed earlier, this 
suggests that, while none of the remote conditions on its own had guaranteed that human 
rights would improve or worsen, these conditions strongly had constrained (or enabled) 
the ability of proximate conditions to further affect human-rights outcomes. Moreover, 
the orientation of these remote conditions strongly aligned with theoretical expectations. 
2. Positive Remote Conditions, Overwhelmed 
It is rare, but not impossible, that the positive influence of remote conditions also 
can be overcome when combined with certain proximate power-sharing configurations. 
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For the negation of an outcome, only two paths consistently had demonstrated this. Each 
path was represented by just a single strong case.  
Path 3 (p3), for example, involved the positive influence of a non-ethnic war 
(NE). Yet when this remote condition was combined with the presence of both military 
power-sharing measures (IDF and IML) and the absence of any third-party security 
guarantees, worse human rights resulted; the civil war in Chad demonstrated this 
configuration and negated outcome.255  
Path 7 (p7) is the only other example here of a positive remote context (short war) 
becoming overwhelmed by other conditions. As the sole strong representation of this 
pathway, the first civil war in Georgia (GRG1) involved two additional measures that 
were anticipated to lead to worse human-rights outcomes, namely the presence of rebel 
integration into the defense force (IDF) and the presence of autonomy (AUT) measures. 
The weaker third-party security guarantee256 was insufficient to affect human rights in a 
positive way; and the human rights remained unchanged, when the removal of the civil 
war would have been expected to lead to improved outcomes. 
3. Low Consistencies 
A number of causal paths (shown in Table 69) involved consistencies that were 
lower than the set threshold used to calculate those sufficient paths that led to the negated 
outcome. While the consistency tool is best thought of as a goodness-of-fit tool that 
                                                 
255 Path 3 is a subset of the causal recipe found in Path 10. The sole difference between the two paths is the 
removal of the remote context. 
256 This third-party security guarantee was calibrated at 0.67 fuzzy set score representation in the set of 
robust third-party security guarantees. Per earlier discussion on R3P calibration, this indicates the presence 
of an armed mandate coupled with an undersized footprint for executing that mandate. 
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describes “the data patterns in the underlying dataset” rather than as a rigid 
methodological benchmark, certain minimum thresholds still apply (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 148). No further analysis was conducted on causal recipes residing 
below the minimum recommended value of 0.75. This included Path 2 (0.60), Path 6 
(0.74), Path 10 (0.70), and Path 12 (0.70). Path 8,at 0.78 consistency, was retained and is 
discussed later below. 
4. The Presence of Integrated Defense Force (IDF) Measures 
The preponderance of all the paths shown in Table 69, including those with low 
consistency, involved the presence of the military power-sharing measure that guaranteed 
rebel representation in a joint defense force (IDF). The negation of the outcome was 
continuously associated with the inclusion of this provision in the negotiated settlement, 
regardless of other conditions. Fully 92 percent (11 of 12) of the sufficient pathways 
leading to the negation of the outcome (~SHRI) involved the presence of rebel 
integration in the defense force (IDF).257 No other remote or proximate condition reached 
this level of continuous association with the negated outcome.  
Many of the causal combinations leading to the outcome’s negation differed by 
just a single condition. Combining these sufficient pathways, then factoring the 
equations, helped to identify causally equivalent conditions. In Paths 1, 5 and 11, for 
example, the conditions of IDF, ~IML, and ~R3P are repeated. Adjoining these paths in a 
single equation obtains the following (Equation 7): 
                                                 
257 Path 9 was the sole exception. 
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(7) ~SHRI = ~NE * IDF * ~IML * ~R3P (p1) + ~SW * IDF * ~IML * ~R3P 
(p5) + IDF * ~IML * ~AUT * ~R3P (p11) 
 
Simplifying this equation to account for duplicate conditions, showed: 
(8) ~SHRI = IDF * ~IML * ~R3P (~NE + ~SW + ~AUT) 
This simplified equation indicated that the negation of significant human-rights 
improvement (~SHRI) consistently had occurred when the military power-sharing 
provision of an integrated defense force (IDF) was present but provisions like the 
integration of military leadership and of robust third-party security guarantees were both 
absent (~IML and ~R3P, respectively). In addition, at least one of the following 
substitutable conditions must have been present: (1) either the conflict was an ethnic civil 
war (~NE), (2) or the civil war was long in duration (~SW), or (3) the negotiated 
settlement excluded autonomy (~AUT) as a power-sharing measure. Altogether, two 
conditions sit opposite of hypothesized expectations: ~IML and ~AUT resulting in the 
negation of the outcome. One possible explanation here is that the beneficial absence of 
such measures is contingent upon the corresponding absence of other conditions. Said 
differently, any benefit gained by those measures is greatly overcome when a peace 
agreement includes integration of the rebels into the defense force (IDF) but fails to 
provide a robust third-party security guarantee (~R3P) to strengthen credible commitment 
by all parties and reduce the threat to the government. In the absence of that guarantee, 
the government is likely to respond to the increased threat—regardless of the exclusion of 
other measures like ~IML and ~AUT—with increased political repression. 
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5. Exception to the Presence of Integrated Defense Force (IDF) Measures 
Path 9 is the only causal combination that did not include the presence (or 
absence, for that matter) of rebel integration into the joint defense force of a country. Path 
9 is additionally made distinct by the fact that the two strongest representative states in 
this path—the civil war in Mozambique (MZM) and the civil war in Guatemala (GUA)—
actually improved slightly (+0.5 PTS score) in their human-rights outcomes. This seems, 
at first glance, like a contradictory finding. How do the only strong cases that represent a 
causal configuration—designed to report a sufficient combination of conditions resulting 
in the negation of an outcome—both point to improved human rights?  
Recall from Chapter 6 that “each case has varying degrees of membership in the 
different corners of the vector space and thus varying degrees of membership in each 
truth table row” (Ragin 2009, 104). At the same time, each case only has “one 
membership greater than 0.5 in the logically possible combinations formed from a given 
set of conditions,” making it possible to “sort cases according to corners of the vector 
space based on their degree of membership” (Ragin 2009, 106). In this case, both MZM 
and GUA had strong membership in this causal configuration, but their outcomes led to 
slightly improved human rights. Though none of the other cases were sorted strongly into 
this specific causal recipe, their partial memberships in this vector space yielded a 
sufficient pathway with 0.82 consistency. 
This causal configuration did not include the presence or the absence of the 
provision for rebel integration into the defense force. This is because the civil war in 
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Mozambique (MZM) included this provision, but the civil war in Guatemala (GUA) did 
not. Both civil wars also notably included measures of autonomy.  
How did both civil wars result in nominal improvement of their human-rights 
scores despite the inclusion of autonomy and, in the case of Mozambique, the inclusion 
of rebel integration into the main ranks? One possible explanation, based on the 
conditions analyzed here, is that inclusion of a robust third-party security guarantee (R3P 
fuzzy score of 0.9) in Mozambique helped to reduce this potential threat to the 
government. The government’s motivation and opportunity to politically repress was 
significantly reduced by this guarantee. In contrast, Guatemala’s negotiated settlement 
did not include this negative measure of rebel integration. The security guarantee was 
also less robust (R3P fuzzy score of 0.67), which may explain their similar small human-
rights improvements.258 In short, the fact that the two strongest cases in this causal 
pathway resulted in opposite outcomes to the one being measured means that a host of 
observations with weak membership scores are drivng the results and that this pathway is 
indeterminate.259  
Implications 
What implications does this fuzzy-set theoretic analysis for the negation of the 
outcome have on negotiated settlements? While no hypothesized remote or proximate 
condition is necessary or sufficient on its own for the negation of significant human-
rights improvement (~SHRI), this process illuminated a number of consistent 
                                                 
258 For further discussion on the Guatemalan civil war, see previous section on sufficient conditions leading 
to the outcome (SHRI), this chapter. 
259 My thanks to Professor Rubinson for his insights and help on these anomalous cases. 
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relationships for comparison with those leading to the outcome (SHRI). For example, just 
as the absence of the military power-sharing measure involving the integration of rebels 
into the defense force (~IDF) consistently had led to the outcome of significant human-
rights improvement (SHRI); conversely, the presence of this IDF measure consistently 
had led to the negation of that outcome (~SHRI).  
In addition, the majority of the causal paths—and the representative cases of those 
paths—involved remote contexts theoretically and empirically identified as leading to 
worse or unchanged human rights. This included ethnic wars (~NE), long wars (~SW), 
and large populations (~SP). In two singular rare instances (Paths 3 and 7), the beneficial 
aspects of non-ethnic conflict (NE) and short wars (SW) were overcome. Both cases 
involved two additional power-sharing measures hypothesized as leading to worse human 
rights: Path 3, represented singularly by the civil war in Chad, involved the presence of 
both military power-sharing measures (IDF and IML); Path 7, represented singularly by 
the first civil war in Georgia, involved the presence of rebel integration into the defense 
force (IDF) and the presence of autonomy measures (AUT).  
How well did the sufficient causal paths derived from this fuzzy-set analysis (see 
Table 69: Sufficient Paths Toward ~SHRI) cover the actual empirical cases where human 
rights either did not change or became worse? Of the thirty-one cases assessed here, 
thirteen cases involved either no change (fuzzy-set score of 0.4) or worse human-rights 
scores (fuzzy-set score of 0) over the two years. Of these thirteen cases, 62 percent (8 of 
the 13) were covered by the initial solution set. Table 66 (below) shows this breakdown.  
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These pathways also captured four of the seven cases where had human rights 
improved just slightly (fuzzy-set score of 0.6). No cases where human rights improved by 
+1 PTS score or more (fuzzy-set score of 0.8 or higher) were strongly present in these 
pathways.260  
 
Table 66: Coverage of Sufficient Pathways for ~SHRI 
  
Predominant Pathways 
An additional method for gauging the fuzzy-set analysis is to assess predominant 
causal pathways. Discussion of Path 8 was reserved for this section, given its role as a 
predominant causal recipe that consistently led to the negation of outcomes.261 This 
causal pathway covered five of the thirteen cases (38%) that led to worse or unchanged 
human rights, as well as two cases where human rights improved just slightly (at 0.6 
fuzzy-set score; see table below for full breakdown).  
  
                                                 
260 This includes the full solution set of sufficient paths leading toward ~SHRI, as initially calculated in 
Table 69. These calculations were uncorrected for the lower consistencies found in paths 2, 6, 10, and 12. 
Removal of these paths dropped the covered cases to 2, 5, and 3 (vice 2, 6, and 4), respectively. This is due 
to the loss of Nicaragua (at 0.4) and the fourth civil war in Angola (at 0.6) 
261 As noted earlier, Path 8’s consistency of 0.78 surpasses the minimum consistency of 0.75 recommended 
by scholars for further analysis. 
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Table 67: Coverage of Path 8 
 
Path 8 identified a consistent pattern within certain negotiated settlements that led to 
negated outcomes (Equation 9): 
(9) ~SHRI = ~SP * IDF * ~IML (p8) 
This equation indicates that when civil wars occur in states with large populations 
(~SP)—and those civil wars are resolved using negotiated settlements that include the 
military power-sharing provision of rebel integration into the military defense force (IDF) 
but exclusion of those rebels from the military leadership positions (~IML)—human 
rights in that state will likely remain unchanged or become worse. Two of these three 
factors are suspected to primarily contribute to the negative outcome, namely large 
populations (~SP) and rebel integration into the defense force (IDF). The combination of 
these two conditions uniquely exacerbates a government’s ability to govern while 
increasing potential threats to that government.  
The larger population size both increases the number of opportunities for 
repression and exacerbates the stresses on a government’s institutional capacity to 
respond in times of scarcity, which are quickly overwhelmed in post-civil war contexts. 
The ability of a government to use alternative governance mechanisms, like cooptation 
and cooperation, gives way to coercion as regimes look to preserve their societal control.  
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In turn, while large populations overwhelm a state’s ability to use alternative 
governance mechanisms, the addition of rebel integration into a joint defense force 
dangerously retains prior belligerents in the armed forces rather than disarming, 
demobilizing, and reintegrating them. This provision increases a government’s 
motivation to repress, because the question of internal security now reigns in mind 
preeminently: Will those forces follow the issued orders? Will they rise up in an armed 
coup or a rebellion against the government, à la Turkey’s attempted 2016 coup? This 
ever-present tension, at least in the short term, consistently has resulted in worse human 
rights.  
In contrast, the absence of rebel integration into leadership positions in the 
military (~IML) is considered the least influential component in this causal relationship. 
Decision-makers should not erroneously conclude that human rights can be improved—
and the odds of this causal relationship avoided—by simply changing the causal path 
through the addition of the IML power-sharing measure. Rather, they should remember 
that the analysis of the outcome (SHRI) had demonstrated only two consistent paths 
where the presence of IDF and IML had led to improved human rights. Notably, the 
singular strong case that represented this causal path was El Salvador, which had a small 
population (SP).262  
An exception where a large population was combined with the presence of both 
military power-sharing measures was the fourth civil war in Angola. Even here, however, 
it only improved marginally in the short term (at +0.5 PTS improvement). Like El 
                                                 
262 An additional factor, mentioned earlier in the Step Two analysis of the outcome (SHRI), was that the 
civil war in El Salvador had reached a substantial mutually hurting stalemate. 
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Salvador, conflict in Angola spanned multiple decades with a number of attempts at 
negotiated settlements. The sheer exhaustion of the belligerents and the population, 
combined with the death of the insurgent’s obstinate leader, aided in its successful 
resolution (Dougherty in DeRouen 2007).  
Predominant Paths at 0.85 Consistency 
Earlier, the higher consistency threshold of 0.85 was discussed as a robustness 
check on the selected threshold of 0.80 for Step Two. This higher threshold yielded ten 
causal pathways. Two of these ten causal paths contained both high consistencies and 
multiple case representations. The combined predominant causal pathway is mentioned 
here because it strongly paralleled earlier analysis for the outcome. The combination of 
these two predominant pathways resulted in the following equation (Equation 10): 
(10) ~SHRI = ~SP * IDF * ~IML * ~AUT (p8)263 + ~SP * IDF * ~IML * ~R3P (p7)264 
Factoring Equation 10 resulted in: 
(11) ~SHRI = ~SP * IDF * ~IML (~AUT + ~R3P) 
Equation 11 covered 38 percent of the cases (5 of 13) that had led to a negated 
outcome and one case (ANG3) where human rights had improved slightly. Equation 11 
uniquely lined up for comparison purposes with the predominant causal pathway that had 
led to SHRI. Recall the simplified Equation 6, which covered eight of the eleven cases 
(71%) where significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) had occurred: 
(6) SHRI = ~IDF * ~IML (~AUT + R3P) 
                                                 
263 Cases with strong membership in this path included: DRC, SAF, ANG3, ANG2, CAM. 
 
264 Cases with strong membership in this path included: SAF, SUD1, ANG2. 
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A number of comparative observations may be made using these two equations:  
1. In both equations (Equation 11 and Equation 6), the general conditions of 
autonomy and robust third-party security guarantees are substitutable factors.   
2. Two conditions demonstrated consistent symmetry. Human rights remained 
unchanged or became worse when integration of the defense force (IDF) was 
present; they improved when this measure was absent. Conversely, the 
substitutable condition of robust third-party security guarantees was 
consistently absent when the outcome was negated and consistently present 
when the outcome was realized. 
3. Both large and small states experience significantly improved human rights. 
However, large states are more likely to experience worse or unchanged 
human rights than small ones.   
4. Lastly, the absence of autonomy and the absence of integrated military 
leadership may allow human rights to improve but do not, on their own, 
guarantee that this will occur.  
Missing Cases Where ~SHRI Occurred 
Five cases exist where human rights remained unchanged or became worse and 
where the sufficient causal pathways did not capture these cases. While the causal 
combinations reflected in these different cases did not obtain the minimum consistencies 
required for inclusion as a sufficient causal pathway, a few observations are still useful 
here, particularly because four of the five cases—Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo, the first civil war in Sierra Leonne, and the second civil war in Sudan—involved 
varying degrees of robust third-party security guarantees.265  
How did the anticipated positive effects of these security guarantees become 
overwhelmed in these cases? Two of the four cases (Democratic Republic and the second 
Sudanese civil war) involved the aforementioned combination of large populations (~SP) 
alongside the presence of the integrated defense force (IDF) measure. This combination 
was shown to overwhelm a government’s institutional capacity to respond with 
alternative governance mechanisms outside of coercion and, simultaneously, increased 
the potential threat to the regime. Both measures were anticipated to inflate the 
government’s motivation to repress.  
The civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was accompanied by a 
weaker security guarantee (fuzzy-set score 0.67). The second civil war in the Sudan 
included a quite robust guarantee (fuzzy-set score 1); however, this positive element was 
significantly counteracted by other conditions, including an ethnic conflict (~NE) and a 
negotiated settlement that included the generally negative conditions of autonomy (AUT) 
and rebel integration in the military leadership (IML). 
Meanwhile, the civil war in Rwanda included a strong third-party security 
guarantee (fuzzy-set score 0.9); however, this guarantee was counteracted by an ethnic 
conflict (~NE)—by military measures guaranteeing integration in both the joint defense 
                                                 
265 The data on all five missing cases was as follows, with respect to the same set of remote and proximate 
conditions: RWA: ~NE * SW * SP * IDF * IML * ~AUT * R3P; DRC: NE * SW * ~SP * IDF * ~IML * 
~AUT * R3P; PHI1: NE * ~SW * ~SP * IDF * IML * AUT * ~R3P; SIE1: NE * SW * SP * IDF * ~IML * 
~AUT * R3P; SUD2: ~NE * SW * ~SP * IDF * IML * AUT * R3P. 
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force (IDF) and the military leadership (IML), and by a mass genocide event after the 
negotiated settlement that was not captured by the conditions used in this project.  
Finally, the first civil war in Sierra Leone involved a very robust third-party 
guarantee (fuzzy-set score 1). However, the negotiated settlement included the negative 
condition of rebel integration into the defense force (IDF), and civil war recurred at the 
measured interval (~EP).   
To recapitulate, these four cases—all of which involved third-party security 
guarantees but resulted in worse or unchanged human rights—raised some caution 
against suggesting that such guarantees are a universal panacea. One perspective is that if 
such guarantees were absent, then even more intense violations of physical-integrity 
rights would have occurred by the government.  
An alternative, and perhaps more sobering assessment, is that these guarantees 
require certain causal combinations in order to succeed. This might include, for example, 
civil wars of short duration and in which no military power-sharing measures are 
included, because certain causal combinations of remote and proximate conditions can 
negate and overwhelm their positive influence on human-rights outcomes. 
When Do Third Parties Intervene Robustly? 
Investigation of the outcome showed that six of the nine pathways leading to the 
desired outcome involved the presence of third-party security guarantees; only one 
sufficient causal pathway leading to the desired outcome consistently involved its 
absence. Is this apparently strong relationship between robust third-party security 
guarantees and human-rights outcomes influenced by selection effects? Do third parties 
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select easier conflicts in which to intervene, which is naturally followed more often by 
improved human rights?  
Fortna (2008, 19) explored a corresponding concern in her work, dedicating a full 
chapter to evaluating “whether the international community tends to send peacekeepers to 
the easy cases or to the hard ones.” Her finding was that peacekeepers had been deployed 
more often in the difficult cases than in the easier ones. 
Does Fortna’s finding that peacekeepers are sent to the more difficult conflicts 
hold true for third-party security guarantees as well? To examine this question of when 
third parties are inclined to offer and implement security guarantees, the bivariate 
relationships between previously defined situational (i.e., remote) variables of war costs, 
war duration, GDP per capita, and ethnic conflicts were explored. Of note, this analysis 
differed from Fortna’s in that it looks at when third parties intervened robustly, rather 
than simply at all third-party security guarantees writ large. This restriction was 
established in order to evaluate the strong relationship between robust third-party security 
guarantees and long-term human-rights outcomes.  
The investigation showed that robust third-party security guarantees were 
generally more common when the cost of the conflict was high, the conflict duration was 
short, and the country was economically poor. Of these three variables, absolute poverty 
was the only statistically significant factor, though (see Appendix 12 for an in-depth 
discussion).  
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Conclusion 
Certain remote conditions enable the effectiveness of proximate conditions to 
affect the desired outcome. Other remote conditions constrain the effectiveness of 
proximate conditions. The selected methodology of fuzzy-set QCA proved ideally suited 
for assessing how well these tools actually work in tandem; more accurately, these 
conditions work together in complex causal configurations. That is to say, the use of QCA 
accommodated previous scholarly insights, like those of Hafner-Burton (2014, 276)., who 
asserted that “The central insight about prevention efforts is that no single tool works 
consistently to promote or protect human rights; all tools have extensive scope conditions 
that limit their effectiveness. Often, the tools work best in tandem.”  
This chapter differed from previous chapters by its disaggregation of peace-
agreement provisions. Principally, this disaggregation was driven by the core contention 
that individual power-sharing measures create a variety of effects on human-rights 
outcomes. More power sharing is not always better. Indeed, sometimes it is consistently 
made worse. Some power-sharing measures improve human rights, while some 
consistently lead to worse human rights. The effects are both varied and asymmetric, and 
cannot be lumped or aggregated altogether as most of the literature does, because this 
masks their influence.  
Given the challenges of limited diversity, the number of proximate conditions was 
necessarily constrained to just four additional conditions in Step Two. These proximate 
conditions were selected based on previous theoretical and empirical findings, 
particularly those discussed in Chapter 5. They included measures guaranteeing rebel 
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integration into the joint defense force (IDF) or into military leadership positions (IML) 
as well as measures guaranteeing territorial autonomy (AUT) or robust third-party 
security guarantees (R3P).  
In robustness checks, the excluded political power-sharing variables of measures 
that guaranteed legislative elections (LEG), executive representation (EXE), and civil 
service representation (CIV) were also examined; each of these conditions were added 
one at a time (i.e., as a fifth proximate condition).266 As suspected, this fifth condition 
routinely resulted in solution sets where each individual causal pathway was covered by 
an individualized explanation; that is, the bulk of causal recipes were represented by a 
singular strong empirical case. While common QCA practice directs that “each causal 
path matters,” this excessive approach diluted useful comparison between cases. Aiming, 
then, for a balance between parsimony and explanatory sufficiency, the original model of 
analysis was retained at a strong consistency level of 0.80. Additional insights from the 
higher threshold of 0.85, with such data consistent and involved in multiple cases, were 
provided.  
A central finding of this analysis was that none of the hypothesized factors was a 
necessary or sufficient condition on its own for significant human-rights improvement 
(SHRI). Rather, multiple causal recipes accounted for the observed instances of 
significant human-rights improvement (or its absence). Certain scope conditions 
consistently enabled, or alternatively constrained, the likelihood that significant human-
rights improvement occurred. The existence of short wars (SW) and of enduring peace 
                                                 
266 Federalism, as noted earlier, was excluded to the rarity of the measure in this dataset. 
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(EP) consistently led, for example, to significant human-rights improvement. Conversely, 
the existence of ethnic wars (~NE), long wars (~SW), and especially large populations 
(~SP) consistently constrained the ability of states to improve their human-rights 
performance in the short term.  
Frequency considerations were also considered, based on QCA scholars who 
advised for its inclusion when conducting research with potential policy implications 
(Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison 2014, 102). In this vein, certain predominant pathways were 
discussed further given the significant number of cases covered by these sufficient causal 
combinations. Eight of the eleven cases (71%) where significant human-rights 
improvement had occurred were covered by the following simplified equation: 
(6) SHRI = ~IDF * ~IML (~AUT + R3P) 
This causal recipe suggests—to those engaged in or considering negotiated settlements—
that military power-sharing measures that involve integrating rebels into the defense 
force (IDF) and into the military leadership (IML) should not be included in the peace 
agreement if improvement of human-rights outcomes is desired in the short term after a 
civil war ends. Additionally, decision-makers should strongly consider excluding 
measures of autonomy for this same reason. Concomitantly, the inclusion of robust third-
party security guarantees—defined by the strength of mandate and corresponding 
footprint (i.e., boots on the ground) to reinforce that mandate—are consistently associated 
with significant human-rights improvement. 
The two conditions of third-party guarantees (R3P) and integration of rebels into 
the defense force (IDF) are symmetrically associated with human rights improving or 
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becoming worse. That is, when the most frequent causal path leading to the negation of 
an outcome was evaluated, these conditions assumed an inverse orientation: 
(11) ~SHRI = ~SP * IDF * ~IML (~AUT + ~R3P) 
This equation demonstrates that the negation of the outcome consistently occurred when 
the integrated defense force (IDF) provision was present.. The absence of robust third-
party security guarantees (~R3P) also consistently led to this outcome.267 
  
                                                 
267 Technically since ~R3P is inside the parenthesis, it is a substitutable condition with ~AUT. That is, the 
absence of third-party guarantees combined with the presence of IDF does not, on its own, produce the 
negation of the outcome. 
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Chapter Nine: Research Findings and Conclusions  
The end of the Cold War in 1989 corresponded with an increase in global civil 
wars terminating via negotiated settlements. The prevention of civil war recurrence was 
upheld as the principal benchmark for gauging the success of different peace agreements. 
Scholars have differed over which features matter most within these agreements, and 
which provisions might ensure settlements that will endure over time.  
Where the extant literature principally focused on the effects of aggregated 
power-sharing provisions on the duration of peace, this study shifted the outcome of 
interest to individual security by assessing the level of a state’s violations against its 
citizens’ personal-integrity rights (i.e., the state’s use of political repression). The desired 
outcome was defined as significant human-rights improvement, recognized by a 
significant reduction in the government’s use of political repression after the war as 
compared to the end of the war. In short, this project demonstrated that power-sharing 
provisions are not an all-encompassing panacea for the resolution of civil wars. Lijphart 
(1977, 44) was right when he stated “All of the consociational methods must be applied 
with caution and restraint.”  
This conclusion chapter is comprised of three main sections: (1) research 
overview, (2) research findings, and (3) final conclusions. The research overview covers 
key components of the research design, including the research puzzle, key research 
questions, the purpose of the research, the universe of cases and applicable datasets, and 
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the research methods. The section on research findings discusses central findings from 
the bivariate contingency tables as well as from the fuzzy-set analyses conducted for both 
the outcome and the negation of the outcome using the two proposed models. The 
conclusions section wraps up the project with commentary on the limitations of this 
research, recommendations for future research, and final thoughts.  
Overview of the Study  
This project evaluated the effects of peace-agreement provisions (i.e., robust 
third-party security guarantees and political, military, and territorial power-sharing 
agreements) on the use of political repression by the state after civil war termination. 
These actor-influenced provisions, also referred to as proximate conditions, were 
examined in the situational and historical contexts (i.e. remote conditions) relevant to 
each state’s civil war experience.  
This project employed fuzzy-set QCA to examine the relationship between 
different combinations of proximate and remote conditions that, together, resulted in the 
outcome of significant human-rights improvement. To confirm these findings, the 
research also tested the different combinations of proximate and remote conditions that 
led to the negation of the outcome. The manifold benefits of fsQCA—such as its 
accommodation of the smaller number of cases and the higher number of initial 
conditions, its asymmetric orientation, and its assumption of causal complexity—were 
expounded in Chapters 3 and 6.  
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Research Puzzle 
The challenge of framing any new government—especially for states exiting civil 
war—is finding the right balance between that government’s capacity to deter violence 
(an issue covered extensively by contemporary literature) and its ability to assure the 
population that this capacity will not be used wantonly against them. Rare is the literature 
that covers the latter. Yet the importance of assurance is fundamental to the birth of 
political liberty. As de Montesquieu (2011, Section 4.2) defined it, “The political liberty 
of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his 
safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite that the government be so constituted as 
one man need not be afraid of another.” 
Additionally, the understated assumption in much of the literature on power-
sharing provisions is that all disaggregated provisions in the same dimension act in 
parallel, in the same direction of influence; aggregation of provisions into similar 
dimensions is thus the commonly pursued protocol. A more robust understanding is 
needed of peace after civil war, for a misbalanced, myopic understanding can lead to 
recommendations for provisions that correlate with enduring peace but also consistently 
lead to worse human rights or, at best, leaves the level of political repression only 
nominally changed compared to when civil war was still ongoing.  
Based on these research gaps, detailed in Chapter 2, this study therefore evaluated 
the effects of peace-agreement provisions—both aggregated and disaggregated—on 
human-rights outcomes. These outcomes were evaluated using the level of a 
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government’s violations of its citizens’ physical-integrity rights (i.e. the amount of 
political repression).  
Research Question and Purpose 
The principal question of interest in this project was: Under what conditions do 
provisions within negotiated settlements significantly improve the degree of political 
repression conducted by the state? The project’s purpose was to explore human-rights 
outcomes, specifically the level of political repression pursued by the state after civil war 
ended and identify provisions within negotiated settlements that might lead to significant 
human rights improvement (SHRI).  
A central argument of this project was that the aggregated, dimension-based 
approach to evaluating power-sharing agreements—the most common method used in the 
academic literature—obscures and misses important relationships between conditions and 
outcomes. A disaggregated approach, involving individual peace-agreement provisions, 
elucidates these relationships in a clearer fashion. 
TThe phrasing of the research question,and evaluation of these two different 
approaches dovetailed well with the selected methodology of fuzzy-set QCA. QCA 
facilitates the identification of core combinations of conditions (i.e. causal recipes) that, 
together, produce variation in a given outcome of interest (Ragin 2014). In this project, 
input factors were organized into two categories: (1) proximate conditions, which 
included actor-influenced peace-agreement provisions interacting within (2) different 
remote conditions, which involved a variety of situational and historical contexts residing 
outside actor influence. The central argument was tested using two different models, 
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distinguished by their respective emphasis on either aggregated power-sharing 
dimensions (Model One, Chapter 7) or disaggrated peace-agreement provisions (Model 
Two, Chapter 8); both models used the same set of remote conditions.  
The research aimed at identifying the specific combinations of (aggregated OR 
disaggregated) proximate conditions AND remote conditions that consistently resulted in 
significant improvement of human rights over time; the negation of this outcome was 
also examined given QCA’s asymmetric nature. The following four aggregated 
arguments were evaluated: (1) More power sharing across multiple dimensions (i.e., 
extensively institutionalized settlements) is better for the desired outcome. (2) More of 
the military power-sharing dimension (i.e., thick military settlements) is better for the 
desired outcome. (3) More of the political power-sharing dimension (i.e., thick political 
settlements) is better for the desired outcome. (4) The presence of any type of territorial 
power-sharing agreement is better for the desired outcome. A total of eight individual 
peace-agreement provisions were initially considered, including robust third-party 
security guarantees and seven disaggregated political, military, and territorial power-
sharing agreement provisions.  
The inclusion of robust third-party security guarantees allowed testing of the 
opposing viewpoints within the academic literature that such guarantees are replaceable 
by more extensive or thicker power-sharing agreements or, instead, should be considered 
indispensable features of negotiated settlements. A new typology of robust third-party 
security guarantees was proposed as an extension to Walter’s (1997, 2002) original 
arguments, under the logic that their success depends upon the dual presence of an 
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extensive mandate that allows for the use of force and of a sizeable deployed footprint 
involving armed peacekeepers. 
By applying the technique of fuzzy-set QCA, the causal recipes (i.e., 
combinations of proximate and remote conditions) that consistently led to the outcome 
and to the negation of the outcome could be identified. Since both models used the same 
universe of cases, the same human-rights outcome data and the same power-sharing 
datasets, the findings from the aggregated and disaggregated models could be compared 
and insights could be gleaned regarding which peace-agreement provisions (or 
dimensions) mattered most to the outcome and the negation of the outcome. These 
findings will assist decision-makers involved in negotiated settlements, as they (1) 
identify the appropriate blends of peace-agreement provisions for resolving different civil 
wars, and (2) balance the need for a post-conflict government to both assure its 
population and to deter future violence.    
Universe of Cases and Applicable Datasets 
Data for individual peace-agreement provisions was procured from Mattes and 
Savun’s (2009) dataset, which included disaggregated political, military, and territorial 
power-sharing provisions.268  Human rights data was primarily measured using the 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset; initial quantitative findings (Chapter 5) were 
crosschecked against CIRI data given its use of the same source data but with an 
alternative coding scheme. The initial universe of cases included thirty-six civil wars in 
twenty-seven states from 1989-2007, which had terminated conflict with negotiated 
                                                 
268 The dataset was truncated to correspond with the end of the Cold War and extended to 2007 to 
maximize available human-rights data. Chapter 3 details this process. 
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settlements. All thirty-six cases were utilized in the first stage of the analysis, using 
contingency tables (Chapter 5).  
In the second major stage of the analysis (Chapters 6, 7, 8), five cases were 
removed from the original set, based on methodological decisions. The two cases of 
Papua New Guinea and Tajikistan were removed based on calibration decisions, namely 
with respect to defining the outcome target set as cases where significant human-rights 
improvement occurred over time. Operationally, full membership in this target set was 
defined as a positive change of two points or more on a state’s PTS score over time. 
Neither of those two cases could improve by two points or more, based on their starting 
point on the scale at the end of the civil war.269 The decision to include the critical remote 
condition of regime type resulted in the loss of the civil wars in Bosnia, Lebanon, and 
Afghanistan, since these cases were missing Polity scores at the respective time periods. 
This reduction of five cases left a total of thirty-one civil wars in twenty-two states for the 
fuzzy-set analysis.  
Research Method 
To address the “many variables–small number of cases” conundrum, a multi-
method approach was employed, which first involved quantitative analysis, then fuzzy-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Foundational components were established before 
these analyses began, including: theoretical underpinnings (Chapter 2); the universe of 
cases, applicable datasets, and research design (Chapter 3); and definitions of variables 
(i.e., conditions and outcomes in QCA) and related hypotheses (Chapter 4).  
                                                 
269 See Chapter 6 for more details. 
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The first stage of the multi-method approach began with quantitative analysis and 
contingency tables to identify statistically significant relationships (Chapter 5). These 
variables—along with potential asymmetric relationships—were retained for later 
examination using the methodological approach of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis.270 This first stage helped to reduce the total number of variables under 
consideration. 
The methodological technique of QCA (explained in Chapter 6) provided the 
ability to examine different causal configurations that consistently had led to significantly 
improved human-rights outcomes, or to the negation of this outcome. Both outcomes 
were explored because QCA does not assume causal asymmetry; the presence of the 
outcome and the absence of the outcome may require different explanations (Schlosser et 
al. 2009, 9). A guiding assumption in this project was that in the messy, complex 
environment of states exiting civil wars, no single causal model best fit the data. In this 
regard, QCA was well positioned, given its emphasis on multiple conjunctural causation, 
for QCA researchers are “urged not to specify a specific a single causal model that best 
fits the data, as one usually does with statistical techniques, but instead to determine the 
number and character of the different causal models that exist among comparable cases” 
(Schlosser et al. 2009, 8).  
                                                 
270 An exception to this was that the remote condition of economic development was still retained for 
fsQCA even though it did not demonstrate any significant bivariate relationship with political repression. 
This decision was made based on the strength of prior empirical data confirming this relationship, the 
strong theoretical arguments for co-optation and alternative governance mechanisms, and because fuzzy-set 
QCA calibration could account for alternative thresholds and asymmetric relationships in ways that 
dichotomization and contingency tables might have hidden (see Chapter 7 for further discussion). 
   354 
By organizing conditions into proximate and remote categories, Schneider and 
Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) Two-Step Approach could then be used to further winnow the 
number of conditions under evaluation and reduce potential errors due to limited diversity 
(i.e., the phenomenon that not all potential causal recipes are empirically represented by 
an actual case). The first step in this approach delivers a deliberately underspecified 
solution set of remote conditions that alternatively enabled or constrained the outcome. 
These conditions were then evaluated in conjunction with selected proximate conditions. 
Chapters 7 and 8 applied this Two-Step Approach, alongside additional fsQCA 
procedures laid out in Chapter 6, to evaluate how different combinations of remote and 
proximate conditions together produced the desired outcome of significant human-rights 
improvement (SHRI) or the negation of significant human-rights improvement (~SHRI). 
Model 1 (Ch 7):  Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions à SHRI 
  Proximate (Aggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions à ~SHRI  
Model 2 (Ch 8):  Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions à SHRI 
  Proximate (Disaggregated) Conditions + Remote Conditions à ~SHR 
Research Findings 
Research findings are organized into three parts: Findings from contingency 
tables (Chapter 5), and fuzzy-set analyses conducted for Model 1 (Chapter 7) and for 
Model 2 (Chapter 8).  
Findings from Contingency Tables 
Contingency tables were used in Chapter 5 to explore the bivariate relationships 
between the proximate or remote conditions and political repression. The nineteen initial 
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proposed conditions were organized into three sets: (1) conditions related to aggregated 
power-sharing dimensions; (2) conditions related to individual peace-agreement 
provisions, including disaggregated power-sharing measures and third-party security 
guarantees; and (3) remote conditions that captured the unique situational and historical 
contexts of different civil wars.  
Contrary to the expectations of power-sharing advocacy camps, power-sharing 
agreements—when assessed by aggregated dimensions—did not positively affect the 
level of political repression pursued by states after their civil wars. Instead, the 
contingency tables showed that when relationships did exist, they always indicated an 
inverse relationship:   
(1) Less extensively institutionalized settlements were quite likely to experience 
improved human rights over all time periods; the record for more extensively 
institutionalized settlements was muddled. This relationship was statistically significant 
(p < .05) for PTS data over the ten-year time period, and approached significance (p < 
.10) for CIRI data over the five-year time period.  
(2) In the short term (two-year period), less military thickness consistently led to 
improved human rights; more military thickness tended to lead toward worse human 
rights. This relationship was significant for p < .05.  
(3) The absence of territorial power-sharing agreements in the mid-term 
consistently had led to improved human rights; the presence of such agreements had led 
almost equally to better or worse human rights. This relationship approached significance 
for CIRI over the mid-term period (p < .10).  
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(4) Political thickness did not reveal any significant relationship over any of the 
evaluated time periods. However, the absence of any political power-sharing agreement 
in the short-term period was strongly significant (p < .01) and associated with improved 
human-rights outcomes. In sum, these findings generally appear to buttress the arguments 
of those who caution against the use of power-sharing agreements in negotiated 
settlements. 
A central argument of this study was that aggregation of power-sharing provisions 
could obscure the effects of different measures within the same dimension, since it 
assumes that different measures within the same dimension act in concert rather than in 
opposition. This possibility was verified by disaggregation of the different power-sharing 
dimensions. Disaggregation showed, for example, that the significance and intensity of 
the relationship between thick military settlements and short-term political repression was 
clearly attributable to military integration of rebels into the main ranks (significant at p < 
.01) rather than to both military power-sharing provisions. The inclusion of the 
integration of military leadership, a non-significant relationship, only served to dilute the 
results (see Chapter 5 for further details).271  
Aggregation also dangerously obscured the results regarding territorial power-
sharing agreements. Cross-tabulation evidence for the disaggregated provisions 
demonstrated that territorial federalism and territorial autonomy operated in opposition: 
The presence of federalism asymmetrically led to improved human rights (4 of 4 cases in 
                                                 
271 Neither military provision was statistically significant at later time periods. 
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the mid- and long-term periods). The presence of autonomy, in constrast, led consistently 
to worse human rights, while the absence of autonomy led to improved human rights.272  
The bivariate analysis of the disaggregated peace-agreement provisions did not 
reveal any significant relationships over any time period for the political power-sharing 
provisions of guaranteed rebel representation in the legislative branch, the executive 
branch, or the civil service. The final remaining provision of robust third-party security 
guarantees demonstrated a positive, medium relationship over the long-term period (p < 
.05),273 meaning the presence of these guarantees corresponded with improved human-
rights outcomes.  
Notably, outside of federalism and third-party security guarantees, none of the 
disaggregated peace-agreement provisions correlated positively with improved human-
rights outcomes. By contrast, the conditions of territorial autonomy and military 
integration into the main ranks correlated negatively with improved human-rights 
outcomes. The remaining four proximate, disaggregated conditions were identified for 
potential exclusion from the fuzzy-set analysis, including all three of the disaggregated 
political measures (repleg, repex, repcs) and the integration of rebels into the military 
leadership (mil_ldr). 
Returning to remote conditions, five of the seven remote conditions demonstrated 
statistically significant relationships over at least one of the three measured time periods; 
no relationship was found at any time for war costs or economic development. The 
                                                 
272 This latter relationship was significant over the mid-term period for CIRI data (p < .01) and over the 
long-term period for PTS data (p < .05). 
 
273 CIRI data corroborated this finding, with p < .10 over this same time period. 
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direction of relationship for the remaining conditions consistently corresponded with the 
proposed hypotheses. The presence of ethnic war strongly led to worse human rights in 
the short term, while the absence of ethnic war was moderately associated with improved 
human rights (CIRI, p < .01). In the short term, wars of short duration (less than two 
years) were strongly and asymmetrically associated with improved human rights (p < 
.05).  
Larger populations in the mid-term experienced unchanged or worse human 
rights, and smaller populations experienced improved human rights, at a 2:1 ratio (p < 
.05). This finding was in line with the proposed hypotheses (H19a/19b) but contrary to 
the empirical literature. Democratic states in the short and mid-term periods were 
strongly associated with improved human rights; non-democratic states—those with a 
Polity IV score less than 6—generally experienced worse human rights (CIRI, p < .05 for 
each period).  
Civil war recurrence, in the mid- and long-term periods, consistently prevented 
human-rights improvement; peace, on the other hand, more often allowed human rights to 
improve (p < .01, 5 years; p < .10 for PTS and CIRI, 10 years). This condition of 
enduring peace—defined as the absence of civil war recurrence at the respective time 
period—was the only proximate or remote factor that met the threshold for identification 
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for human rights to improve. Enduring peace 
consistently met this threshold across all three-time periods.  
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Findings from Model 1: Remote + Aggregated Conditions 
The findings from the contingency table analysis were used to refine which 
variables were carried forward into the fuzzy-set analysis. Relational comparisons 
between the remote or proximate conditions and the outcome of human rights were 
inherently limited by dichotomization, which resulted in a loss of data. Fuzzy-set QCA 
corrected for these limitations in two ways:  
First, it allowed for calibration of the outcome in alignment with theoretical 
arguments and empirical data. The target set for the outcome was defined as those cases 
where significant human-rights improvement occurred over time (SHRI); coding was 
conducted in accordance with this definition, and the range of experiences were more 
accurately captured.  
Second, individual conditions were assumed—in accordance with QCA 
methodology—never to act in isolation. Rather, these conditions had interacted in 
combination with one another and in a variety of different situational and historical 
contexts. Eight major findings from the fuzzy-set analysis of Model 1, using remote 
conditions and Set 1 proximate conditions (those related to aggregated dimensions), are 
discussed below. 
Eight Major Findings of Model 1 
(1) The presence of power-sharing agreements is not necessary for human rights 
to improve. Four cases were shown where power-sharing agreements were completely 
absent.274 Despite the total absence of such agreements, the four respective states all 
                                                 
274 In contrast, the only other consistent causal pathway that included this condition involved non-ethnic 
wars in combination with the absence of thick military settlements, extensively institutionalized 
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witnessed a reduction in the level of state-based political repression, All four of these 
wars were also ethnic wars; as explained in the contingency table results, the presence of 
ethnic conflict in the short term was strongly associated with worse human rights. 
Surprisingly, these four cases shared in common the absence of all power-sharing 
agreements and the presence of ethnic conflict, yet they experienced less political 
repression in the short term as compared to when the conflict ended. 
(2) Some remote conditions asymmetrically affect the level of political repression 
pursued by the state after civil war. Asymmetrical relationships are made apparent when 
comparing those conditions (and combinations of conditions) that led to the outcome of 
significant human rights improvement (SHRI) against those that led to the negation of the 
outcome (~SHRI, or the non-occurrence of significant human-rights improvement). A 
prime example found in this investigation was that the presence of enduring peace (EP) 
consistently had led to the outcome. Correspondingly, we might expect that the absence 
of enduring peace (~EP) would consistently lead to the negation of the outcome. 
However, this was not the case. Rather, a more consistent condition leading to the 
negation of the outcome was the absence of small populations (~SP, aka large 
populations). This condition, like enduring peace, was also asymmetrically related to 
political repression. That is, the presence of small populations was not shown as a 
consistent remote condition leading to the outcome. 
(3) Multiple pathways are available to attain significant human-rights 
improvement after civil war. Said in reverse, no single pathway exists. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                                 
settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreementsThese cases included Angola 1975-1989, Azerbaijan 
1989-1994, Croatia 1991-1992, and the Philippines 2000-2000. 
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certain features are prominent and foretell a predictive pattern. Specifically, all nine 
causal recipes that led to significant human-rights improvement involved the absence of 
thick military power-sharing agreements (~THM). This finding serves as a significant 
caution to policymakers and merits further investigation. Chapter 8 explored this issue 
further by disaggregating the military power-sharing dimension into its two components 
(i.e, integration into the main ranks of the military, and integration into leadership 
positions of that same military force) to observe any (a)symmetries and whether one 
factor mattered more than the other to human-rights outcomes. 
(4) The remote conditions of enduring peace (EP) and of short wars (SW) 
consistently affected political repression, as hypothesized. The presence of enduring 
peace was evident in two causal pathways, both of which evidenced high consistency 
(p6: 0.80; p7: 0.94) and multiple associated cases (3 cases and 5 cases, respectively). 
This finding corroborated the proposed hypothesis (H14b) that the absence of civil war 
recurrence is an INUS condition for significantly improved human rights. 
Regarding war duration: Outside of the anomalous case of Guatemala, where long 
war led to improved human rights, all other causal pathways involving the remote 
condition of short war resulted in significant human-rights improvement with high 
consistency (p3: 0.91 consistency, 5 cases; p4: 1.0 consistency, 1 case). In other words, 
when short civil wars were combined with proximate conditions, significant human-
rights improvement occurred. This aligned with the proposed hypothesis (H16b) that 
short wars are an INUS condition for improved human rights. Of note, this hypothesis 
contradicted much of the contemporary literature regarding war duration. 
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(5) The condition of non-ethnic wars (NE) did not respond in line with the 
proposed hypothesis. As mentioned above, one causal pathway existed where the 
presence of ethnic war (~NE, or the absence of non-ethnic war) combined with the 
absence of all power-sharing agreements to consistently result in significant human-rights 
improvement. Four cases strongly fit this causal pattern.275  
(6) The type of power-sharing dimension matters, just not in the ways that power-
sharing advocates stated. As noted above, the absence of thick military power-sharing 
agreements corresponded consistently with the desired outcome of significant human-
rights improvement. The other dimensions—captured by the conditions of thick political 
power-sharing agreements and the presence or absence of territorial power-sharing 
agreements—were less definitive here. Sometimes, thick political dimensions and/or the 
presence of territorial power sharing led to the desired outcome; at other times, thin 
political dimensions and/or absent territorial power sharing led to the desired outcome. 
Extensively institutionalized settlements seem more consistent, but even this is somewhat 
deceiving (see later discussion below).  
(7) While remote conditions may constrain political repression, their beneficial 
influences can be overcome. Discussed in Chapter 5, the contingency tables show that 
human rights are unlikely to improve when a country has a large population (~SP) or 
when its war is long in duration (~SW). Likewise, small populations (SP) and short wars 
(SW) are associated with improved human rights. When examined in the fuzzy-set 
                                                 
275 In contrast, the only other consistent causal pathway that included this condition involved non-ethnic 
wars in combination with the absence of thick military settlements, extensively institutionalized 
settlements, and territorial power-sharing agreements. This causal pathway was strongly represented by the 
two empirical examples of Guatemala and Moldova. 
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analysis for the negation of the outcome, though, the presence of a small population (SP) 
or a short war (SW) is no guarantee that human rights would improve. 
Both of these beneficial remote contexts were overcome by the same causal 
combination of three proximate aggregated conditions: Something in the combination of 
thick military settlements (THM), extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS), and the 
absence of thick political settlements (~THP) consistently resulted in human rights 
stagnating or becoming worse. Without disaggregating the power-sharing dimensions, it 
is difficult to recommend or further investigate what specific measures might be 
overwhelming the beneficial situational contexts. This leads to the final observation here: 
(8) Analysis of power-sharing agreements using aggregated dimensions is of 
limited utility. Besides the previous finding, other observations demonstrated the 
limitations of using aggregated dimensions to evaluate human-rights outcomes. For 
example, extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS) were common throughout the 
pathways that had led to both the outcome (SHRI) and the negation of the outcome 
(~SHRI). Extensively institutionalized settlements were also considered a necessary 
condition for the negation of the outcome. The consistent presence of this condition in 
seven of the nine causal pathways that led to the outcome,276 and all eight of the 
pathways that led to the outcome’s negation, demonstrated the inherent shortfalls in using 
an aggregated measure of peace-agreement provisions rather than disaggregated 
individual provisions.  
                                                 
276 If the two pathways where all power-sharing agreements were absent are momentarily ignored, then all 
remaining pathways included extensively institutionalized settlements (EIS). 
   364 
Another example of how aggregated measures muddy the follow-on analysis is 
evident in looking at the negation of the outcome. This study showed—in Paths 3, 4, and 
9 (see Table 65)—that human rights are unlikely to improve when extensively 
institutionalized settlements (EIS) are combined with territorial power-sharing and:  
EITHER (1) the presence of thick political settlements (THP) but the absence of thick 
military settlements (~THM), OR (2) the inverse situation, meaning the absence of thick 
political settlements (~THM) combined with the presence of thick military settlements 
(THP). Without disaggregating the political, military, or territorial power-sharing 
dimensions, researchers would not know if specific individual provisions are causing 
these alternations. Policymakers are largely left without definitive guidance regarding 
which individual measures affect political repression and in which direction.  
Findings from Model 2: Remote + Disaggregated Provisions 
The second model examined the effects of disaggregated peace-agreement 
provisions in combination with remote conditions on the outcome of significant human-
rights improvement (SHRI) and on the negation of this outcome (~SHRI). The 
disaggregated provisions under initial consideration included robust third-party security 
guarantees and seven individual power-sharing provisions. The contingency table 
analysis helped to narrow the field from eight proximate conditions to just four: (1) 
integration of rebels into the main ranks of the military defense force, (2) territorial 
autonomy, (3) territorial federalism, and (4) robust third-party security guarantees.277 The 
                                                 
277 The political provisions were also checked individually as a fifth proximate condition alongside the 
previous set of four proximate conditions. This fifth condition routinely resulted in solution sets where each 
individual causal pathway was covered by an individualized explanation; that is, the bulk of causal recipes 
were represented by a singular strong empirical case. See Chapter 8.  
   365 
rarity of federalism led to its substitution with the condition of integrating rebels into the 
leadership of the military defense force.278 Eight major findings from the fuzzy-set 
analysis of Model 2 are discussed below. 
Eight Major Findings of Model 2 
(1) As with Model 1, the absence of individual power-sharing provisions did not 
prevent human rights from still improving significantly. Model 1 demonstrated that four 
empirical cases lacked any power-sharing dimensions. Correspondingly, those cases lack 
any power-sharing provisions, so this finding still held for Model 2. 
(2) Significant human-rights improvement was likely when both military power-
sharing measures (i.e., integration of rebels into the main ranks of the military and into 
leadership positions) were absent. This extended the findings from Model 1 where all 
nine causal recipes that had led to significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) 
involved the absence of thick military power-sharing agreements. In Model 2, seven of 
the nine causal pathways led to the desired outcome of significant human-rights 
improvement when both military power-sharing conditions were absent. Coverage for 
theses pathways was quite large, with each of the pathways represented by at least two 
and as many as ten different cases.  
The two causal pathways not captured by this commonality were both represented 
by the sole outlier case of the civil war in El Salvador. These pathways included the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
278 Preliminary investigation revealed that the absence of federalism consistently led to both the outcome 
and to the negation of the outcome at nearly equal rates. This is largely intuitive, since federalism is a 
dichotomous measure and just 3 of the final 31 cases under fsQCA consideration included this provision. 
Its inclusion in leading to both the outcome and the negation of the outcome effectively negated its utility 
as a necessary condition in either set. Therefore the next most suitable condition was substituted. See 
Chapter 8 for further discussion. 
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presence of military integration into the defense force and the presence of rebel 
integration into military leadership of that defense force. Further analysis of this outlier 
case showed that one critical factor that potentially enabled significant human-rights 
improvement to occur was that the conflict was deeply exhausting for the rivals. The 
existence of a mutually hurting stalemate, combined with a third-party security 
guarantee—nominal as it was with respect to the strength of its presence—was extensive 
enough to improve human-rights outcomes despite both forms of military integration that, 
elsewhere, had proved consistently inhibitory to achieving positive human-rights 
outcomes.279 
(3) Short wars consistently led to significant human-rights improvement, when 
combined with other key proximate conditions. Improvement required the absence of both 
military power-sharing provisions. In addition, one of two remaining conditions had to be 
met: EITHER the condition of territorial autonomy (~AUT) was excluded from the 
negotiated settlement, OR the presence of robust third-party security guarantees (R3P) 
was included in that settlement. That is to say, the absence of autonomy and the presence 
of robust third-party security guarantees represent causally equivalent, substituble 
conditions here. Both of these causal pathways had very high consistency and high 
frequencies (see Table 67).   
(4) The most consistent causal pathway to achieving the desired outcome of 
significant human-rights improvement—based on the requirement that the path involve 
multiple representative empirical cases—included the remote condition of enduring 
                                                 
279 See Chapter 8 for further discussion on this specific case. 
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peace. Specifically, Path 5 (see Table 63) had the highest consistency (0.93). This causal 
combination also involved robust third-party security guarantees and the absence of both 
military power-sharing measures.  
(5) The only pathway where the territorial power-sharing measure of autonomy 
was present (AUT) also involved the presence of robust third-party security guarantees 
AND the presence of enduring peace. It is possible that the presence of semi-robust third-
party security guarantees attenuated the negative potential effects that autonomous 
power-sharing measures are expected to make on human-rights outcomes. 280 The causal 
mechanisms need further exploration. 
(6) Six of the nine sufficient causal pathways leading to significant human rights 
improvement (SHRI) involved the presence of robust third-party security guarantees. 
Coverage on these six pathways was high. Outside of federalism—which was not 
included in the fuzzy-set analysis—this proximate condition of robust security guarantees 
was the only peace-agreement provision where the presence of that provision consistently 
had led to the desired outcome.281  
For this reason, Appendix 12 explored this specific condition further to see if the 
apparently strong relationship between these guarantees and reduced political repression 
might be influenced by selection effects, wherein third parties choose easier conflicts in 
which to intervene. Naturally, such conflicts would be followed more often by improved 
human rights. Bivariate relationships between previously defined remote variables of war 
                                                 
280 Chapter 8 discusses the specific mandates and footprints involved in the two civil wars (Georgia-
Abhkhazia and Guatemala) represented by this causal path.  
 
281 The one causal path that consistently involved the absence of such guarantees was also made distinct by 
the absence of all power-sharing provisions and the presence of ethnic conflict (see first finding above).  
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costs, war duration, GDP per capita, and ethnic conflicts were explored. The investigation 
showed that robust third-party security guarantees were generally more common when 
the cost of the conflict was high, the conflict duration short, and the country economically 
poor. Of these three variables, absolute poverty was the only statistically significant 
factor, though (see Appendix 11 for an in-depth discussion).  
(7) The majority of sufficient paths and strong cases that led to the negation of the 
outcome (~SHRI) involved one of three anticipated contextual conditions: ethnic conflict 
(~NE), long wars (~SW), and large populations (~SP). Correspondingly, it was rare, but 
not impossible, that the anticipated positive influence of remote conditions was 
overcome. Only two paths, each represented by a single strong case, demonstrated this 
with high consistency. The civil war in Chad involved the positive influence of a non-
ethnic war (NE). The benefits of this remote condition were overwhelmed by the 
presence of both military power-sharing measures (IDF & IML) and the absence of any 
third-party security guarantees (~R3P); worse human rights resulted.  
The first civil war in Georgia involved a short war (SW), but two proximate 
conditions that were anticipated to lead to worse human-rights outcomes—namely, the 
presence of rebel integration into the defense force (IDF) and the presence of autonomy 
(AUT)—were also included. The semi-robust third-party security guarantee (an armed 
mandate coupled with an undersized footprint) was insufficient to affect human rights in 
a positive way. Human rights remained unchanged, despite the ending of the civil war.  
(8) The presence of the provision to integrate rebels into the defense force (IDF) 
was continuously associated with the negation of the outcome, regardless of changes in 
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other conditions. Fully 92 percent (11 of 12) of the sufficient pathways leading to the 
negation of the outcome (~SHRI) involved the presence of rebel integration in the 
defense force (IDF). No other remote or proximate condition reached this level of 
continuous association with the negated outcome.  
Conclusions 
This research project began with a sequence of questions exploring the 
relationship between peace-agreement provisions and political repression. These issues 
were encapsulated in the primary research question: Under what conditions do peace-
agreement provisions significantly reduce the degree of political repression conducted by 
the state?  
Considerations for Decision Makers 
The findings from this research strongly suggest that decision-makers and 
practitioners engaged in negotiated settlements should consider the following ten 
implications: 
(1) Endurance of peace is asymmetrically related to significant human rights 
improvement..The most consistent causal pathway (0.93 consistency) with multi-case 
coverage involved the remote condition of enduring peace.282 Moreover, the only 
pathway where the territorial power-sharing measure of autonomy was present (AUT) 
also involved the presence of both enduring peace AND robust third-party security 
guarantees. Surprisingly, the negation of the outcome is not consistently affected by the 
absence of enduring peace using the parameters described herein. 
                                                 
282 This causal combination also involved robust third-party security guarantees AND the absence of both 
military power-sharing measures. 
   370 
(2) War duration negatively and symmetrically affects political repression. Those 
states that experienced very short-duration civil wars (i.e., one year or less) and those 
with partial membership in this defined set (i.e., less than five years) consistently 
witnessed significant human-rights improvement. Conversely, when wars were long in 
duration, those states consistently experienced worse, or at best unchanged, human-rights 
outcomes.  
(3) The size of the population is asymmetrically related to the level of political 
repression. Small population size does not consistently affect significant human-rights 
improvement. But the negation of that outcome is consistent when states have large 
populations of greater than ten million people. 
(4) The presence of ethnic-based conflict, combined with the absence of all 
power-sharing agreements consistently resulted in significant human-rights improvement. 
This was the most unexpected result of the study. The four cases that strongly represented 
this causal combination merit further investigation.  
(5) Power sharing is not a panacea for significant human-rights improvement. 
Rather, the desired outcome was more consistently reached when settlements were less 
extensively institutionalized (i.e., less dimensions included), when the military power-
sharing dimension was thin or absent, and when the provision of territorial autonomy was 
absent.  
(6) Political power-sharing agreements—whether assessed in the aggregate or 
disaggregate, over the short, mid, or long-term, or using contingency tables or fuzzy-set 
analysis—did not reveal any consistent relationship with political repression. This does 
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not mean they have no effects on the outcome. Rather, the effects may vary too much 
from state to state (see discussion and hypotheses in Chapter 4 for potential reasons why 
this happens). 
(7) Significant human-rights improvement is more likely if territorial autonomy 
is absent. If this provision is strongly desired in a negotiated settlement, decision-makers 
should insist upon inclusion of a robust third-party security guarantee involving a 
mandate to use force and a sizeable footprint of greater than 5,000 armed personnel to 
enforce that mandate.283  
(8) The only power-sharing provision to consistently result in improvement 
human rights over time was territorial federalism. The rarity of this provision precluded 
its use in the fuzzy-set analysis. Further investigation is needed to determine when its use 
is merited and why it succeeded.  
(9)  Outside of federalism, the provision of robust third-party security guarantees 
was the only peace-agreement provision where the presence of the provision consistently 
led to the desired outcome. Six of nine sufficient causal pathways involved this measure. 
Third parties engaged more often when the cost of conflict was high, conflict duration 
was short, and the country was economically poor; only this last variable was statistically 
significant, though.  
(10)  If significant human-rights improvement (SHRI) is desired after civil war, 
then both military power-sharing measures—including integration of rebels into the main 
                                                 
283 This recommendation is based on the fact that the sole sufficient causal path that included autonomy and 
that resulted in SHRI also included the presence of a semi-robust third-party security guarantee and the 
presence of enduring peace.  
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ranks and into leadership positions—should be excluded from negotiated settlements. All 
nine causal recipes that consistently led to the desired outcome occurred when both 
provisions were absent. Furthermore, when the provision to integrate rebels into the main 
ranks was present, the negation of the outcome consistently occurred. This provision was 
present in 92 percent (11 of 12) of the sufficient pathways leading to the outcome’s 
negation.  
In sum, the results here suggest that decision-makers involved in negotiated 
settlements used to terminate civil war should approach power-sharing provisions with 
great caution and restraint. Outside of federalism, no power-sharing provision was 
consistently or significantly associated with human-rights improvement. Other measures, 
like the inclusion of rebels into the main ranks of a state’s military police force, 
consistently resulted in unchanged or worse human rights; the absence of that same 
measure consistently resulted in significant human-rights improvement.  
Causation, as Ragin (2008, 149) noted, “is complex and very often involves 
specific combinations of causal conditions (or causal ‘recipes’).” These combinations of 
factors jointly produce an outcome. In this regard, the most consistent pathway to the 
desired outcome of significant human-rights improvement—represented by seven 
empirical cases—involved the combination of enduring peace, robust third-party security 
guarantees, and the absence of all military power-sharing provisions from the negotiated 
settlement. 
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Explaining the Negative Influence of Military Integration 
With respect to human-rights outcomes, this project found that military 
integration in the main ranks and in leadership positions is not just ineffective—it is 
downright dangerous. This position stands in opposition to much of the conventional 
literature and to the proposed hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4. What went wrong?  
A review of Figure 4 from the introduction provides critical initial insights: 
looking at the proximate and remote conditions that mattered most to reducing the state’s 
use of political repression after civil war, it becomes quite apparent that the strongest 
causal mechanism was reducing the threat to the government (as compared to 
constraining its opportunity or improving alternative governance mechanisms). Viewed 
primarily from the state’s perspective, military integration into the main ranks (IDF) is 
potentially dangerous for several reasons. First, the integration of former belligerents into 
a joint defense force places the state’s monopoly on the use of force in serious question. 
Integration also occurs at a critical juncture, when the population is already skeptical of 
the force and when the state is seeking its reconstitution in order to deter future political 
violence. Complicating this unease is the reality that this power-sharing agreement re-
arms and remobilizes previous rebel combatants into a joint defense force rather than 
transforming prior combatants into civilians—as is the aim of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs.  
Second, internal security is preeminent in the government’s mind: Will these new 
integrated forces respond to orders issued to them by the government? Are they 
trustworthy? Will these forces rise up against the government in a coup or a rebellion? 
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Integration of rebels into the main ranks may intensify short-term tensions, with the 
government perceiving integration as a significant threat to the status quo. Any perceived 
benefits that such integration will decrease the government’s opportunity to repress 
appear to be significantly overwhelmed by the government’s perception of a threat to its 
monopoly on the use of force. Political repression thus increases when this provision is 
present. 
Integration of rebels into military leadership roles (IML) holds similar benefits 
and risks. While integration provides a new restriction on the government’s ability and 
opportunity to repress, the government’s motivation to repress likely increases. 
Guaranteeing rebels representation in leadership positions of a joint defense force is 
setting “the fox to guard the henhouse”; these new leaders have strong potential conflicts 
of interest. When rebels hold significant power with certain military leadership roles, they 
may wield this power for coercive purposes, such as a military coup.  
This reality is made clear when reviewing the thirty-six cases here. Every instance 
of the provision guaranteeing rebel representation in military leadership positions was 
always coupled with integration in the main ranks; that is, no cases existed of the military 
leadership provision on its own. Whether intended or not, this ensures that new rebel 
military leaders will have available followers—fellow rebels integrated in the main ranks. 
Any rebel guaranteed a military leadership position knows, as does the government, that 
the military ranks now include rebels, too. Governments will likely remain quite wary of 
this tenuous hold they retain on military power.  
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In retrospect, the integration of rebels into military leadership positions likely 
necessitates the presence of a third-party security guarantee in order to succeed (as 
evidenced in paths 1 and 2 of Table 63). John Nagl (2014) made this same argument 
about the integrated Iraqi Army. In his assessment, the loss of a third-party guarantor 
shortly preceded—if not allowed for—the untimely unraveling of security sector reform 
measures in Iraq and the corresponding rise of ISIL in the resulting security vacuum. Nuri 
al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister, had purged his most senior and capable Sunni 
Iraqi Army officers under fears of a coup, yet “An American presence would have kept 
Maliki more honest, resulting in improved leadership of Iraqi forces that would have 
fought harder against the ISIL assault” (Nagl 2014). From this perspective, robust third-
party security guarantees provide a sufficient check against the potential threat to the 
government that is inherent with integration of rebels into military leadership positions.  
Research Limitations 
This study is the first known to analyze and investigate the influence of 
disaggregated peace-agreement provisions on a state’s use of political repression. The 
project is additionally distinct by its mixed-method research design and use of fuzzy-set 
QCA.  
The scope of the research was limited by the available cases where civil wars had 
concluded via negotiated settlement and where data was available on political repression. 
Additional constraints in the project included the: (1) dichotomization of data, (2) 
calibration of data, (3) restriction of the fuzzy-set analysis to short-term changes over 
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time, (4) focus on peace-agreement provisions rather than on practice, and (5) QCA 
disadvantages. These limitations are reviewed in sequence.  
Dichotomization of Data 
The decision to dichotomize was based on the low number of available cases 
where negotiated settlements had occurred and the human-rights data was available (see 
Chapter 5 for further explanation). The dichotomization of conditions made it possible to 
construct contingency tables that evaluated bivariate relationships between proximate and 
remote conditions and the outcome of interest. This provided an initial foray into the 
relationships between various peace-agreement provisions or remote contexts and 
human-rights outcomes after war.  
Certain limitations apply to these findings, though, since all of the conditions—
with the exception of aggregated proximate conditions—were dichotomized. In addition, 
the outcome of human rights required dichomitization, which lumped cases where the 
level of political repression had remained unchanged where human rights became worse 
after conflict ended. The dichotomization process naturally dumps a great deal of 
information, including pertinent, critical details. These distinctions and details matter.  
In this vein, the findings from fuzzy-set QCA were granted more scholarly 
weight, for they allowed me to assign gradations in set membership and to 
simultaneously conduct qualitative and quantitative assessments. To accomplish this, the 
data had to be calibrated according to set definitions, which were based on theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings.  
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Calibration of Data 
This research project was very transparent in the calibration process in order that 
future researchers might corroborate the data and test alternative interpretations of where 
those calibration parameters ought to be set. Said differently, the research findings in this 
project are linked to the calibration decisions made herein. Substantial calibration 
changes will likely change the research findings.  
Restriction of the Fuzzy-set Analysis 
The implications of this project are also limited by time. The fuzzy-set analysis 
was necessarily restricted to just the short-term period. In this regard, Snyder and Jervis 
(1999, 28) cautioned that in post-civil war contexts, a consistent tradeoff often exists 
“between short-run stabilization and long-term transformation.” Will there be such a 
trade-off here? Will the short-term findings from this project also obtain over the mid- 
and long-term periods?  
Preliminary research indicates that the research findings will generally hold. 
Cross-tabulations of the proximate and remote conditions in this project indicated the 
following four relationships with human-rights outcomes: (1) Federalism became more 
positive in the mid- and long-term periods. (2) Robust third-party security guarantees 
were significant in the long-term. (3) Military integration into the main ranks became 
non-significant in the later periods. (4) Autonomy became significant and remained 
negative for both the mid- and long-term periods.  
Based on these relationships—albeit, limited by bivariate analysis—I anticipate 
that future fuzzy-set QCA performed on the mid- and long-term periods will not reveal 
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dramatic shifts outside of a slight lessening in the consistent, negative relationship 
between military integration in the main ranks and attaining significant human-rights 
improvement. Any lessening of this provision will be overshadowed by intensification of 
the roles that robust third-party security guarantees and autonomy are likely to play in 
causal combinations over the mid- and long-term periods.  
Focus on Peace-agreement Provisions 
This project was restricted by its emphasis on peace-agreement provisions, 
referring simply to the existence of a given measure in a negotiated settlement. Other 
scholars, like Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), asserted that the practice of such measures—
meaning whether those provisions were actually implemented—matters more than the 
“mere” provisions. They then coded provisions based on whether: no implementation had 
occurred (0), partial implementation had occurred (1) or full implementation had 
occurred (2). One problem with their dataset—and the primary reason their data was not 
used here—was that Jarstad and Nilsson evaluated every peace agreement that had 
occurred within a civil war rather than evaluate a single civil war as a whole. As a result, 
those civil wars that involved multiple agreements were weighted more heavily.284  
One other challenge in using this approach, which Ottman and Vullers (2014) 
demonstrated, is that a snapshot-in-time of rebel integration in certain political, 
economic, or military positions can miss the reversal of implementation. Full 
implementation might occur, with rebels placed into reserved government positions. At 
                                                 
284 See Chapter X for further discussion on Jarstad and Nilsson’s study. Also, as a counterpoint to Jarstad 
and Nilsson’s (2008) argument that the practice of these agreements is so critical, their own data in the 
article revealed that in 5 of the 12 cases where peace was kept, power sharing agreements were not 
implemented. 
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some later time period, the rebels might be fully or partially removed. Ottman and 
Vullers’ new “Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED)” reinforced the argument that the 
practice of implementation is a constantly moving target that can be rather difficult to 
measure, unless the dataset is continuously updated to track all changes over a set time 
range. 
Future studies should consider using this new dataset to see whether the findings 
change when the practices of peace agreements are evaluated instead of the provisions. 
One under-discussed possibility is that both provisions and practice are useful: Provisions 
might matter more in the short term, while practice may be a better gauge for outcomes in 
the long term. In either case, a more uniform dataset that tracks both provisions and 
practices is needed if the two arguments are to be accurately compared.  
QCA Limitations 
Chapter 6 detailed certain disadvantages and burdens inherent to QCA. As 
discussed there, equal weighting is given to every individual case, including outliers and 
deviant cases (Berg-Schlosser 2012). To balance out QCA’s known insensitivies to “the 
historical frequency of occurrences” this project accounted for “those causal 
combinations responsible for the largest number of the outcome of interest” (Chan 2003, 
63) by reviewing what I called predominant causal pathways. QCA is also limited in that 
it cannot account for the sequencing or timing of conditions. Case studies may aid in 
examining theorized causal pathways and potential sequencing concerns; the research 
conducted here did not afford full case-study exploration, but potential avenues for future 
studies were discussed. Finally, the methodological techniques within QCA force a 
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number of methodological decisions that place great onus on the researcher to be 
transparent in justifying and explaining the selections so that future researchers can verify 
and extend research avenues.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Research on the relationship between peace-agreement provisions and political 
repression is far from complete. The introductory chapter discussed and depicted (see 
Figure 5) how the findings of this project ought to feed back into future research that 
builds upon these insights in a recursive process. A ripe, primary area for immediate 
exploration would involve conducting fuzzy-set QCA, using the project’s existing data, 
to evaluate the effects of remote and proximate conditions over the mid- and long-term 
periods. Differences over time would supplement these findings, not negate them. That is, 
QCA is context and conjuncture-sensitive, meaning the effects of different provisions are 
anticipated to change over time. This holds true because QCA methodology “does not 
assume any permanent causal direction between a given condition and the outcome” 
(Engeli, Rihoux, and Allison, 2014, 86). After this analysis, Ottman and Vullers’ (2014) 
new dataset might then be used to evaluate differences in findings when peace-agreement 
practices are evaluated rather than provisions.  
A multitude of avenues exist for refining, confirming, and then expanding 
examination of the relationship between power-sharing agreements and political 
repression. The quickest inroad for confirmatory analysis would be to conduct fuzzy-set 
QCA using CIRI data over the short-term period. CIRI data also would accommodate 
exploration of a disaggregated outcome. This would allow researchers to observe how 
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different conditions shape the type of political repression (i.e., kidnapping, torture, 
imprisonment, extrajudicial killings) pursued by the government and whether 
governments alter their preferred methods. Governments might also switch to less visible 
techniques, such as repressing freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, or domestic 
movement. These indicators, along with four others, are captured in the CIRI 
empowerment index.  
The potential also exists that governments might switch who conducts the 
violence, by outsourcing this to pro-government militias acting on their behalf. Carey, 
Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) documented this possibility in their presentation of a new 
database covering pro-government militias.285   
Returning to the causal conditions, alternative disaggregation methods of power-
sharing agreements should be considered. In this vein, Cammett and Malesky (2012) 
made the case that political power-sharing agreements ought to be disaggregated and 
evaluated based on whether the new institutions provide effective governance rather than 
procedural democracy. They found that closed-list proportional representation served as 
the strongest check on executive power, enabling peace to endure longer than when 
rebels were guaranteed representation of certain seats in the executive branch, legislative 
branch, or civil service. This argument about constitutional design and electoral systems 
and the level of political repression after civil war merits further investigation.286  
                                                 
285 The Shi’ite militias engaged throughout Iraq represent a clear contemporary example of this concern 
(Parker 2015).  
 
286 On the issue of political institutions and electoral system design within (and following) peace 
agreements, see Bogaards (2013), Reilly (2013), Pospieszna and Schneider (2013). 
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Finally, future research should also consider confirmatory research techniques, 
alongside exploration of alternative but related variables and conditions. A promising 
arena for deepening the arguments made here—and for confirming whether the proffered 
hypotheses and causal pathways outlined in Chapter 4 hold true—would integrate the 
cross-case analyses with causal process tracing of individual specific cases. The merging 
of in-depth case studies alongside set-theoretic research is a nascent field, recently 
inhabited by a host of proposals on how best to merge these methodologies.287 Scholars 
commend the use of causal process tracing “to test the internal causal validity of the 
findings from a QCA study” by selecting “a typical case for those causal configurations 
which have high levels of coverage and consistency” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 
231).288 This commendation is useful for future case selection process; such case studies 
would help verify the causal mechanisms and hypotheses proposed and described in 
Chapter 4 and the findings established herein. 
Final Thoughts 
To what end should social science projects, like this one, aim? Lynch (2014) 
contended that “The purpose of social science, if it has any, must be to inform our 
decisions about the likely effects of our actions.” What then are the likely effects of 
selecting different power-sharing provisions on life in that state after the war? As the 
introduction and Chapter 2 detailed, most scholarship on power-sharing provisions has 
                                                 
287 See, for example, Beach and Rohlfing (2015), Blatter and Haverland (2012), Mikkelsen (2015a, 2015b), 
and Schneider and Rohlfing (2013),. 
 
288 These methodological proposals are still largely theoretical in nature. The advocates (Blatter and 
Haverland 2012, 231; Rohlfing and Schneider 2011) knowingly acknowledge they cannot point researchers 
towards any existing study that effectively combines QCA with causal process tracing as they prescribe.  
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evaluated them using an aggregated approach and primarily in relation to their effects on 
peace duration (a proxy for state security). Given the potential that such measures might 
simultaneously make the populace less secure and lead to increased political repression 
by the state, a driving force behinds this project was exploration of the “likely effects of 
our actions” when choosing and advocating various provisions within negotiated 
settlements. We ought to know not just how such decisions affect a state’s ability to deter 
future violence, but also how these measures secure the peace for individuals in a state by 
assuring them that the regime is not a grave threat to their personal-integrity rights.  
While no single pathway exists to improve human-rights outcomes significantly 
in post-civil war contexts, this research demonstrated that a number of common power-
sharing provisions—namely integration of military power-sharing in the main ranks and 
territorial autonomy—are consistently inhibitory to individual security after civil war 
ends. Other provisions, like robust third-party security guarantees and (albeit rare) 
territorial federalism, demonstrate consistent presence alongside a reduction in the level 
of political repression used by a state.  
How then shall this information be used? It is imperative that the decision-makers 
involved in developing any peace agreement properly balance (1) the ability of the state 
to deter internal violence and prevent civil war recurrence with (2) the government 
assuring its population that it no longer threatens them. Focusing only on the first element 
might secure the state but would potentially jeopardize the security of the people within 
the state—while preserving high levels of political repression and the latent potential for 
great dissension again in the future.  
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Appendix 1: Naming Conventions for Proximate & Remote Conditions 
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Appendix 2: Dichotomized Set 1 Conditions & Human-Rights Outcomes 
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Appendix 3: Dichotomized Set 2 Conditions & Human-Rights Outcomes 
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Appendix 4: Raw Data for Remote Conditions
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Appendix 5: Dichotomized Remote Conditions & Human-rights Outcomes 
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Appendix 6: Plausability Probe – Exploring Limitations of csQCA and mvQCA 
 
Both csQCA and mvQCA require a dichotomized outcome. Before switching 
automatically to fuzzy-set QCA—which accommodates multiple values for a given 
condition or outcome—a preliminary test was run to observe how much “analytically 
relevant information” (Skaaning 2011, 404) was lost when the human-rights outcome was 
dichotomized. The probe compared changes in the data when two thresholds were used 
instead of one.  
The outcome of human rights (i.e., change in political repression assessed over 
time) was initially dichotomized over the three assessed time periods as shown in Chapter 
3 (Table 7: Human-Rights Improvement over Time (in Number of Cases)). For the 
purposes of this preliminary probe, an alternative coding of PTS change over time was 
proposed using two thresholds. Changes of ± .5 were coded as representing nominal 
change in human-rights outcomes; values outside these neutral scores represented cases 
where human-rights outcomes definitively worsened or improved. Such scores require 
that both PTS-Amnesty and PTS-State scores indicate a change in the same direction in 
human-rights outcomes.289  
The change in the PTS score over the first time period (from t to t+2), adjusted 
for multiple thresholds, was coded as: 
pts2mt = 0, if pts2 is ≤ -1 (human rights worse; repression increased) 
pts2mt = 1, if pts2 is -0.5, 0, or +0.5 (neutral, nominal change)  
                                                 
289 When states only change by half a point (± 0.5) in the PTS score over time, this indicates that only one 
of the PTS-State or PTS-Amnesty evaluations changed by one point, while the other assessment remained 
the same. Such a small shift indicates nominal change in the human-rights score as compared to more 
significant positive (or negative) change in the human-rights outcome—which would be verified by both 
evaluations changing and a corresponding score change of at least ± 1.0 over time. 
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pts2mt = 2, if pts2 is ≥ +1 (human rights improved; repression decreased) 
 
This coding scheme was also applied to the two other time periods, and captured 
in the variables pts5mt and pts10mt. The application of these new thresholds to the thirty-
six cases, yielded the following results:  
Table 68: Human Rights Δ Over Time vs. Human-rights Outcome 
(two thresholds) 
 
  
This recoded data revealed a significantly different interpretation to human-rights 
outcomes following negotiated settlements: First, the great majority of cases in the short 
term did not experience significant human-rights improvement. Nor did human rights get 
significantly worse. Rather, 56 percent of cases (20 of 36) experienced nominal change in 
the human-rights score. Second, the number of neutral cases continually decreased over 
time. From the two-year to the five-year point, those cases with nominal change in the 
human-rights outcome reduced from twenty to fourteen cases. Of the six cases that 
changed score, three experienced improved human rights and three experienced worse 
human rights. Negative cases (worse human-rights outcomes) doubled as a result. In the 
long-term situation, two more neutral cases became positive in outcome (improved 
human rights). 
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Lastly, while human-rights outcomes appeared stagnant over time in the original 
dichotomized data (i.e., net gain of only one positive case), the recoded data showed 
continual change over time. For example, two years after civil war ended, human-rights 
outcomes had improved in just over one-third of the cases (13 total). By ten years, 
human-rights outcomes had improved in fully half of the cases (18 of the 36) and 
worsened in only six cases (17%). Stated in reverse, when using the recoded data, 
human-rights outcomes for twenty of the thirty-six states (56%) had changed only 
marginally in the short term. By ten years after a civil war had ended, only one-third of 
those states had remained nominally close to their original scoring, while one-sixth had 
worsened and fully one-half had improved.  
This plausibility probe of recoding the outcome demonstrates that a strong 
potential cause for continual contradictions in the csQCA and mvQCA analyses was the 
limitations inherent in dichotomizing the outcome of interest. The significant loss of 
precise, discriminating, empirically useful information constrained the utility of these two 
techniques; not all social science concepts easily translate into distinct dichotomies. As 
Ragin (2009) put it, “Many of the conditions that interest social scientists . . . vary by 
level or degree” and, therefore, cannot be effectively captured by the simple 
absence/presence dichotomies of csQCA or the multichotomies of mvQCA.  
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Appendix 7: Analysis of Necessary Conditions for SHRI (Consistency & Coverage) 
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Appendix 8: Analysis of Necessary Conditions for ~SHRI (Consistency & Coverage) 
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Appendix 9: Truth Table Solution, SHRI (Step 1, 0.65 Consistency Threshold)  
                Raw  Unique 
   Coverage     Coverage    Consistency   
               ----------   ----------   ----------    
 NE   0.389831     0.054802     0.575000 
 ~SW          0.410170    0.104520     0.602490 
 EP       0.807910     0.401130     0.595833 
 solution coverage: 0.991525   
 solution consistency: 0.598363 
  
  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term NE: 
 
CHA (1,0), DRC (1,0.4), SAL (1,0.8), GNB (1,1), GUA (1,0.6), MLD (1,0.9), MZM 
(1,0.6),   
NEP (1,0.6), NIC (1,0.4), PHI1 (1,0.4), SIE1 (1,0.4), SIE2 (1,0.8)  
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW: 
 
ANG1 (1,0.8), CAM (1,0.4), GUA (1,0.6), PHI1 (1,0.4), SUD1 (1,0.4), SAL (0.99,0.8),  
MZM (0.96,0.6), SAF (0.88,0.4), NIC (0.84,0.4), CHA (0.65,0)  
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP: 
SUD2 (1,0.4), SIE2 (1,0.8), SAF (1,0.4), RWA (1,0), PHI2 (1,0.8), PHI1 (1,0.4), NIC 
(1,0.4),   
NEP (1,0.6), MZM (1,0.6), MLD (1,0.9), LIB3 (1,0.9), LIB2 (1,0.9), GUA (1,0.6), GRG1 
(1,0.4), GRG2 (1,0.6), SAL (1,0.8), DRC (1,0.4), CRO2 (1,1), CRO1 (1,0.8), CHA (1,0)  
   
 
 
Note: The first value represents the strength in a causal configuration and the second 
represents the human rights outcome.  
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Appendix 10: Truth Table Solution, ~SHRI (Step 1, 0.65 Consistency Threshold) 
                 raw       unique                
                coverage     coverage    consistency   
               ----------   ----------   ----------    
 ~SP          0.660639     0.062331     0.688565  
 ~NE          0.616541     0.091827     0.431579  
 ~SW*~SD      0.405338     0.000000     0.864358  
 ~SW*~ME     0.450301     0.024361     0.826753  
 EP*~SD       0.503759     0.005271     0.697917  
 solution coverage: 0.949173  
 solution consistency: 0.493657  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SP: 
PHI2 (0.9951,0.2),  PHI1 (0.9921,0.6), DRC (0.9558,0.6), SAF (0.887,0.6), SUD2 
(0.8509,0.6), SUD1 (0.8261,0.6), NEP (0.7718,0.4), MZM (0.6009,0.4), ANG4 
(0.6003,0.4), ANG3 (0.5458,0.4), ANG2 (0.5257,1), GUA (0.513,0.4), ANG1 
(0.5122,0.2), CAM (0.5015,0.6)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NE: 
SUD2 (1,0.6),  SUD1 (1,0.6), SAF (1,0.6), RWA (1,1),  PHI2 (1,0.2), LBR3 (1,0.1), 
LBR2 (1,0.1), LBR1 (1,0.6), GRG2 (1,0.4), GRG1 (1,0.6),  CRO2 (1,0), CRO1 (1,0.2), 
CAM (1,0.6),  BUI (1,0.4), AZE (1,0.2), ANG4 (1,0.4), ANG3 (1,0.4), ANG2 (1,1), 
ANG1 (1,0.2)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW*~SD: 
SUD1 (0.8,0.6), ANG1 (0.6,0.2), CHA (0.6,1)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW*~ME: 
CAM (0.994,0.6), MZM (0.964,0.4), CHA (0.651,1)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EP*~SD: 
AZE (0.8,0.2), RWA (0.8,1), ANG3 (0.6,0.4), ANG4 (0.6,0.4), CHA (0.6,1), CRO1 
(0.6,0.2), CRO2 (0.6,0), SUD2 (0.6,0.6)  
Note: The first value represents the strength in a causal configuration and the second 
represents the human rights outcome.  
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Appendix 11: Truth Table Solution, ~SHRI (Step 1, 0.64 Consistency Threshold) 
             raw        unique                
           coverage     coverage    consistency   
          ----------   ----------   ---------    
 ~SP      0.660639     0.055105     0.688565  
 ~SW     0.553684     0.083977     0.609502  
 ~NE     0.616541     0.187353     0.431579  
 solution coverage: 0.955105  
 solution consistency: 0.472471  
 
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SP: 
PHI2 (0.9951,0.2),  PHI1 (0.9921,0.6), DRC (0.9558,0.6), SAF (0.887,0.6), SUD2 
(0.8509,0.6), SUD1 (0.8261,0.6), NEP (0.7718,0.4),  MZM (0.6009,0.4), ANG4 
(0.6003,0.4), ANG3 (0.5458,0.4),  ANG2 (0.5257,1), GUA (0.513,0.4), ANG1 
(0.5122,0.2),  CAM (0.5015,0.6)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~SW: 
CAM (1,0.6), GUA (1,0.4), PHI1 (1,0.6), SUD1 (1,0.6),  ANG1 (0.996,0.2), SAL 
(0.99,0.2), MZM (0.964,0.4),  SAF (0.881,0.6), NIC (0.841,0.6), CHA (0.651,1)  
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~NE: 
SUD2 (1,0.6), SUD1 (1,0.6), SAF (1,0.6), RWA (1,1),  PHI2 (1,0.2), LBR3 (1,0.1), 
LBR2 (1,0.1),  LBR1 (1,0.6), GRG2 (1,0.4), GRG1 (1,0.6),  CRO2 (1,0), CRO1 (1,0.2), 
CAM (1,0.6),  BUI (1,0.4), AZE (1,0.2), ANG4 (1,0.4),  ANG3 (1,0.4), ANG2 (1,1), 
ANG1 (1,0.2) 
 
 
 
Note: The first value represents the strength in a causal configuration and the second 
represents the human rights outcome.  
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Appendix 12: When do Third Parties Intervene Robustly? 
Introduction 
Investigation of Model 2 for the desired outcome of significant human rights 
improvement (SHRI) showed that six of the nine pathways involved the presence of 
third-party security guarantees; only one sufficient causal pathway leading to the desired 
outcome consistently involved its absence. Was this apparently strong relationship 
between robust third-party security guarantees and human-rights outcomes influenced by 
selection effects? Do third parties select easier conflicts in which to intervene, which is 
naturally followed more often by improved human rights? This section examines the 
question of when third parties are inclined to offer and implement security guarantees by 
evaluating the bivariate relationships between third-party guarantees and the previously 
defined situational (i.e., remote) variables of war costs, war duration, GDP per capita, 
and ethnic conflicts. This analysis differed from Fortna’s review in that it looks at when 
third parties intervened robustly, rather than simply at all third-party security guarantees 
writ large. This restriction was established in order to evaluate the strong relationship 
between robust third-party security guarantees and long-term human-rights outcomes. 
War Costs 
How does the intensity of a civil war influence its post-conflict intervention? The 
available data on war costs290 shows that half of the robust guarantees (6 of 12) had 
occurred in the more costly wars and half in the less costly wars. By considering what 
percentage these interventions have represented in each category, greater insight can be 
                                                 
290 Recall that war costs were measured by dividing the number of of battle-related deaths (in thousands) by 
the war duration and then logging this result. The threshold was set at 6.5. 
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gained on where the third parties were engaged. Data on war costs exists for thirty of the 
thirty-six states. Nineteen of these thirty states were considered low-cost conflicts. Third 
parties had intervened robustly in only 32 percent of the conflicts. In the remaining 
eleven high-cost civil wars, robust third-party intervention occurred in over half of the 
conflicts.   
In other words, when the cost of conflict is high, in terms of deaths adjusted for 
war duration, third parties intervene more often. This relationship does not reach 
statistical significance, but it does parallel and corroborate Fortna’s (2008) findings that 
intervention tends to occur more often in difficult wars. 
War Duration 
Do third parties intervene more often in shorter wars or in longer wars? In 
considering this, I examined the three previously discussed duration thresholds of two 
years, four years, and seven years. Third parties were present in half of the conflicts that 
lasted two years or less (6 of 12 civil wars), as well as half of all conflicts (10 of the 20 
civil wars) that lasted less than four years. This trend also held for wars that lasted seven 
years or less, with third parties involved in twelve of these twenty-four conflicts. Most 
telling, of the twelve wars that lasted seven years or longer, third parties engaged robustly 
in only three of these conflicts (just 25%, see table below): 
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Table 69: Contingency Table for Robust 3PSGs & Civil War Duration 
 
Additionally, when robustness is defined more narrowly as involving only peace-
enforcement missions,291 third parties intervened robustly in only one of these twelve 
long-duration conflicts. The sole outlier was the civil war in Afghanistan.  
To recap, for the civil wars that ended in negotiated settlement, third parties 
intervened in half of all the civil wars that lasted less than seven years, but in only one-
quarter of the wars that lasted beyond seven years. When intervention in long-duration 
conflicts did occur, third parties favored interpositional or multidimensional missions 
over peace enforcement. When choosing to commit full force via peace-enforcement 
missions, third parties opted for shorter conflicts of less than seven years. Of note, none 
of these relationships reached statistical significance, although they did show a general 
trend that guarantees are more likely with wars of shorter duration.  
GDP Per Capita 
What influence does a state’s economic condition have on 3PSGs? Are third 
parties more inclined to intervene robustly when the chances of success are higher, such 
                                                 
291 This is assessed using category four from the ‘Spectrum of Third-Party Security Guarantees.” 
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as when a state’s economy is already strong and the peoples’ economic condition is more 
secured?  
GDP per capita is a proxy for gauging the level of economic development in a 
given state. In looking at the relationship of robust 3PSGs with respect to the two 
previously discussed thresholds of absolute poverty ($456 per year per person) and 
moderate poverty ($730 per person per year), the clearer and stronger relationship is with 
absolute poverty. Data exists for all thirty-six states, with twenty states surpassing the 
threshold of absolute poverty and fifteen states residing below it.  
Robust 3PSGs occurred in just four of the twenty-one states (19%), with greater 
than $456 GDP/capita. In states exiting civil war, but with their populace largely 
undergoing absolute poverty, third parties intervened robustly nearly three times more 
often. Third-party security guarantees occurred in 73 percent of all available cases (11 of 
15 civil wars). This relationship, depicted in Table 73 below, is statistically significant 
with Pearson’s Chi-Square equal to 10.609. The corresponding value of .0016 sits just 
shy of p < .01 but well within significance at p < .05. The relationship, as described 
above, is strongly negative, which phi confirms at -.543. The relationship between robust 
third-party security guarantees and GDP/capita is one of the most significant and strong 
relationships seen so far in this study. Also, this data point buttresses Fortna’s conclusion 
that interventions occur more often in difficult rather than easy civil war contexts. 
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Table 70: Contingency Table for Robust 3PSGs & GDP/capita292 
 
Ethnic War 
Lastly, do third parties avoid ethnic conflicts, which are known to carry often 
deeper divisions and more challenging post-conflict resolution? The evidence indicates 
that there are equal opportunists here, intervening almost equally in ethnic conflicts (45% 
of the total, or 9 of 20 civil wars) as in non-ethnic wars (38% of the total, or 6 of 16 civil 
wars).  
In the same fashion, ethnic conflict had no effects on the decision to intervene 
robustly using peace-enforcement missions. When ethnic wars occurred, third parties 
intervened robustly with peace enforcement in only 30 percent of those missions (6 of 
14). In the non-ethnic wars, third parties similarly intervened in almost exactly the same 
percentage of missions (31%, or 5 of 16 missions).  
Ethnic conflicts did not affect the tendencies of parties to intervene. In this regard, 
Fortna’s findings that intervention occurs in difficult conflicts were largely corroborated. 
Robust third-party security guarantees—those involving the strongest mandate and 
strongest force structure to back that mandate—occurred more often when conditions for 
recovery were more difficult. Difficult, intense conflicts (i.e., those with high costs) and 
                                                 
292 This is set at absolute poverty. 
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prevailing absolute poverty within a state attract robust third-party security guarantees, 
though third parties are less likely to provide such guarantees following a long-lasting 
conflict (i.e., one those lasting longer than seven years).  
Summary of Findings 
The investigation showed that robust third-party security guarantees were 
generally more common when the cost of the conflict was high, the conflict duration was 
short, and the country was economically poor. Of these three variables, absolute poverty 
was the only statistically significant factor.  
 
